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Introduction
Kierkegaard's philosophical focus is the development 
of the individual, a development that leads to a 
particular form of existence that is concerned with 
itself and its relation to its ontological grounding 
within the framework of the Christian religion. Within 
this focus, one can discern a passing interest in other 
areas. One of these is art.
Discussing art within the framework of Soren Aabye 
Kierkegaard's philosophical writing poses a number of 
problems, but it is a rich source of material for an 
existential investigation of the nature of the art 
object. His writing provides a variety of positions which 
entangle any interpretation into a series of conflicting 
statements, but a careful reading of Kierkegaard's work 
produces an aesthetic unified enough to be established as 
a singular affirmation of the value of the art object to 
the single developing individual.
To this date, Kierkegaard has not been, truly 
considered as a source of writing on art. One only has to 
take the example of Taylor in Journey to Selfhood as an 
indication of this, who writes:
[Stephen] Crites provides an excellent account of Kierkegaard's aesthetic theory in relation to Hegel's position... I have benefited greatly from [his] two essays and have drawn on them in formulating my interpretation of Kierkegaard's aesthetics. Another study of considerable importance is Theodore Adorno's Kierkegaard: 
Konstruktion des Aesthetischen... Adorno's analysis effectively relates Kierkegaard's notion of aesthetics to his general understanding of aesthetic existence.i
While this statement contains references to different
issues, Taylor writes nothing else, nor continues comment
on Crites' research. Taylor is an excellent scholar, but
symptomatic of the Kierkegaard world as a whole.
Kierkegaard's understanding of the art object is ignored
except in the most superficial sense. My own research
shows that Kierkegaard's work is rich with potential.
^Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 98
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questions the interpretative silence of Kierkegaardian 
scholarship, and affirms a new definition of the art 
object, one informed by Kierkegaard though not determined 
by him (since he himself seemed unaware of the potential 
for the art object within his description of existence).
A basic summary of a Kierkegaardian position 
regarding the art object (which is necessarily 
constructed interpretively from his writings rather than 
explicitly stated by Kierkegaard himself) is as follows: 
the art object is a material form of communication ideal 
is nature and external to both the producing and the 
receiving individual. As ideal, the art object 
communicates the idea of existence between the producer 
and the receiver, an idea which in Kierkegaard is 
specifically Christian. Christianity, as an idea and an 
expression of the actual ontological grounding of 
existence, demands a specific developing relationship of 
the existing individual to actuality. Because this 
relationship is developing rather than explicit, the art 
object as a communication of the idea of the ideal is 
embodied in a variety of forms, all of which are embodied 
in their specific nature as a product of the development 
of the producing individual in order to develop the 
receiving individual towards knowledge of the actual. 
These forms are not necessarily Christian- in fact, 
because of the peculiar nature of Christianity, they 
cannot ever be wholly Christian- but directed at the 
various stages of the development of the individual's 
relationship to the actual (the Christian) . The content 
is also not necessarily Christian, but reflects the 
position which both the producer and the receiver occupy 
in their existences at various stages of development 
towards the actual (again, the Christian), This emphasis 
on both the producer and the receiver makes an 
interpretation of Kierkegaard's conception of the art 
object vital, placing a reliance on the existence- 
situation of the individual. The art object, within the 
process of creation and reception becomes a wholly
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personal issue for the artist and the receiving 
individual.
Two further points, both developed and differing 
from the Hegelian conception of the art object. First, 
the Hegelian concept determines the art object as a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, one dictated by the 
specifics of its historical condition out of the 
necessity of its existence. Therefore, the art object 
becomes not an object for reflection by the receiving 
individuals, but merely a manifestation of its 
historicity. The Kierkegaardian art object, while being a 
product of a specific period of history, remains wholly 
directed at the specific individual regardless of the 
differences between the historicity of the object and the
individual. The art object in Hegel is a product of its
time. The Kierkegaardian art object is both a product of 
its time as well as timeless.
Second, Hegel's art object, because it is a product 
of historical necessity, is limited in that the 
development of the art object in general has a teleology 
which is fulfilled. The development of the art object 
serves a specific purpose, regardless of the individual, 
which ends at a specific point in history. The
Kierkegaardian art object also ends, but not in a 
teleological sense, in that its inadequacy, in the' face 
of the idea of the actual ideal, becomes clear once the 
individual reaches knowledge of the actual, and,
therefore, the material and existing and external nature 
of the art object is shown to be in conflict with the 
idea as ideal expressed. This ending, however, of the 
vitality of the art object, is further proof of the 
object's vitality; while affirming its impossibility in 
the face of the actual, the existing art object 
clarifies, for the individual, the separation of 
existence and the actual, indicating the very inadequacy 
of existence as a whole in the face of knowledge of the 
actual.
I have organised my thesis in the following manner. 
In Part One, I have described the elements necessary to
define a Kierkegaardian art object. I have divided up 
Part One into four short chapters, each dealing with a 
specific topic. These are: 1. the difference between
contradiction and dialectics and between existence and 
actuality; 2. the objective and the subjective; 3. 
repetition and reduplication; and 4. communication as 
direct and indirect. These interrelated concepts are the 
necessary, but do not define the art object per se. They 
do, however, establish the basic ground for the 
discussion of the art object and their necessity cannot 
be stressed enough.
I have divided the lengthier Part Two into four 
chapters. In the first, I analyse the artist, 
particularly as to how the artist fits into Kierkegaard's 
distinction between the genius and the Apostle. In the 
second, I discuss and criticise the secondary scholarship 
concerning Kierkegaard's understanding of the art object. 
In the third chapter, I categorise and discuss 
Kierkegaard's own statements on art. This chapter is 
further divided into four sections: in the first,
Kierkegaard's negative, dismissive statements about the 
art objects; in the second, Kierkegaard's positive 
statements; in the third, I show how many of 
Kierkegaard's negative statements can be understood in a 
positive manner. Finally, in the fourth section, the 
second focus becomes clear, wherein the art object is 
shown to be actively determining its own inadequacy in 
the face of the communication of the actual, functioning 
in a negativity which can also be positively understood 
and which, within a contemporary theoretical context, 
provides one answer towards the recent debate about the 
end of art.
At the end of the thesis, I have included two 
appendices. This are related to information which is 
important within the grand scope of thé thesis, but not 
necessary. The first covers the individual self. The 
second discusses, in brief, the application of a 
Kierkegaardian description of the art object to actual 
examples. The second appendix also dicusses the
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application of this theoretical framework within an art 
historical sense as well as the absence of any discussion 
of specific artists. A distinction must always be 
maintained within the thesis between a descriptive and a 
proscriptive theoretical position. Caution must also be 
employed when discussing real individuals. This 
distinction and caution will be discussed in the second 
appendix.
Rather than beginning with the thesis itself, I 
would like to briefly introduce some of the difficulties 
involved. These are difficulties fundamental to 
understanding why Kierkegaard has not been understood as 
a writer on the art object, of lesser and greater 
importance.
The first problem, which seems to exacerbate all 
commentators on Kierkegaard, is his use of pseudonyms. 
The first half of the authorship^ contains pseudonyms and 
pseudonyms within pseudonyms, all presenting a question 
of interpreting Kierkegaard's own position based upon the 
commentators' understanding of the pseudonyms. How 
exactly are we to understand what the pseudonyms state, 
i.e. are we to take the pseudonyms at face-value at all? 
Generally, it is assumed that any interpretation will 
discount Kierkegaard's own statement that everything 
about the authorship up until CUP had been part of a 
plan. Most mix an interpretation of the pseudonyms with 
an awareness that at times Kierkegaard is speaking with 
his own voice. Thus, the reader reads the text as if it 
was written by a pseudonym- not by Kierkegaard- and 
accepts it as such, while at the same time continually 
paralleling such a reading with Kierkegaard's own voice 
in mind, modifying any interpretation. A second position, 
also widely taken, is to treat Kierkegaard at his word 
and read the pseudonyms as distinct authors. This 
produces the intriguing position of allowing a comparison
common division of the writings, which are divided by Princeton University Press into 2 5 volumes and which do not also include a large number of volumes of journals, only about half of which are translated into 6 volumes. The first half includes up to Concluding Unscientific Postscript and the second continues until the " Attack Upon Christendom" , each half containing pseudonymous texts, though the first has the greater number.
between Kierkegaard and the pseudonyms. A third position 
takes all of the writing without regard for the 
pseudonyms at all; they remain the fictive 
individualities which in truth they always were, while 
voicing their originators' voice.
My position tends towards the first, with the other 
two always in mind. The pseudonyms remain a problem 
because they resemble (as Louis Mackey wrote about, in 
Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet) art objects in themselves. 
All three positions regarding the pseudonyms (and there 
are many more shades between them) have deficiencies. 
Kierkegaard's authorship, as stated in PV, does appear to 
have a semblance to a structured development of thought; 
it is not a random output. The pseudonyms embody 
Kierkegaard's own words, while remaining simultaneously 
independent of his own individuality. The pseudonyms are 
also an integral part of Kierkegaard's theory of 
communication, further lending them to such an 
understanding. The continue, however, to pose a problem 
because they can be considered art objects at the same 
time as being examples of Kierkegaard's indirect and 
direct communication to the reader. A different kind of 
dialectic could emerge whereby my own position vis-a-vis 
the pseudonyms is involved not only in taking up a 
position in regards to the pseudonyms- i.e. making a 
decision as to how I will understand them in the context 
of Kierkegaard in a subjective and personal manner- but 
in continually assessing them as art objects in an 
objective manner as well. This complicates my reading, 
requiring an interaction with the texts as subjectively- 
direct indirect communications (as they are intended) as 
well as to view them from without, against Kierkegaard's 
own intentions. This dialectic becomes clearer when one 
considers the direct and signed texts containing 
statements about art which are just as viable to 
interpretation as the pseudonymous texts. One can 
understand these purely as sources for interpretative 
work, rather than as art objects in their own right. 
These issues are continually in mind throughout this
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research but, because they cannot be specifically 
addressed except at greater length and by removing the 
focus from the art object itself, they are not discussed 
herein.
The second problem which exists is Kierkegaard's 
lack of discussion about art. Very few statements exist 
in which he directly refers to the artist or the art 
object. Kierkegaard did not leave any substantial text on 
aesthetics, beauty, art, etc., almost as if it was of no 
concern to him. In the early writings (published and 
unpublished) , however, and also in the later half of the 
authorship, a concern is detectable. Kierkegaard's 
writing developed such that it became more polemical in 
nature, targeting the religious establishment and, 
therefore, the omission is understandable, but this 
polemicism contains a continuing concern with the manner 
of presentation of the polemic. This concern exists not 
as any statements on art, such as those by Hegel or 
Schelling, but as occasional references^. Thus, any 
interpretation of art, within the framework of 
Kierkegaard's writing, necessitates the inclusion of all 
of his writing; one must shift through statements to 
discover those which might, even indirectly, pertain to 
Kierkegaard's understanding of art. This requires that 
some subjects outside the grounds for a discussion of the 
nature of the art object appear in this research; the 
best example being marriage. To find art within 
Kierkegaard's writing is to dredge through a vast body of 
text in the hope of small discoveries, sometimes on wild 
paths.
The third problem is Kierkegaard's confusing 
ambivalence or hostility towards the role that art has in 
existence. At the esthetic beginning of the authorship, 
when Kierkegaard would supposedly be most concerned with 
art, such works as Either/Or (both volumes) establish a
^This can be characterised as a hidden references. I would posit that the same reasons Kant appears hidden in Kierkegaard (as suggested by Green in his excellent analysis of their relationship) can also serve to explain the hidden concern for the aesthetic. See Green, Ronald M ., Kierkegaard and 
Kant: The Hidden Debt, (Albany: State University of New York, 1992) for further discussion on this topic.
negative quality to the art object. Even further, 
Kierkegaard actually writes in PC: " ...this [the painting
of Christ, as an ideal in art] is incomprehensible to me; 
I repeat, it is incomprehensible to me..."  ^ Does this mean 
that Kierkegaard doesn't understand art? For Kierkegaard, 
the esthetic stage of existence^ is something that the 
individual is required to surpass in order to appropriate 
the actual truth of its existence. Necessarily, the 
products of such a stage of existence are something 
valued as part of that stage, even if they are to be 
overcome. They can be retained to some degree, 
appreciated for their craftsmanship or beauty, but they 
do not, for Kierkegaard, have any particular bearing on 
the relationship of the individual's existence to its 
actuality.
This is true, but only in a limited sense. 
Kierkegaard's continual reference to himself is 
vindication of the possibility of the art object within 
existence. Even though I shall not assess Kierkegaard as 
a poet, it cannot be overlooked. He writes of himself as 
being a poet in nature in a positive sense (though a 
doomed one, in that he will never be able to allow 
himself to act in that capacity) . The art object can 
maintain, therefore, through Kierkegaard's own personal 
example, a specific role in the development of the 
individual towards authenticity. Even in some of the most 
Christian-oriented texts- SUD, PC, and particularly WL- 
the art object is mentioned in such a manner as to 
suggest that its role is not merely negative but 
positive.
The fourth problem is Kierkegaard's continuous 
Christian focus. Kierkegaard's concern throughout his 
writing is to elaborate the requirements of the Christian 
faith. He writes: " It is Christianity that I have
^PC, p. 256
®To clarify- The esthetic (in which an individual is preoccupied with the satisfaction of individual needs and the gratification of personal desires), the ethical (in which the individual has developed towards the religious and understood to a limited degree his relationship with other individuals), and religiousness (divided into religiousness A and B, in which the individual first accepts the relationship which he has with a infinite being (his ontological grounding) and then with the Christian faith specifically).
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presented and still want to present; to this every hour 
of my day has been and is directed."  ^The Christian faith 
is primary, and art is, at best, a minor issue. This 
necessitates two strategies. Obviously, the first is to 
elevate the importance of art within the thesis at the 
cost of making Kierkegaard seem less interested in 
Christian issues. This involves establishing not only the 
primary concern as the art object, but also requires the 
sublimation of Christianity and Kierkegaard's discussion 
of aspects of Christianity such as faith, sin, and love 
to the embellishment of the art object. In effect, 
Christian terms must be used from within Kierkegaard's 
writing to produce a description of the art object within 
the same context, but in an unchristian sense. Secondly, 
the Christian faith must be accepted as part of this 
research unquestioningly. Writing about the art object 
without allowing the primacy of Christianity to remain 
intact is an impossibility. I have tried to alleviate 
this by referring to Christianity in an oblique way?, but 
this still complicates the issue. And, while this may 
seem a limitation, it lends itself to a further 
interpretation in the form of positive iconoclasm.
The fifth problem is closely related to the fourth. 
Kierkegaard's writings are focused on the development 
within a Christian framework of the individual human 
being. A discussion of the art object, in relationship to 
the development of the individual, requires maintaining 
the continuing nature of the existence of the individual 
in mind, while relating such an existence to the singular 
and static nature of the art object. The very concept of 
art as object suggests a complete separation from the 
continuing existence of the individual. The art object 
may be considered an example of a being in existence, but 
any form of communication which takes place between the 
art object as being and individual is one-way.
Vol. 6, p.27-28, <<620, IX A  171 n. d. 1848)
?I would prefer to refer to Christianity as part of the " authentic development of the individual in existence towards an authentic appropriation of the paradoxical actual ontological truth of existence" This is clarified later.
nullifying, after the fact, any dialectical relationship 
that may exist. Hence, I use the term 'art object" 
rather than 'art work', further differentiating it from 
an esthetic object; the static nature of the art object 
is maintained against an interpretation of the object as 
a continual work in progress. The art object remains for 
this consideration a material and completed object, 
limited by its very completeness, but able to communicate 
to the existing individual.
A sixth problem is Kierkegaard's conception of the 
esthetic stage of existence, as opposed to an aesthetic 
object and the concept of the art object. The difference 
between the esthetic stage of existence and the aesthetic 
object is not merely a philological one. The esthetic 
stage of existence is a description of the development of 
the individual at a particular point. It limits that form 
of the individual from others which have progressed 
further into the appropriation of the actual through the 
existential. Though the delineation between the various 
spheres may be a source of debate, it must be accounted 
for only in a limited sense. Describing the art object as 
an aesthetic object serves to differentiate it from being 
merely a product of the esthetic; the art object has 
value beyond the esthetic stage.
From these points of difficulty, I would like to go 
on to summarise the developments which I have made in 
this research towards interpreting the art object within 
the framework of Kierkegaard. These exist in four points. 
First, the art object can be autonomous and authentic, 
dialectical in nature and separated from it creator. 
Second, the art object is a communication of the 
development of the artist and for the development of the 
individual receiving such communication, but its 
dialectical nature entails a reciprocity which must be 
maintained, as found in PF, which means that the art 
object is also an expression which allows the artist who 
has created to further his own development as well as 
receive the reaction in reduplication from the viewer to 
further his development. Third, the art object is nearly
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a revelation; unlike a revelation, however, it is 
inadequate to the communication of truth (the artist is, 
therefore, between a genius and an Apostle). Fourth, the 
art object is inadequate, but this is also its 
dialectical value within existence and the communication 
of actuality. Art's value is its valuelessness.
While reading Kierkegaard's own writing as well as 
the secondary literature a discrepancy emerges. This 
discrepancy exists whenever art was discussed or referred 
to. No clear picture exists of the nature and role of 
art. If communication is important, then so is art. If 
art is to be positive, then what should be the nature of 
this positiveness?
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Part One : The Necessary Grounds for Art
Chapter One- Contradiction and Dialectics; Existence and Actuality
To understand Kierkegaard's understanding of the 
dialectic, one must understand first Hegel's. Hegel's 
conception of the dialectic, an integral aspect of his 
philosophy, dictating the direction and method of 
approach that he takes towards his material, is a 
resolution and development of contradicting concepts 
which, through their opposition, develop inevitably 
towards the ideal. Contradiction and dialectics are 
independent concepts, but necessarily related, since 
contradiction is the force which drives the dialectical.
Contradiction has two classical definitions which 
Hegel found problematic. First, contradiction is the 
occurrence of two proposition opposing each other by 
being each other's opposite, or by being the negation of 
the other. Hegel saw these definitions as impossible. 
Contradiction as conflict must be accommodated within 
logic, but must also be understood as far more widespread 
and integral than his predecessors believed. Previous 
philosophers ascribed to contradiction a static place, 
resolving the interaction between opposing concepts yet 
leading nowhere beyond that resolution. For Hegel, any 
finite thought or conception involves a contradiction, at 
its most basic level, as a negative element of its 
definition, with the capacity for proposition, a process 
analogous to thinking, havingthe capacity and the impulse 
to overcome the limitations. Hegel writes:
Logic shows that the subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which would be finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over into their opposites. Hence this transition, and the unity in which the extremes are merged and become factors, each with a merely reflected existence, reveals itself as their truth.®
^Hegel, Logic, p. 2 77
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This process is appropriate when the thought moves to a 
new, higher concept involving a contradiction and removal 
through interaction with the first. By successively 
revealing and overcoming contradictions, which drive the 
process of negative thought onward, thought arrives at 
the Absolute Idea, which is free of contradiction and 
appropriate for concepts that elude comprehension (such 
as God) , sublating their individual contradictions 
through mediation (the taking-into-account of the entire 
process fuelled by contradiction), occurring in three 
stages, and leading into the dialectical process.
The dialectic in Hegel is not the classical 
conception as embodied in the Socratic dialogues and 
other sources- as a dialogue between two thinkers, or 
between a thinker and his subject matter, such that a 
singular resolution is created from such interaction- but 
is conceived as the autonomous self-development of the 
subject matter of, for example, consciousness or a 
concept. The dialectical has three sides: 1. ' the
abstract, or that of understanding; 2. the dialectical, 
or negative reason; and 3. the speculative, or positive 
reason within dialectics. Speculative or positive 
reasoning- the third stage of the dialectical process, 
and the most important- is the expression of the adequate 
determination caused by the development of the abstract 
through the dialectical process. In the Science of Logic, 
Hegel writes :
Ideality can be called the quality of infinity; but it is essentially the process of becoming, and hence a transition- like that of becoming in determinate being- which is now to be indicated.®
In the first, one or more concepts are taken as sharply 
fixed from each other in understanding. In the second, 
contradiction emerge whereby the continued existence of 
such concepts becomes an impossibility through negative 
reasoning. In the third, a results is established through 
a new, higher category through speculation or positive
®Hegel, Science of Logic S, p. 150
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reasoning. The new category is the unity of opposites, 
one in which contradictions evolve together and intensify 
internally into a single individuality. Dialectics 
becomes, in Hegel's system, not merely a method but also 
an intrinsic structure and development of the subject- 
matter of thought within the existence of that subject- 
matter. It becomes the autonomous process in thought and 
in the existence of thought whereby self-creation and 
self-negation produce a sense of consciousness of the 
process.
Kierkegaard's understanding of contradiction and 
dialectics is partially derived from his reading of 
Hegel, but differs significantly enough that it becomes a 
primary thread for the interpretation of his aesthetics, 
requiring a further level of interpretation. 
Kierkegaard's view of life as dialectical is one which 
takes as its starting point the idea that two contrasting 
principles may interact within thought, existence and the 
actual. For Hegel, this requires sublation of both 
principles into a third, which is the idea. For 
Kierkegaard, this process emphasises the developed unity 
of the two into a third relationship while simultaneously 
maintaining their previous identities. Such a notion of 
contradiction, in which there is both dialectical 
resolution negatively as well as simultaneous
affirmation, is crucial to Kierkegaard's thought. Evans
points out:
The contradictions he focuses on are notlogical but existential. He is discussing theincongruity, tension, or contrast between onestate of affairs and another... In every case the contradiction is between clashing or incongruous realities.
These, however, are realities which are maintained. The
very notion of sublation or of positive or speculative
thought is, for Kierkegaard, an impossibility when it
comes to describing the individual within existence. This
necessitates a difference between existence (which can be
defined as the immediate awareness and knowledge of the
^°Evans, Kierkegaard's " Fragments" and " Postscript" , p. 188
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individual's being and its relationship to its 
surroundings) and the actual (which can be defined as the 
grounding of existence, that which is immanent within
and, because of its opposition to existence, transcendent 
beyond mere existence).
This can be strengthened further by noting the
apparent difference between the Kierkegaardian notions of 
the idea (which is the idea in pure thought, within 
existence but without any relation to the existence of 
the individual and its relationship to the actual) and
the ideal (which is the application of the appropriated
idea of the actual ideal within the continual existence 
of the individual's existence) . The actual is the ideal 
or the Christian which is always in opposition to the 
existence of the individual. Indeed, the existing 
individual as the actual are so separated that 
Kierkegaard writes in a further journal entry:
The man and the ideal are separated from each other in this way. To be so situated as to be able to live for an idea, to be able to employ all one's time for this, is indeed closer to relating oneself to the ideal- although, of course, when the ideal is Christ there is the infinite qualitative difference between him and one who comes closest to him...n
Existence, and existence with knowledge of actuality,
should favour the contradictions inherent in their
natures. Unity may be the highest principle for abstract
thought removed from existence, but existence and
actuality must recognise the inherent impossibilities
present.
Kierkegaard's understanding of the very nature of 
humanity is that its goals are accomplished only through 
their opposites. Taking what Malantschuk identifies as an 
'anthropological' form of the contemplation of man^ -^ , in 
which man as individual is investigated on various levels 
of mental and spiritual activity, Kierkegaard believes 
that the individual must simultaneously reflect such a 
various nature and, further, that the perfection or the
vol. 1, p. 99, <<236; A  135, n.d,, 1849 
^^Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 14
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development of such in existence is a process whereby 
these are recognised. He writes: " the imperfection
consists of not so much in the opposite as in one's not 
being able to see one thing and its opposite 
simultaneously." Therefore, perfection in one's
relationship to the truth of existence (i.e. knowledge 
and appropriated understanding of the ontological
grounding within actuality of existence) is such a
recognition of the imperfect, Kierkegaard further writes:
" Actuality" [Virkeligheden] cannot beconceptualized... To conceptualize is to dissolve actuality into possibility- but then it isimpossible to conceptualize it, because toconceptualize it is to transform it into possibility and therefore not to hold to it as actuality. As far as actuality is concerned, conceptualization is retrogression, a step backward, not a step forward. It is not as if " actuality" were void of concepts, not at all; no, the concept which is found by conceptually dissolving it into possibility is also inactuality, but there is still something more- that it is actuality.14
Actuality thus becomes not only a means of understanding
the grounding of existence but, through a recognition of
its opposition to existence, it becomes a pursued
existential stance. Actuality, or the ideal, is that
which is both beyond existence and a goal of the
individual in existence.
An understanding of the dialectical nature of the
individual as composed of opposites is, therefore, one
which takes into account the opposition inherent in the
nature of the individual. Unity must be stressed, since
the individual remains singular in existence in relation
to the actual. But, if unity is emphasised over
contradiction and the dialectical relation of the
individual within existence, then existence becomes a
contradiction itself. As long as an individual remains in
time (i.e. its relationship to the actual is governed by
the fact that it is within a temporal existence) then a
Ilj-P, Vol. 1, p. 328, <<700
vol. 1, p. 461, <<1059; A  439, n.d., 1850
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single, unified identity is abstract from an existing 
identity.
Kierkegaard privileges the elucidation of the 
existential situation through a form of thought which 
understands the inherent oppositions. In particular, 
Kierkegaard's interpretation of Christianity is a process 
which is a continual recognition of the impossibilities 
of oppositions. Truth, communicated in whatever form or 
discovered through thought, must always contain its 
opposite. Kierkegaard writes: " Every truth is
nevertheless truth only to a certain degree; when it goes 
beyond, the counterpoint appears, and it becomes 
untruth." The phrase 'either/or' becomes a talisman 
whereby truth is maintained always in relation to 
untruth, in a continual process of oppositionalism.
This does not mean, however, that the dialectical 
nature of individual existence does not have a 
resolution, whereby existence merges with actuality. An 
understanding of the paradox of opposition is, in part, 
the hope for the individual. Malantschuk writes:
By one's understanding... in individual existence, the transcendent can be achieved, contrary to Kant's clasm. For Kierkegaard, there is not in this respect " ein Ding an sich" ; a higher form of this may be found in Kierkegaard's category of the paradox, which is " an ontological qualification which expresses the relation between an existing cognitive spirit and the eternal truth."
An understanding of the paradox affords the individual
the ability to determine opposites as such within
existence and their relationship to actuality- opposites
such as temporal/eternal, quantity/quality,
necessity/freedom- and overcome the separation of
existence and actuality. The paradox is, however, always
present and never resolved within existence. When the
actual is fully appropriated into existence, then the
dialectic is fulfilled but, since the actual cannot
become completely unified within existence for the
^^JP, vol. 1, p. 350, <<753;
^^Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 123
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individual until the individual's leap of faith into the 
absurdity of Christianity or the individual's death, this 
remains an impossibility throughout existence. 
Christianity is a process whereby the hint of the actual 
ideal is presented to the individual in existence, but 
always with the stipulation that it is in opposition to 
that existence. This results in the determination in 
Kierkegaard's mind of the differences between the idea 
and the ideal, between existence and actuality.
This may, in part, seem similar to Hegel's notion of 
the dialectic; a resolution takes place at the end of the 
development of oppositions. What is different for 
Kierkegaard is the organic nature of this process, 
whereby identity of the oppositions are always present. 
Three crucial points make this clear. First, Hegel's 
method is concerned with bringing about a finalised unity 
of all elements since it reproduces the necessary cause 
of the Idea in the unfolding of its whole concept. 
Therefore, actuality is created by the method, and the
connection of the idea and actuality is made empty. 
Kierkegaard's method is an instrument, tested in 
actuality and never producing actuality, but, whereby the 
medium of thought becomes possibility. Second, in Hegel, 
the idea or concept produces actuality and its forms. 
Concept, method, and actuality are congruent. In 
Kierkegaard, only the existing actuality of the
individual brings itself into existence and, therefore, a 
strict difference is maintained between method, concept, 
and actuality, a difference only bridged by a leap of 
faith. Third, Hegel's' dialectic, his system, tries to
explain all actuality through his speculation within 
existence, exhausting all existence from such thought. 
All links are identical and, thereby, identity is the key 
factor. Kierkegaard's dialectic is employed to define the 
individual existence as apprehended in the form of
actuality. The contradictions which he discusses never 
cease to exist, since they are never caught in a system
^^See the elucidation of these in Malantschuk, pp. 170-173, for further discussion.
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which requires their dissolution, but appear both in
existence and actuality simultaneously. Kierkegaard 
writes in a journal entry:
If the distinctive mark of the true is the opposition it suffers, if I am to prove therightness of my view by the opposition it finds- how then shall I order things; then all the distinctive marks will have become completely dialectical. Quite so, for precisely thereby and therefore faith is what it is, if it is preceded by an absolute dialectic which has made everything dialectical. That thedistinctive mark is opposition is really the expression for the inwardness of theconviction; indeed, it is hoping against hope, believing against the understanding etc.^®
In Hegel's process, each stage of the dialectic destroys
the previous and the individual is discounted in favour
of the actual. In Kierkegaard's, the oppositions do not
even resolve themselves except in a full relation of the
individual with the actual on an individual basis which
is, in itself, a contradiction. The individual must
remain the focus for the individual.
What does this have to do with communication and
Kierkegaard's aesthetics? It follows that if all
existence of the individual is dialectical opposition to
actuality, i.e. composed of opposites which do not
resolve themselves except in the resolution of existence
with actuality, then all aspects of existence in relation
to the individual, as well as all aspects in existence in
relation to the ideal, must be dialectical in nature as
well. This has two implications.
First, since the existence of the individual is the
only form of existence which can enter in a resolved
relation with the actual, because of the nature of the
individual, then all other aspects of existence are
impossibilities in relation to the actual. Only the
existence of the individual, in recognition and
appropriation of its actual nature can become removed
from the Kierkegaardian dialectic. All of existence is,
therefore, in eternal contradiction to the actual. This
18JP, vol. 4, p. 490, <<4855; IX A  304, n.d., 1848
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does not mean that relations between individuals in
existence cannot become determinants of a relation with 
the actual for such individuals^^, but it does mean that 
any possibility of a resolution being determined in
existence, as well as being removed from the 
individualities involved, is an impossibility. It is
because of this that art objects- which are removed from 
the existence of the individualities taking part in the
communicative process embodied as such- remain an
impossible communication and development of such a 
resolution. Indeed, all of existence becomes an 
impossibility for the individual's resolution with 
actuality. It would therefore be logical to maintain that 
they have no value in terms of such a resolution.
Kierkegaard and secondary commentators, however, 
have missed a further vital implication, one which 
categorically determines the art object as having 
positive potential. If the dialectic is to be maintained 
in existence for the individual, then it must also be 
maintained regarding that which is in existence as well 
as the products of the individual. If existence is to be 
understood as an impossibility, in regards to the 
resolution of the individual with the actual, then 
Kierkegaard's dialectical method also maintains that the 
very impossibility is a possibility. The dialectical 
nature of existence, composed of contradictions, requires 
that all objects within existence (whether material or 
thought) have both possibility as well as impossibility 
in relation to the actual. The very possibility of a 
communication within existence of the actual, necessarily 
in contradiction, is evident in some of Kierkegaard's 
thought, though he does not seem aware of the 
implications. For example:
Christianity tends above all toward actuality, toward being made actuality, the only medium to which it truly is related. It is not to be possessed in any way other than by being made
^^Kierkegaard notes in a number of section of WL in particular that this is not the case
point Kierkegaard maintains throughout the authorship.
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actual; it is not communicated except to or in upbuilding and awakening. It must always be assumed that there are some who do not have it or who are still lagging far behind- therefore there must be labor on their behalf.
Christianly understood, there are certain requirements
for the authentic communication of the ideal and, because
there would appear to be such requirements, the potential
for communication is always there.22 Both aspects of an
object or elements of a specifc existence are necessarily
present, since it is only through the presence of one
that the other determines itself (i.e. an object cannot
exist finitely without having a relationship, even
negative, to the infinite) . This is not an Hegelian
speculation, nor it is a resolution of an Hegelian
understanding; it is merely a recognition of oppositions.
Furthermore, if this is developed, it must be that the
very nature of the object as dialectical, contained
within an object within existence appearing to the
individual as possible or positive in nature with regard
to the actual, necessitates that both aspects be present
within the object; an object, within existence, must
appear to a full understanding of the existing individual
simultaneously as both positive (i.e. establishing a
possibility to actually exist within existence and to
communicate such) as well as negative (i.e. establishing
the impossibility of actually existing within existence
and to communicate such). The impossibility must be
primary in relation to the individual's appropriated
knowledge of the ideal or actual of its existence, since
only the individual can enter into an actual relation
with the actual ideal, but the possibility can still
appear within existence as long as it ultimately
indicates its impossibility;23 the object, while appealing
to be a positive indication of the idea of the ideal.
vol. 1 , p. 203, <<508; XI A  558, n.d., 1849 
^^And, with such statements, Kierkegaard almost makes it an ethical duty tocommunicate the potential for knowledge of the ideal of the actual ideal.This is a point addresses in the second appendix.
^^Something which grounds the very nature of the stages, since they become both possibilities for the individual's existence in relation to the actual as well as impossibilities for the determination of that relation.
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must be continually tempered with an awareness of the 
impossibility of the determination of the actual truth of 
the ontological dependency of existence. Kierkegaard 
hints at this, writing:
The human dialectic cannot advance further than to the admission that I cannot think this [revelation] , but also to the admission that this does not imply anything more than that it cannot think this... that all this about genius and education and reflection makes no difference but that divine authority is the decisive fact...^^
The implications for art, though, are missing. The
depiction of the actual ideal always points to and ends
with the Christian. Kierkegaard writes:
The secular mentality... turns the relation around, that the higher actually becomes the lower, for when the lower relates to the higher in order to profit from the relation, then the lower is actually higher than the higher from which one wishes to profit, consequently higher than the higher. It is also the same when a person relates to a higher in such a way that he wants to profit also.The essentially Christian is the higher which continually reflects itself inversely. Any higher which reflects itself directly is not Christian. The reason that the essentially Christian must reflect itself inversely is that finitude and infinitude, time and eternity, from a Christian point of view, are qualitatively heterogeneous; the infinite is anything but a superlative or the most superlative superlative of the f i n i t e .
Why can art not function within this? Kierkegaard does
not address this question. It should be noted, though,
that Kierkegaard writes of the Christian as the inversely
higher, as if the actual ideal no longer remains the idea
but becomes merely the ideal once the Christian has been
appropriated into the existence of the individual- i.e.
no longer does a difference between existence and
actuality exist for the individual. And cannot art embody
communication in the same manner?
vol. 3, p. 365, <<3026; VIII^ B 15, n.d., 1847 
25j-p, vol. 4, pp. 420-421, «4696; A  11, n.d., 1852
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Chapter Two- Object and Subject
Based on the distinctions defined in the previous 
chapter, one then has to turn to Kierkegaard's
understanding of objectivity and subjectivity. The 
differences between objectivity and subjectivity are 
fundamental, describing the art object's objective nature 
dialectically embodied in representation as the 
particular form of that representation and the 
possibility of subjective importance.
Objectivity and subjectivity are based on 
Kierkegaard's understanding of truth and his continual
emphasis on the individual's responsibility towards 
learning the actual truth of its existence. An initial 
understanding of truth is that it is a conformity of
thought and being interacting in a process of becoming 
such that, as long as one exists, one is in a process of 
becoming; one seeks to enact that about which one has
thought, thereby striving to effect a unity of one's 
thought and being. This has two consequences: 1. that the 
empirical being is emphasised in the process of 
conforming being with thought (through perception), or 2. 
that the idea is emphasised in conforming thought with 
the idea of the being. Kierkegaard rejects both of these 
as being too static in their approach to that which is 
firmly rooted in existence. Kierkegaard's argument is 
that " the unity of thought and being is a task that is 
posed to the existing individual and is not an 
accomplished fact." Truth is a continuing function of 
the individual's existence rather than a static fact 
which confronts the individual and remains wholly 
separate.
For this reason, Kierkegaard argues that any 
objective approach to truth is fundamentally flawed. He 
argues that objective truth exists only as the product of 
a knowing of the particulars of a thing, which are static 
in nature, rather than knowing its actual existence, 
which is continually evolving in its own definition of
Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p.44
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itself. Truth, as something which the individual
contemplates objectively, is not something that is 
determinative, and, therefore, is not the real existence
of the object. The consequences of this are such that
when the subject attempts to understand the object in an 
objective manner, a detached relation is constructed 
between the subject and the object. The subject does not 
become involved with the object in a passionate
relationship, becoming solely an observer of the 
existence of the object, standing in existence beyond its 
existence and, therefore, never truly knowing that which 
it contemplates.
The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into something accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing something. The way to the objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject and subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and that is precisely itsobjective validity; because the interest, just like the decision, is rooted in subjectivity.z?
The individual, by attempting to remain objective in
contemplation of the object, never fully begins to
encounter the object. Rather, the object begins to
increasingly disappear the more the individual becomes
objective about it, as does the subject's own
subjectivity.
This understanding of truth leads to Kierkegaard's 
developed criticism of objectivity. For Kierkegaard, 
objective reflection requires a suppression of both the 
existing subjectivity of the individual subject and the 
existing object, seemingly denying existence in favour of 
a state of detachment, such that " to the extent that the 
subject does not become totally indifferent to himself, 
this is merely an indication that his objective striving 
is not objective enough... whereas subjectivity has gone 
out." 28 The essential nature of objectivity, of objective 
reflection on the object, is the gradual process whereby
27 CUP, p. 193
23ibid., p. 193-194
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the very subjectivity of the subject becomes 
inconsequential and disappears.
From this understanding of objective truth, 
Kierkegaard applies it to the religious as actual. 
Objectivity, for religious truth, has specific 
consequences in an historical and a speculative sense. An 
historical, objective approach to religion can be 
characterised by two approaches. First, the individual 
may be in a position of faith and belief in the religious 
which is conditioned by the historical truth of his 
knowledge (thus deemed to be in historical reference to 
religious truth). The individual understands that the 
truth of Christianity is an historical event which 
determines his own belief in the truth. Second, the 
individual may be in a position of disbelief which 
investigates objectively the truth of religious 
knowledge. Either way, the individual is beyond a 
personal interaction with religious truth; he is not 
involved personally when a personal involvement is 
required. " The solid, sensible subject thinks this way: 
'Just let there be clarity and certainty about the truth 
of Christianity and I will be surely be man enough to 
accept it; that will follow as a matter of course.'" 29 
The objective historical reference to religious truth 
might ground itself upon three things- Holy Scripture, 
the Church, and the evidence of the continuance of 
Christianity through the centuries- which are inherently 
vital to being a Christian; even these, however, prove 
inadequate for the individual to fully become authentic 
as a self.
The speculative objective seeks to conceive of 
Christianity in terms of pure thought, and, thus, relates 
it to the eternal with no presuppositions as to the 
nature of Christianity, except to accept that 
Christianity is a given, requiring the fact of the 
existence of Christianity to begin. This speculatively 
objective stance is a'misrelation whether the objectively
2^Ibid., p. 46
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speculative thinker is a believer (in that " speculative 
thought, in its objectivity, is indeed totally 
indifferent to his and my and your eternal happiness" o^) 
or not (in that " the speculative individual does not 
raise the issue... because as a speculative thinker he 
becomes precisely too objective to concern himself with 
his eternal happiness" ^i). Kierkegaard is strongly 
opposed to the speculative point of view for the same 
reason as the historical; neither adequately describe the 
existential relationship that the individual is required 
by Christianity to fully come to the truth of
Christianity. In the case of the speculating individual 
" the question of his personal eternal happiness can not 
come up at all, precisely because his task consists in 
going away from himself more and more and becoming 
objective and in that way disappearing from himself." 22
For Kierkegaard, neither the historical nor the 
speculative objective relate themselves to the actual 
truth of the religious for
objectively understood, there are more than enough results everywhere, but no decisive results anywhere. This is quite in order because decision is rooted in subjectivity, essentially in passion, and maximally in the infinitely interested, personal passion for one's eternal h a p p i n e s s . 3^
The individual who is bent on historical objectivity does
not take part fully in the synthesised elements of being
an individual; he emphasises the temporal over the
eternal. The speculative objective individual does the
opposite, emphasising the eternal over the temporal. The
objective interest of the individual removes it from its
own happiness and fulfilment as a synthesis of eternal
and temporal within the religious truth, and thus the
objective individual does not really know truth. By
reflecting on objective truth the subject is not
2°Ibid., p . 55 
3^Ibid., p. 55 
^2jbid., p. 56 
23ibid., p . 34
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" infinitely, personally, impassionedly interested in his 
relation to this truth." 4^
Thus, Kierkegaard denies the validity of objective 
truth as it is related to existence. This is furthered 
within Kierkegaard's own reaction against Hegel. 
Kierkegaard, in stressing the importance of subjectivity, 
sees the abstract manner of understanding existence to be 
vitally flawed. He asks: 'Is thinking the same as
creating, giving existence?' This does not hold true, he 
acknowledges, to imperfect existence, but is it true of 
perfect existences, however, such as ideas, in which 
thinking and being are one. This could be so, but he 
questions whether or not one can consider an existing 
human being, an individual, as a perfect thought or an 
idea. " Existing (in the sense of being this individual 
human being) is surely an imperfection compared with the 
eternal life of the idea, but a perfection in relation to 
not being at all." Existing as a human being may be 
assigned a place in the system but " if the individual 
were related directly to the development of the human 
spirit a as matter of course, the result would be that in 
every generation only defective specimens of human beings 
would be born." His point is that Hegel's system does 
not take into account each specific individuality, 
despite Hegel's protestations to the contrary. Scientific 
observation orders subjectivity into a particular place 
within the system, but does not describe its passionate 
and necessary relation to the existence of the individual 
subjectivity as it exists. Kierkegaard's point is that 
the individual itself is all that can relate itself to 
its eternal responsibility in relation to God, and that 
any system which does not emphasis the individual's only 
true knowledge of itself, namely, its subjectivity, warps 
the individual's actuality. This is the ethical task of 
the individual: to determine his own subjectivity as the 
grounds for his knowledge of his actuality, and to apply
24ibid., p , 21 
35ibid., p. 329 
26ibid., pp. 345-346
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this knowledge as it relates from himself and his 
possibilities to other individualities.
The most important instance where Kierkegaard writes 
on objectivity is found in PF and in the first half of 
CUP. In PF, Kierkegaard tries to reconcile the 
implications of Socratic understanding of the truth 
through recollection with the Christian understanding of 
acquiring truth through faith, basically asking " Can the 
truth be learned?" 27 The Socratic position is, for 
Kierkegaard, such that truth is brought about through the 
reminding of the ignorant person of its existence through 
an indirect communication. Truth is not external to the 
individual, but can be found if the person is fully 
reminded of its existence within himself. Every human 
being is the midpoint on which the whole world focuses, 
such that self-knowledge is God-knowledge. By
implication, objective truth is an aspect of knowledge 
which the individual contains within himself and which, 
dispensing perhaps even with the teacher, the individual 
relearns as he develops.
Kierkegaard rejects this position, stating that the 
learner is not only outside of truth but also in a 
polemical position, remaining wholly outside of the truth 
in a state of untruth. Both the teacher and the pupil, 
in Socrates' view, come to know themselves through each 
other and through their own deliberation. They do not 
understand themselves fully, whereas God does. By coming 
to knowledge through God, the individual comes to terms 
with his relationship with God, and, thereby, moves from 
a state of untruth to truth. This moment has decisive 
significance for the individual, who does not move 
towards God and the truth, but discovers that God and the 
truth moves towards him.
The individual moves against the unknown, and is 
thereby moving against and towards God. In trying to 
demonstrate the existence of God, however, the individual 
discovers that God does not exist only as a concept or
27pF, p .9
p. 28
notion, but is that which determines the very fact of 
existence itself. At the same time, a paradox is 
constructed, whereby an understanding of the unknown is 
posited, but this very act of positing also disallows the 
act of knowing the unknown.
If, namely, the god does not exist, then of course it is impossible to demonstrate it. But if he does exist, then it is foolishness to want to demonstrate it, since I, in the very moment the demonstration commences, would presuppose it is not as doubt ful...but as decided, because otherwise I would not begin, easily perceiving that the whole thing would be impossible if he did not exist. If, however, I interpret the expression 'to demonstrate the existence of the god' to mean that I want to demonstrate that the unknown, which exists, is the god... then I demonstrate nothing, least of all an existence, but I develop the definitionof a concept.38
A gap occurs that the definition of a concept cannot 
fulfil. One cannot fulfil one's desire to explain the 
unknown and, thereby, one cannot prove that which might 
exist. Yet, that which one does not have any knowledge of 
truly does exist. " The paradoxical passion of 
understanding is, then, the continually colliding with 
this known, which certainly does exist but is also 
unknown and to that extent does not exist. The 
understanding does not go beyond that." The unknown is 
always at the point of being disclosed, but is never 
fully disclosed. The existence of the unknown becomes a 
paradox for the individual seeking to know it, since the 
unknown only exists as the unknown and not the known.
The moment of this paradox is defined through the 
concept of offense. Kierkegaard describes offense in the 
following manner:
If the paradox and the understanding meet in the mutual understanding of their difference, then the encounter is a happy one... If the encounter is not in mutual understanding, then the relation is unhappy, and the
38ibid., p.39-40 
39lbid., p.44
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understanding's unhappy love... we could more specifically term o f f e n s e .
Offense is a misunderstanding of the moment of knowledge
of truth for the individual. Understanding seeks to
reconcile the offense which exists in paradox, but
discovers that the paradox is both defined by and defines
the very nature of offense itself, and so comes to odds
with understanding. Reconciliation occurs for the
individual in a Christian sense when the individual comes
to terms with the offense in understanding the event
whereby God takes on human form. For the contemporary to
this event, knowledge of it is easy to acquire, and the
degree of offense is not as large as one who must come to
terms with it through history. The 'second-hand' learner
can only come to terms with the offense of the human form
of God through faith. Faith is not knowledge per se
for all knowledge is either knowledge of theeternal, which excludes the temporal andhistorical as inconsequential, or it is purely historical knowledge, and no knowledge can have as its object this absurdity that the eternalis historical...4i
but it is the means. It is thus only faith which can give
some knowledge, and security in that knowledge as respite
from offense, of the Christian even of God as the eternal
becoming human and thereby temporal.
Implied negatively in this example of the religious
and of the Christian as the highest truth in objective
terms is the implication that subjectivity is truth
itself. One's interest in one's self constitutes one's
own existence, and, thus, to become subjective is the
greatest responsibility of the individual human being.
" Truth becomes subjectivity in that the disturbing
'truth' of the God-man is apprehended and appropriated
not as a rational dogma but in a passionate
inwardness." 42 Truth can only be appropriated and
constructed by the individual through a perception of it
existing in existence. Truth becomes a matter of
4°Ibid., p.49 
4llbid., p.62
4^Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, pp. 211-212
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subjective response, rather than objective perception. It 
is impossible for man to grasp spiritual concerns 
objectively. Indeed, it is impossible even for the 
objective to be communicated as the actual idea of the 
ideal as thought. To treat God as an objective 
uncertainty is the only manner of obtaining any knowledge 
of him, and to treat externality with objective 
uncertainty is the only way to construct its importance 
for the individual. Only in the passionate relationship 
formed through an understanding of the importance of God 
to one's subjectivity can one come to terms with the 
truth of God.43
This reflection on knowledge has certain 
implications. Objectivity, within the context of PF, 
cannot be understood as a viable means of reconciling the 
anxiety which the individual feels in coming to terms 
with a specific Christian event and, therefore, it can be 
concluded that objectivity does not correctly place the 
individual in an authentic position to judge any object 
in an objective manner; the individual is unable to 
discover both its essential and existential natures. 
Objectivity becomes, in PF, an impossibility in relating 
the individuality to the God-man event of Christ, as the 
embodiment of the most important Kierkegaardian paradox. 
The individual does not, however, inquire after 
subjective truth. In the case of the subjective view, the 
individual seeks to know not only how the object of his 
inquiry exists as such (i.e. as an independent subject in 
its own right) , but also seeks to understand the complex
43sorae truth is not subjective and some modes of subjectivity are not concerned with the truth. There is also some confusion in that the truth of Christianity is concerned with objective fact, but only through the subjective appropriation through passionate concern and inwardness on the part of the individual- " subjectivity which is faith is objectively
grounded."  ^ Subjective faith is not concerned immediately with revelation, but with the historical fact of Christ in the world. Kierkegaard finds objectivity to be a necessary aspect that precedes subjectivity as a growth from God- it is only the fact that the objective fact of Christ and God never requires assent on the part of the individual, but a leap of faith. Kierkegaard's use, therefore, of the term 'subjectivity' is wrought with difficulty because it requires objectivity to exist. There is no such thing as faith but only faith-in-God. Likewise, there is the possibility that there is no such thing as subjectivity but only subjectivity-appropriating- objactivity. This leads to the development of art as a possible means of resolving the conflict, discussed at the conclusion.
^Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, p. 225
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interrelation that the object of his inquiry not only has 
with his own existence, but also as a synthesis of 
eternal truths in its own right. The objective individual 
is a subject who is not " infinitely, personally, 
impassionedly interested in his relation to [the] 
truth" 44^ while the subjective individual is.
Subjective truth is that by which the individual 
comes to know himself. Kierkegaard writes that " Since 
the questioner specifically emphasises that he is an 
existing person, the way to be commended is naturally the 
one that especially emphasises what it means to exist." 45 
Subjective truth for Kierkegaard is " an objective 
uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the 
most passionate inwardness... the highest truth there is 
for an existing person." 46 Subjectivity concerns itself 
with decision in regards to that objective uncertainty. 
There is a conjunction between thought and being and, 
therefore, the existing individual is always in a state 
of uncertain becoming, leading Kierkegaard to believe 
that it is only the subject's existence that he should be 
concerned with or, more precisely, the individual's sense 
of inwardness.
Kierkegaard relates religious truth to subjectivity, 
as an example, in the following passage.
At its highest, inwardness in an existing subject is passion; truth as a paradox corresponds to passion, and that truth becomes a paradox is grounded precisely in its relation to an existing individual. In this way the one corresponds to the other. In forgetting that one is an existing subject, one loses passion, and in return, truth does not become a paradox; but the knowing subject shifts from being human to being a fantastical something, and truth becomes a fantastical object of it knowing. 4?
Thus, Kierkegaard equates religious truth with
subjectivity, noting that it is the paradox which the
knowing subject understands. Truth, as a paradox, remains
44CUP, p. 21
45lbid., p. 193 
46ibid., p. 203 
47lbid., p. 199
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a paradox for the subjective individual; it becomes a 
continual confrontation with its knowledge of its 
existence. Knowledge, which remains grounded in a non- 
paradoxical knowing of existence, is an impossibility for 
the subjective thinker because it then becomes a 
distortion of existence and its relation to the actual. 
Knowledge in relation to the paradox is described as 
such: " the paradoxical passion of understanding is,
then, the continually colliding with this unknown
[referring to the God] which certainly does exist but is 
also unknown and to that extent does not exist." The 
paradox exists between the unknown and known existence of 
the god, the learner's understanding, knowledge, and its 
own existence. By relating to subjective truth, the 
individual goes through the described process and becomes 
a more actualised and individuated self, understanding 
the ontological dependency of the individual grounded in 
the paradoxical nature of the revealed truth.49
By acting, by venturing, by choosing to exist, it is 
only by these that the individual is able to come to 
terms with his existence, subjectivity and eternal 
responsibility. To think of existence as abstract is to 
think of it without its necessary progression of becoming 
and its relation to its own future (by which Kierkegaard 
means the responsibility of the individual to the
eternal). To think of existence in abstraction is to 
essentially annul it, since abstract thinking is 
inherently unconcerned with the ethical life as it should
48pF, p. 44
49Two important consequences arise from Kierkegaard's identification of subjective truth with the religious- first, attention is diverted towards the subject, subjectivity and the subject's own potentialities, which is exactly opposite of objective reflection. Second, by focusing the knowing subject's conception of truth in such a manner, Kierkegaard emphasises the subject's relation to the goal or focus, his relation to his choice, rather than the goal or choice itself (the goal being to become a more actualised self in relation to God). This has lead critics of Kierkegaard to insist that he is thus denying the objective existence of God- this is not true, since Kierkegaard never denies this, attempting to reconcile the Socratic notion of truth with both the historical and revelational nature of the Christian truth- but it is only an emphasising of Kierkegaard's idea that religious faith has to do with personal choice for a paradoxical form of existence rather than an objective understanding of existence. Kierkegaard's understanding of subjective truth requires, in essence, an acceptance and application of the absurd.
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be lived (though it can be concerned with it as it is, in 
static relation to the individuality).
It would be another matter if pure thinking would explain its relation to the ethical and to the ethically existing individuality. But this is what it never does; indeed, it does not even make a show of wanting to do it, since in that case it would also have to become involved with another kind of dialectic, the Greek or existence-dialectic.
For Kierkegaard, it is only the motion of existence which
the individual can be concerned with, not a static
temporality. The existing person's concern must lie with
the possibility of his existence as he knows it through
his sense of the subjective, whereas objectivity is
merely an eternal abstraction.
The actual and subjective individual is one whose
concern lies in having an absolute telos of existence for
himself, such that his interestedness in existing is his
actuality. Only by engaging with the fact that the
individual is part of his own actuality, i.e. only being
recognising its own individuality through a sense of the
subjective, can the individual fully come to terms with
it. Actuality, for the individual, is not merely
abstraction, nor is it merely possibilities; it is a
becoming of possibilities within existence of which the
individual, through his responsibility towards his
eternal future. " The actual subjectivity is not the
knowing subjectivity, because with knowledge he is in the
medium of possibility, but is the ethical existing
subjectivity." An abstract thinker exists, but his
existence is, to him, only a satire; proving existence
from pure thinking is a contradiction, since the thinker
has only knowledge and thought about the other
individualities and nothing by which returns from the
other to knowledge of himself. The individual who is
subjective sees not only his own existence as a
necessarily vital aspect of his thinking, but relates
SOCC/P, p, 3 09 
Sllbid., p. 316
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this emphasis in an ethical manner to other 
individualities. ^2
The subjective thinker's task is to understand 
himself in existence. He does not abstract from existence 
but is in it while thinking about it (the inherent 
dialectical and contradictory nature of actual 
existence). The subjective thinker may progress only in 
that " abstract thinking turns from concrete human being 
to humankind in general; the subjective thinker 
understands the abstract concept to be the concrete human 
being, to be this individual existing human being." ss 
Every individual possesses that which belongs essentially
to being an individual being and, therefore, the
subjective thinker must transform himself into an
instrument clearly and definitely expressing the
essentially existential humanness of individuality. Thus, 
the subjective-orientation of the individual determines
for the individual the form of his communication, a style 
that takes into account both the fact that his own 
existence is a concrete human existence and the objective 
uncertainty of existence. To the same degree that his 
existence as a subjective thinker must be concrete, so 
also must his form be concrete dialectically, while 
reflecting the synthetic nature. His form must not be 
abstractly specific, i.e. it must not deal with that
which is removed from actuality by the abstract thinker 
and therefore made lifeless, but must be related to his 
existence qua existence. Existence and actuality qua 
existence-actuality cannot be directly communicated as 
objective fact. Actuality may only be understood by a 
third party through the communication of possibility. " A 
production in the form of possibility places existing in 
it a close to the recipient as it is possible between one 
human being and another." 4^
The conclusion of this is that direct communication 
of static facts, of objectivity, is possible between
82a point which is more fully developed in WL, pp. 99-196. 
83cC7P, p. 3 52 
84lbid., p. 358
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individualities precisely because it is static and 
contains within itself no possibilities toward a 
development of actuality for the individuals involved. 
Direct communication between individuals of the motion of 
existence, of the subjectivity of the individuals 
involved, is impossible because of the very nature of 
subjectivity as an isolation of the individuals from each 
other. Subjectivity must be the goal, and this determines 
art within a Kierkegaardian description of existence.
The prospect for Kierkegaard's understanding of the 
objective and the subjective as a grounding for art is 
indicated, to an extent, by Broudy in his article 
" Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication" Kierkegaard, 
for Broudy, argues that subjectivity is the truth of 
man's existence, and that such a truth cannot be 
communicated directly. The being of human existence must 
be communicated indirectly, if it can be communicated at 
all. Anything that sticks to the ideals of objectivity is 
unable to communicate the authentic truth about human 
existence, and can only, thereby, communicate untruths 
about such a subject. Should a philosopher wish to 
communicate the authentic truth of human existence, then 
he must abandon the ideals of objectivity and " resort to 
modes of communication whose cognitive status in 
philosophy is suspect." ss
Broudy cites five points which he sees Kierkegaard 
indicating as the problems of communicating subjective 
truth directly: 1. the effort to communicate subjective
truth is nonsensical; 2. direct communication of 
existential reference points which are constantly in 
motion determines them as static, which is a 
falsification of their value; 3. the values of direct 
communication and objective thought are considered to be 
unambiguous, but existential and subjective truths are, 
by their very nature, ambiguous; 4. subjective truths 
cannot be directly communicated because this directness 
transforms the truth for the recipient so that it become
^^Broudy, " Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication" , pp. 225-233 
SGibid., p. 225
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untruth; and 5. existential truths are related to the 
appropriational mode or the prepositional epistemic 
relation rather than the assertion.
It is the final point which is vital. Broudy asserts 
that the subjective is a matter primarily indicated in 
the form of the communication rather than in its content. 
Kierkegaard asserts that it is not necessarily the truth 
content itself which is of value, but the manner in which 
the truth is communicated; the truth of existence, once 
it is communicated, still remains the truth, but that the 
method whereby the truth is passed from one individual to 
another is more important. This emphasis on the form of 
the communication reflects Kierkegaard's own interests 
and concerns. Throughout his writing there is a conflict 
between directness and indirectness, reflected most 
clearly in the differences between the signed and the 
unsigned texts. It is when Kierkegaard sets up indirect 
communication as the only vital and able means of
communication allocated to the individual to communicate 
truth to each other that art takes its place within his 
system. Communication can reflect an historical,
objective truth, but subjectivity is the primary concern 
of the individual and, therefore, must be one of the 
determinants for the form of the communication if it is 
to reflect the individual's concern with both its own and 
another individual's existence and relation to the 
actual. The communication's form should reflect not a 
distancing of the recipient from the truth, through an
imposition of a style of form that excludes the
recipient,87 but should be an enclosing element within the 
individual's existence producing appropriation, through 
passionate concern, in the development of a relationship 
to the actual. Communication's form should be a reminding 
in the style of the form of the subjective truth of the 
individual, a form indicating the separation of the 
individual from the truth and the granting of grace as 
the only viable means of a full appropriation of
57As well as the creator.
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actuality. Since grace cannot be determined by the 
individual but, with Kierkegaard's framework of 
Christianity or merely from the existing and continuing 
separation of the individual from the actual, the form 
must also be an indication of is inadequacy.
Kierkegaard, Broudy asserts, determines that 
subjective truths are such that they cannot remain 
anything but what they are and, yet, they lose their 
meaning when the individual attempts to express in 
concrete terms what they mean for him. Broudy indicates 
three means of indirect communication: irony, behaviour
syndrome (i.e. the pseudonyms and Kierkegaard's own 
method of signed writings), and art. It is the inherent 
nature of art to reflect the nature of the individual, as 
described by Kierkegaard. Moving beyond both Kierkegaard 
and Broudy, art's dialectical nature embodies both 
objective fact as representation and subjective fact as 
the product of an individual artist. The very fact of its 
nature as embodied communication is an objective 
representation of fact, while the fact that the art 
object is a product of an individual embodies that 
individual's subjective nature, requiring a subjective 
response by the viewer. What is important to continue to 
remember, against Broudy and Kierkegaard,is that the 
objectivity is always present, but must also be rejected; 
the dialectical relation of the embodied objective and 
subjective must be simultaneously present.
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Chapter Three- Repetition, Redoubling, and Reduplication
Repetition, and the various concepts which bear a 
resemblance to it such as redoubling and reduplication, 
are an important part of Kierkegaard's development of the 
individual. They serve a specific role; it is only 
through their application to the existence of the 
individual, within the process of communication, that the 
subjective individual enters into an awareness of its 
actual existence. Repetition, in particular, is important 
as an imaginary psychological construction, utilising 
Kierkegaard's understanding of imagination and 
communication to indicate the possibilities of further 
development, while delineating the limitations imposed by 
a lack of faith. Repetition is the process of carrying 
out actions with thought of the eternal, the " conditio 
sine qua non of every issue in dogmatics'' ss according to 
Constantin Constantins. This chapter defines the concept, 
and its further development in other forms: redoubling
and reduplication.
The easiest, initial means of defining repetition is 
to distinguish it from recollection. Repetition and 
recollection are of the same type, movements in the 
development or existence of the single individual, but 
are movements in opposite directions. " What is 
recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas 
genuine repetition is recollected forward." 89 By 
recollection, Kierkegaard means the ancient understanding 
of comprehension as it progresses and develops the truth 
in relation to the individual; the single individual 
recollects during its lifetime to learn, acquiring 
knowledge and applying it in recollected form. It is, 
however, of little significance. For example, the young 
poet/man of R is in love, but his love is, initially, 
merely a recollection rather than a repetition of that 
love. " He was deeply and fervently in love, that was
58R, p. 149 
89ibid., p . 131
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clear, and yet a few days later he was able to recollect 
his love. He was essentially through with the entire 
relationship." so The love of the individual, within 
recollection, is both a misunderstanding and an 
inauthentic communication between two individuals; the 
fact of the relationship and its communication (both
between the loved individual and the loving individual to 
itself) ends as soon as it begins. Recollection is a loss
rather than a gain. " Recollection has the great
advantage that it begins with the loss; the reason that 
it is safe and secure is that it has nothing to lose." 
Furthermore, in terms of the existing relationship to the 
actual, recollection is the cessation of interaction with 
the idea rather than a reaffirmation.
Repetition, in contrast, is not merely the 
repetition of the past but an earnest, dialectical 
furtherance of the individual's development in the moment 
indicating the continuance of the future; it is the 
" actuality and the earnestness of existence." 62 
Repetition is the continuance of the individual's 
involvement with an earnest and authentic approach to 
existence and its relationship to actuality, a double­
movement within existence to reach the actual truth of 
existence. Repetition is an earnestness about being
earnest (i.e. being passionately interested in one's 
existence). It is a fortification of the individual's 
awareness of its relationship to the ideal. Kierkegaard 
makes an explicit reference to this in CA:
But this same thing to which earnestness is to return with the same earnestness can only be earnestness itself; otherwise it becomespedantry. Earnestness in this sense means thepersonality itself, and only an earnest personality is an actual personality, and only an earnest personality can do anything with earnestness, for to do anything withearnestness requires, first and foremost.
60lbid., p. 136 
61lbid., p. 136 
62ibid., p. 133
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knowledge of what the object of earnestness
I S  .63
Repetition is a step beyond recollection; it is applied 
earnestness where earnestness already exists. Earnestness 
can only be an active part of the individuality if the 
individual has already earnestness as part of its 
individuality; a repetition of the capability of 
earnestness is necessary for the individual to be able to 
act upon that capability.
Repetition is ultimately a movement towards 
transcendence. It occurs as an overcome impossibility for 
the individual. A letter from the young poet points out 
that Job serves as an example of repetition:
When does it occur? Well, that is hard to say in any human language. When did it occur for Job? When every thinkable human certainty and probability were impossible. Bit by bit he loses everything, and hope thereby gradually vanishes, inasmuch as actuality, far from being placated, rather lodges stronger and stronger allegations against him. From this point of view of immediacy, everything is lost...®^
Repetition is the moment when Job regains everything, not
by submitting to the punishment, but by continuing to
profess his faith that everything, no matter the
difficulty, as part of the process of God's relationship
to the individual and the truth of actuality.
" Repetition is basically the expression for immanence;
thus one finishes despairing and has oneself; one
finishes doubting and has the truth." is also beyond
immanence. The individual accepts the truth of actuality,
any previous existence is nullified, and then existence
returns again. Repetition is " transcendent, a religious
movement by virtue of the absurd- when the borderline of
the wondrous is reached, eternity is the true
repetition." Repetition is the inner movement of the
62CA, p. 14 9, referenced by the Hongs in FT+R, p. 3 63, Note 7.
6^This categorisation of the capabilities of the individuals does not apply solely to the earnestness of the single individual, but to other capabilities of the individual such as faith or love G5#, p. 212 
66c[7f, p. 263
67j-p, IV B 117, n.d., 1843-44, quoted in FT+R, p. 305
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individual whereby the ideal of the actual truth of 
existence is attained and personalised in the 
individuality of the individual's new existence. McCarthy 
points outs that:
Kierkegaard is positing a concept whose actualization is existential rather than conceptual. In contrast to the Hegelian system, it is not when one gets to the concept 
(Begriff) that one has attained the fullmeaning. Real repetition is beyond theconcept. 68
The movement points beyond itself and, in indicating 
further possibilities to the individual, points back 
again to the individual. Repetition is basically an 
expression for immanence, with the emphasis now being on 
its activity as an expression in a movement towards 
transcendence, though not its achievement. 69
From this, repetition can be further described as 
the end product of the communication of the idea and the 
resulting attempt at an appropriation of that idea as 
ideal (i.e. as appropriatable and applicable idea) . One 
of the questions raised is how to translate the purely 
poetic (esthetic, or, perhaps, the abstract or 
speculative) of existence or the idea of the actuality of 
existence into the applicable and appropriatable idea of 
the actual. It is repetition that solves this all. The 
explanation for the combining motion of two factors is 
provided when one considers it as the defining element in 
the dialectical transition.
68McCarthy, Vincent, 'Repetition's Repetitions', International Kierkegaard 
Commentary Fear and Trembling and Repetition, p. 2 79
69The difference between immanence and transcendence is discussed in greater in detail in the chapters on the artist and the art object.
^°Mhat is appropriation in Kierkegaard's philosophy? Poetically, he defines it in the preface to Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions as such:
Let each do a share- the reader therefore more. The meaning lies in the appropriation. Hence the book's joyous giving of 
itself. Here there are no worldly " mine" and " thine" that separate and prohibit appropriating what is the neighbour's. Admiration is in part really envy and thus a misunderstanding; and criticism, for all its justification, is in part really opposition and thus a misunderstanding; and recognition in a mirror is only a fleeting acquaintance and thus a misunderstanding- but to see correctly and not want to forget what the mirror is incapable of effecting, that is the appropriation, and the appropriation is the reader's even
greater, is his triumphant giving of himself. ^
^Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, p. 5
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The dialectic of repetition is easy, for that which is repeated has been- otherwise it could not be repeated- but the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new.When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they said that all existence, which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one says: actuality, which hasbeen, now comes into existence.
Repetition is the means whereby that the already present
is revealed as being present to the individual. It
extends this further to reveal it as of interest for the
individual, already there and already part of the
individual's existence. Repetition allows such a process
to begin, while not achieving it. Repetition is a process
of self-revelation, an acknowledgement of actuality as
part of the existence, such that the idea of actuality,
within existence, nullifies the previous existence for
the individual, allowing the individual to create a new
existence based on the new perception of actuality. In
essence, repetition becomes a means of creating a new
form of existence.72
p. 149
72Repetition as a concept can be understood furthermore to provide both an escape from the ethical (in its immanent sense) as well as the means of transcending it to enter the religious as ideal. In this sense, it also provides one of the means of producing the authenticity of a communication or the product of a communicator since such a process must be part of the communication of the actual ideal. Again, the difference between recollection and repetition is valuable. Recollection is a social construction, allowing individuals to exist within a web of rituals that determine through the recollection of such rituals the means of communication between individuals. By recollecting what is required in social terms, the individuals can communicate with each other within structures which are acceptable to both sides of the communication, but this
can lead into mere chatter.  ^ Constantin writes: " Recollection is the 
ethnical [ethiniske] view of life, repetition the modern."  ^^ Stephen Crites (whose thought provides much of the catalyst for this direction) equates this to the German term sittliche- a signification of the social pattern and structure by which individuals interact with each other is established
patterns.  ^^ ^ The pattern in which the individual exists provides that individual with a degree of identity, albeit one based on the constructed and recollected social interaction of other individuals. Crites points out : This shared 'ethnic' way of life has the feel of timelessness, the events and decisions of each day, the reiteration of immemorial patterns. Recollection in this sense is not necessarily a bad thing either, but Constantius suggests that repetition implies quite a different relation between personal 
identity and social identity. 'I'111 The shared social structure is certainly not something that is inherently bad for the individual- Kierkegaard implies in his thoughts on communication that such a learned form of communication is necessary for the individual to interact and communicate with other individualities. But it would also be correct to state that Kierkegaard would require of the authentically developing and communicating individual the necessity to transcend those structures. An inert development of social interaction only leads to an
p. 43
The authentically developing individual must become 
determined, in its form of communication, not by the 
bonds imposed by recollection, but by the self­
determining movement and moment of repetition. He must 
act as the Job of the young man's letters, whose missives 
to Constantin suggests that he is searching not just for 
an escape from the social mess that he is placed himself 
into, but a new means of establishing his identity. The 
young man writes of his inability to find an identity 
among other individuals: " I do not converse with people...
What could be gained if I did say something- there is no 
one who understands me. My pain and suffering are 
nameless, even as I myself am nameless..." 3^; but he finds 
a path towards a self-re-establishment of his identity in 
the example of Job. Job is an example, for the young man, 
of an individual discovering a relationship with God in 
which the identity of the individual is affirmed. Because 
of this, the individual is able to return to 
communication with other individualities as an example of 
that affirmation. Job becomes, for the individual, a 
being who has entered a category which is beyond 
esthetics or the ethical and which is transcendent, a 
movement through one mode of existence and into another
inert level of communication between individuals- something which the example of the '"'Attack" Upon Christendom suggests as well.
^See Peter Fenves' Chatter concerning this concept, tti?, p. 149
'•"•'tpor example, Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, Oxford, 1967, pp. 122-123:182. The concrete person, who is himself the object of his particular aims, is, as a totality of wants and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one principle of civil society.But the particular person is essentially so related to other particular persons that each establishes himself and finds satisfaction by means of others, and at the same time purely and simply by means of the form of universality, the second principle here.183. In the course of the actual attainment of self ends- an attainment conditioned in this way by universality- there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all.On this system, individual happiness, & c . , depend, and only in this connected system are they actualized and secured. This system may be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages i t .
Crites, Stephen. " ' The Blissful Security of the Moment' Recollection, 
Repetition, and Eternal Recurrence" , International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. Perkins, Robert. Mercer University Press, Mercer, GA, 1993, p. 23173R, p. 203
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through the authentic appropriation of actuality. 74 
Through repetition, the communication is transformed, 
becoming wholly personal, specific to the individual, and 
universally applicable in a transcendental manner. 
Repetition becomes the means of breaking down the ethic 
forms of communication to produce a form which is 
transcendent in nature in the direction of the ideal. In 
effecting the process of repetition, the very process 
authenticates the nature of the individual's development 
as an individual, singling out the individual from the 
'crowd' in order to ground his communication in ideality. 
The authentic communicator- the authentic artist- is an 
exception, one no longer bound by the constraints of 
societal requirements. Instead, through repetition, the 
individual has encountered his own possibility of 
development and allowed the singularly necessary 
possibility, leading to appropriation, to occur; in spite 
of the inherent impossibility of its occurrence. The 
young man, as the example of the process, asks 
Constantin- " How did I get involved in this big 
enterprise called actuality?" 75 ye discovers the means of 
removing himself from the proscribed understanding of 
actuality, placing himself into the prescribed knowledge 
of it, and reflecting, in itself, the necessity of 
communication. Repetition is the moment when the 
individual becomes an individual, aware of the 
responsibility of his existence in relation to actuality, 
and aware of his existence as a movement within eternity. 
He becomes also aware of the responsibility that he has 
to his past, present and, most importantly, his future.
74This is, of course, an ordeal-This category, ordeal, is not esthetic, ethical, or dogmatic- it is altogether transcendent. Only as knowledge about an ordeal, that it is an ordeal, would be included in a dogmatics.But as soon as the knowledge enters, the resilience of the ordeal is impaired, and the category is actually another category. This category is absolutely transcendent and places a person in a purely personal relationship of opposition to God, in a relationship such that he cannot allow himself to be
satisfied with an explanation at second hand.^The process of the movement of repetition- the ordeal which occurs during the transcendence- becomes a collision for the individual with the individual's preconceived bonds of communication.ÎR p. 21075R, p. 200
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The movement into the moment of eternity, which contains 
the past, present, and future, is one not of recollection 
but of repetition. It is the intersection of the past, 
present, and future with the responsibility that the 
individual assumes and appropriates for its future self; 
the individual becomes involved in the confrontation with 
the impossibility of a future as a self grounded 
ontologically within Christianity.
As Crites explains, this eternity is not an eternal 
present- one in which the individual is continually aware 
of and existing in a state of existence that is not 
dissipated in the past nor fragmented in the 
possibilities of the future, " concentrating the fullness 
of being in itself" 76_ because the eternal present is a 
state of static being, rendering conditional judgements 
and requirements of the individual empty. It is a blessed 
state of being, in which the individual remains the 
individual without threat or promise of change. What is 
required of the individual entering into repetition is 
the continual movement of the individual, acting in a 
process of self-transformation within the moment of 
existence, which becomes a series of moments. The 
elements of time are synthesised, by the individual self, 
within the self; they become not a static moment within 
the present, but a moment that is an expression of the 
continued existence within the actuality of the 
individual. By repetition, in which the individual is 
able to come to recognise itself as spirit, reflecting 
upon itself as itself in relation to the truth of 
actuality, the individual enters into a state of 
existence in the moment in which the moment itself is 
recognised not as merely the present but as linked to the 
eternal. Kierkegaard in CA describes this understanding 
of the moment in two stages. First the moment is 
recognised as existing within the present as a vanishing 
point, particularly in the case of the Greeks conception 
of time:
76Crites, p. 236
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Whatever its etymological explanation, it is related to the category of the invisible, because time and eternity were conceived equally abstractly, because the concept of temporality was lacking, and this again was due to the lack of the concept of spirit... Thus understood, the moment is not properly an atom of time but an atom of eternity. It is the first reflection of eternity in time, its first attempt, as it were, at stopping time. For this reason, Greek culture did not comprehend the atom of eternity... did not define it with a forward direction but with a backward direction. ??
This stage recognises only the moment as one in which the 
present is attendant, yet, one which seems to the 
individual to be not within existence. No sense of 
temporality (within which the individual's existence 
resides) remains. Yet, the recognition of the synthesis 
of the individual's self further allows, within the 
repetition, the individual to recognise the temporal 
nature of the moment, linking it not only to the present 
but also recognising its eternal nature. By entering into 
a state of repetition, the individual can posit and 
appropriate its authentic nature as spirit and, 
therefore, can also posit the moment within which it 
exists to be eternal.
The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not another synthesis but is the expression for the first synthesis, according to which man is a synthesis of psyche and body that is sustained by spirit. As soon as the spirit is posited, the moment is present. 7s
The future is thus created as a necessary aspect of the
individual's own existence within actuality. The
individual is not allowed to abstract the moment from
actuality into existence and, therefore, remove its
potential and responsibilities for the existing
individuality (as it would in the eternal present); it
must retain its temporal and eternal elements. The moment
determines the future as it should be, as a guide, in
both the sense of boundary and path for the individual,
CA, p. 88 
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allowing the individual to be able to relate to itself as 
spirit within the context of its future as individuality, 
while simultaneously determining itself based upon its 
relation to its past and present. Crites writes:
the future, considered simply as one of the modes of temporality itself, cannot contain this whole. But... it is the future considered as eternity that contains the entire temporal sphere. Furthermore, this eternal future stands in an intrinsic relation to the temporal present: the two are united in the moment,which is just the present set in motion by the eternal future.
The eternal future, as a repetition of the
individuality's temporal existence, is the continued
possibilities of the individual, bounded by an
understanding of its nature within temporality. Thus,
repetition becomes a moment in which the continuing
existence of the individual comes into a relationship
with the actual.
Extrapolating from this, the differences between
eternal present and eternal future describe the form of
the authentic communication of the the idea of the actual
ideal, 60 as opposed to the inauthentic. This has specific
consequences for the art object. In R, for example, the
young man is swept into a state of recollection by his
love for the young woman, but this love is one not of
communication between the two individualities. Rather,
the love between the two individuals is one that takes
place completely within the mind of the young man who,
through recollection of the idea which he himself has
created of the young woman, continues to torment himself.
Falling in love does not create an actual relation between him and the young woman. It awakens something purely internal in himself, his capacity to create an imaginative ideality in language. He adores her, but his adoration takes the form of an unsurpassable longing, ostensibly for her but really for his ideal image of her.^i
79crites, p. 243
6°From this point onward, the description of authentic communication must generally be understood to mean an indication of the authentic art object. 
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This imaginative construction, which he himself has 
created, comes between the actual woman and the real 
woman. The form of the communication between himself and 
the object of his love, within recollection, is a 
separation from the object, one that cannot and will not
be brought together. The object is lost to the young as
long as he remains held by the recollection of the 
object, unable to enter into state of repetition whereby 
he would be able to appropriate the truth of his
existence and therefore balance himself out in relation 
to other individuals.
Recollection, and its manifestation as eternal 
present, reflects an aesthetic achievement for Crites, 
containing a moment of epiphany. It is an aesthetic 
achievement, presenting itself as the embodiment of 
possibility through immediacy and reflection, while 
remaining wholly tied to the present state of the
individual. Through immediacy, there is a concentration 
within the moment of the present moment. Through 
reflection, there is a reflective transcendence of the 
temporality which is maintained within the immediacy of 
the temporality of the moment, thereby producing a 
synthetic object. This matches, however, merely the 
esthetic form of the communication. Crites is wrong to be 
so simple about the aesthetic (he means, of course, the 
esthetic, but by implication the aesthetic object). 
Recollection, and the eternal present as the 
communication of the communication, may be authentic for 
the state of development for the communicating 
individual, but lack the possibility of a full 
development of the communication of the idea of the 
actual truth of existence. Crites might identify this 
state of the eternal present as being an aesthetic 
achievement, but it is recognisable in Constantin's own 
example, wherein the form of the object can only be one 
of separation:
At one time I was very close to completesatisfaction... Everything was prescient in me,and everything was enigmatically transfigured
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in my microcosmic bliss, which transfigured everything in itself, even the most disagreeable... it was one o'clock on the dot when I was at the peak and had presentiments of the highest of all; when suddenly something began to irritate one of my eyes... in the same instant I was plunged down almost into the abyss of despair... Since then I have abandoned every hope of ever feeling satisfied absolutely and in every way...®^
Constantin can find in the self-generated, momentary
illusion that he himself generates a hope of satisfaction
or repast from the restlessness which the lack of an
engagement enforces upon his self. His expression
resembles nothing if not a typically overly exuberant
collision that someone who would not be engaging with an
art object might have. What might be interpreted as being
present is a separation of the individual receiving the
communication from the art object's actual communication.
This inauthenticity is present, both in the reception as
well as in the production of the art object.
Authenticity, in contrast, can occur when the
individual, in both the reception and the production of
the communication, maintains repetition as part of the
individual's authentic development. What is required is
that the individual remains not within the eternal
present, but seeks to implement the eternal future within
the present in its appropriation of the idea and,
therefore, the actual ideal into its existence. The key
to the form of communication of the idea of the actual
ideal lies in repetition as an indication of the eternal
future.
Repetition is a vital element in the communication 
of eternity to another individuality. Eternity is not a 
dissipation of existence but an affirmation of the 
present in its fullest sense; repetition is the 
facilitation of the eternal in the present, pointing 
towards the continued transcendent position that the 
future has in relation to the present. Crites cites some 
examples taken from Kierkegaard's writings as examples of
82R, pp. 173-174
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art objects as communications of the eternal present- 
Mozart's Don Juan and the theatre that is attended by 
Constantin- and in doing so labels them as " examples of 
the pursuit of bliss afforded by the eternal present." 63 
In doing so, he cites these examples of art objects as 
authentic communications as the culmination of 
aesthetics, as if the eternal present can be interpreted 
as the only example of the path that art must take. He 
fails to realise, however, that the eternal future holds 
a specific and more viable place within aesthetics, 
despite the opposing argument that an aesthetic art 
object is, by its very nature, an eternally present 
object. The possibility of the art object as eternal 
future is rightly held up as a vanishing possibility 
(particularly in the form of the young man's vanishment 
from Constantin's sight) but, in its very example as an 
imagined construction, there is the possibility for the 
eternal future to be embodied in the form of the art 
object which the young man himself represents.
Repetition provides the self-transformative 
movement. It can do this by remaining a repository of the 
present while simultaneously being a synthesis as 
indication of the authentic possibilities and 
responsibilities of the future of the individual. This 
reading of the authentic communication, within the 
context of repetition, takes place parallel to Crites 
reading of the present's relation to the future per CA 
and R, but with a different result.
The inadequateness which Crites sees in repetition, 
however, is not completely misplaced. While he fails to 
engage with the possibility of the potentially authentic 
communication as the embodiment and the inducement of 
repetition within another individual, Kierkegaard's own 
further description of the development of repetition 
begins to annul any initial positive approach. Any 
discussion of recollection and repetition leads to the 
related concepts of redoubling and reduplication, which
83Crites, p. 237
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are internalised intensifications of repetition. 
According to the Hongs, redoubling {Fordobleslse) is an 
ontological category for a kind of being belonging to the 
realm of faith. Philosophical thought normally explains 
empirical or limited being, through which such thought 
can explore and explain abstract concepts as 
abbreviations of being. Only when the thinker explores 
concrete being within the context of higher faith, within 
the religious, does reduplication take place. It is 
important to recognise the differences between redoubling 
(or, in Poole's translation, " doubled reflection" and 
reduplication at this point. Poole determines doubled
reflection as a form of communication which implies a 
separation of the communicator from the communication 
even though the communication may be authentic in nature 
and indirect. This separation denies, to some degree, the 
process of appropriation by the communicated because the 
communication is unable to be repeated within that 
individual's existence and applied to its actuality.
Reduplication is more important and more authentic. The 
communication of the communicator is infused with the 
communicator's own existence, and remains indirect.
Because the communication and the communicator act within 
existence as an indication of a singular truth, the 
communication can be appropriated by the receiving
individual; the very fact of reduplication in one 
individual acts to reduplicate itself indirectly in the 
receiving individual and thereby determine itself.
However, as Poole at least alludes to, in referring 
the concept of reduplication to the position of the 
pseudonym Anti-Climacus of SUD and PC, this reduplication 
becomes a complete appropriation of the actual ideal. In 
effect, for Kierkegaard and for Poole, reduplication 
becomes an appropriation and application within the 
existence of the individual only in relation to the 
fullest embodiment of the existence-actual being: Christ. 
The individual's being consists of body-mind, as
84Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, p. 257
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empirical/objective reality, and possibility, as the 
possibility of appropriation of the actual within 
existence. Kierkegaard writes:
A person's task, then, is to form a synthesis of these two parts in redoubling, when the synthesis is actualized, each element in man's existence contains a doubleness in that it simultaneously has a temporal and an eternal expression. One reaches redoubling as anontological category in the sphere of faith. ss
Redoubling is an indication of the eternal self; it is
the presentation of the individual's own self as a
relationship to actuality. Reduplication is the further
step forward, such that existence becomes the actual, and
it is a necessary step f o r w a r d . sc Reduplication is to be
what one says or to exist in what one understands,
presupposing reflection as the knowledge to appropriated
the actual. This whole process remains, however, an
impossibility except in the face of death. Actuality
cannot be fully realised within existence except in the
collision of existence and actuality. Reduplication,
therefore, becomes an impossibility within existence.
Kierkegaard always implies in his description of
recollection, repetition, redoubling and reduplication a
possibility of communication. In fact, they require
communication; all four are the embodiment of the
appropriation of a position of knowledge within existence
in relation to the actual, necessitating the importation
of an externalised position as part of the process of
appropriation. What neither Kierkegaard nor the secondary
literature describe, however, is the dialectical nature
(in a Kierkegaardian sense) of this communication. The
very possibility of this communication necessitates its
impossibility. This is seen in Constantin's own
description of repetition. He notes that there is almost
an impossibility to true repetition in that it requires
the 'death' of the individuality in favour of a further
65jp. Vol. 3, p. 908
66Necessary since the process of development through recollection, repetition, and redoubling is always a process towards the appropriation of the actual into existence, which can only be accomplished by reduplication.
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possibility, i.e. the individual must overcome its own 
identity in order to reassert its furthered identity. 
" It may be true that a person's life is over and done 
within the first moment, but there must also be a vital 
force to slay this death and transform it into life." 6? 
He further observes^! that there is no possibility of 
repetition at all. For him, the esthetic object, and even 
the aesthetic object, can only be enjoyed once. This 
leads to a further point. Even though redoubling and 
reduplication both would appear to be transcendent by 
producing the illusion of knowledge of the actual, in 
effect they remain impossibilities as well. There is an 
impossibility inherent in them; the position gained 
remains at odds with existence within actuality. 
Redoubling is understood as a doubled form of 
communication, taking place within the realm of the 
imagination, necessarily characterised as an
impossibility, a gap between the reader and the author, 
the artist and the art object's recipient, whereby the 
two are completely separated.
By taking place in the form of an imaginary construction, the communication creates for itself an opposition, and the imaginary construction establishes a chasmic gap between reader and author and fixes the separation of inwardness between them, so that a direct understanding is made impossible. The imaginary construction is the conscious, teasing revocation of the communication, which is always of importance to an existing person who writes for existing persons, lest the relation be changed to that of a rote reciter who writes for rote reciters.ss
The imaginary construction as communication retains an
opposition to the existence and the process within
existence of gaining knowledge of the actual which is an
inherent possibility of the individual. Kierkegaard
further writes regarding redoubling:
No doubt there have been keener and more gifted authors that I, but I would certainly like to
'R, p. 13787j
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see the author who has reduplicated 
[reduppliceret] his thinking more penetratingly that I have in the dialectic raised to the second power. It is one thing to be keenly penetrating in books, another to redouble [fordoble] the thought dialectically in existence. The first form of the dialectic is like a game played for nothing other than the game; reduplication is like a game in which the enjoyment is intensified by being played for high stakes. The dialectic in books in merely the dialectic of thinking, but reduplication of such thinking is action in life. But every thinker who does not reduplicate the dialectic of his thinking continuously constructs an illusion. His thinking never gains the decisive expression of action. He tries to correct misunderstands etc. in a new book, but it is of no use, for he continues in an illusion of communication. Only the ethical thinker, by acting, can protect himself against illusions in communications.
And, regarding reduplication, the following two examples
serve to determine the impossibility of reduplication as
a form of communication, no matter how authentic.
Come Unto Me All of You. If the object is to say these words esthetically, then the art would be to say them in such a way that literally everybody, if possible, comes. Christ said them in such a way that the effect was that everybody ran away from him. Here again is the reduplication which is in everything essentially Christian.siand
The essentially Christian is the rigorousness of the reduplication [Reduplicationens] with which the teacher, even more cruel toward himself in serving the idea, watches lest the winning of men develop into an illusion for them, lest it become something they say, etc., also lest the cause very gradually go backward, lest it be held to the center less than originally, which usually is the case the more there are who join up. S2
As forms of communication, as means whereby the positive
potential of an authentic communication can take place
between two individuals, all of these concepts maintain a
specific and valuable place within Kierkegaard's
Vol. 3, p. 698, << 3665 (VIII^ A 91, n.d. 1847]
®lj-p, Vol. 3, p. 705, « 3 6 8 3  (X^ A 377, n.d. 1850)
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description of the existence of the individual and its 
relationship to its actuality; they serve as part of the 
process of appropriation of the idea as ideal. However, 
the very nature of the fullness of a development of 
reflectiveness, of an application and appropriation of 
knowledge of the actual ideal into existence, contains 
within it an impossibility. As will be seen in the final 
chapter, however, this is to the advantage of the art 
obj ect.
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Chapter Four- Direct and Indirect Communication
Kierkegaard's theory of communication was never 
fully articulated, found only in brief references 
scattered throughout the published texts and in journal 
and paper entries. Though he planned to set it out in a 
series of lectures, this was never realised. Still, 
communication for Kierkegaard was of vital importance. 
His writing was directed at the individual and the
individual's relationship to the truth of its existence, 
namely, its ontological grounding and its place within 
Christianity. This concern manifests itself first with 
the truth of existence as such and, through understanding 
a specific conception of the truth, how one can 
communicate truth to the individual.
As has been seen, the objective nature of a
systematic exposition of theory did not appeal to 
Kierkegaard in that it conflicted with the existence of 
the individual. Yet, a systematic description was
necessary to communicate cohesively. The essence of
communication in Kierkegaard, the central aspect to 
understand, is that it, like all concepts in his thought, 
is dialectical. Communication takes place between two
individuals, necessarily dialectical themselves, and is, 
therefore, dialectical in structure. The dialectical
nature of communication develops as the unity of 
synthesis, the combination of contradictory terms within 
an organic whole, which accurately elaborates existence 
as existing. Communication is the flow of information,
leading to knowledge of existence, between individuals 
which is not unstructured but which can fulfil all 
individuals' places within the community and in
relationship to God.
The truth of existence which emerges for Kierkegaard 
is the subjective grounding of the individual's 
understanding first, leading to the next part of the 
process: the direction of the development of the
individual towards a passionately determined decision 
with God and Christianity. The truth of existence is both
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a function and a universally valid aspect of the 
individual, rather than something that can be understood 
solely through observation. Truth is not a turning away 
from existence into objectivity, but a process of 
appropriation of both externality and revelation through 
an emphasis on the subjective nature of the individual. 
The process of appropriation is absolutely vital, since
objective observation and speculation never fully 
determines the exact nature of the truth for the 
individual, keeping it in static compromise rather than
allowing it reciprocally to determine the individual's 
own existence. For Kierkegaard, truth is subjectivity, 
appropriated and transformed within and through 
Christianity into the individual existence.
This process of appropriation by the individual 
calls into question the manner in which the truth can be 
communicated. Objectivity distorts the nature of truth 
for the individual, transforming it into something which 
it is not, removing the fact of existence from its being 
for the perceiver. Subjectivity brings the truth into the 
individual's existence, making it a necessary aspect of 
what it means to be an individual. This, however, also
has problems, since the individual, in appropriating the 
truth of existence only through subjectivity, tends to
sink into a reified understanding of subjectivity;^* since
a requirement of communication would seem to be 
subjectivity, how can communication take place at all?
Both objectivity and subjectivity seem to deny the very 
possibility of communication itself; both remove the 
individual from any relationship with other individuals.
Communication is, therefore, plagued with problems. 
What is required is that a theory of communication takes 
into account both the direct and indirect communication
of existence from one individual to another, such that
both the idea in objectivity and the ideal in 
subjectivity become necessary for the individual; at the 
same time, any theory of communication must also take
^2a  position very similar to Fichte's philosophy.
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into account the process of exchange. Communication's 
method is not only an exchange of information, but must 
be a manner of leading the individual from inauthentic
selfhood to authentic selfhood, employing an educational 
method that constantly respects the integrity of choice 
as a necessary element for the individual's development 
into an individual self. Kierkegaard's theory of
communication is such that communication must both 
directly speak to, while simultaneously and indirectly 
approaching, both the spirit and the soul of the 
individual; it must facilitate the development of the 
individual toward a better understanding, within the
process of appropriation, of its relationship with God 
and Christianity, and the allowing of choice by that 
individual receiving the communication.
This chapter describes the Kierkegardian conception 
of communication, showing how these are related as
possibility to another gap in Kierkegaard's thought- his 
conception of art. This is done in four parts: 1.
Communication of knowledge through both direct and 
indirect means; 2. communication of capability through 
the indirect; 3. communication of the Christian, 
necessarily indirect; and 4. the application of both 
direct and indirect communication as embodying one 
possibility for the grounding of art, a grounding which 
provides the form of such a communication (not the 
content) for the art object. As a final part, though, the 
entire theory of communication is briefly shown to be 
inadequate to its purpose. Communication, whether direct 
or indirect, remains an impossibility in light of the 
subjective nature of the appropriation by the individual 
of knowledge of the actual grounding of its existence. 
Communication of any sort remains within Kierkegaard's 
structure an impossibility.
1. Communication Of Knowledge Through Both Direct And 
Indirect Means
p. 59
The difference between direct and indirect 
communication is the manner in which they create 
knowledge for the individual. Knowledge takes two forms :
1. knowledge about something; 2. self-knowledge. Direct 
communication is the conveyance of information from one 
individual to another in a direct fashion- knowledge 
about something. It is based on objectivity, the 
observation of facts which are external to the 
individual. Direct communication of ideas and facts are 
necessary for individuals; without them, they could not 
function in the world. " We human beings need each other, 
and in that there is already a directness." 4^ still, 
there is something lacking in the direct exchange of 
ideas between individuals for Kierkegaard.
Direct communication is dangerous when trying to 
communicate eternal truths between individuals on two 
levels. First, communication of knowledge may be direct, 
through imagination (which is the creative capacity of 
combining the elements of all thought), but a genuine 
engagement with this direct knowledge for the 
individual's existence is not possible. Direct 
communication does not engage the individual's existence 
sufficiently to produce for him self-knowledge. Second, 
impatience may get the better of the communicating 
individual. The target may become hostile to the message. 
Kierkegaard cautions that:
First and foremost, no impatience. If he becomes impatient, he will rush headlongagainst it and accomplish nothing. A direct attack only strengthens a person in his illusion, and at the same time embitters him.There is nothing that requires such gentle handling as an illusion, if one wishes todispel it.
The direct communication forces the individual to
reassess its objective existence, not from within its own 
subjectivity, but through a presented objectivity 
external to itself. A direct attack achieves nothing, 
since it does not persuade the individual to the truth
JP, Vol. 2, p.3 84 
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away from the deception which constitutes his existence, 
but forces it on him.
And this is what a direct attack achieves, and it implies moreover the presumption of requiring a man to make another person, or in his presence, an admission which he can make most profitably to himself privately.
The direct attack upon the individual's preconceived
ideas, static and incorrect in the case of eternal
truths, may seem necessary for the communicator, whose
existence is in truth, but only reinforces the
individual's firmly held ideas and deception resulting
from these ideas. Rather than slowly convincing him to
move beyond that which he knows in a static state, to
incorporate that which he can make his own decision
about, direct communication serves to convince him that
he is right, keeping the individual in a static,
inauthentic state of existing. The direct communication
of ideas, the direct communication about eternal truths,
is impossible if it is to be appropriated into the
individual's existence. Rather, the better method is the
gradual convincing of the individual whereby he comes to
those truths himself.
One may assume that the targeted individual is in an
illusion, but to point this out to him in a direct manner
only invites failure; the receiving individual is more
prepared to reject the message rather than accept. The
target individual is in an illusion, his existence is
occupied by it. The first task must be to remove this
illusion, but this can only be done by an illusion
itself, by negativity.
Assuming then that a person is the victim of an illusion, and that in order to communicate the truth to him the first task, rightly understood, is to remove the illusion- if I do not begin by deceiving him, I must being with direct communication. But direct communication presupposes that the receiver's ability to receive is undisturbed. But here such is not the case; an illusion stands in the way. That is to say, one must first of all use the
66ibid., p.25-26
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caustic fluid.57 But this caustic means is negativity, and negativity understood inrelation to the communication of the truth is precisely the same as deception. 58
This deception consists of accepting the target's own
preconceptions, rather than simply seeking to do away
with them. " What then does it mean, 'to deceive'? It
means that one does not begin directly with the matter
one wants to communicate, but begins by accepting the
other man's illusion as good money." 59 Direct
communication transmits information that is necessary for
existence as a human being, but not the form of
information which can, through appropriation into the
existence of the individual, develop him out of his
deception and into authenticity. " 'Direct communication'
means to communicate the truth directly. 'Communication
in terms of reflection' means to beguile a person into
the truth." This takes into account that the
individual is always in a state of existence, of motion
rather than static form, and his communication must
display this. Direct communication is inappropriate to
communicate eternal truths because the very act of
communicating in such a manner only serves to cease the
motion of existence that is embodied by these eternal
truths. Any attempt to directly communicate the
reflection of the individual only results in a
contradiction which distorts these truths. Indirect
communication differs from direct communication in that
it is a deception at first but, through the receiving
individual's own reflection, this deception becomes
truth. The indirect method, as the form of such
communication, achieves far more than the direct. The
form of direct communication is adequate only in specific
cases, but inadequate for those truths that need to be
appropriated by the subjective individuality. The art and
57a  reference to a previous simile, where the example of discovering a hidden text underneath the writing is used.
58pv, p.40 
55%bid., p .40
^^^And, problematically, transmits the fact of the illusion of the individual to the communicator, who must appropriate it into his own existence.101PV, p. 148
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difficulty of communication of knowledge is not in 
showing that the system is incorrect in its assessment of 
existence. Direct communication makes the receiving 
individual misappropriate the communicated knowledge for 
his existence. Rather, through indirect communication, 
there should be a bringing out the correct manner of 
appropriation for the individual's existence such that he 
is lead by his own thoughts to God and the religious, 
into knowledge of the actual idea as ideal.
2. Communication Of Capability Through The Indirect
The next stage in communication lies in the genuine 
realisation of the process of the development of the 
individual as something which is to be indirectly 
communicated. Genuine communication resides in the 
upbringing or training, rather than in the direct 
passing-on of knowledge. Upbuilding brings out that which 
the communicator knows to exist already in the 
individual, rather than believing that he is imparting 
something on the individual. Upbuilding deals with the 
universally human, with the capability of being 
authentically human; in the ethical-religious with the 
ontologically necessary grounding of the human and its
relationship to Christianity. Kierkegaard himself 
struggles directly with the difference between the direct 
and the indirect communication of capability, of
upbuilding. He writes:
I have been experiencing much spiritual trial 
[Anfægtelse] thinking about how far one dares to withhold direct communication. O, there are perhaps a few men who have any idea of the fear and trembling involved in having lightness enough to be able to be something else [in order] to act in the service of the truth- and then, then to sit in fear and trembling lest one do anyone harm, all the while understanding that this is the truest way to help a n o t h e r . 0^2
Journal and Papers, Vol. 1, p.259-260, <<633 
l02j-p^ vol. 6, p. 41, <<6230, IX A  217, n.d., 18481 ; direct communication, and an indication that other artists, authors exist besides Kierkegaard himself who are aware of the difficulty of communicating the truth of existence.
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This upbringing, as the communication of capability, is 
found in Kierkegaard in three places, PV, his journal 
entries, and in The Book of Adler.
In PV, Kierkegaard seeks to reconcile his authorship 
with the widely-held view that he began as an esthetic 
author, and changed to a religious. He saw that simply 
declaring his message to the people would either have him 
ridiculed or held in great esteem, but ultimately ignored 
and ineffective. From this, Kierkegaard recognised that: 
" If one is truly to succeed in bringing a person to a 
definite point, one must first and foremost pay attention 
to finding him there, where HE is, and begin there." ^^ 4 
Communication, if it is to have any effect in bringing 
the individual to the truth of his existence, must first 
present itself as if it is a natural part of the
individual to whom it is directed, deceiving him in his 
own existence, rather than trying to carry him out of it 
against his will.
The indirect manner is a deception, carried out in 
love for that individual to whom it is addressed. It 
allows that individual to make his own step forward as 
the communicator steps away from his offering. This is
Kierkegaard's response to the nihilism of his age, which 
he termed " the levelling of individuality" . This
levelling is discussed in detail in PA (the third part of 
TA) as the process whereby the individuality of each
human being loses its value, and all are accounted for as 
one mass, as part of the crowd. Indirect communication, 
by requiring the individual to make his own choice about 
his existence, counters this. By addressing the process 
of levelling, indirect communication reaffirms the value 
of each individual's capabilities.
In the lectures on communication, found in the 
journals, Kierkegaard aims to draw a fundamental 
difference between the communication of knowledge as 
direct communication, and the communication of 
capability. Communication of capability is one aspect of
^°^Quoted in Pattison, Kierkegaard, The Aesthetic and the Religious, p.71
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indirect communication; it is the drawing out of the 
individual, allowing him to discover his own potential 
and possibilities and the direction in which he can lead 
his life. It does not have an object per se, but 
" demonstrates that there is reflection and consequently 
also a distinction in the direction of 'the object,' 
namely, negative in the direction of 'the object,' or
away from the 'the object.'" This is most important in 
the communication of ethical and religious truths. While 
these are communication of knowledge to some degree, 
through the learning of Christianity and the constant 
" you shall" , they still remain a communication of
capability; the individual has the capability of becoming 
a Christian to the fullest degree through his own choice 
rather than through the prescription of an object of
understanding. This communication of capability is 
universal, required of every individual unconditionally, 
but which every individual already has knowledge of, to 
some degree. This unconditional knowledge is already 
known, underlying the concepts of revelation, authority, 
and choice, as embodied particularly in the example of 
Abraham in FT. Christian dogmatic knowledge can be 
learned and easily understood by a child, but the
individual always knows, within his existence, the 
Christian truth of existence, which must be communicated 
to him through indirect means.
Vol. 1, p.281, <<647 
lOÊThig lead to the distinction of the maieutic method, which is different from the indirect. The indirect method of communication communicates knowledge to the individual which he does not necessarily have; the maieutic method takes place when the student is reminded of what he already has as capability of his individuality by an individual already in a position of truth. " Where the communication of knowledge is concerned the maieutic is
irrelevant."  ^ However, where the communication of capability is concerned, the maieutic is essential, since it brings forth the individual's own capability and confidence in himself through his own decision. The maieutic is the process whereby the communicator does not produce anything himself- such as he does when he communicates knowledge- but allows the target to produce the results of the communication and the development himself. The maieutic differs from the indirect in that the communicator as well as the target are already capable of knowledge of the actual ideal truth.Kierkegaard deals with this difference most clearly in PF, where it emerges that the actual truth of existence is something which must be granted through grace- paralleling the development of form while not actually informing its construction- and where it also emerges that authority is not something granted to the communicator. Indirect communication requires a degree of authority in the person of the communicator, even though this communication develops most ideally as the maieutic in nature. For Kierkegaard, any communication of religious and
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3. Communication Of The Christian, Necessarily Indirect
PC offers Kierkegaard's Christian interpretation of 
the possibilities of communication. It is concerned, 
firstly, with the development of the individual in a 
process of healing the sin-consciousness self and, 
secondly, with the ethics developed through the awareness 
of the redemptive gift of Christianity. As is suggested 
by the title, it is concerned with the individual 
practising Christianity, and the place that his 
activities as a human have within his development to an 
acceptance of the ontological grounding of the 
individual.
PC may be understood in two ways. It constitutes a 
healing and corrective support of the contemporary 
established church; it may also be understood as an 
attack on the establishment. Both views are grounded in 
the necessity of a dialectical understanding of 
communication, developed as a doubly-reflective form, 
making clear the dialectical nature of communication 
itself. In this respect, PC may also be read as an 
embodiment of Kierkegaard's theory of communication. It 
is in this dual nature of the communication, embodied by 
PC, that Kierkegaard's theory of communication finds its 
final form, and where the impossibility of direct 
communication for the development of an authentic 
individual becomes determined in relation to the actual 
in existence.
The central point of the book is the offense of 
Christianity (examined earlier in the context of PF) , the
Christian truths must be based on authority that comes from within the individuality- an authority which is based itself on faith and the capability of faith- rather than on a directness which only distorts the truth. Faith is a communication through which no proof, no form of knowledge, can be offered for the receiving individual. Faith is the individual's capability of accepting the paradoxical offense of Christianity. In Christianity, this faith deals solely with the paradoxical nature of the basis of the religion. The communicator vanishes in the face of a requirement for proof of his message, and the recipient is faced with his own decision of acceptance.The maieutic, however, is essentially not communication and irrelevant to the discussion of the art object.tPattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, p.77
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paradox of the Christ-event, and the individual's 
relationship to it. In PC, Kierkegaard asks about the
possibility of any individual being able to declare that 
he would recognise the God-Individuality of Christ. He 
asks whether or not one who is not contemporary could say 
that, should he have been contemporary to Christ, he 
would have recognised Him as Christ, and Kierkegaard 
answers absolutely in the negative. For Kierkegaard, this 
question is blasphemous, since the very point of Christ's 
existence was his unrecognisability, his status as 
incognito, and his position as individual within His 
contemporary society. The very nature of Christ's
appearance among humanity as an individual, and not as 
directly revealed as Christ and God, requires that the 
incognito aspect of His appearance remain indirect. 
Essentially, with the paradox which Christ embodies,
Kierkegaard would indicate that :
If there is to be a direct communication that remains a direct communication, one must step out of the incognito; otherwise that which in the first is direct communication (the direct statement) still does not become direct communication through the second (the incognito of the communicator) . lo?
The very nature of the Christ-Event embodies the
essential, necessary fact of indirect communication.
Therefore, the communication of this fact to others, for
whom it is impossible, because they not directly
contemporary, must, through necessity, remain indirect.
Indirect communication is necessary for Christianity
as communication of the idea of the actual ideal truth of
existence and, thus, as the basis of the message of
Christ and the ontological grounding of the existence of
the individual human. Indirect communication takes two
forms in PC. First, it is an act of communication which
redoubles in reflection that which is reflected upon and
communicated to the individual. This involves removing
the objective present of the communicator into a purely
objective nothing, and then combining that which is
^O'^PC, p. 132
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present in the dialectical of that which is communicated. 
The manner in which this occurs is as follows:
One presents faith in the eminent sense and represents it in such a way that the most orthodox sees it as a defence of the faith and the atheist sees it as an attack, while the communicator is zero, a nonperson, an objective something- yet he perhaps is an ingenious secret agent who with the aid of this communication finds out which is which, who is the believe, who the atheist; because this is disclosed when they form a judgement about what is presented, which is neither attack nor defence. los
This first form of indirect communication presents the 
very dialectical nature of the communicated to the
individual while at the same time revealing the
dialectical nature of the individual himself (who may be 
in a position of both attack and defence) . The message 
may be seen from both directions, in the very manner of 
PC itself.
In the second form, indirect communication can also
appear through the relationship between the communication 
and the communicator. The example of Christ as 
individual, message, God-Man, and actual ideal makes this 
clear. Christ cannot be said to have used direct 
communication, which involves not only direct
communication within the communication, but also the 
direct display of the individual's nature qua individual; 
this is something which is inherently impossible due to 
Christ's own nature as the God-Man. Direct 
recognisability is the characteristic of the pagan idol. 
Even though Christ explicitly states that He is the Son 
of God, this is still clothed in the fact that He 
remained a common human individual among men. " He is the 
sign of contradiction, and by the direct statement He 
attaches Himself to you only so that you must face the 
offense of the contradiction." Direct communication of 
His true nature is impossible for the God-Man. " The true 
God cannot become directly recognisable, but direct
I0®lbid., p.133 
l°®Ibid., p.136
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recognisability is what the purely human, what the human 
being to whom he came, would plead and implore him for as 
an indescribable alleviation." Thus, the very fact of 
Christianity, the human form of God, cannot be 
communicated directly but only indirectly, since that is 
that way that the very event occurred and must be 
revealed. Therefore, the very humanness of the individual 
must be removed. What is necessary is faith, and this may 
only be communicated from one individual to another 
maieutically.
The possibility of the paradox, the offense of 
Christianity, the very fact of Christ as the embodiment 
of the actual ideal of existence, and faith in all these 
confirms " the chasmic abyss between the single 
individual and the God-man over which faith and faith 
alone reaches." The possibility of offense exists for 
all men, but this offense is a reflective-inducing 
repulsion, and is, thereby, necessarily indirect. Only 
through faith is the choice made and accepted, after 
despair has been reached through sin-consciousness. Only 
through the indirect form of communication does the 
individual come authentically to the actual ideal truth 
of his existence within Christianity. And only through 
the removal of the communicator does this process occur 
authentically.
4. The Application Of Both Direct And Indirect 
Communication As Embodying One Possibility For The 
Grounding Of Art.
Brayton Polka's interpretation of Kierkegaard's 
theory of communication is interesting as a modified 
approach. It lays the burden fully on the responsibility 
of the individual, while keeping the actual theory of 
communication withheld from the individual's possibility
p.137
^^^Once again, faith is that which the individual comes to achieve through their own development in relation to the actual, while grace is granted from the actual and cannot be determined by the individuality. Faith cannot, therefore, be communicated, 
p. 139
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of coming to terms with it, constructing it so that 
communication cannot become an aspect of an authentic 
individual, but a function of authenticity.
Polka's stresses the similarity between existence 
and Christianity as a dialectical relationship. He 
equates this dialectical structure to that as between the 
esthetic and the religious stage of existence. What he 
observes is that a degree of undecidability constantly 
emerges, deconstructing the binary opposition such that
the decisiveness of the Kierkegaardian either/or is that it encompasses the undecidability of indirect communication. Its non-dialectical other is the illusory decidability of Christendom whose direct communication reflects indecisiveness.
Polka sees Kierkegaard's understanding of communication
as rooted first of all in the choice/non-choice offered
to the individual by Christianity, in dialectical
relationship with the esthetic, and in rejection of the
non-choice offered to the individual through the
established church of Christendom, expressed in direct
and dogmatic form.
The dialectical nature of communication is necessary
because of the constant collision of the individual with
the paradoxical offense which is Christianity, as seen in
PC. The reader is, essentially, bound up in his existence
with this offense until he either fully accepts or
rejects the acceptance of the religious (whereby all of
the texts are accepted as being religious). Ultimately,
all communication becomes understood, by the individual,
as being religious in nature, even if it does not appear
that way on the surface. Communication is religious
because it embodies that which it is to be human, namely
spirit, as well as that which it is to be ontologically
grounded within God, brought into and existing through
the grace of God.
Though the nature of human existence as spiritual
may make direct communication impossible in the absolute
^^^Polka, Brayton. " Aesthetics and Religion: Kierkegaard and the Offense of Indirect Communication" . in Kierkegaard on Art and Communication, ed. Pattison, George., p.28
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sense, both it and indirect communication are necessarily 
aspects of the existence of the individual. 
Undecidability may remain, even though the individual 
within the Christian paradox may understand this 
paradoxical offense as direct and decidable, but 
Kierkegaard's exposition of the dialectical nature of 
communication makes this an impossibility. Polka's 
understanding of communication emphasises the necessity 
for the individual to come to terms with in order to be 
authentic; the individual must accept the undecidable 
nature of the Christian offense and accept it through 
faith.
One soon becomes aware that there is nothing aesthetic in itself, for what is aesthetic must express the spirit of being human- in its most diverse manifestations, including itsdegradations as idolatrous Christendom- and what is spirit always embodies the indirect communication which is metaphor and paradox.The same is true of the religious. To attempt to capture either God or human being- including the God-Individual- directly in image orconcept, or even directly outside the image or concept, is the rankest idolatry (heresy).There is no image outside its concept, except as idol, and there is not concept outside its image, except as idol.
Therefore, all that remains is the undecidable nature of
acceptance of the Christian offense, based on faith. The
religious is the offense, the paradox, the embodiment of
the communication as it should be in Christian form, and
is, therefore, by its very nature, undecidable.
I am not in complete agreement with Polka's
understanding of Kierkegaard's form of communication, but
it points in the right direction. Communication, in
Kierkegaard's authorship, begins with the tension that
exists between the direct communication of knowledge from
one individual to another and the indirect communication
of the truth of existence, on which every individuality
is based in actuality. For Polka, all the texts, and
hence Kierkegaard's theory on communication, become
religious. This is an impossibility, since the actual
^l^Polka, p.50
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cannot be appropriated fully into existence until the end 
of existence; the communication of the actual idea of the 
ideal within existence is an impossibility. In the 
development of the authorship, this tension is resolved 
wholly in favour of the indirect as the only means of 
communication which is vital for the individual. Yet, 
this understanding is lacking not only in Polka's 
development but also Kierkegaard's. Because the gravity 
of Kierkegaard's thought is centred around the exposition 
of Christianity as the actual truth of individual human 
existence, the functionality of communication in general 
terms is underdeveloped and impossible. More 
specifically, what is required is an interpretation of 
the value which communication has for the individual, 
within Kierkegaard's thought.
Kierkegaard's theories suggest the possibilities of 
communication, but are lacking in this specific instance. 
Beginning with the communication of knowledge, it is 
clear that communication fully expresses this aspect in 
both direct and indirect form. Indeed, as must be implied 
by the direction of this thesis, art, specifically as 
communication, can take place solely on this level, 
making known facts of existence as knowledge in pure 
form, having nothing to do with the existence of 
individuals per se. Historical facts, facts of 
appearance, and facts of narration are firmly rooted in 
the possibility of direct communication which can be 
concreted in " artistic" form. It is clear that this is 
the simplest and most obvious point of possibility for 
art as communication, and the least problematic. Yet, 
contra Polka and Kierkegaard, I question whether or not 
this interpretation of art communicates (as objectivity) 
the fact of the individual's existence and, therefore, 
whether art can have any value under this conception of 
it. Clear objective fact may state distinct objective 
truth, and is necessary for certain forms of 
understanding and interaction with actuality, but the 
conveyance of the truth of individuality in existence 
does not occur. The appropriation and application of
p. 72
actual ideal truths may also form a direction whereby the 
individual is able to more fully come to knowledge of the 
actual, but the actual is always in confrontation with 
existence until it becomes the existence of the 
individual (which occurs only in death). Thereby, 
communication itself always remains an impossibility, 
inadequate even in indirect form.
With indirect communication, the possibility of art 
becomes partially capable and, thereby, positive. 
Capability is more than the development through indirect 
means of an individual's faculties. Communication of such 
may declare what is necessarily and concretely required 
of the individual to exist in actuality, but points 
beyond actuality to the universal and eternal nature of 
existence as it exists for the receiving individual. 
Because the communication of capability is indirect, art 
too must be indirect and, through this indirectness, it 
has value for the individual. Art may not only be 
constructed of reflection and the maieutic but also a 
form of revelation and the materialising of faith itself. 
The possibility of art as the communication of capability 
addresses firmly the possibility of understanding and 
rejecting the esthetic manner of existence.
With this understanding of the communication of 
capability lies a second conceptualisation of art. Even 
the possibility of communication of the Christian as 
being necessarily indirect^^^ is also a further indication 
of another set of value for the possibility of art. 
Though Kierkegaard, at times, refuses to understand the 
purpose of any direct religious depiction (which would 
place any such communication as art form in the category 
of direct communication of knowledge, rather than the 
conveyance of self and Christian knowledge), art, as 
embodied communication, quite clearly can manifest, 
through indirect means, the requirements of an indirect 
communication of Christian truths. By presenting the 
paradoxical nature of the individual's relationship to
fulfilled by PC.
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Christianity through indirect means,us by even 
representing this relationship to existence alone, art as 
communication fulfils the possibilities of communication 
which Kierkegaard describes. It is, nevertheless, an 
impossibility. By addressing the paradox of existence, in 
relation to the actual (which occurs as the message and 
truth of Christianity), communication maintains a 
possibility of value in Kierkegaard's thought, but one 
which has its own problems.
Despite the Kierkegaardian description of 
communication and, in particular, of indirect 
communication and its apparent usefulness as a means of 
communicating the idea as ideal, the actual within 
existence, it still remains an impossibility. In terms of 
reflection, for example (which implies recollection, 
repetition, redoubling, and reduplication), it is 
important to note that reflection cannot be a result that 
directs itself out from the individual, but remain wholly 
within the individual's own dialectical and synthetic 
self. This is seen most clearly in the difference between 
the upbuilding discourses and the indirect and 
pseudonymous texts. In the first, reflection is not there 
to be communicated, but concerns itself with ideas which 
are already fixed, and seeks to directly change them. In 
the indirect texts, " reflection does not presuppose the 
qualifying concepts as given and understood; therefore, 
they [the indirect texts] must not so much move, mollify, 
reassure, persuade, as awaken and provoke men and sharpen 
thought." Regarding communication itself specifically, 
Kierkegaard makes this statement, expressing striving and 
how it is modified by grace:
With regard to the claim of ideality, it may be right to present the ideal higher than one himself is existentially if he then, note well, makes an admission concerning himself. In this area it may be right, for indeed one ought to express striving. But with regard to grace it would be nonsense if one proclaimed grace for
either the redoubling of reflection or through the very existence of the communicator, the artist and then by removing itself.
Vol. 1, p.263, <<641
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others and denied that it is for himself. Grace pertains to receiving, not to my worthiness but rather to my unworthiness. Without any embarrassment at all I can speak of grace because I thereby also speak indirectly of myown unworthiness. -^8
How can the actual ideal be presented? Only in striving, 
but only in a striving which is also an impossibility as 
communicable idea. Does Kierkegaard recognise this? 
Regarding specifically the actual, he does. However, what 
Kierkegaard does not recognise is that the very 
impossibility of communicating the actual means the 
communication itself becomes impossible in its entirety.
What is clear from another journal entry is that indirect
communication remains inadequate to the depiction of the 
actual ideal: " ...in connection with Christianity the
indirect method is only transitional, for Christianity, 
after all, has grace to proclaim." it must be noted, 
though, that grace is something which can only be given
to the individual by the actual ideal of God, and not
communicated as either knowledge or capability by another 
existing individual. Art is not grace. In this, 
communication embodies an unworthiness within the context 
of the actual.
vol. 2, p. 164, <<1470, A  188, n.d., 1849 
vol. 6, p. 427, <<6783, ^ A 395, n.d., 1851
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Part Two: Artist, Art Object, and the Death of Art 
Introduction
This section will serve as an introduction to the 
second part of my thesis, which provides the descriptive 
analysis of a Kierkegaardian aesthetic from within an 
exclusive focus on the potential of the art object. The 
first part of my thesis developed the Kierkegaardian 
grounds within which the art object must function. On the 
basis of the previous chapters therein, the art object 
can be considered to emerge as a type of communication 
which is ideal in nature (in that it is the communication 
between two individuals of knowledge of the truth of, for 
Kierkegaard, the Christian ideal or, more generally 
applicable, knowledge of the existing individual's 
relation to the ontological grounding of its existence as 
idea of the ideal) , dialectical (in that it involves a 
communication between two individuals, and contains in 
its nature opposing concepts), and in a specific relation 
to the individual (in that the communication must always 
be related to the existence of the individual, that which 
is creating and receiving the communication, involving 
the processes of refletiveness) . Furthermore, the art 
object is an indirect communication of knowledge and is 
necessarily so, within a Kierkegaardian framework, as the 
means which offers the greatest capability for the 
facilitation of the communication of the idea as ideal 
(as applicable and appropriateable idea), within the 
opposition of the individual's existential knowledge and 
its subjective individuality. This grounding, based on 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the individual, its 
relation to the actual ideal, and the communication of 
such an ideal through the idea of the ideal, leads to the 
potential for the art object as a catalyst for the 
receiving and the creating individual, instigating 
progression towards more complete knowledge of its 
relation to the actual ideal. A problem exists, however, 
in that the entire first part does not differentiate
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between the art object as such- as a material object
created by an individual and received by a single
individual- from communication as a whole. Kierkegaard
seems entirely unaware of the potential for any such
object to exist, one remaining wholly outside of the 
existence of an individuality and, yet, which is still 
applicable. Communication, for Kierkegaard, is always a 
communication between two individuals, and does not exist 
on the basis of an external third. The art object, 
therefore, does not exist directly within Kierkegaard's 
description of existence. This second part of my thesis 
will address this issue, and construct, from such a 
description, a positive potentiality for the art object.
In the first chapter, I discuss the nature of the
artist. Because the artist does not usually appear in the 
Kierkegaardian literature (either primary or secondary) 
with only a few exceptions, this has required utilising
that within the literature which might be understood as
describing an authentic artist. In no way does
Kierkegaard ever set out a definition of what the artist 
should be; his idea of an authentic communicator seems to 
reside solely in the individual capable, through the 
spoken or written word, to indirectly communicate the
ideal of the ideal and actual ontological grounding of 
the individual, in order for that individual to
appropriate it into their existence. This would seemingly 
deny the possibility of an authentic artist in the
Kierkegaardian philosophy in that an artist is usually 
considered one who is creating singular, material art 
objects that have a personal and an historical identity 
to them (historical in the sense of being located within 
a particular point in temporality). This denial is a
mistake on the part of K i e r k e g a a r d .  ^ 20
Because of this lack, I show that the artist, within 
Kierkegaard's writing, can play a role while producing
temporal, material, static (i.e. non-existing, in that
I am to follow the implications of Green in his wonderful book on the relation of Kant and Kierkegaard, it is a deliberate attempt to disguise Kierkegaard's personal inclinations.
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they do not change in an historical sense but remain the 
same in time) objects that are authentic in nature. What 
I mean by authentic is that they communicate not only the 
possibility of the ideal of the ontological grounding of 
the individual as idea but also, and more importantly, 
the actuality of such an ideal for the individual. From 
this first chapter emerges the most important point, 
determining the difference between a genius and an 
Apostle and the existence and identity of the artist as 
between the two, and the implications of this in terms of 
its creative activities.
The second deals with secondary sources, showing how 
they have been unable, with only a few exceptions, to 
focus on the potential for a Kierkegaardian art object 
from within the literature; they maintain, for the 
scholarly reasons, Kierkegaard's own prejudice. This is 
entirelly within acceptable reason but, because of my own 
predilections and interests in art, I would like to take 
my own Kierkegaard scholarship in a different step.
The third chapter describes the art object 
specifically as communication of the idea of the actual 
ideal, and as authentic in nature. This chapter describes 
and critiques a number of elements which have been left 
out up until this point, in particular the relation that 
Kierkegaard has to the art object and how that position 
shifts within the literature. What should be remembered 
is that the description of the art object is, to a great 
extent, dependent upon the first part of this thesis (as 
sumarised in the paragraph above). The concluding chapter 
of this part will answer, in part, the question of the 
omission of the authentic art object from Kierkegaard's 
writing, answering the question of the final development 
of art. This final development is the death of art. What 
I would like to describe is an art object whose ultimate 
(in the sense that it communicates and allows and informs 
the appropriation of the actual in the developing 
individual in the fullest sense) value is its lack of 
value. Kierkegaard himself, for a variety of reasons, 
seemed to ignore the art object. Why? Because he was
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unable to think its dialectical implications through to 
the end. 121 this sense, I am applying a corrective to
Kierkegaard himself, one on which to end. Like so much of 
the development of a Kierkegaardian art object, this is 
based on a dialectical development of radical 
contingencies. Its result? Art's value is its 
valuelessness.
I2iparticularly since his understanding of the dialectical requires a lack of ending- and yet his understanding of the communication requires an ending.
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Chapter Five- The Actuality of the Artist as an 
Individual
My interpretation of Kierkegaard has so far covered 
the grounding aspects of his philosophy related to the 
artist and the art object. I've proceeded along in the 
following manner: interpreting Kierkegaard's
understanding of the metaphysical nature of the 
individual and its ability to communicate and the means 
by which these produce the possibility^^'^ of art as 
authentic communication. I hope to have shown in this the 
development of the expression of the individual which has 
the possibility of authenticity, but what is also 
important is to show that the artist, as a producer of 
objects external to the individual, is an actual and 
positive (though unrecognised) possibility in 
Kierkegaard's philosophy, and this can be done by 
examining the actuality of the artist.
The first important point to understanding the 
actuality of art, for Kierkegaard, is to outline and 
analyse his statements about the artist himself. 
Statements on the nature of such an individual are 
scattered throughout the published and unpublished works, 
but I shall base my understanding of Kierkegaard's 
relationship to the artist on the following sources: 
" From the Papers of One Still Living" (published in 
EPW) , TA (containing " The Present Age" ) , "On the 
Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle" (published 
in Adler), PF, and Adler itself. This analysis shall be 
supplemented with entries on the artist from 
Kierkegaard's JP. A number of other texts contain 
important allusions to the nature of the artist- E/O II, 
FT, PV, and Crisis^23_ but the references contained 
therein are minor.
in that these aspects are the grounds for communication and are therefore the necessary conditions on which communication can take place.
I23ijhis is in part because much of the secondary literature adequately describes the artist or poet as they appear in these texts. Sylvia Walsh in particular does an interesting and important analysis of the ethical artist/poet as he appears in Either/Or. However, I am going to concentrate
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The artist is usually demoted to the esthetic 
stage, because his products are usually considered an
element of s u c h .  ^24 The artist is generally relegated to 
the esthetic stage by secondary literature and 
Kierkegaard. This is to such an extent that Kierkegaard 
seems, at times, to be completely dismissive of the 
possibility of the artist as a distinct identity. He
writes :
An artist, a poet, a scientist, etc. may very well live admired trough a whole lifetime, and it is accidental if such a one is persecuted or derided. Every such person relates himself differentially to the universally human, and, since his production is in the medium of the imagination it does not essentially touch existence... an ethicist relates himself to the universally human (consequently to every man, and equally, not differentially), and he relates himself to human existence as a requirement. 125
This problem occurs particularly when discussing the 
artist within a context determined by the esthetic. The 
esthetic stage of existence is a necessary one, in that 
it begins the process of the authentication of the 
individual towards a relation with the infinite. The 
esthetic stage is also that which damns most men to a 
lack of individuality. If the individual remains within 
the esthetic stage, then no development towards an
authentic self takes place. Such individuals see 
themselves as defined by the crowd; indeed, they see
themselves as defined by those things which they 
understand as commenting upon society. In the Diapsalmata
on the stated volumes because they provide the most direct information on the artist as a practising individual.
^24iMhy? Because of Kierkegaard's own inclinations (in favour of the artist as an individual- his activities when writing Either/Or would suggest this, though I would always like to avoid a biographical reasoning) and his desire to disguise or hide such from his 'public' in order to create a more 'perfect' image of himself.
I25j-p^ vol. 4, pp. 290-291, «4444; VIII^ A 160, n.d. , 1847; An interesting comment, which on sense denies the possibility of an authentic artist or art form. On another sense it also defines the possibility of creating an authentic art form, which must correspond to the ethical communication of the ethicist, and therefore the authentic artist must be at least equal to the ethicist. Of course, remaining an artist is, to a degree, an entirely accidental element in the development of an individual and therefore not related to its production in a universal and only in a particular sense, but that individual's form of communication as art remains, if authentic, an authentic communication of the ideal.
81
of E/O I, A writes: " people complain that the world is
so prosaic that things do not go in life as in the novel, 
where opportunity is always so favorable." Modern
life, contemporary life for Kierkegaard, was empty of 
meaning. However, the authentic artist, one who 
recognises his own development towards an understanding 
of his ontological grounding, and whose communication has 
passed through the various developments of form and 
content in the movement from immanence to transcendence, 
can surpass these difficulties and communicate to other 
individuals both his own and their development. The 
authentic artist is a communicator of the idea of the 
actual truth of existence as i d e a l ,  ^27 both because he is 
describing such a development for other individuals, as 
well as describing his own development. Because of this, 
the authentic artist is one who appears to be defined as 
either a genius or an Apostle, since both are 
communicators of such an idea. This is not, however, 
entirely true, and is an issue which Kierkegaard did not 
work out fully. The authentic artist is one who 
communicates within a reciprocal relationship (reciprocal 
both in the sense of others and himself) , developing 
others while at the same being developed through his 
message. In this sense, the authentic artist is a 
communicator of the ideal, but in what sense? Therein 
lies the question of the actual nature of the authentic 
artist in Kierkegaard's thought, one which he himself did 
not explicate.
The artist is a developing individual, something 
which is described and referred to in the secondary 
literature only briefly. Indeed, in Kierkegaard's 
writing, the artist is not much more than a minor figure, 
if one at all. However: " it is through sin that once
gains a first glimpse of salvation." ^28 The authentic 
artist and his production cannot be dismissed because of 
the inauthentic one. The art objects produced by the
^2Gg/o I, p.22
^27The beliefs of Christianity for Kierkegaard, the grounding nature of the individual.
1 2 8 ^ / 0  X, p . 2 0
p .  8 2
artist contain, within their material form of 
communication, an expression of the idea of the actual 
ideal of existence, and, therefore, the authentic artist, 
producing such forms of communication, is a valid subject 
to discuss within the philosophy.
The artist can be understood to be developed within 
Kierkegaard's thought in five stages. In the first, the 
definition of the artist by others who might have 
influenced Kierkegaard is explored. In the second, the 
artist, as expressed in his earlier writing, is shown 
contained within the emphasis on a life-view and a life- 
development. Kierkegaard's concern is to establish the 
authentic artist as one who has a passionate existential 
commitment to his own authenticity and seeks to 
communicate and develop in others that commitment. In the 
third, a definition emerges which can be found in both 
his pseudonymous as well as his signed work throughout 
his oeuvre, interpreting the artist as he interacts with 
other individuals. In the fourth, and most importantly, 
Kierkegaard differentiates between a genius and an 
Apostle. This differentiation is of vital importance, 
declaring the exact role of the artist in both his own 
and others' individual development. It distinguishes the 
difference between the genius as a communicator within 
immanence and the Apostle as a communicator within 
transcendence as revelation. In the fifth, I carry this 
distinction to its developed conclusions. It emerges, 
from the difference between the two, that the authentic 
artist is an individual who, by the very nature of its 
communication, exists in a position between the two. He 
is higher than a genius, but lower in relation to the 
ontological grounding of his individual existence than 
the Apostle. Furthermore, the artist, as existing between 
the genius and the Apostle, exists between immanence and 
transcendence. The artist's communication of the truth of 
the idea and its application as ideal is a dialectical 
combination of immanent truth, created through the 
imagination of the artist as an immanent individual, and 
the transcendent nature of its communication as ideal.
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Therefore, the artist's product exists between both. The 
implications from this are vital, in that the art object 
thereby becomes a combination of immanence and 
transcendence, creating an identity for itself which can 
only be understood as untruth. The further implication of 
this is that the art object communicates neither 
immanence nor transcendence, failing both. These 
implications are explored in the remaining chapters.
1. The Artist as Understood by Kierkegaard's Influences
What is first necessary for this elucidation is an 
elaboration of the identity of the artist as conceived by 
writers before Kierkegaard (Kant, Hegel, Schlegel, and 
the Romantics) and an examination of the actual means of 
communication by which the artist interacts with other 
individuals. It is not possible to state that Kierkegaard 
took from his readings on the nature of the artist 
anything in specific. He remained far too much of an 
individual to be thoroughly influenced by them. However, 
they can serve as a basis from which to elaborate on the 
exact nature of the Kierkegaardian artist.
An interpretation of artist within the framework of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy must take into account a 
definition of imagination as the basis for the artist's 
identity. Imagination is necessarily a vital aspect of 
any understanding of aesthetics concerns, informing the 
production of the art object as well facilitating an 
interpretation of such an object and the nature of the 
identity of the artist. More specifically, it is, for 
writers on the art whom Kierkegaard would have read, the 
crucial mean whereby the individual can be identified as 
an artist. What is interesting is that Kierkegaard did 
not, however, treat imagination at any length, while 
other writers did. It is a vital human faculty, but is of 
minor importance for Kierkegaard. Yet, it must be both 
defined and interpreted, since it is a vital faculty for 
the artist as artist for such individuals as Kant, Hegel, 
and others.
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The origin of the early 19th century's conception of 
imagination is Kant. Kant can be understood as a seedbed 
for the Romantic and Idealist understanding and
application of imagination, having established 
imagination at the centre of epistemological and 
aesthetic concerns. Contrary to the misgivings of the 
Enlightenment, of the rational and empirical approach, 
which could not properly place imagination in a
philosophical context, Kant did not dismiss the
irrationality of imagination, but vindicated it by 
establishing a new function for imagination both 
epistemologically and aesthetically.
Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason is 
limited to the processes of understanding of the subject 
in relationship to externality, to the capacity for 
comprehension of the manifold of experience.
If this intuition is to match a concept, wemust have an active power or ability tostructure the particular features of thatintuition in accordance with the structure of the concept; this power is what Kant calls our 'imagination.' The imagination " apprehends"(takes up) what is given in intuition and then puts together or " combines" this diversity (or " manifold" ) so that it matches the concept. In this way the imagination " exhibits" ... theconcept, i.e., provides it with a matching or " corresponding" i n t u i t i o n . ^ 29
It is not, however, limited only to the reception, but
can also function in a productive and reproductive
capacity. It is reproductive in that it allows the
possibility of the connection of disparate associations
of experience, and it is productive in " possessing a
higher transcendental function necessary for empirical
experience and the association of ideas." ^20 imagination
allows the orderly perception of the world while
producing, through association, the continual perception
of the manifold in space and time, appearances being
experienced thus in a unified and rational manner. It is
2-29Kant, Critique of Judgement, , translated Pluhar, Werner S., translator's preface, p. xxxv 
2-3OgQuv/ens, p. 18
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the capacity for matching empirical judgements with
empirical intuition.
Imagination in the Critique of Judgement acquires a 
greater role. In addition to being a capacity for 
structuring experience, it also becomes a part of
aesthetic and teleological judgements. In the experience 
of the beautiful imagination and understanding combine in 
free play. In a confrontation with the sublime the 
imagination is unable to present the experience to the 
understanding for reasoning, but the imagination is not 
denied its ability to continue the experience in a 
negative infinity.
It does not achieve the repose belonging to thebeautiful, but strives without success for apositive representation, since the imagination and reason, in the experience of the sublime, are in conflict. There is no " what" in the imagination's experience, but only the sense of the apeiron, the boundless, " the ground of which... is concealed from itself." Thus, Kant refuses to conclude that the imagination delivers an epiphany. The imagination does not give access to the positive Infinite, but only a sense of the powers and dignity of the self. 2-31
The imagination is thus, in Kant's system of experience, 
a means of upholding, or upbuilding, the individual's own 
sense of capability as a subjective individual, something 
inherently ethical in nature and, therefore, appealing to 
Kierkegaard. This upbuilding is, with the Romantics, 
taken to extremes. Kant writes in the Critique of 
Judgement :
§49 ...presentations of the imagination we may call ideas. One reason for this is that they do at least strive toward something that lies beyond the boundary of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus [these concepts] are given a semblance of objective reality. Another reason, indeed the main reason, for calling those presentations ideas is that they are inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely a d e q u a t e . 2-32
2-3iibid., p. 21
^^^Critlgue of Pure Reason, pp. 182-183
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and §4 9 Now if a concept is provided with 
[unterlegen] a presentation of the imagination such that, even though this presentation belongs to the exhibition of the concept, yet it prompts, even by itself, so much thought as can never be comprehended within a determinate concept and thereby the presentation aesthetically expands the concept itself in an unlimited way, then the imagination is creative in [all of] this and sets the power of intellectual ideas (i.e. reason) in motion: itmakes reason think more, when prompted by a [certain] presentation, than what can be apprehended and made distinct in the presentation (though the thought does pertain to the concept of the object [presented]) . 122
These two statements provide some link to the expansion
of the imagination which takes place with later
developments, particularly the work of Fichte, Schelling,
and the Romantics as a whole. Later thinkers identified
in Kant a split between nature and freedom, and sought in
different ways to provide an answer to the bridging
towards the ideal or the expanding of the individual's
experience. Kant's interpretation is more common-
sensical, but this did little to curb the excited
activities of later thinkers.
For Fichte, imagination was the source of the
categories of experience, determining in and through the
imaginative capability of the ego the whole of the
objective experience of nature. Imagination is a
foundational process and capability of the ego in the
production of the non-ego. The system of Fichte played a
vital role in Kierkegaard's thought, providing along with
Hegel a philosophical system that he could react against.
Fichte's system is found primarily in his Science of
Knowledge (1794). The focus of Fichte's philosophical
system is to provide an alternative to the followers of
Kant, whom he labels " dogmatists" , as opposed to his own
thought which he terms idealism. For Fichte, dogmatism is
a form of thought which stresses the external in reality,
the so-called objective or real. Fichte's criticism of
dogmatism is that it cannot account for the existence of
2-23Critique of Pure Reason, p. 183
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consciousness or conscious selves, i.e. that it is 
mechanistic in its approach to reality and thereby 
excludes the possibility of freedom. Fichte would have 
philosophy based on a purely subjective level, inclining 
towards the personal as the source of philosophical 
knowledge rather the impersonal. Idealism should be the 
emphasis of philosophical thought, insisting on the self 
as sufficient. For Fichte, dogmatism ascribed to the 
conscious self an unconscious origin, and felt that 
idealism, centring its thought on the individual self,
would destroy this view. His approach came to a head in 
his description of the opposing concepts of self and not- 
self, seeing both as exclusive, yet also viewing the not- 
self as having its source in the self. It is this aspect 
of the s e l f  2-34 which was to have a decisive effect on 
Kierkegaard's thought in terms of his understanding of
the imagination, in both a positive and negative manner.
Schelling, like Fichte and others, who are linked to 
Romanticism, affirmed the possibility of achieving the 
positive Infinite, i.e., knowledge of the ideal. For 
Schelling, imagination acts primarily in this capacity in 
the production of art as manifestation of absolute world 
unity, in a manner that is similar to Fichte's 
description of the positions of the self. He writes:
the imagination does not simply emulate theplay of reason in going beyond nature, butactually attains the secret of nature that is beyond unaided philosophical reason. The imagination has such power because... imagination stands at the beginning and the end of Schelling's system of transcendental idealism. Experience begins before consciousness with the individual's primitive productive perception, progresses to the act of coming to consciousness with reflection and reproductive perception, and moves then to the aesthetic perception as productivity with consciousness.The importance of the imagination is that it is the subject of the whole development of the " I" from the beginning to the end, and can be spoken of as the true fundamental capacity of
t h e  s e l f .  235
234Discussed in greater detail in the first appendix on the self. 
235Qouwens, p. 24
with the production of art, the identity of the real and 
the ideal occur in concrete combination. Kant's 
imaginative creations are only emulations of reason's 
attempts to comprehend the ideal, while for Schelling, 
the imaginative production of art is a material 
attainment reached in aesthetic intuition.
The splendid German word " imagination" 
{Einbildunskraft) actually means the power of 
mutual informing into unity {Ineinsbildung) upon which all creation is based. It is the power whereby something ideal is simultaneously something real, the soul simultaneously the body, the power of individuation that is the real creative power. 236
It is both Fichte's and Schelling's development which
establishes the position of the German Romantics.
With the German Romantics, the conception and
application of imagination expands, not only as a
metaphysical tool, but also as a cultural, historical,
and religious concept. The artist becomes a creative
genius, his personal creative powers a source for art's
fantastic forms. From both Fichte's and Schilling's
developments beyond Kant, the Romantics posited an
imagination whose creative powers were identified as the
distinguishing element of the poetic genius above the
common individual. In particular, the imagination would
be able to be used to unite the unconscious activities of
such a poetic genius with the conscious activities in
which the subject is related to an object of such
activities. This is not just a creative, productive
ability. Poets such as Novalis237 used imagination as both
an active and passive capability, receptive and creative,
but this combination asserted a new freedom by opening
all experience to the artist's abilities to manipulate
and produce new form, a new openness of human
possibility, active imagination and passive imagination
creating in freedom a new sense of the individual's
possible union with the Infinite.
236schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 32
237por example, Novalis' Hymns to the Night. Another example of this is the paintings of Friedrich and, in particular, Runge.
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The Romantics' use of imagination resulted in two 
distinct types of religious vision, depending upon the 
conception of the relationship of infinity and the 
striving of the individual. The first form (which can be 
identified with Novalis and later Schlegel) is a religion 
of transcendence, a striving for the Infinite through the 
use and transcendence of the finite world. It can be 
typified by such statements of Schlegel as:
The mind... can understand only the universe. Let imagination take over and you will have a God.Quite right: for imagination is man's facultyfor perceiving d i v i n i t y ,
The second form (Schleiermacher and early Schlegel) holds
that the Infinite, within the experience of the world,
finds, and is given in the finite world, the revelation
of its existence. Imagination is the means of perceiving
the world as infused, impregnated by the Infinite's
truth. Imitation is maintained as important, but
imitation in the face of the world's plenitude.
The two views are united in their application of
irony, a distancing of self from the normal realm of
human experience. Irony appears in both objective and
subjective form, it may even be applied to such a degree
that the artist must be ironic about his own production.
In its ironic form, it signifies a detachment from the
world itself. In a subjective form, it signifies a
detachment from the artist's own production. It finds one
of its high points in the work of Solger, who gives a
theoretical account of both forms (objective and
subjective). Solger's approves of subjective irony's
understanding and recognition of the ephemeral quality of
artistic accomplishments while also seeing objective
irony's relativising of the world as a means of
simultaneously preserving the world. Imagination is vital
in either application of irony. For Solger,
all art is ironic because it is all symbolic, reflecting a gap between the loftiness of the act of its creation and the transitoriness of the unity it achieves out of opposites. In the
^3®Schlegel, Friedrich, Lucinde and the Fragments, brans. Firchow, P., p. 242
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act of creativity, the imagination symbolizes the divine creativity in which act and achievement are united. At the same time the poet's imagination, with subjective irony, sees the nothingness of one's own efforts. Objective irony, however, represents imagination's triumph, for in " world-irony" the art object is created. The imagination is the key to this entire dynamic, artistic production.
It is the imagination which allows the binding process of
opposites to be contained in the production of the
singular, material, communicative object. For the
Romantic individual, the production of the imagination
achieves not only aesthetic objects but the means of
grasping, in ironic detachment, the meaning of life, the
Infinite within and grounding the Finite, the basis for
freedom and the development of the world.
Kierkegaard's early analysis and response to
Romanticism is that it is grounded by unsatisfied
yearning. He appreciates the Romantic imagination and
irony, but was aware also of the inner infinity
produced by the irony of reflection. Through this, he
establishes a position viewing Romanticism as inadequate
for the individual, striving after the infinite without
regard for the dialectical nature of actuality, which
necessarily contains the finite.
Kierkegaard criticised the Romantics' understanding
of imagination on two counts. First, they expanded the
function of the imagination to such a degree that they
lose themselves; human freedom, in producing a vision of
the infinite, always remains bound to the finite, thereby
contradicting itself, unless both the infinite and the
finite are maintained in a dialectical relationship.
Second, the finite always remains to produce an
unsatisfactory relationship between the finite and the
infinite, a doubled sense of negativity. The imaginative
capabilities of the Romantics expanded the ideal to such
a degree that the actual was lost, losing both the world
^^^Gouwens, p. 34
appreciation developed in his thesis on irony.
^^^Schlegel: " Only in relation to the infinite is there meaning and purpose; whatever lacks such a relation is absolutely meaningless and pointless." t tSchlegel, Friedrich, Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Firchow, P., p. 241
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and the self. Actuality is not the product of a dream but 
is retained and developed for the individual as part of 
the activity of the individual. The Romantics established 
in their use of imagination possibilities of actuality 
but not actuality itself. The actual then acts against 
the Romantics productions, since their imagination is no 
longer rooted in actuality.
To live Romantically, for Kierkegaard, is to live in 
imagination as possibility, denying the actuality of the 
self as concrete e x i s t e n c e . Any attempt to incorporate 
actuality into the possibilities of imagination fails 
because imagination remains the basis for such 
incorporation, i.e. the incorporation of the finite into 
the infinite fails if only the infinite is acknowledged. 
Gouwens summarises Kierkegaard's position:
Schlegel, Tieck, and Solger in different ways represent the same unsuccessful incorporation of actuality into possibility. Schlegel most clearly denies actuality and flees into an imaginary life that falsely claims to attain infinity in an ideal life; but the finite takes its revenge, and the imaginative idealization dissolves into sensuality. Tieck's denial of actuality produces formlessness in his poetic production. His imagination, opposed to the static forms of the philistine world, makes his artistic work arbitrary and empty. Lacking a definite relation to the ideal, his imagination vitiates both the infinite, ever-vanishing ideal and the finite world. Solger's attempt to give a philosophical and religious account of the place of irony that retains the finite fails, since his understanding of the artistic movement dissolves the finite into an imagined nothingness.
In effect, the Romantics lacked a proper development of 
form and content of the dialectical relationship of 
possibility and necessity, resulting in communcation and 
knowledge of the the actual, which would dialectically 
unite, for the individual, as communication the infinite 
and the finite, the idea and the ideal. From The Concept 
of Irony, containing the criticism of the writing of
142This affirmation is an inclincation of the affirmation of the necessity of the physicality of the art object.143Gouwens, p . 3 8
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Schlegel's Lucinde, Kierkegaard notes a particular 
example of the fantastic realms that the Romantics 
imagination occupies:
He hopes to achieve the purely poetic in this manner, and as he abandons all understanding and lets fantasy alone prevail... This (letting fantasy alone prevail) is repeated throughout 
Lucinde. Who would be so inhuman as not to be able to enjoy the free play of fantasy, but that does not imply that all of life should be abandoned to imaginative intuition. When fantasy alone gains the upper hand in this way, it exhausts and anaesthetizes the soul, robs it of all moral tension, makes life a dream. But this is essentially what Lucinde attempts to promote... This [the purpose of Lucinde] clearly means that when the understanding has reached its apex, its order should give way to fantasy, which now alone is to prevail and not be an interlude in the task of life.
The imagination of the Romantics was interpreted by
Kierkegaard as a force which allowed the individual to
'go beyond' itself into the fantastic. Though
Kierkegaard's interpretation of Lucinde does not always
match the actual premise of the book, nevertheless his
general conception of the Romantic form of imagination is
indicative of the development of his own understanding of
it.
Kierkegaard understanding of Hegelian and Idealist 
conceptions of imagination is just as polemical. Hegel, 
like Kierkegaard, was extremely critical of the Romantics 
for their indulgences in a bad sense of the infinite. The 
Romantic form of art is a development out of the 
classical, a transition to a higher form of the 
expression of the ideal. For Hegel, this is a denial of 
the expression of the ideal.
The romantic form of art cancels again the completed unification of the Idea and its reality, and reverts, even if in a higher way,to that difference and opposition of the twosides which in symbolic art remain unconquered... Abandoning this [classical] position [the
144,‘CJ, p. 292
is over-rated- disjointed as it is, it serves very little as an example of the individual ‘going beyond' and perhaps can only be criticised for its lack of imagination at times.
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correspondence of the spiritual and the sensuous], the romantic form of art cancels the undivided unity of classical art because it has won a content which goes beyond and above the classical form of art and its mode of expression.
The embodiment of the romantic form of art necessitates a 
further separation of the ideal and the sensuous. Inward 
self-consciousness has advanced to understand the true 
element of the development of the Absolute, but this has 
become one which can only be realised in spiritual 
knowing. Therefore, the romantic form of art, as the 
Hegelian third stage of the development of art, is one of 
free concrete spirituality manifested spiritually, as 
part of the inner world. However, all art is an external 
manifestation or expression.
Now since spirituality has withdrawn into itself out of the external world and immediate unity therewith, the sensuous externality of shape is for this reason accepted and represented, as in symbolic art, as something inessential and transient... The aspect of external existence is consigned to contingency and abandoned to the adventures devised by an imagination whose caprice can mirror what is present to it, exactly as it is, just as readily as it can jumble the shapes of the external world and distort them grotesquely.i*?
While his treatment of the Romantics (not the romantic
form of art, but the individuals who could be called the
'Romantics') is not considered necessarily remarkable, it
is crucial to understanding Kierkegaard's developed
stance on imagination. Hegel writes;
Of course we are accustomed to rate a free production of the imagination higher than the manipulation of material already available, but the imagination cannot go so far as to provide the required harmony so firmly and definitely as it already lies before us in actual reality...
It initially establishes Hegel in opposition to the
Romantics, a position which Kierkegaard himself eroded.
^^^Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 79 
14'^Ibid., p. 81 
1‘^ ^Ibid., 256
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For Hegel, imagination is important in 
representation as the capacity to create images but 
subordinate to reason. Representation is recollected or 
inwardly directed intuition, " and as such is the middle 
between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself 
immediately subject to modification and that where 
intelligence is in its freedom, or, as thought." 
Representation is between intuition and thought, forming 
an image from intuition, but not as part of thought. It 
begins with intuition and the ready-found material of 
intuition: " The intelligence which is active in this
possession is the reproductive imagination, where the 
images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego, 
which is now the power over them." Its products,
however, in the mind, do not grow into notions until they
reach the stage of thought and, therefore, do not act 
within the actual.
Representation is divided into recollection, 
imagination, and memory and is reproductive rather than 
being productive. For Hegel:
imagination, in its turn, contains three forms into which it unfolds itself. It is, in general, the determinant of the images [which are to be present through memory for reason].At first, however, it does no more thandetermine the images as entering into existence. As such, it is merely the reproductive imagination. This has thecharacter of merely formal activity.But, secondly, imagination not merely recalls the images existent in it but connects them with one another and in this way raises them to 
general ideas or representations. Accordingly, at this stage, imagination appears as the activity of associating ideas.The third stage in this sphere is that in which intelligence posits general ideas or representations as identical with the 
particular aspect of the image and so gives the former a pictorial existence. This sensuous comprises creative imagination [Phantasie], which produces symbols and signs, the latter forming the transition to memory.
^4 9Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 201 
iSOibid., p. 206
p. 208
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Imagination in the psychology of the individual at this 
point is composed of definite and concrete subjectivity. 
This concretion of ideas in the subjectivity, however, is 
not yet at-hand for the manipulation by reason. 
Imagination is merely the means of allowing the process 
of memory to develop.
Furthermore, imagination for Hegel is the source for 
the production of art, the capacity to begin the 
production in the artist of the artist's expression of 
the ideal, but it is not the capacity to extend such 
sources fully. Hegel does not truly progress the idea of 
imagination in the " Lectures on Fine Art" .
This central element of imagination 
[Vorstellung] therefore draws something from both spheres. From thinking it takes the aspect of spiritual universality which grips together into a simpler determinate unity things directly perceived as separate; from visual artit keeps things juxtaposed in space andindifferent to one another. For imagination is essentially distinguished from thinking by reason of the fact that, like sense-perception from which it takes its start, it allowsparticular ideas to subsist alongside one another without being related...is2
Imagination is subordinate to reason. It is only an
expression of a passage through the spirit, arising from
spiritual productive activity as a product of the
subjective productivity of the artist through activity of
the artist's reason. Indeed, in The Philosophy of Mind,
imagination is almost a static element in the production
of the embodiment of ideas, almost as a " store of
ideas" rather than as a creative power. The art object
is an undivided entity produced through the
constitutional activity of the imagination.
This activity is the rational element which exists as spirit only in so far as it actively drives itself forth into consciousness, yet what it bears within itself it places before itself only in sensuous form. Thus this activity has a spiritual content which yet it configurates sensuously because only in this
^^^Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 1035 
^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 209
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sensuous guise can it gain knowledge of the content.
Though this might be the source for productive sensuous 
form- i.e., the configuration of a new form, imagination 
remains, however, primarily reproductive- productive use 
of the imagination is limited. Hegel writes:
Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being, one's own and what is picked up, internal and external, are completely welded into one... The creations of the imagination are on all hands recognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of intuition...i5s
Sensuous material, the opposite of thought, is grasped,
manipulated, to become the repository of the content as
Idea, manifesting the truth of the Idea in sensuous form,
such that :
imagination rests rather on the recollection of situations lived through, of experiences enjoyed, instead of being creative itself. Recollection preserves and renews the individuality and the external fashion of the occurrence of such experiences, with all their accompanying circumstances, but does not allow the universal to emerge on its own account.
Imagination is the capability of the individual to
produce " self-sprung" ideas through the recollection of
experience. Though art may develop beyond the merely
sensuous to the medium of language (which embodies most
fully the art form of the Romantics in Hegel's system),
it is still surpassed in history as an outmoded form of
consciousness.
Imagination, when regarded as the agency of this unification, is reason, but only a nominal reason, because the matter or theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference; whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content.
It is almost as if the products, resulting from the
imagination in a creative capacity, are without truth,
even though they derive their content from the truth of
^^^Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 40 
^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 211 
^^^Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 4 0 
^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 211
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the individual subject's sensuous experiences. In that 
sense, imagination remains an extremely limited capacity 
(though infinite in its relation to the finite) , and, 
because of this limitation, the union with the Absolute, 
the realisation of the Idea, most occur in a development 
through religion into rational thought.
This limitation is wholly present in Hegel's
conception of the artist. The Hegelian artist remains 
linked inextricably to the development of the Idea within 
its specific historical manifestations. In effect, the 
Hegelian artist is unable to utilise its power of
imagination to a full extent, but is beholden to the 
identity of it circumstances. However, within the 
Aesthetics, the role of the artist emerges in an
interesting manner. Hegel writes:
But since this whole stage of art by itspresentation of the external makes straight for an exterior effect we may cite as its further general character the production of effects... Producing effects is in general the dominating tendency of turning to the public, so that the work of art no longer displays itself as peaceful, satisfied in itself, and serene; on the contrary, it turns inside out and as it were makes an appeal to the spectator and tries to put itself into relation with him by means of the mode of portrayal. Both, peace in itself and turning to the onlooker, must indeed be present in the work of art, but the two sides must be in the purest equilibrium. If the work of art in the severe style is entirelly shut in upon itself without wishing to speak to a spectator, it leaves us cold; but if it goes too far out of itself too him, it pleases but is without solidity are at least does not please (as it should) by solidity of content and the simple treatment and presentation of that content. In that event this emergence from itself falls into the contingency of appearance and makes the work of art itself into such a contingency in which what we recognise is no longer the topic itself and the form which the nature of the topic determines necessarily, but the poet and the artist with his subjective aims, his workmanship and his skill in execution. In this way the public becomes entirelly free from the essential content of the topic... In the severe style, on the other hand, it is as if nothing at all were granted to the spectator; it is the content's substance
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which in its presentation severely and sharply reduces any subjective judgement.
Hegel would seem to be suggesting that the artist is one
who can both act within the development of the Absolute
as a manifestation of historical progressive identity as
well as function specifically within historical
conditionality of the singular individual as
individuality. The artist and its production acts both as
a display of the development of the Idea as well as an
embodiment of its nature as artist.
Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel is multifarious.
This last point about the artist, which seems in
contradiction to much of Hegel's own aesthetics, is
something I am certain he would be in agreement with-
but, concerning imagination, it is initially simple.
Despite agreeing with Hegel's criticism of the Romantics,
he sees Hegel limiting the imagination too much, while at
the same time allowing it a freedom in areas which it
does not warrant it. This develops on three levels.
First, Hegel^^^ devalues imagination and feeling. The
progression to the rational realisation of the Idea is
inadequate because it leaps over the existential
situation of the individual; it removes the individual's
characteristic primitivity. Second, Hegel and the
Idealists, despite their criticism of the Romantics' use
of imagination, remain just as fantastic as the Romantics
themselves. This criticism is particularly related to
Danish Idealism and the work of Heiberg specifically, and
rooted in Kierkegaard's analysis that both the Romantics
and the Idealists live in possibility rather than
actuality (produced by imagination or through imagination
by reason) ; the Romantics in poetic possibility, and the
Idealists in speculative or intellectual possibility.
From both standpoints, possibility is higher than
actuality, and Kierkegaard would posit the ethical in
substitution and opposition for possibility, rooted in a
^^®Hegel, Aesthetics, Vol. 2, pp. 619-620
the Idealists in general, since Kierkegaard has in mind Danish Hegelianism as well.
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passionate attachment to the individual's existence. 
Imagination may produce poetic possibilities, but a 
danger exists in allowing possibility the semblance of 
actuality. The individual remains an individual in 
actuality, but its existence is transferred through the 
incorrect use of imagination into the realm of 
possibility, and the infinite and the finite are not 
realised in authentic combination. Third, Gouwens 
believes that Kierkegaard would also criticise the 
Romantics and the Idealists because their conception of 
imagination is limited rather than embodying infinite 
possibility. This is the first step towards a positive 
role for imagination. Kierkegaard's goal, the purpose of 
the authorship, is to advance passionate attachment to 
actuality within existence as a way of developing the 
individual towards an appropriation of the actual truth 
of existence as ontologically grounded. Because of this, 
he must
redefine the imagination as more than either Idealism's " surpassed medium" or the Romantic's aestheticism. The imagination must also be seen as a passion and an activity characterising a " higher enthusiasm" -- the enthusiasm of the " subjective thinker."
The third position Gouwens defines as the imaginative-
passion, a process of transforming the imaginative-
passion of the esthetic to the imaginative-passion of the
subjective thinker, one concerned with its own
development and the development of others in time. This
is done through inwardness, a directing of passion and
imagination to the infinite, within the self, rather than
to an external infinite. The medium changes from the
possibility of imaginative constructions or speculations
to expressions of the inwardly-directed existence of the
subjective individual.
Positive imagination at this point means that
imagination must be related to a negative infinity, but
also a positive infinity. A positive infinity, which can
be reconciled with actuality, exists in religion and
ISOGouwens, p. 117
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mastered irony. Imagination still contains possibilities, 
but at the early stage of the authorship Kierkegaard 
remains unsure.
Despite the hints of a more positive role for the imagination, Kierkegaard views it, by and large, in a negative fashion in The Concept of 
Irony. The imagination, perhaps even more than irony, is the subject of a sustained polemic.His primary interest is to restrain the claims of the imagination to be either the key to the infinite or in any way adequate for a truly human life... The possible positive senses of the imagination are not [yet] developed...iGi
But, as the authorship and the writings in the journals
progress, a certainty in the role of the imagination
emerges.
Kierkegaard's own notion of the fullest development 
imagination is one which is specifically different from 
the preceding ideas. Imagination is, first of all, 
central to logic, abstract thought, and objective 
knowledge; second, imagination in the esthetic is a 
corruption of the first, the abstract; third, imagination 
functions in the qualitative dialectic, part of the 
development in existence for the individual towards the 
appropriation of the actual truth of existence. 
Imagination is basic to thinking, but in an anti- 
speculative manner, as an activity of the individual. 
Kierkegaard focuses on the development from actuality to 
possibility in this respect. In abstract thought, the 
imagination is an abstraction from existence to 
possibility, a endless process, unless halted by the will 
of the individual.
Only when reflection comes to a halt can a beginning be made, and reflection can be halted only by something else, and this something else is something quite different from the logical, being a resolution of will.
This process involves an abstraction from the self, a
denial of the self's place in the process. Unfortunately,
imagination contains the danger of moving from
p. 81
^^^CUP, trans. Swenson, D., PUP, 1941, p. 103; quoted in Gouwens, p. 179
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abstraction to pure thought, obscuring the 
differentiation between essence and being, positing a 
fantastic identity crisis in which thought and being are 
equivocated. Imagination is not, however, a purely 
negative force in the development and thought of the 
individual, since it may first be, and is, necessarily a 
part of the establishing of the forms of expression 
required for thought and communication. Imagination is 
the means of splitting reality and ideality, an 
identifying immediacy in the dialectical consciousness of 
the individual, such that reflection can occur. 
Imagination, as identifying immediacy, is, thus, one of 
the primary tools to understand the individual. This tie 
to immediacy Gouwens identifies in three stages: 1. the
origin of the categories, 2. theoretical consciousness, 
and 3. objective knowledge.
The origin of the categories is rooted in Gouwens' 
reading of SUD. Kierkegaard labels imagination as the 
origin of categories, derived in part from his reading of 
Fichte. Kierkegaard agrees with Fichte in saying that 
imagination is their origin, including any a priori 
categories. Gouwens:
In reflection, the ideal and the real are posited over against one another, and the imagination helps generate the synthetic a 
priori categories applicable to contingent knowledge, plus the necessary logical laws of thought. The a priori is both a gift and a task; it is an activity, and yet something not simply generated by the self.
In any analysis constructed by a thinking individual, the
ideal and the real are separated. Thus, in thought, the
categories of experience are separated from the real
experience of the individual. It is the imagination that
brings them together in the continuing existence of the
individual.
The activity of the imagination, then, not only posits the ideal realm as opposed to the real in the beginning of language, but, as part of
163Gouwens, p . 151
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that activity, gives rise to the categories " receptively." 1^4
Objects exist, but are undifferentiated and, thus, not
objects until categorised by the imagination of the
subject. This shows
the essential feature of Kierkegaard's understanding of knowledge in an age dominated by Idealism: knowledge is the result of humanactivity, and in the operations of the imagination in positing the ideal and the real, certain a priori concepts are g i v e n . iss
In effect, imagination is the one of the key means of
understanding the Kierkegaard's system of epistemology.
Yet, this is also a misinterpretation of his description
of experience, since the imagination is interpreted as
producing a priori categories, and Gouwens gives too much
emphasis to the powers of the imagination at this point.
This is an incorrect understanding, since the imagination
can only determine the a priori categories from within
the esthetic stage as possibilities generated within the
subjectivity of the individual. Rather, the categories
are given to the individual and can only be understood in
actual truth in existence, rather than in the existential
truth in existence. Nevertheless, this does provide an
understanding of the categories at an esthetic level. iss
Theoretical consciousness is a transitional stage,
one in which the individual is aware of the separation of
the self, such that consciousness is both an awareness of
p. 152 
p. 152
I were to posit the role of imagination in an epistemological sense from within this Kierkegaardian framework, I would concentrate on the senses of immediacy rather than imagination- allowing imagination only a conductive role- because all experience (even transcendent experience) is immediately given to the individual. Immediacy in the first stage of existence of the individual is one of spontaneous interaction with experience of the actual world, without imagination. In the second stage of immediacy, imagination functions in the manner described by Gouwens, separating reality and ideality in existence (since the concerns of the individual are not ones of existence and actuality at this stage) but also producing the possibilities of the third stage of immediacy. In the third stage, knowledge of truth through imagination becomes one of a combination of the real and the ideal, an awareness of the separation of existence and the actual, which allows a full understanding of the categories of existence as existing in actuality. The development of the individual then results in an appropriation of the actual, a separation of the real and the ideal as grounded by actuality, and the construction by imagination of the individual's place in actuality. This process more closely matches Gouwens' own interpretation of the changing role of imagination in the development of the individual, though here his emphasis is strangely incorrect.
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consciousness, the process of constructing a 
consciousness of the real and the ideal (again, before an 
awareness of the differences between the existential and 
the actual), and the consciousness of such a process. 
This leads into objective knowledge and the role of the 
imagination there. Imagination has a role in theoretical 
and empirical knowledge as well. In objective knowledge, 
a disjunctive exists between thought and being; truth 
becomes an object of thought, but how does one move to 
truth in objectivity? Objective knowledge of truth is 
only an approximation, but the imagination facilitates 
this.
Thinking [in a quantitative dialectical manner] for Kierkegaard is an individual act that requires imagination; it involves projection, sympathy, insight, and suggestion. Precisely because it requires imagination to be a thinker, thinking is for Kierkegaard an eminently human activity.
The quantitative dialectic is more important. Imagination
is no longer employed merely as the means of identifying
ideality in existence, but is now concerned with the
possibility of the development within subjectivity.
The self is reflection, and the imagination is reflection, us the rendition of the self as the self's possibility. The imagination is the possibility of any and all reflection, and the intensity of this medium is the possibility of the intensity of the self.
Positing the idea, imagination extends the immediate,
providing the possibility of all reflection, within a
movement towards the ideal. Imagination is the medium for
the process of infinitizing the finite, becoming
identical as reflection with the process and the
possibilities of the individual. Imagination is a key
element in the individual's becoming conscious of itself,
opening possibilities for the self that the individual
existing self was not conscious of, and effecting a
variety of responses.
157
168Gouwens, p. 155 SUD, p. 31
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Imagination takes a further development in the 
ethical stage of the individual. In the ethical 
development, the aesthetic and the esthetic are not lost. 
In the esthetic stage, actuality is almost the enemy of 
an authentic use of the imagination, even in the daily 
activities of existence. Echoing the sentiments found in 
R, before the party for the esthetic individuals in " In 
Vino Veritas" , Constantin's apprehension in Stages on 
Life's Way is expressed thus:
Even though one knows that one is driving to a banquet and consequently indulges momentarily in imagining the sumptuousness of it, yet the impact of the natural environment is so powerful that it must prevail. The only fear Constantin had was that this would not happen, for just as there is no force so proficient as the imagination in embellishing everything, so, too, there is no other force able to play havoc with everything when things go wrong for one in the moment of encounter with actuality.^®®
Actuality is the enemy to the esthete and the imaginative
productions of the individual; imaginative possibilities
presented to the individual exclude the concreteness of
actuality. In the relationship between the actual self
and an ideal self, imagination emerges as part of the
significance of choice, the transition and separation of
possibility and actuality, the process of the concretion
of actuality in existence, and as the inner ingredient in
the infinite of the ethical.
Just as finitude is the limiting aspect in relation to infinitude, so also necessity is the constraint in relation to possibility. Inasmuch as the self as a synthesis of finitude and infinitude is established, is Kaxa 6uva|j,iv [potential] , in order to become itself it reflects itself in the medium of imagination, and thereby the infinite possibilities become manifest. The self is Kaxa ôuvaf.iiv [potentially] just as possible as it is necessary, for it is indeed itself, but it has the task of becoming itself. Insofar as it is itself, it is the necessary, and insofar as it has the task of becoming itself, it is a possibility.
Stages on Life's Way, p. 26170SUD, p. 35
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For both the actual and the ideal self, the movement of 
the ethical is twofold. In R the letters from the Young 
Man, expose the emptiness of the esthetic imagination, 
the lack of choice which does not produce a movement 
within existence, as found in this quotation from his 
'silent confidant':
" What foolish contradiction is often found in human cowardliness and courage. One fears to see something terrible but has the courage to do it... If you know what you want, why and how much, then you ought to inspect, you ought to respect, every argument and not speak away from something in the hope that your imagination is duller than actuality..." It is true, every word is true, but it is a truth so very cold and logical, as if the world were dead. It does not convince me, it moves me not.
And so the young man, who is on the verge of becoming the
ethical-religious individual, rejects the use of
imagination that Constantin is offering. Imagination, in
the esthetic stage, is an objective capability of the
individual, limited in its capacity to bring pleasure to
the individual. In the ethical individual, imagination
generates movement. This movement begins with the
concrete, the given, the actual within the existential,
abstracting from the concrete to create possibility
(duplicating the esthetical process of creating
possibility), taking the possibility of the self present
in imagination and making it the goal of the self.
The ethical individual begins with the idea of the
actual, but in the transition to the ethical the
individual chooses one possibility through necessity. The
ethical individual takes the elements of existence, given
in possibility, and infinitises the task of itself in
imagination. This occurs as a process of infinitizing one
element of the self rather than one from an infinite
number of possibilities, limiting itself, engendering
pathos and resolution. The imagination facilitates this.
It is only momentarily that the particular individual is able to realize existentially a unity of the infinite and the finite which
171R, p. 191
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transcends existence... In passion the existing individual is rendered infinite in the eternity of the imaginative representation, and yet he is at the same time most definitely h i m s e l f .
The imagination thus facilitates the transition from the
imagined ideal self to the possibility of the actual,
concrete, ideal self. This occurs in the infinitising
process such that the eternal emerges as an ethical task.
In short, for Kierkegaard, to be a self is to exercise the ability to choose freely the self one is to be; in choice a person gains sovereignty over the self... In ethical choice one rules over the territory of the self, one's dreams, and imaginings becoming transformed into a concretely constituted actual self.
The ethical individual then makes a transition between
the imagined ideal self and the actual self. This occurs
as a process of choosing the concrete particular. Having
recognised the eternal in the ideal, the eternal is shown
in its fullness. Here one of the applications of
imagination in the capacity of producing art is
determined by the concept of Kivr)Gia.^ '^ 4 This is the
transition from possibility to actuality, the means by
which Kierkegaard separates thought and existence, and
yet relates them together in a dynamic manner. Kivr|Gia
mediates between possibility and actuality, between the
quantitative and qualitative. This movement between the
two is the key to the incorporation in ethical passion.
" Becoming a concrete, finite, individual, in ethical
striving does not exclude, but dialectically
incorporates, the ascending movement of imagination."
Existence becomes confused with imagination, with the
choice of the ethical individual to be a choice; the
choice becomes imaginatively fused with the ethical,
allowing the individual to maintain the choice and not to
Swenson, D. (trans.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 176; quoted in Gouwens, p. 197 
^^^Gouwens, p. 199
^^^In JP, vol. 1, p. 109, IV C 47, n.d., 1842-43, <<258, KlVTioia is defined by Kierkegaard as movement or becoming- " The transition from possibility to actuality is a change... kinhsis is difficult to define, because it belongs neither to possibility nor to actuality, is more than possibility and less than actuality."175Gouwens, p. 201
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slip into the possibility of despair. " In contrast to 
the aesthete who finds only an external infinity, the 
actual self gives to the ethical person in the shape of 
the ideal self, an internal infinity of 
possibilities." This is a process of actualising the 
ideal in a universal ideal as the ideal " other" , 
pointing beyond an abstract self to an ideal self.
But although he himself is his aim, this aim is nevertheless another, for the self which is the aim is not an abstract self which fits everywhere and hence nowhere, but a concrete self which stands in reciprocal relations with these surroundings, these conditions of life, this natural order. i??
Thus, in the ethical, the imagination functions not only
as an indication of the possibilities (which, of course,
it did in the esthetic stage) , but also to concrete the
ideal union of the finite and the infinite in the ethical
individual. At the same time, imagination provides the
abstraction from the given, and this internally generates
an external ethical ideal. The self remains a dynamic,
ordered relation of factors and plays a vital role in the
ethical nature of the individual which is sustained by
the will.
Every human being possesses to a higher or lower degree a capability called the power of imagination, a power that is the first condition for what becomes of a person, for will is the second and in the ultimate sense the decisive condition.
The imagination is the first capability necessary for the
individual in order to become a self. The imagination, in
the formative process of the self, allows the self to
construct a notion of what it means to be a self, a
process which then becomes part of the self's own
identity as a self. The self continues to develop as an
individual self, utilising imagination to unite finitude
and infinitude, necessity and possibility, reality and
ideality, in a concrete way, while exhibiting freedom.
, p. 203
II, trans. Lowrie, W., PUP, 1959, p. 267, quoted by Gouwens, p. 203178PC, p. 186
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However, the self has not yet appropriated the actual in 
existence, and the imagination continues as a capability 
of furthering this development.
Because of this alone, Kierkegaard can reject the 
concept of imagination elucidated by his predecessors, 
and, thereby, reject their understanding of the artist 
itself. A quote from Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses 
(" Every Good and Perfect Gift is from God Above" , 1843)
provides a succinct means of grounding Kierkegaard's 
reaction. He writes:
what he would choose if he had the choice; whether what he had heard was true, that the most glorious thing to do was to have nothing to do with the world, to be able to say: I came into the world naked, I possessed nothing, I was a stranger in it, and I leave it againnaked; whether it would be very hard andirksome to possess the treasures of the world; whether being able to communicate to others would be so difficult a work and involve so much responsibility. Yet any such deliberation, which flirts with the circumstances and premises of life as a game for the power of the imagination, serves only to halt freedom'spower to act and to grieve the spirit inromantic hankering and pain.
The artist becomes, in his understanding, one who lives
within a dangerous state of existence, whereby
imagination, as the central means of facilitating
artistic production, becomes a denial of the very
existence of the individual existing as artist. Unchecked
imagination becomes a 'flirtation' with premises which do
not hold weight within the development of existence
towards actuality. The identity of the artist does not
become communicative within an instructive and
externalising sense but in an internalising manner; i.e.
the artist's power of imagination is used to create the
artist's identity which, simultaneously, becomes a
grounding of such identity outside of the artist's
existence. This is not to say, however, that imagination
does not serve a positive role within the Kierkegaardian
literature. For example, he writes in SUD:
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, p. 144
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Just as finitude is the limiting aspect in relation to infinitude, so also necessity is the constraint in relation to possibility. Inasmuch as the self is a synthesis of finitude and infinitude is established, is Kaxa ôuva|Liiv [potential] , in order to become itself it reflects itself in the medium of imagination, and thereby the infinite possibility becomes manifest. The self is Kaxa ôuvap,iv [potentially] just as possible as it is necessary, for it is indeed itself, but it has the task of becoming itself. Insofar as it is itself, it is the necessary, and insofar as it has the task of becoming itself, it is possibility.^®®
Kierkegaard is apparently envisioning as the role of
imagination the medium whereby the development of the
individual is able to be reflected upon, wherein the
individual can stand back and appraise its own
development towards authenticity. Imagination is
definitely the means of developing the subjective
individual, even though this means is inherently
dangerous for the individual, and may lead to despair. It
is vital in making the leap from within religiousness
(specifically Religiousness A) towards appropriated and
applied knowledge of the true nature of the relationship
of the individual with its actual ontological grounding;
but, within a Romantic setting (as the above appear in
Kierkegaard's understanding of them), imagination is a
dangerous escapism. Any infinity of the artist must take
this into account.
2. The Development of a Life-View
This escapism is something which Kierkegaard 
believes can be countered by a number of different 
elements within the identity of the artist, particularly 
a developed life-view. Kierkegaard makes it clear that 
the requirement of a life-view is universally applicable 
when he applies the concept to himself, as well as citing 
examples throughout history. He writes:
An understanding of the totality of my work as an author, its maieutic purpose, etc, requires
180SUD, p. 35
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also an understanding of my personal existence [Exister en] as an author, what I qua author have done with my personal existence to support it, illuminate it, conceal it, give it direction, etc., something which is more complicated than and just as interesting as the whole literary activity. Ideally the whole thing goes back to " the single individual"
[den Enkelte] , who is not I in an empirical sense but is the author.That Socrates belonged together with what he taught, that his teaching ended in him, that he himself was his teaching, in the setting of actuality was himself artistically a product of that...i®i
Kierkegaard seemed at times to be searching for an 
authentic individual acting the capacity of an artist. 
This desire was voiced throughout his life, from his 
student days-
In an age when it is the order of the day for one author to plunder another, it is nevertheless pleasant at times to stumble upon men whose individuality so molds and stamps every word with their portrait that it must compel everyone who meets it in a strange place to say to those concerned: " Render unto Caesar
w h a t  i s  C a e s a r  ' s  .
to the final publications constituting his Attack Upon 
" Christendom" . The first example of Kierkegaard writing 
about an individual in an artistic capacity is in his 
first published work, " From the Papers of One Still 
Living" (1838)^®®. It is a review of Hans Christian 
Andersen's Only a Fiddler, negative in tone, difficult to 
follow, and an obvious product of Kierkegaard's early 
thought. Yet, it shows signs of his mature thinking, 
emphasising the individual, the individual's
responsibilities, and the formation and understanding of 
the importance of a developed life-view, as well as 
alluding to his understanding of indirect communication.
Kierkegaard's review begins with a polemic against 
the Hegelianism of the time. He notes that it has become
I®lj-P, vol. 6, p. 126, <<6360; A 146, n.d., 1849
182j-p, vol. 1, p. 53, <<127; the requirements of individuality in the authentic artist, I A 234, September 10, 1836
183" From the Papers of One Still Living: Andersen as a Novelist with Continual Reference to His Latest Work: Only a Fiddler" , published inEPW, pp. 53-102
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a general tendency infecting most spheres of contemporary 
thought. This tendency is identified as one in which 
thinking, contemplating, and interacting within the 
social structure is reduced to a desire for a system 
precluding the positive and the actual in favour of the 
concept of nothingness. The review is a continuation of 
this observance, to show how the poetic and artistic 
production of the time lacks any substance, making it 
valuable enough to be considered seriously by the 
individual. The review " is done out of consideration for 
the life-view contained therein, which just as surely has 
had its corresponding element in existence for its 
presuppositions as it has also an aroused element for its 
effect..." 184
Kierkegaard first notes two authors who are 
deserving of praise. In the stories of Thomasine 
Gyllembourg-Ehresvard Kierkegaard finds a relation of the 
author to both the worki®^ and the audience, a relation 
which is seemingly based on the truth of Gyllembourg's 
individual existence. i86 The author's work seems, to 
Kierkegaard, to reflect her life, communicating an 
authentic individual life-view. The work of Steen 
Steensen Blicher is also noted, wherein Kierkegaard 
perceives that a unity exists within the elements of the 
work conveying the nature and truth to which the work 
appeals.
Andersen's work, in contrast, is viewed as 
disunited, as chaotic in nature:
he is characterized rather as a possibility of a personality, wrapped up in such a web of arbitrary moods and moving through an elegiac duo-decimo scale of almost echoless, dying tones just as easily roused as subdued, who, in
184spiv, p.65
I85rpbis is the first time that I have consciously used " work" . In this case, I feel it is applicable because Kierkegaard is relating to the entire body of writing of the authors discussed. For the most part, I prefer to describe an example of art as " object" , in that this implies a staticness inherent to the example.
iBSipbough it should be noted that Kierkegaard did not know that Gyllembourg was a pseudonym for Heiberg's mother, and therefore the truth of the author's existence was an untruth.
p. 112
order to become a personality, needs a stern lif e-development. is?
Andersen has not developed his art form properly, to
encompass both his development as well as the development
of the reader; he has " not entered into relation with it
[such development] for the sake of his own individual
life or out of any more general esthetic interest as a
reader but for reasons of prospective short-novel
writing." 8^® He does not write to incite reflection
either upon his existence (which would be the most basic
form) or for the audience's own subjectivity (which is
the more valuable intention) , and, therefore, his work
has no substance or value in terms of an individual's
existence.
Andersen, as an artist, lacks a life-view in his 
work. For Kierkegaard, a life-view is more than 
propositions of neutrality or experience:
it is, namely, the transubstantiation of experience; it is an unshakeable certainty inoneself won from all experience, whether thishas oriented itself only in all worldlyrelationships (a purely human standpoint. Stoicism, for example) by which means it keeps itself from contact with a deeper experience- or whether in its heavenward direction (the religious) it has found therein the center as much for its heavenly as its earthlyexistence...^ 89
A life-view is a reflection on existence, whereby the
individual artist concerns himself with his own 
activities and thoughts, within existence, and applies
any conclusions reached about these to himself. It is not 
yet true development, but a strengthening of a 
consideration for one's self.
The presence of a life-view affects the production 
of an artist. A life-view is the deepness of the product
of an artist, freeing the art object from being
purposeless or arbitrary. The life-view is the means of
EPN, p. 70 
188ibid., p.73
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determining the communication as embodying the artist's 
concern with his actual truth in his own individuality.
In an age when it is the order of the day for one author to plunder another, it is nevertheless pleasant at times to stumble upon men whose individuality so molds and stamps every word with their portrait that it must compel everyone who meets it in a strange place to say to those concerned: " Render unto Caesarwhat is Caesar's."
The artist must achieve an authenticity to himself, which
then produces a unity and authenticity to the work. This
must not be based solely on the artist's life, imbedded
with unnecessary details, but must be produced, as a
product, emerging and developing from the artist. In the
work of Andersen, Kierkegaard detects strains which
contradict this, as well as encountering aspects of his
work that have potential but which are not realised.
Kierkegaard concludes, from his analysis of Andersen's
work, that Andersen has not realised his own potential as
an existing individual being; Andersen's potential, which
might be created through achieving authenticity, is not
there. Therefore, Kierkegaard also concludes that
Andersen's artistic output does not have the necessary
life-view, and is not valuable for the individual.
This negative judgement is also based on
Kierkegaard's belief that artistic production can be
divided into two elements. The first shapes the life-view
of the individual who creates such a work. It is
determined through the lived experience of that
individual's existence. Kierkegaard writes:
When I read a book, what gratifies me is not somuch what the book itself is as the infinitepossibilities there must have been in every passage, the complicated history, rooted in the author's personality, studies, etc., whichevery phrase must have had and still must have for the author. 3-91
The second is the reflection that is created from the
creating individual's life-view, imbuing the work with
Vol. 1, p. 53, <<127; I A  234
vol. 5, p. 115, <<5297; II A 693, January 13, 183!
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the life-view and, thereby, creating a process of 
reflection in the receiver/audience. For Kierkegaard, 
Andersen's work possesses a misrelation between his 
person and the necessary elements of a art object; the 
source of his work's art contains a lack of unity between 
its creation and the possibility of reflection contained 
therein. The author of Only A Fiddler experiences an 
environment transforming him from a genius to a wretched 
man, paralleling events in Andersen's life, and can be 
interpreted as a story of self-pity. There is no 
development, from the experiences of his own life to a
reflection furthering any understanding of his existence. 
Kierkegaard scorns this, since it produces nothing for 
the individual who might encounter Andersen's work; 
nothing valuable is created for the reflection of the 
audience. In the novel, Andersen projects his own 
individual problems, and does not address the reader. 
What is not created is a life-view, a fixed idea of the 
dialectical nature of existence.
The publication of TA describes, in even more
detail, the nature of the artist, as Kierkegaard
understood him. TA was a review of Gyllembourg- 
Ehresvard's book of the same name and, as in the review 
of " Only a Fiddler" , Kierkegaard cites her writing as 
one in which a life-view is developed for the individual 
being authentically. Two sections of the review are
important and distinct from each other. The first is the 
introduction, in which Kierkegaard describes the 
authentic author as artist in greater detail as having a 
life-view, stressing this aspect of the artist.
Kierkegaard understands that an author/artist can be 
judged along a number of criterion, a range which 
includes styles, accuracy, and general formalistic 
qualities, but faithfulness to the artist's own identity 
is the most important. TA, as a book describing the 
relationship and differences between " the age of 
revolution" and " the present age" , Kierkegaard notes as 
open to criticism on the basis of its representation of 
such ages. However, Kierkegaard focuses on the artist's
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identity, and ability to remain authentic to such 
identity, as the most important aspect of any production. 
Kierkegaard would have the artist remain true to himself 
as an individual being, coming to terms with its 
ontological grounding, and not be overcome by perceived 
requirements of a public or the demands of an " age" . He 
writes :
If the apparent metaphysical profundity about the demands of the times is not to disintegrate in confusion, here again the re-examination must ethically be assumed to be able to judge by determining whether he was an author who remained true to himself despite the demands of the times, or one who betrayed himself and his consciously undertaken commitments... a justifiable demandiez
Despite the character of the time, and its position
within a relationship to the ideal, the artist must be an
individual who assumes a position outside of such a
society. Each specific, historical period necessarily has
a relation to the actual within its existence, and the
artist must remain in a position contrary to its
contemporary society. The artist makes commitments to
himself based on reflection on his own life experiences,
and his production can be judged, or, more strongly,
should be judged, by the degree to which the artist
remains true to those commitments.
The author should remain true to himself, achieve a
unity of self in his production. The author should not be
determined by external concerns, but determined in his
production of art objects by a faithfulness to himself,
to his subjectivity and existential commitments, to his
own self-constructed demands on his being. Speaking
specifically about the author of TA, but applicable to
all artistic productions, Kierkegaard writes:
The considerable richness of the author consists precisely in that. The life-view that creatively sustains those stories remains the same, while an ingenious inventiveness and an acquired resource of rich experience and vegetative luxuriance of prolific mood serve to
192TA, p. 8
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produce change within the creative repetition.The disquietude is essentially the same, the quietude is essentially the same, the movement in all the stories is essentially from the same to the same... that is, the life-view is the same.
The artist embodies his life-view in his productions, 
sustaining it throughout. This is an absolutely vital 
point. The artist takes everything learned so far in 
existence, applies it, and allows the production to 
embody the reflection created by its life-view and, 
through imagination, creates objects which communicate 
this life-view while the life-view remains a constant and 
continual factor.
This sense of faithfulness to the artistic life-view 
is vital, and must run necessarily throughout the 
artist's productions, characterising each one, even if 
only in a subtle and almost undetectable manner. 
Kierkegaard labels the entirety of production as 
sustaining, as opposed to creating. The difference is 
vital. Sustaining means that the life-view is carried 
through all of the production, coloring each, and 
determining their reception. Creating is simply the means 
of bringing into existence objects with no inherent 
existential value. If the artist is too dependent on 
creating objects, on focusing on their individual natures 
and the variety of forms which his production can take, 
then the production is not sustained, but dissolves into 
individual and unrelated works, since only God can create 
and sustain simultaneously. Instead, the artist must 
concentrate on sustaining a life-view, no matter what 
form the productions might take.
Indeed, if this were not the case with this author [again, speaking specifically, but generally applicable], his own words would contain a self-contradiction. The life-view in this one story must also be in the whole production; otherwise it reveals the discrepancy that, despite all his presumed creativeness, an author has no life-view.
p.13-14
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The contradiction of the individual's dialectical nature 
cannot be resolved. Therefore, the production of the 
artist must be a communication of the tension created by 
the dialectical nature of his existence. The very nature 
of the artist's own production remains in opposition to 
its existence. Kierkegaard writes:
What is it to be a poet? It is to have one's own personal life, one's actuality, in categories completely different from those of one's poetical production, to be related to the ideal only in imagination, so that one's personal life is more or less a satire on the poetry and on oneself... Such a life is the life of the witness to the truth. This rubric disappeared long ago, and preachers, philosophy professors, and poets have taken over the place of servants of the truth, whereby they no doubt are served very well- but they do not serve the truth. 195
Kierkegaard is, here, maintaining his negative position 
against artists, but the dialectical development out of 
this position secures an authentic identity for the 
artist. The demoralisation, in which the position of the 
artist as a communicator of the possibility of knowledge 
of the actual idea as ideal and its application within 
existence, can be countered if the artist, as individual, 
continually relates itself to the idea of the ideal. This 
is only done by sustaining the life-view, which is 
paramount to the production of authentic art and always 
counter to the expectations presented to the individual 
artist, as expected by its contemporary society and its 
approach to the ideal.
The difference between sustaining a production and 
creation creates a difference between conventional 
understandings of art and one which Kierkegaard would 
agree to as being viable for the developing individual. 
An idealistic, Hegelian interpretation of what the art 
object signifies, for the individual, sees art as being a 
means of reconciling the individual and the object with 
the ideality of imagination, by means of an application 
of imagination. Kierkegaard has been accused of
195JP, vol. 6, p. 85, <<6300; A  11, n.d., 1849
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subscribing to this view,^96 but it is clear, from a 
reading of TA, that Kierkegaard would accuse this view as 
one negating the importance of actuality and denying a 
reconciliation of the individual with the reality of its 
existence. A reconciliation of the idea in the actual 
person is a split from actuality; on a basic and, 
importantly, as a differentiation between inauthentic and 
authentic art, e s t h e t i c ^ ^ v  level art cannot become fully 
an expression of actuality for either the artist or the 
r e c i p i e n t . ^ 9 8  However, an art form, whose subject is 
strictly bound to the actuality of the artist, an artist 
who is bound to his life-view and to a developing 
understanding of his actual ontological grounding, can be 
labelled by Kierkegaard as one both authentic and 
valuable for the developing individual, through a 
faithfulness to the artist's life-view. The authentic art 
form is the product of the artist's maturity^99^ a product 
of the development of his individual existence and his 
own personal life-view. It is because of this that
sustaining the life-view is to be emphasised over and 
above the act of creating.
His writing is not an element in his own development, but since this development is mature it brings forth as its fruit a work of inferiority. It is not genius, talent, virtuosity that makes the work what it is, for the writing virtually would stop if these were to disappear. No, the work itself, the possibility of being able to produce such a work, is, if anything, the reward that God gave the author...2oo
The authentic art object is a product of the artist's
existence. The productivity of the artist develops from
the artist's maturity as an existential being and
authenticity towards his own individuality. The vital
^96%n Crites' introduction to Crisis in the Life of an Actress and Connell's 
To Be One Thing
^9?Meaning an art form which is created for the desires of the esthetic individual.
^98For further discussion, see Samlede Vaerken PC SV XII 173-175, CUP SV VII 384-389, and JP II 737-50.
^99which is a recognition and development of the authenticity of the individual, towards an acceptance and appropriation of the ontological grounding of the individual.
200rA, p. 15
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aspect of the authentic art object is the development of 
that individual who produces it as a communication of 
their own individuality.
As should be already clear, the authentic artist is 
unlike the conventional and idealistic one. The 
conventional artist, Kierkegaard notes, is able to 
transport and inspire through imagination (an allusion to 
Romanticism) , but his production never engages concretely 
with the actuality of the individual. Art objects 
produced by an inauthentic artist are never truly 
concerned with the artist's individual existence nor with 
the existence of those who receive it as communication. 
The conventional/inauthentic artist produces only for 
pleasure. It is never persuasion but relief from a need 
for sustenance, for sustaining their own inauthenticity.
The authentic artist, in contrast, persuades the
recipient through an intermediate tone between actuality 
and imagination; the communication is indirect, but the 
results firmly grounded in a transformation of the 
recipient towards a better understanding of his 
existence. The recipient of the artist's production is 
moved through the recipient's own reflection upon itself, 
to a new relationship with actuality; through indirect 
communication, and the recipient's own reflection on its 
being, it comes to a better understanding of its 
ontological grounding. The product of the aesthetic may 
move the individual, as may (and will, Kierkegaard hopes) 
the religious, but this process of movement must be 
supported by persuasion. As a product of a life-view, as 
the product of a percevied reciprocity between
individuals, as an example and means of sustaining the
production, as the product of an developed and authentic 
individual, the art object persuades the individual to 
move towards authenticity, supporting him as the changes 
are made, and maintaining the individual in the direction 
of actuality. The esthetic, as a product of the 
inauthentic individual, does not move through support of 
the recipient, but cajoles him through temptation. The
product of the authentic individual does not move the
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recipient beyond actuality through necessity, but acts as 
a support in such a move. This is the limits of the 
product of the authentic artist: it may support, but
cannot move through necessity. Therefore, the product of 
the authentic artist is limited in that it cannot bring 
the individual to authenticity- it cannot bring the
individual to accept the paradoxical nature of his
ontological grounding- but it can be valuable as a 
support, always as the product of a life-view grounded in 
the same existential relation to actuality as the
individual receiving the communicating. Kierkegaard 
recognises this throughout his writing, in particular, as 
always, through the use of the pseudonyms and indirect 
communication.
3. Interaction with Individuals
The second aspect of Kierkegaard's understanding of 
the artist can also be understood through reading of
" The Present Age" , being the third part of TA.
The age in which Kierkegaard lived he classified as 
one that reflects on the nature of actuality, but which
does not act on that knowledge. Reflection in the artist
should produce art objects which produce reflection in 
those who are being communicated with. However, the 
artist must be prepared to overcome the nature of the age 
and interject a cessation within the reflection which 
currently possesses individuals. Misplaced reflection is 
a temptation.
One thing... is certain, an increased power of reflection like an increased knowledge onlyadds to man's affliction, and above all it is certain that for the individual as for the generation no task is more difficult than to escape from the temptations of reflection, simply because they are so dialectical and the result of one clever discovery may give the whole question a new turn...^ °^
It is against this that the artist must strive, to avoid
presenting mere possibilities rather than the possibility
201PA, p. 42
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of a relationship to concrete actuality. The individual 
being communicated to is always in danger of seeing the 
artist's advancements, and accepting them purely at face- 
value, without seeing them as applicable to this own 
existence. The artist must seek to induce in the 
individual a change which is brought about through the 
individual's own passionate choices. He should not allow 
the message of the truth of actuality to become a feat of 
dialectics empty of existential content. Kierkegaard 
warns specifically against such a feat, for:
It leaves everything standing but cunningly empties it of significance. Instead of culminating in a rebellion it reduces the inward reality of all relationships to a reflective tension which leaves everything standing but makes the whole of life ambiguous: so that everything continues to exist factually whilst by a dialectical deceit, privatissime, it supplies a secret interpretation- that it does not exist.202
Such a communication leads the individual to regard his
own existence within dialectical terms not applicable to
his own actuality, leading the individual to regard his
own actuality as something not necessarily having
significance for his existence. The relationship in the
individual, between his existence and his actuality,
Kierkegaard describes as a tension " which exhausts life
itself and the fire of that enthusiasm and inwardness
which makes the fetters of dependence and the crown of
dominion light..." 203 passionate, developing relationship
between the individual, his existence, and the actuality
of his existence must always be the goal of the authentic
artist. The communication of the authentic artist must
overcome the tendency to allow individuals to discover
and appropriate a singular message, to manipulate such a
message for the fulfilment of their own personal
requirements, and never develop further.
This sense of passion has its own dangers. It
requires a sense of reflection, an examination of the
202ibid., p. 42-43 203ibid., p. 45
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individual artist's position in relation to itself, as 
well as to its contemporary society. Kierkegaard notes, 
though, that: " Reflection is a snare in which one is
caught, but once the 'leap' of enthusiasm has been taken, 
the relation is a different one and it becomes a noose 
which drags one into eternity." 0^4 Reflection alone is 
that by which the esthetic individual makes no 
commitment, no decision, within passion but only 
speculates and contemplates. As noted by Dreyfus in his 
introduction to PA, the esthetic individual is only 
contemplating pleasure and enjoyment, rather than taking 
part in it. This is furthered by Kierkegaard's 
understanding of the concept of levelling.
In Kierkegaard, the concept of 'levelling' is 
synonymous to Nietzsche's nihilism. Contemporary society 
has become one within which individuals do not develop 
but decide a singular position for themselves and remain 
there. He cites classical society as one example of a 
time when individuals did not do this, but continually 
points out that his own is one which has become petrified 
by l e v e l l i n g . 205 Kierkegaard believed in his position and 
the viewpoint and, therefore, in a specific identity of 
the artist.
Little by little, being an author has become the most contemptible profession of all... How stupid: the one who writes should understandthat what he is writing better than the one who reads; otherwise he should not write.- Or one has to become a clever shyster who knows how to lead the public by the nose.- That I will not do, I will not, I will not, no, no, the devil take it all. I write as I want to, and here rests- the rest can do as they wish, refrain from buying, reading, reviewing, e t c .206
Levelling seems to Kierkegaard to be an inevitable
process, since the artist is communicating to individuals
204ibid., p.58
205Qne wonders if Kierkegaard's, like Nietzsche's, and many other's, understanding of classical society was correct? Did people en masse act as a collected group of individualities as Kierkegaard would suggest, thereby retaining their individual value while acting as a group? Or did, as I suspect, they act in the same manner as the public of which Kierkegaard is writing about.
20GjT, vol. 5, p. 227, <<5647; IV A 88, n.d. 1843
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who are receiving such communication, and which, 
therefore, necessarily wish to understand such 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 207 This, however, is mere understanding, 
which is inadequate.
Kierkegaard's point about levelling as a concept is 
that, in antiquity, the individual men were valued as 
such, even when they were exiled. The public, and the 
communications which were produced by the public, brought 
about an equality to every individual, denying their 
individuality. This is such even when the individual is 
denied the communication of that society which partially 
creates it identity as an individual because that 
individual, exiled from the community, continues to 
maintain its identity as a member of the community. The 
individual could be what others could not be in the 
present age. The individual being is, in Kierkegaard's 
understanding of contemporary society, constructed by the 
public and is able to achieve what anyone can achieve, 
but only at a loss of its passionate commitment to its 
own identity. This becomes not only a justification for 
ressentiment, of envy, but also a means of justifying a 
lack of commitment through a lack of sufficient character 
to make oneself s i g n i f i c a n t . 208 The authentically 
communicating artist must counteract this levelling.
The public is the main thought-forming and acting 
body, being incredibly concrete and also insubstantial at 
the same time. The public sets things forth, but then can 
deny responsibility quite easily. This is the process of 
levelling in action, " equating itself to the divisor by 
means of which every one is reduced to a common 
denominator." 209 But religiousness holds the key to
escaping this. " Eternal life is also a sort of
levelling, and yet that is not so, because the common 
denominator is that every one should really and
297ji,cjoj-no's understanding that Kierkegaard in Construction of the Aesthetic is a product of early 19th century ideas on the author and its responsibility to its public serves here, but this is also generally applicable.
29®Therein lies Kierkegaard's condemnation of the established church; it is easy for a man to become a Christian, since he is already born a Christian- there is no struggle here.
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essentially be a man in a religious sense." 210 Thus, a 
man should return to a conception of his individual self 
that is equitable to that of the Greeks, and, yet, also 
apply himself fully to Christianity. This is a vital 
aspect of the artist's almost ethical obligation to 
create and move the individuals who are stuck in the 
masses. 211 The artist must overcome the stagnation and 
induce in individuals, through authentic communication, 
their own development almost in complete opposition to 
the society which might give the individuality an 
identity. This remains a process fraught with 
difficulties, but ones which Kierkegaard would appear to 
regard as necessary for the authentic artist. He writes:
There is a strange psychological contradiction in the following:It is well known that suffering and pain are a condition for many kinds of distinctiveness, such as with poets, artists, religious individualities, and the like. Without these sufferings they would not have become great.Take away their sufferings, give them an easy life, grant them what they desire- and it is all over with greatness. If they had their desire satisfied and the suffering taken away, they would lose even more: ergo, they ought tobe happy in their suffering, so happy that they would not wish it removed. But then again they are beyond suffering. I wonder if an individual so situated could really understand this. An individual could be held at the point of extremity where he constantly grasps for the highest in order to find out to what extentthis could be d o n e . 212
The authentic artist must always seem to be in a state of
opposition to the public and to the public's ability of
levelling in order to overcome the public's ability to
level the individual's own specific existence.
In PA, furthermore, a difference between the
immediate and the reflective esthetic and an
understanding of the authentic artist are further laid
2l0lbid., p.67
2^^And sets up further questions about the nature of great art being produced by artist. Is one quality of great art that it be produced only when the needs of the individuals within society are to be addressed? Is great art only created when there is a need for it?
212j-p^ vol. 4, p. 371, <<4590; VI A  80, n.d. , 1845
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out. The authentic artist is is tune with his 
contemporaries, able to induce, to create, a higher 
degree of reflection in their own individualities through 
indirect communication. The authentically communicating 
artist is able to create a higher degree of reflection 
that both implies and induces a greater significance than 
immediate passion (i.e. a greater desire to fulfil 
immediate requirements and pleasures). The authentic 
artist should construct an enthusiasm which intervenes to 
gather the powers of reflection together into a decision, 
and because reflection confers, on the average, a greater 
capacity for action; then, when religion enters in, it 
takes command of that increased capacity for action. The 
artist creates authentic communication (and, therefore, 
authentic art) which is that through which the individual 
experiences experience and possibilities in an idealised 
sense (i.e. including opposing appopriateable 
possibilities) and applies the decisions which are 
created for the individual based upon the reflection of 
those experiences.
This is furthered by the artist's means of 
communication, whereby the artist does not cater to the 
requirements imposed on him by the public, but silently 
works in opposition to the public for the individual. 
Communication, as art not having the ideal actuality of 
the ontological grounding of the individual ever present 
and yet always hidden, becoming the responsibility of the 
receiving individual to discover it, is not authentic 
communication. This is particularly problematic for the 
artist, because the artist remains a part of the society- 
indeed, subsistence, the continuation of the artist 
producing an authentic communication, is based on an 
interaction with society. However, artistic production as 
authentic communication must always be a product of an 
individual acting as an artist opposed to society and 
communicates in silence.
Only one who knows how to remain essentiallysilent can really talk- and act essentially.Silence is the essence of inwardness, of the
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inner life. Mere gossip anticipates real talk, and to express what is still in thought weakens action by forestalling it. But some one who can really talk, because he knows how to remain silent, will not talk about a variety of things but about one things only, and he will know when to talk and when to remain silent... Every man who has a real experience experiences at the same time all its possibilities in an ideal sense, including the opposite possibility. Aesthetically these possibilities are his lawful property. His talk and his production both rest upon his silence. The ideal perfection of his talk and of his production will correspond to his silence, and the absolute expression of that silence will be that the ideal will include the qualitatively opposite possibility... but as soon as the artist prostitutes his own reality he is no longer essentially productive. His beginning is his end, and his very first word will be a sin against the modesty of the ideal. This type of artistic production is therefore even, aesthetically speaking, a kind of private gossip. 213
Thus, any artist who caters to the public, to the 
public's taste and levelling processes, loses his value 
in this process of levelling. But an artist who remains 
silent in his production will capture the ideal within
his art, and make his production have value as such. 
Kierkegaard finds this evident in the difference between 
the actor's art and the art of actuality.
The actor should seem to be moved, although he is calm (if he is actually disturbed, this is a mistake) . In the realm of actuality one should seem to be calm, although he is moved (if one is not actually moved, this is a mistake, andit is easy enough to be calm) . 214
The artist should, in the realm of actuality, when trying
to assist other individuals in existence to develop
towards appropriation of the actual truth of their
existence, should be silent, withdrawn.
The authentic artist is one who does not declare
that his communication is the expression of the ideal
truth, but remains almost indifferent to it. The artist
can attain the ideal- a communication of the truth of the
213
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actual existence of the individual- and communicate this 
as idea, but specific conditions apply.
The condition of his attaining this ideal is the silence with which he shuts off his own real personality. Otherwise, in spite of all precautions... his one-sided predilection will be privately recognizable. For an author, like any one else, must have his own private personality, but it must be his own aôuTov^is The more thoroughly a man grasps the ideal and the idea- in silence- the more capable will he be of reproducing man's daily life so that it seems as though he only talked of particular things at a certain distance. The less ideal, the more superficial his talk...^ ®^
Inauthentic art leads to formlessness which is ” the
result of doing away with the vital distinction between
form and content. Formlessness may, therefore, unlike
madness or stupidity, have a content that is true, but
the truth it contains can never be essentially true." 217
Inauthentic art may contain truth in objective form,
either through form or content, but it does not contain
the essential and subjective in its truth. Kierkegaard
may be criticising objectivity in art and inauthentic art
as such, but he is also pointing a way towards an
authentic art that does take into account completely the
individual's subjectivity and essential truth. Authentic
communication is art in which " the very soul of the
writer [or any artist] should go into his style." 218 And,
in fully engaging in his own productions, the
communication of the artist is the means of assisting
other individuals to develop. The responsibility of this
for Kierkegaard is clear in this journal entry:
What pains me most, however, is not the vulgarity of the rabble but the secret participation in it by the better people. I, too, would like to make myself comprehensible to one single person, to my reader. But I dare not, for then I defraud the idea. It is precisely when I am succeeding most, when brutality is at its most shameless peak, that I
2^5#Yranslated in PA as " Holy of Holies" , p. 70 
2l5pA, p. 71 
2l7ibid., p. 72 
2l8ibid., p. 76
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dare not speak. Finally, it is myresponsibility to be consistently unyielding so that I will not be responsible for several people going completely astray. So be it, Imust be silent.219
But, authentic art is also that in which the artist,
while instilling his production with his own experiences
in development towards an understanding of his
ontological grounding, also removes all traces of his
development so as not to confuse the authenticity of the
communication. " The law of delicacy by which an author
is permitted to use what he has himself experienced is
that he never says the truth but keeps the truth for
himself and only lets it emerge in different ways." 220
What is clear from this is that the artist must be
removed from his audience as well as from his own
communication, while both maintaining concern for the
audience's existence as individual beings and removing
himself from his work, such that his own existence is not
completely reflected in the work that he p r o d u c e s .  221
Kierkegaard is quite clear to point out the fact that the
artist should remain a communicator of the actual ideal
and serve as such. He writes:
What the age needs is not a genius- it surely has had geniuses enough- but a martyr, one who in order to teach men to obey would himselfbecome obedient unto death, one whom mean putto death; but, see, just because of that they would lose, for simply by killing him, by being victorious in this way, they would become
2l9jrp, vol. 5, p. 315, <<5887; VII^ A 98, March 9, 1846
22ÛJ-P, Vol. 1, p. 57, « 146; IV A  161
22l.phis is taken even one step further, whereby the artist is removed from his own communication and almost becomes a member of the audience. Weston points out that Kierkegaard achieves this through the use of the pseudonyms
The pseudonymous writings avoid even an indirect relating 
actuality of an I to an I since the one who addresses thereader is not an actual individual but a fiction, and so theauthor himself is in the same position as any other reader, left alone entirely in what he does or does not do with what is 
said.^The authentic artist constructs a reciprocal relationship between the communicator, the communicated, and the communication. The artist is not only communicating to an individual the means of that individual's development, but also establishing a relationship between himself and the individual for his own development.
^Weston, M ., Kierkegaard and Modern Continental Philosophy, p.146
129
afraid for themselves. This is the awakening which the age n e e d s .222
The artist is an awakener, presenting himself as a martyr 
without regard for his own acknowledgement, the one who 
would awaken and reform the age. His existence is so 
completely removed that, even by killing the artist, by 
removing the means of the communication, nevertheless the 
knowledge is imparted.
To put it another way, Kierkegaard stresses the 
importance of the relationship between artist and
audience by emphasising the relationship between 
dialectical redoubling and serious communication. 
Dialectical redoubling is important for the artist, as a 
translation of the truth of actuality from a purely
intellectual understanding of it, grounded in the 
individual's existence, into its application to the very 
actuality of the individual. The indirect communication 
of such is necessary for the development of other 
individuals, requiring the artist to maintain his own
actuality in a state of ambiguity. The artist should not
declare his own actuality to the individual, with whom he 
is trying to communicate the truth of existence to, but 
should keep himself distant from such communication. This 
is not a indication for the use of a mystifying form of 
communication, which only distorts the message, but 
rather an indication of how the communicating individual 
should present himself. The process of mystification not 
only distorts the message, but also the communicator. As 
Kierkegaard writes, significantly, in PV:
In case a sophistical person should find it necessary in a given contingency to resort to mystification, it would be perfectly natural for him to do it in such a way that the comical situation results that he can't get himself out of it. But this, too, is due to a lack of seriousness, which prompts him to fall in love with mystification for its own sake, instead of using it for a purpose. Hence when a mystification, a dialectical reduplication, is used in the service of a serious purpose, it will be so used as merely to obviate a
222JP, vol. 3 , p. 151, <<2636; VIII^ A  418, n.d., 1847
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misunderstanding or an over-hastyunderstanding, whereas all the while the true explanation is at hand and ready to be found by him who honestly seeks it. 223
The artist must always seek to maintain his own
seriousness about the subject of the actual truth of
existence, removing his own individuality from such a
communication as well as remainng unwilling to indulge in
the cleverness of the communicative act. As always,
Kierkegaard requires of the individual who would know or
communicate the truth of his existence a complete
seriousness towards that truth. The artist must always be
able to identify with the communicated individual, and,
therefore, must always maintain a relationship with that
individual.
To summarise the above, the authentic artist, the 
communicator of the truth of the existence of
individuals, should have specific qualities in order to 
be able to communicate that truth. He should have no 
impatience with other individuals. He should be able to 
recognise that the individuals, with whom he is
communicating, are confirmed in their own illusions, and 
unwilling, at first, to overthrow these, unless through 
their own activities.
First and foremost, no impatience. If be becomes impatient, he will rush headlong against it [the esthetic condition of the individual being communicated with] and accomplish nothing. A direct attack only strengthens a person in his illusion, and at the same time embitters him. There is nothing that requires such gentle handling as an illusion, if one wishes to dispel it.224
The authentic artist should approach the individual and
seek to allow them to come to the truth through their own
reflection. He cannot dictate this truth, for that only
breeds resistance to it. He should also not be impatient,
because his own efforts do not produce direct results.
Instead, as always, he must employ the indirect method;
223
224 PV, p. 16Ibid., p. 25
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loving and serving the truth, [the authentic artist] arranges everything dialectically for the prospective captive, and then shyly withdraws... so as not to witness the admission which he makes to himself alone before God- that he has lived hitherto in an i l l u s i o n . 2 2 5
The authentic artist, the religious artist, must start
with the esthetic, continue to be in fear and trembling
before the truth of his own existence, and have
everything in readiness to bring forward the religious
promptly in order that he may just as quickly withdraw
from the process of communication " so that with the
momentum gained by devotion to the [a]esthetic they rush
headlong into contact with the religious." 22s The
authentic artist must be able to make other individuals
take notice of his own serious witnessing to the truth,
but must never allow his own position to become the means
whereby other individuals seek the truth of their
existence, for therein lies the danger of those
individuals relying on the communicator rather than the
actual truth.
4. The Difference Between A Genius and an Apostle
Kierkegaard's understanding of the artist is further 
defined in the essay " On the Difference Between a Genius 
and an Apostle" , published by Kierkegaard in 184 9 as 
part of " Two Minor Ethico-Religious Essays" , but 
originally intended to be included in The Book On Adler. 
In the first, Kierkegaard affirms the importance of the 
authentic i n d i v i d u a l 2 2 ?  even when he seems to be denying 
the importance of any such labelling as the use of the 
term 'genius'. Kierkegaard describes the individual's 
confrontation with ideality and the possible subsequent 
communication of such a confrontation. This communication 
contains within itself the means of betraying that 
communication of the idea of the ideal for the
225ibid., p. 25 
226lbid., p. 26
227j^s always, the one who is able to communicate to other individuals based on a development towards knowledge of the actual ideal and allow them to develop themselves as a result of such knowledge.
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individual's own subjective concerns, and, therefore, 
destroying such a communication for other individuals. 
But it also contains the very possibility of producing 
art as authentic and ideal communication within material 
form.
A genius belongs to the sphere of immanence. What a 
genius bring forth may be new, but this still becomes 
assimilated by humanity. A genius is such through his own 
merits, through being himself, having an immanent 
teleology. An Apostle, on the other hand, has something 
new to bring forth, the newness of which is paradoxical 
and thus always remains new as an Apostle remains an 
Apostle for eternity (a genius may be discredited as such 
in later history). An Apostle is an Apostle by divine 
authority rather than through himself, and is placed 
within an absolute paradoxical teleology before which all 
sensuous thoughts vanish.
Genius is born, is genius as genius. Genius may 
change, but remains a genius. A genius may bring forth 
something paradoxical, but this loses its paradoxical 
nature through assimilation and ultimately the genius is 
assimilated (the paradox is not absolute, and thus can be 
assimilated). A genius is appreciated aesthetically, but 
his value is not divine. Authority is the key, since 
authority is inconceivable within the sphere of immanence 
and is thus transitory.
Genius has an immediate teleology, developing itself 
and developing self-projection, but does not have 
external authority. Genius is self-sufficient, despite 
the fact that the public may try to immediately 
assimilate him as serving them (or at least assimilate 
him as one of them).
The humorous self-sufficiency of genius is the unity of a modest resignation in the world and a proud elevation above the world: of being an unnecessary superfluity and a precious ornament. If the genius is an artist, then he accomplishes his work of art, but neither he
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nor his work of art has a telos outside him... No genius has an in order that.228
Hence, a genius is an individual immanent within the
world.
The Apostle, in contrast, has absolutely and 
paradoxically an in order that. An Apostle is not born, 
but called and anointed by God. An Apostle does not 
develop. To become an Apostle is to be preceded by no 
potential possibilities to be an Apostle. An Apostle 
" stands paradoxically outside his personal identity with 
himself as the definite person he is." 229 This 
paradoxical nature of his calling brings forth the new, 
which always remains new.
An Apostle remains himself and also is not himself, 
thus always making his message new and, therefore, 
transcendent. An Apostle is such through divine 
authority, an authority which is decisive in its quality 
because, unlike genius which only has authority in its 
own production, an Apostle has authority paradoxically 
outside of himself through revelation. The authority is 
paradoxical because it remains outside of that in which 
it comes from. The Apostle's identity, the quality of 
'Apostle' as authority is transcendental rather than 
immanent. He is not only absolutely teleological and 
faithful as such, but is also sent out by God with His 
authority.
The difference between the two is discussed in great 
detail in The Book on Adler^^^, which elaborates on the
228pA, p. 108
229ibid., p ,92
230Not published by Kierkegaard in his lifetime. Commentators have debated the reasons, but it would seem most likely that Kierkegaard was concerned that passages in it would be interpreted (correctly) as an attack on the Bishop Mynster- head of the Danish church throughout most of Kierkegaard's authorship. On friendly terms with each other, but Kierkegaard's journals reveal his criticism of Mynster's leadership as dangerous- something which Kierkegaard did not undertake until able to do so indirectly after the Bishop's death. It is, however, strange that he did not do so, for it is one of the more important books of Kierkegaard's many, in particular as to the place of the author/artist in relation to Christianity. Specifically, it asserts the identity of the artist as beyond a merely authentic communicator (i.e. above the level of a genius) while at the same time being below that of an Apostle. Reading The Book On Adler in this fashion clearly identifies the place of the artist in Kierkegaard's philosophy, and it is surprising that this book has not been more studied before (perhaps an indication of the lack of importance that not only secondary literature has afforded it, but also Kierkegaard himself). It is beneficial to cover The Book On Adler in detail because, even though it covers some of the previously discussed
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difference between the genius and the Apostle more 
specifically in terms of a premise and an essential 
author, described below. Kierkegaard begins the book by 
noting that individuals, for the most part, do not 
attempt to live their lives in an extraordinary manner. 
Individuals who identify themselves as artists 
Kierkegaard describes as a premise-author, or premise- 
artist. He writes:
It is not improbable that the lives of many men go on in such a way that they have indeed promises for living but reach no conclusions- quite like this stirring age which has set in movement many premises but also has reached no conclusions. 231
The character of the age Kierkegaard has identified as 
one in which individuals might seek greatness, but never 
truly achieve it. More specifically, Kierkegaard would 
characterise the age (and most ages) as one in which 
greatness is recognised but never sought because it is 
unattainable except in the most rarest instances.
Within such an age, an individual might aspire to 
become an artist. What is clear from Kierkegaard's 
criticism of Andersen, however, is that such an 
individual would have no chance of being an authentic 
artist, because the very nature of society restricts 
this. Without a conclusion, without passion and
ideas, it clarifies the position of the authentic artist within the entire philosophy.
The Book on Adler is concerned with a priest named Adler who declared that he had received a vision from Christ, telling him in revelation that he was not only to change the Christianity of Denmark, but also that he was to abandon Hegelianism, which Adler had been a devoted follower of. Adler published a number of books on this subject and sought both confrontation and confirmation from the established church. Surprisingly, the Danish Church did not take kindly to Adler's efforts to reform it, and removed him from its organisation.Kierkegaard's involvement with Adler results from two things. First, Adler apparently made a gesture to Kierkegaard personally, seeing him as a kindred soul and offering him a secondary position in his reform movement. Second, Adler published a number of books which discussed and described his revelation, seeking to both prove it and make it a convincing means of changing the people's attitude to the established order. Not only was this project something which Kierkegaard himself felt strongly about (resulting spectacturarly in his various attacks at the end of his life on the church), but Adler's writing was compared favourably to Kierkegaard's, especially with Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms. As Lowrie points out, Adler became a concern of Kierkegaard's not only because he attempted to carry out something which Kierkegaard himself felt was necessary, a project which Kierkegaard felt he was carrying out wrongly, but also because Adler appeared in the same light as Kierkegaard had when he had been attacked by " The Corsair" . Even if he did not publish the book. The Book on Adler was important to Kierkegaard personally.
23lAdIer, p. 113
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authenticity and a proper life-view (all of which run 
counter to societal requirements), the individual would 
find it impossible to become a true artist, able to 
create within his reader knowledge of the truth of 
existence. Such an individual might be talented enough to 
write the first or even the second part of a description 
of an authentic existence, by which Kierkegaard 
understands as the physical and the psychical nature of 
man, but it would be impossible to write the third part, 
which would facilitate the generation of knowledge of the 
actual ideal.
The nature of the individual being is such that he 
must pass through a variety of stages of self- 
consciousness and self-knowledge. " To find the 
conclusion, it is necessary first of all to observe that 
it is lacking, and then in turn to feel quite vividly the 
lack of it. " 232 The individual who has not yet reached a 
conclusion, who has not progressed through the various
stages of self-consciousness and self-knowledge, cannot 
effectively come to terms with his own existence. The
individual must go through the agonies of anxiety and
despair before being able to come to terms with his
existence. Not doing so denies the possibility that an
individual would be able to communicate the nature of his
or any other individual's existence at all, either 
directly or indirectly.
An esthetic production of such an individual (one in 
which the individual recourse to his infinite powers of 
imagination) is lacking. This is in contrast to an 
essential literary or artistic production by an
individual which contains a life-view such that:
If a life-view is developed, if it stands out whole and clear in its necessary coherence, one has no need to put the hero to death, one may as well let him live: the premise isnevertheless resolved and satisfied in the conclusion, the development is complete. But if there is lacking a life-view (which of course must be in the first part and everywhere, though the lack of it only becomes evident in
232jbid., p. 114
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the second part or the third, that is to say, the conclusion) , it is of no avail to let the hero die, no, it avails nothing that thewriter, to make quite sure that he is dead,even has him buried in the course of the story- with this the development is by no meanscomplete. 233
The art object, as a product of a communicating 
individual, is not a resolution of the life of an
individual, but should be part of a development of the
individual's life. Death is not a conclusion, but a life 
may be concluded long before death if it is not lived in 
an authentic manner. Likewise, the artistic production 
focusing on the life of an individual is not necessarily 
concluded with the ending of the production (the 
completion of the art object), nor the finality within 
that production. The art object is an object whose
communication can be appropriated for the authentic 
artist as part of his own communication as well as part 
of the development of the individuals being communicated. 
The lack of conclusion may be evidence that the artist 
(and the art object as well) lacks an authentic
existence.
The author lacking conclusions has something else, 
which is an indication of the lack of authentic
existence. An artist, lacking in conclusion, and, 
therefore, any authentic direction or passionate choice, 
has only a premise on which to base his work. This brings 
out a vital distinction. The premise is a superficial
goal, a direction without grounding, whereby an effect is 
created. The premise-author (or artist) is outwardly 
directed, while its counterpart, the essential-artist, is 
inwardly directed.
Premise-authors are the opposite of the essential authors, for the latter has his own perspective, he constantly comes behind himself in his individual productions; he strives forward indeed, but within the totality, not after it... For he has a definite world-view and life-view which he follows, and with this he is in advance of his individual literary
233ibid., p. 114
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productions, as the whole is always before the parts. 234
The premise-artist is bound by the constraints of 
externality, and his production is led and constructed 
along the laws laid out by this externality, be they 
physical limitations in the most basic sense, or social 
limitations in a more complicated manifold. The premise- 
artist' s productions are created not on the grounds of 
his own existence, but on a perceived existence. The
premise-artist is a producer of an esthetic product, one 
which may be a communication of the idea, but not the 
application and, hence, the appropriation, of the idea as 
ideal. The essential-artist, on the other hand, produces 
according to his existence. He is either a teacher or a 
learner, expressing his own existence as an individual. 
The essential-artist is a producer of the aesthetic,
which is a communication not only of the idea but the 
ideal as a necessary processof appropriation and 
application to the receiving individual's existence.
The essentialist nature of the individual's 
communication is one of the key factors of the individual 
being an authentic artist. The form of communication 
which such an essential-artist uses is one which is part 
of his existence but also maintains the dialectical 
nature of the art object. " The art of communication 
consist in coming as close as possible to reality, i.e. 
to contemporaries who are in the position of readers, and
yet at the same time to have a viewpoint, to preserve the
comforting and endless distance of ideality." 235 The 
ideal for the premise-artist is a construction based on 
the interaction of externality with his imaginative 
powers. The essential-artist, in contrast, bases his work 
on his existence as an individual with full awareness of 
the communication which he is creating, directed towards 
other developing individualities, thereby producing an 
object easily understood to be not existing as reality
234ibid., p. 117
235ibid., p. 118
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(i.e. it is only a depiction), but as something 
understood in terms of a movement towards actuality.
These points are the main features of Kierkegaard's 
criticism of Adler. Kierkegaard does not criticise Adler 
from an aesthetic viewpoint, in opposition to the 
esthetic viewpoint, nor is he critical of Adler as an 
ordinary author. Rather, Kierkegaard discusses Adler from 
the position of one without authority, investigating the 
phenomenon of Adler in its entirety (i.e. to see if he is 
an essential author with a life-view, according with his 
claims to revelation). Adler has not, for Kierkegaard, 
denigrated any claims to the possibility of revelation. 
Rather, Kierkegaard notes about him that " when a man 
only wishes to explain away what was intended to be an 
apostolic existence into being a genius, without revoking 
the first claim- then he confounds the situation 
terribly." 23s Adler's revelations may be enough to label 
him an Apostle, but he confuses the issue and, therefore, 
denies his claim as such through the nature of his
communication.
Kierkegaard continues to confront Adler along a 
number of levels. First, he examines the historical 
aspect of Adler's revelation. Adler's collision with the 
universal is that of the special individual by way of 
revelation. A man so called should regard himself, for
Kierkegaard, outside of the age, while remaining part of 
it an embodied individual.
The man chosen in our age will not be merely an instrument in the immediate to serve but willconsciously undertake his calling in a sense different from that which has always characterised a divine calling: he will thinkof himself and understand himself in the fact that this extraordinary thing has happened tohim. 237
This is an historical individual, but with a claim of 
revelation. For Kierkegaard, the historical individual is 
fully tied into the existential individual, relating 
himself in an authentic manner to his contemporaries,
236ibid., p. 124
237ibid., p. 130
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while at the same time continuing to come to terms with 
the existential truth granted him. This granting of 
revelation bears great responsibility, such that the 
individual, who has received one, should place himself in 
the best possible position, whereby he maintains his 
existential role as both a witness and a teacher of that 
revelation. This responsibility cannot be carried out 
only inwardly, through subjective reflection, but must be 
performed within the context of the individual's fellow 
man.
In case everything was in order about a man being called of God by revelation, he would then understand that to this call and to the fact of having a revelation there corresponds ethically a prodigious responsibility in all directions, not only inwardly... but outwardly, in relation to the established order, because the extraordinary has in reflection the dialectic of being the highest salvation, but also of being able to be the greatest corruption. ^38
His responsibility is to make his extraordinary 
experience and, therefore, through that experience, his 
extraordinary communication such that he continues to 
learn while at the same time teaching. In effect, the 
individual who experiences a revelation must make himself 
suffer direct damage from this revelation, while knowing 
that it is simultaneously his salvation. " In the 
ultimate consequence of reflection he would then 
transform the fact of revelation into his life's deepest 
secret, which in the silence of the grave remained the 
law of his existence, but which he never communicated 
directly." 3^9 The revelation must be completely counter 
to the individual's existence, and the individual must 
understand, reflect, and, ultimately, apply this to its 
existence and communication.
What is clear for Kierkegaard, however, is that, 
while the individual experiences seems to require the 
necessity to keep the revelation inward, this is not 
enough. What makes the change a requirement- that the
238ibid,, p. 130 
, p . 131
p. 140
individual communicate his revelation- is the dialectical 
nature of a revelation. Not only must the individual who 
has received a revelation not directly communicate it, 
but, because the revelation is dialectical, he must 
indirectly communicate it; " he who is called by a 
revelation and to communicate a revelation, or the fact 
that he had a revelation (for the principal thing is 
precisely that he has had a revelation, not always so 
much its contents...) , he should proclaim this, appeal to 
it, exert authority." 240 The revelation is a universally 
applicable communication, revealed to a single 
individual. The dialectical nature of the revelation 
(through all of its manifold apparitions) emerges when it 
becomes clear to the individual that he has no authority, 
since the revelation comes from divine authority, but he 
must continue, because of the very fact of the 
revelation, proclaim its contents and be witness to the 
fact that he has received one.
In an age of reflection, which Kierkegaard 
identifies as characteristic of his own, the receiver of 
a revelation has no authority in himself; the actual 
ideal is granted from actuality, outside of the 
receiver's existence. The authority is divine in its 
source and nature. Divine authority is the only 
authority, and the questions which an individual must ask 
are not 'Do you understand?' or 'Do you agree?' but are 
commands for obedience. The individual who receives the 
revelation is not granted any status. It is hard beyond 
belief to exist in such a state, with a revelation, but, 
by the very fact of its being revelation, the individual 
must persist without the authority, thereby developing in 
existence as an extraordinary individual. " The true 
extraordinarius will not be comforted nor seek relief no 
find relief in the public, but only in God; and therein 
consists the dialectical, which is anguish and crisis but 
at the same time blessedness." The true extraordinary
, p . 131
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individual confronts his revelation and situation, 
acknowledging his burden while rejoicing underneath it.
How does the individual become extraordinary? He 
might be a normal individual but, upon increasingly 
inward reflection, he conceives of a new point of 
departure for the established order, a position from 
which he is in direct conflict with the paradigms of such 
an order and which cannot produce for himself a position 
from which he might gain authority. What distinguishes 
the ordinary from the special individual? The starting- 
point is the revelation. An ordinary individual might 
reach a higher standing in the world, but he does not 
affect those very terms which placed him in such a 
position; he accomplishes nothing beyond the ordinary, 
nothing original, though he might be considered by the 
public as being " great" . The extraordinary man, in 
contrast, starts with the same- the human standard of 
individual ethics- but he also starts with a revelation. 
The extraordinary man is required to make sacrifices and 
to put himself in a position contrary to the established 
order, and does so.
The true extraordinary individual, capable of being 
an essential-artist, accepts its revelation, and attempts 
to communicate such. However, by its very nature as 
revelation, such an individual is always placed within an 
existential opposition to the revelation, resulting in 
suffering. Kierkegaard writes:
Truly there is only one thing to do with respect to serving truth: to suffer for it.This is the only possible awakening. Such an appalling, all-engulfing web of reflection as now envelops the generation cannot be exploded by reflection; greater powers are needed. And martyrs are the only ones who are n e e d e d . 4^2
Suffering is one of the marks of the true extraordinary
individual, since the revelation, which is communicated
to the individual from the actual ideal, becomes not only
applicable to its existence but removes the existence of
that individual beyond its normal existence, while still
242JP, vol. 3, pp. 159-160, <<2650; A  16, n.d., 1849
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requiring an interaction within its previous existence. 
The extraordinary individual, by the very fact of the 
communication of the idea as ideal to i t s e l f ,  243 ig placed 
within existence, while being wholly outside of that same 
existence. Kierkegaard writes:
The extraordinary person is not vain about what has been granted him- for then he would definitely not be the extraordinary; moreover, he is far too exhausted by what has beengranted him to be more vain. But on the other hand it is nevertheless true that he is the extraordinary.And then, yes, perhaps the extraordinary prefers to encourage men to believe that he is a fool, a nobody- but then the responsibilityto God- does he dare, is it not deceiving God,since under the circumstances God has made him into the extraordinary.O, so strenuous is the true God-relationshipthat it is always characterized by a tendency toward madness. To be the extraordinary, to know with God that one is that, to dare know that the future will reveal it more and more (yet here the future perhaps says: not untilafter one's death)- and then in his present life to have the most insignificant person among his contemporaries be more than the extraordinary, for the most insignificant person is in the previously given relativity, the extraordinary is the new- which is still nowhere at home . 244
This tendency to madness is, first of all, a specific
aspect of the revelation as idea, always in opposition to
the extraordinary individual's previous existence prior
to it attaining the status of Apostle. Not only does the
true extraordinary individual exist within a
confrontation with existence itself, but it also bears
the burden of its revelation as revelation, and is,
therefore, secondly, within a confrontation with itself.
By its very nature, as revealed truth of the actual
grounding of existence, the revelation is a continual
opposition corrupting the existence of the extraordinary
individual. As Kierkegaard writes : " But on the whole it
243j^d one might argue that the Apostle is receiving the idea as pure idea, rather than as ideal. The extraordinary individual is not an Apostle. Revelation is present, but the idea expresses the ideal. The Apostle's revelation is such that the ideal is the idea.
244jy, vol. 4, p. 404, <<4672; A 189, n.d., 1851;
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is certain that to be an apostle must be torture and 
horror, total torture and horror." 245
The extraordinary man is one who is unconcerned with 
his own temporal responsibilities. This is not to say 
that he is an unethical individual (though this is a
criticism which can be cited against Kierkegaard if such 
an individual is to be justified) . His primary source of 
anxiety is the inward responsibility which he bears,
hoping that suitable resistance will be met. The ordinary 
(or, as Kierkegaard begins to distinguish, the ordinary- 
extraordinary author, the premise author) sees his 
efforts as having a telos, constructed and carried out 
within the confines of rationality. The ordinary-
extraordinary man individual already knows the results, 
whereas the true extraordinary is in anxiety about their 
truth, and he is concerned only about his relationship to 
God and the revelation, and not about the " preordained" 
results. The true extraordinary man (the extraordinary 
author/artist) possesses certainty only in the fact that 
he has the eternal on his side and that he has had a
revelation.
The ordinary-extraordinary man understands the 
nature of his message in a different manner from the true 
extraordinary. His message is reached as a result of his 
thought and, once he is through with this inward thought, 
he then takes up a position against the established 
order. The ordinary-extraordinary man constructs his 
message on his own rational terms, and then applies then 
against the establishment. " The problem and the labor 
[for the ordinary-extraordinary] is only to insure that 
[the desired results] may be brought to victory." 246 The 
extraordinary individual is the opposite, concerned only 
about his relationship to God and the manner of 
revelation of the idea of the actual truth which he 
wishes to communicate, since his message will succeed if 
it is coming from God, though the individual might 
himself fail. The ordinary-extraordinary individual (whom
245jp^ vol. 2, p. 454, <<2098; XI^ A  400, n.d., 
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Kierkegaard describes as the " man of movement" , one who 
moves under his own impetus and directs himself towards 
his own goals) needs the established order, if only so 
that the established might change their minds and 
appreciate and accept his plan. The extraordinary man has 
no such need, only a need for a proper relationship with 
God. " Whether the true extraordinarius prevails today or 
tomorrow or in a thousands years is a matter of no 
concern, for he has conquered, his relationship to God is 
his victory; yea, through what he has to proclaim were 
never to prevail in the world, to this he might reply, 
'All the worse for the world.'" 247 indeed, elements by 
which the extraordinary individual might be identified- 
such as suffering- are inconsequential to a great extent.
A true extraordinary person performs activities 
which are profound, which go beyond the normal scope of 
temporal imagination to connect with the eternal. It is 
something profound and " properly speaking profundity is 
the deep existential realisation of an idea which 
corresponds directly with God." 248 profundity is a mode 
of existence- the individual who is extraordinary has 
both knowledge of, a relationship with, and the ability 
and necessity to communicate knowledge of actuality, such 
that he must not only fear and yet be reconciled with his 
extraordinary nature, he must also love the established 
order and not wish it any harm while at the same time 
contain within himself the seeds of its dissolution and 
make himself one who is reviled and repulsed such that no 
one would wish to be him. The individual becomes 
extraordinary only when he understands the thought that 
he is paradoxical; the extraordinary individual becomes 
such when he understands his message of salvation as one 
which will be interpreted as damnation by those for whom 
the message is intended. It is on these terms that the 
true, authentic artist is created. Kierkegaard writes:
It is one thing to be a so-called extraordinarywith direct recognizability (that is, the
247lbid., p. 149
248ibid., p. 152
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spurious extraordinary), getting along fine with all the relativities that participate in that which is merely the maximum of their range and on that basis interpret the extraordinary's behavior as the extraordinary.It is something quite different to be the true extraordinary, who relates inversely, explodes the relativities, which therefore defend themselves with all their might against him- the true extraordinary is inversely recognizable by being that which is ridiculed, cast off, etc., and the life of the extraordinary one is sheer wretchedness andsuffering. 249
The true extraordinary is not only outside of the normal 
understanding of existence within the knowledge of those 
to whom it is communicating, but must maintain that 
difference even as it is communicating the actual ideal 
as possible while simultaneously maintaining the 
impossibility of acceptance or recognition.
This extends across the artist's entire life and 
defines not only the nature of the individual as the 
extraordinary individual but also such an individual's 
output. The extraordinary individual as artist is one 
whose communication is established by the nature of its 
existence and, furthermore, the nature of the 
relationship between its existence and the knowledge of 
actuality which has been revealed to it. What must an 
author do when writing, particularly if he is writing a 
multiple number of books? Similarly, what must any artist 
do when producing art objects? Kierkegaard answers this 
question with regards to Adler's last four books.
The four books must have objectively a deeper aim- for example, as I think of it, to compass, if possible maieutically, a certain field from various sides at once. It must be important for the author of the four books, a half-poetical artistic task for him, that each book, which in 
itself is essentially different from the others, may be characteristically kept apart from the others; the author must know how to express poetically the illusion which is essentially confirmed by the special point of departure of each book...2so
249JP, vol. 4, pp. 435-436, <<4719; XI^ A  541, n.d., 1854
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For Kierkegaard, the artist must produce objects which 
differ in style and structure, but in which the inherent
nature of each object must remain the same, and must be
expressed maieutically.
Kierkegaard is highly critical of Adler's claim to 
genius. For Kierkegaard, the vital and amazing fact of 
Adler's writing is that he might have had a revelation. 
However, even if he had had one, by claiming to be able 
to go beyond the immediate fact of the revelation, by 
seeking public approval, and by claiming to be able to 
come to terms with his revelation through reflection and 
mediation, Adler is dismissed as being either unworthy of 
having had a revelation (if he had one at all) , or of not
having had one. The claim to genius, which Adler makes
based on his revelation is a false one. The individual 
who is called by a revelation to have an effect on the 
world contains within himself a teleological attitude, 
since he is God's (and the ideal truth's) instrument 
(and, by being such, the goal's success is never in 
doubt) . Such an individual, and Adler is not one, in 
Kierkegaard's understanding, however, must remove itself 
from a position of authority. To live humouristically 
denies this teleological aspects of the existential 
individual, and describes Adler's attitude towards his 
own revelation. Kierkegaard points out that
this is pretty much the attitude Adler assumes in his last works- but Adler began by being called by a revelation, and Adler now thinks that he is in identity with himself, that is to say, he fails to notice that there is a qualitative decisive difference between his first position and his last.^si
To have a revelation, and to accept it and understand it
as such, is marvellous for the individual involved. To
assume that one must then become a clear and reflective
author on the matter, to assume that one can then enter
into a dialogue with one's own revelation, is
blasphemous. The results of assuming any position of
authority are to relegated one's status to that of
 ^p _ 215
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ordinary genius, and relegates the communicative 
production to inauthenticity.
The development of the individual being is 
paralleled by the development of originality, determined 
through silence.
Silence is the way by which originality is acquired, an originality which is more than a surrogate for the originality of the genius... By holding fast a definite expression of one's life, a definite single thought, in absolutely silent inwardness, by not wishing to open the least communication with any other man (by which relative and comparative standards, the standees of mediocrity, are made accessible) every man will, if in the meantime he does not lose his reason (for this danger is inescapable) , acquire originality
Silence as originality is a claim to an exemption from
normal existence, without making a claim for distinction
within existence. Silence ensures a separation from
normal existence (though it never ensures a position
within actuality). Silence is not writing multiple books
of reflections on a revelation. Silence is the expression
of the individual who does not seek approval from the
public but simply presents his communication in indirect
form so that they might accept it or not, based upon
their own e x i s t e n c e .253 The change of the individual, the
qualitative existential decision, is by its very nature
both inward and silent. The outward and the inner may
appear to be both necessary, but it is the silence of the
inner subjectivity of the individual, which is vital.
252ibid,, p. 215
253j^ interesting and rare note- Rothko quotes from Kierkegaard's Fear and
Trembling on this subject, and is agreement on the necessity of silence forthe artist. Rothko read this book in 1955-56, and was much taken with the figure of Kierkegaard's Abraham. Rothko is quoted in Breslin, p. 392, as stating in April, 1956: " Last year when I read Kierkegaard, I found that he was writing almost exclusively about that artist who is beyond all others. And as I read him more and more I got involved with his ideas that Iidentified completely with the artist he was writing about. I was thatartist." Rothko is typical of many other artists who have chanced upon Kierkegaard in the 20th century- reading piecemeal, understanding even less (especially since so many did not have access to a translation from the Danish), What is remarkable about this is that Rothko (and other 'Abstract Expressionists' like Pollock and Motherwell) seemed to have latched onto applicable passages. Despite the fact that I have done nothing to investigate the possible influence that Kierkegaard has had on 20th century art (and 19th century for that matter), I would like to point out that there remains a great potential for such an investigation.
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Adler might be qualified, his subjective 
transformation may be qualitative with regards to his 
existential being, but it is not so in a Christian (in a 
paradoxical relationship to knowledge of the actuality of 
existence), and, therefore, in an authentic, manner; 
Adler appears not to have experienced a transformation 
which is qualified in a Christian sense.
It is different with the definition of a Christian awakening to a religious interest 
which lies in the sphere of transcendence. The emotional seizure of the individual by something higher is far from defining a Christian adequately, for by emotion may be expressed a pagan view, pagan conceptions of God. In order to express oneself Christianly there is required, besides the more universal language of the heart, also skill and schooling in the definition of Christian concepts, while at the same time it is of course assumed that the emotion is of a specific, qualitative sort,the Christian e m o t i o n .  254
Herein are even more qualities for the extraordinary 
individual to be regarded as an authentic artist. The 
means of expression require an emotional commitment to 
the knowledge of the ontological grounding of the 
individual being, as well as that very knowledge itself. 
Danger exists in the fact that an individual, believing 
that he has had a religious emotion, assumes that it is 
necessarily a Christian emotion, simply because he is a 
Christian, when the qualitative imperative may not, in 
fact, be present. The authentic individual will recognise 
this. Therein lies a specific distinction. The authentic 
artist is one who implements, within its communication, 
the qualitative imperative as a confrontation within 
existence against the actual, but does so not merely as 
an action within existence, but as a state of existence 
to move both against and beyond. In effect, the 
extraordinary individual is one with potential for being 
an authentic artist, as a communicator of the idea of the 
actual ideal within existence, so that even its own
254^dler, p. 252
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qualitative transformation towards the actual is 
irrelevant.
5. The Implications Of The Above
Three problems arise from the preceding ideas. First 
is a major criticism which many have held against 
Kierkegaard. Throughout his writing, Kierkegaard could be 
understood as describing an authentic existential 
individual who remains silent and does not produce 
communication of any sort, either direct or indirect. 
Kierkegaard would reply that the individual can 
communicate his revelation, his relationship to God and 
his understanding of his ontological grounding, 
authentically. The only stipulation is that such an 
individual not enter into a form of reflection which 
leads to his seeking assurances from outside of his own 
self. His subjectivity, and his understanding of 
subjectivity, must be the key to his authenticity and the 
development of his individual self. This is clear and 
precisely defined through Kierkegaard's criticism of 
Adler :
one may say that he has been productive at the wrong place, his productivity sails before a false wind. For instead of giving himself time, 
gaining repose, coming to his senses, going to school; instead of acquiring respect for what after all it means to have had a revelation, and coming to an understanding with himself and to a qualitative decision, in short, instead of 
keeping and acting and labouring, he becomes so 
productive in a literary way about all this, 
that he has not yet attained repose, that he is fatigued, that he is shaken, pale, that he is on the point of making the leap, that with a longer time for working quietly to revise the ideas he hopes, e t c . 255
Certain steps were not taken by Adler which were
necessary. He should have come to an understanding of
himself in terms of the revelation. Instead, he begins
producing works directly which seek to explain in a
literary and direct fashion that which does not require,
255ibid., p. 259
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through its nature as a revelation, an explanation. Adler 
becomes bound by reflection in the wrong manner.
The second problem is that Kierkegaard requires for 
the communicating individual a necessarily Christian 
grounding, based on both the emotional and existential 
nature of the individual, as well as on a specific 
Christian knowledge. From the preceding, it would seem 
possible to suggest that Kierkegaard believes that it is 
only the Apostle who is able to produce a communication 
which allows for the appropriation. Otherwise he would be 
unable to state, in a reference to the genius and the 
apostle and as an indication of both the limits of art 
and Kierkegaard's recognition of his own limitations, the 
following :
A 56, n.d., 1849: ...My situation will placeme personally under the same " judgement," as everyone else, the judgement upon Christendom contained in these books. It is precisely this which will prevent my being confused with an apostle or someone like that. The books are poetically written, as if by an apostle, but I have stepped aside- no, I am not the apostle, anything but, I am the poet and the penitent,
Yet, the very example of Kierkegaard himself (unless we
are to label him an Apostle!), and other indications
noted in the preceding, disallow this. This is more
difficult to answer and come to terms with. The initial
response is to state that Kierkegaard's philosophy, no
matter how it is appropriated, must remain Christian in
its grounding. Therefore, any production or communication
which is to be authentic for the individuals both
communicating and receiving must, by its very nature and
efforts to be authentic for the existence of individuals,
be Christian.
But where, then, does the artist fit into the whole 
scheme? A solution to this is only found in an 
interpretative reading and determination of the previous 
descriptions of the extraordinary individual as either 
genius or Apostle. The artist appears to be neither and
256JP, vol. 6, p. 100, <<6317
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Kierkegaard makes no indication of the artist as such. 
Yet, the authentic artist (one who is an authentic 
communicator of the idea as actual ideal, i.e. as 
appropriatable into the receiving individual's existence 
through a process of reception which involves reflection 
and repetition) must fit into a position within this 
framework, something Kierkegaard never suggests. 
Kierkegaard does not describe the artist as a distinct 
identity anywhere. This is the third problem, but is 
resolved by defining the distinction between immanence 
and transcendence, and then placing the importance of an 
authentic artist between the communication of the genius 
and the communication of the Apostle, having qualities of 
the essentialist, the ordinary-extraordinary, and the 
extraordinary individual.
Immanence and transcendence can be used to describe 
the development of a specific concept or relation within 
the subjectivity of the individual. In particular, it is 
used to distinguish between Religiousness A and 
Religiousness B and, while it can and will be used to 
describe other developments, it is that example which
provides the clearest understanding in a Kierkegaardian 
context. The difference then becomes a mean of
application in determining the identity of the artist.
Religiousness A is a form of religiousness concerned 
with the individual's relation to the actual but not yet 
fully appropriating the implications of this relation 
into its existence. Religiousness A is not specifically 
Christian, and can even be a form of paganism, but has 
not yet confronted itself with the paradoxical nature of 
Religiousness B. It is pathos-filled, i.e. it contains 
within its stage of existence, a concern and limited 
appropriation of the pathos of the actual, the truth of 
the actual for the individual. It remains, however,
separated by that acceptance of the paradox, only one 
step before the completion of the dialectical 
confrontation with the ideality of the actual in 
existence. Religiousness A is not for acting in a 
decisive manner and, as such, can be described as
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immanent religiousness in that it has appropriated into 
existence only that which exists in existence.
Religiousness A, as an immanent form of religion, is 
static in nature, an unmoving relation to the actual.
This does not mean that the state of immanence is 
undialectical, but that it is not paradoxically 
dialectical; it is not in a pathos-determined
confrontation and appropriation with, and of, the paradox 
of the God in time.
The distinction between the pathos-filled and the dialectical must, however, be qualified more specifically, because Religiousness A is by no means undialectical, but it is not paradoxically dialectical. Religiousness A is the dialectic of inward deepening; it is therelation to an eternal happiness that is not conditioned by a something but is the dialectical inward deepening of the relation, consequently conditioned only by the inward deepening, which is d i a l e c t i c a l .257
Religiousness A, as immanent religiousness, remains a
condition of the individual, determined by the
individual's singular relation to itself, rather than in
a confrontation with that which is outside of itself.
It is not a grasping of the eternal within
temporality within the eternal but within the temporal
nature of the individuality, and it is this relation with
the temporal that makes the movement a necessary one.
Just as the forgiveness of sins is an event which occurs
not within the temporal but in direct relation to the
eternal, a movement from immanence to transcendence, so
too must the development of the content of the art object
take place. This movement is necessary in the case of the
forgiveness of sins because such an act is determined as
a temporal relation to the eternal, necessitating the
movement from one to the other. In the case of the
development of content of the art object, the movement
must also be one of immanence to transcendence for both
the communicating individual and the receiving individual
if it is to invoke an appropriation for the receiving
2 57 CUP, p. 556
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individual a truthful relation with the actual. Even 
though the objects remain wholly within time as material 
objects, there must be an indication of a transcendence 
of their own temporal nature, beyond the immanent.
Immanence, as Religiousness A must be first present 
before transcendence can take place, before acceptance of 
the absurdity of the paradox. Religiousness A may be 
understood as higher than B by speculative thought, in 
that it remains immanent, grounded as it is by human 
nature; B can only be B by having been A, and therefore A 
is a necessary determinative of B. Within Kierkegaard's 
understanding of the human individual, however. 
Religiousness A contains within itself the means of 
transcending itself. Religiousness A is a doubleness 
within life, one in which the specific stage of existence 
becomes re-doubled and then overcome through a 
transcendence.
The view which sees life's doubleness (dualism) is higher and deeper than that which seeks unity or " pursues studies toward unity" ... the view which sees the eternal as Tsloa, and the teleological view in general, is higher than all immanence or all talk about causa 
sufficiens. The passion which saw paganism as sin and assumed eternal torment in hell is greater than the summa summarum of the thoughtlessness (which is disheveled) which sees everything within i m m a n e n c e .
The view of existence which sees only that which is
within immanence, that which is at hand to the existence
of the individual, is one which is inherently incorrect.
If the singularity of the existential stage that the
individual is within and perceives is adhered to, then
the individual will be unable to fully develop. But, if
this singularity is transcended, by perceiving such as
containing within itself the possibility of redoubling,
then such a singularity is transcended.
This transcendence occurs when the relation of the
individual to the actual becomes a matter not of thinking
258JP, IV A  192, n.d., 1844, <<704, vol. 1, p. 329
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of the actual (a partial acceptance), but of acting 
within existence in the direction of the actual.
Religiousness B... or paradoxical religiousness... makes conditions in such a way that the conditions are not dialectical concentrations of inward deepening but a definite something that qualifies the eternal happiness morespecifically (whereas in A the more specific qualifications of inward deepening is the only more specific qualification), not by qualifying more specifically the individual'sappropriation of it but by qualifying more specifically the eternal happiness, yet not as a task of thinking but as paradoxically repelling and giving rise to new pathos.259
Religiousness B becomes a confrontation with an other,
determining the individual's relation to the actual
external and to the individuality, despite the
individual's own ability to conceive of that actuality.
Religiousness B is an appropriation which is not
qualified by the individual but by a qualification
outside of the individual in a paradoxical relation to
it.
The specific for Christianity is thedialectical in the second place, except, please note, that this is not a task for thinking (as if Christianity were a doctrine, not an existence-communication...) but is a relation to the pathos-filled as an impetus for new pathos. 260
In effect, the appropriation by the individual is not 
grounded in the individual's own act of appropriation but 
grounded external to it, almost imposed on it. Because of 
the dialectical nature of Christianity, however, guilt 
and sin consciousness being primary considerations of 
Religiousness B. This process of appropriation of the 
actual, which is external to the individual, becomes 
internalised, becoming a transcendence of the internal 
appropriation in an external direction.
The movement from immanence to transcendence within 
the context of Religiousness A and B occurs as follows. 
The individual's existential-dialectical development is
259
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immersed in the immanence of its personal situation, it 
existential immersion in pathos being determined by a 
guilt-consciousness. Therefore, the individual's relation 
to the telos of his existence becomes reduced to a 
minimum, since the guilt-consciousness is a repelling 
relation to the eternal. At this point, the dialectical 
movement of transcendence occurs, when the absolute 
minimum of immanence is present and then overcome in 
favour of the eternal. The dialectical relation of the 
individual to itself, in reference to its immanent 
character, in relation to the actual, is a process 
whereby it is recognised in a progressively diminishing 
manner as inadequate and, in this process of recognition, 
is transcended.
Transcendence may become an isolating factor for the 
individual, in that its relation with the eternal is 
exclusive of other individualities- " Religiousness B is 
isolating, separating, polemical." and transcendence
may reflect only the individual's own specific 
confrontation with the actual, but the communicative act 
must reflect both this development towards the actual as 
well as the isolation which it creates. Kierkegaard 
writes: " The genius's point of departure is within his
own personal identity; the point of departure of 
revelation is paradoxically beyond the personality." 262
This isolation ultimately determines the 
communicative act as inadequate within existence while 
indicating the actual. Therefore, the development of the 
individual's communication must be a reflection of this 
development towards transcendence. It must be maintained, 
however, in opposition to this development of inadequacy, 
that the transcended immanence of the previous existence 
remain in a dialectical relation with the new situation 
of the individual.
The divine can very well move in an earthlycontext, and it does not require the
261ibid., p. 582
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annihilation of the earthly as a condition forits own appearance...263
The material may remain. Through the distinction between 
immanence and transcendence, the communication of the 
idea becomes confused. In the case of the genius, who is 
immanent, the communication of the idea itself is 
immanent. Therein lies its inapplicability to the 
receiving individual, since the idea is presented but 
remains part of the existence of the communicating 
individual. In the case of the Apostle, because the idea 
is a communication transcendent to the communicator's 
being, the idea also remains separate from normal 
existence. The idea is a continual factor within the 
existence, making communication of the idea as ideal a 
necessity, but still remaining transcendent by its very 
nature as actual idea. What is necessary to maintain is 
that the dialectical movement (like all dialectical 
movements for Kierkegaard) from immanence to 
transcendence does not simply annihilate the preceding 
state but affirms it in the movement to a higher state, 
while simultaneously isolating the actual from existence 
in any form of communication. Transcendence is a movement 
through the immanent, in that it surpasses it while 
simultaneously maintaining it. There is a transformation 
occurring in which the original identity is transcended 
but is also always present.
Does this mean that neither the genius nor the 
Apostle are capable of communicating the idea as ideal? 
In the case of the genius, yes, but in the Apostle's
case, because of the very nature of revelation, there is
a certainty about the possibility of the communication 
and its appropriation. This is not the issue, though. 
Kierkegaard, goes to some length (though never an 
adequate one) to define the nature of the genius and the 
Apostle. His definition of each is inadequate because it 
defines them solely on the basis of a negative 
distinction- the differences between the two- and does
not define the nature of their communication. The
263JP, II A  351, Feb. 3, 1839, «833, Vol. 1, p. 382
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definition is possible, nevertheless, and quite simple; 
the genius is a communicator of an idea immanent to its 
being, and the Apostle is a communicator of the idea as 
revelation of the actual ideal, which is transcendent to 
its being. This does not, however, define the artist.
Only when this distinction between the genius and the 
artist is examined in further detail does the artist 
emerge as a separate entity.
The ordinary-extraordinary individual, the genius, 
is an immanent creature. His productions may be new for 
both himself and other individualities to whom he is 
communicating, but these communication remain wholly 
within the realms of existence (i.e. they never truly
communicate the actual ideal of existence). The 
communication of the genius is something which is 
appreciated on an esthetic level and, while it might be 
considered and judged on aesthetic terms, is not 
authentic. The communication of the genius is not 
authoritative and his production does not have an 
accomplishment which can be cited except within the realm 
of the existence of individuals- i.e. it does not 
communicate actual truths. There is neither life-view nor 
passion, but simply a desire to create fulfilment of the 
basic requirements of the public. Kierkegaard condemns 
such production in his journals:
It occurs to me that artists go forward by going backward, something which I have nothing against intrinsically when it is a reproduced retreat- as is the case with the betterartists. But it does not seem right that they stop with the historical themes already given and, so to speak, think that only these are suitable for poetic treatment... Why are modern heroes and the like not just as poetic? Is it because there is so much emphasis on clothingthe content in order that the formal aspect can be all the more finished?^^*
This communication may be more than simply esthetic, but
not much more (at most, it might be ethical, but never
religious). The art object, as product of such an
individual, is not a resolution which is the result of
264JP, Vol. 1, p. 51, <<119, I A  86
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reflection by both the communicator and the communicated, 
but simply a playful production which has no real 
conclusion to offer. In short, the product of the genius 
is merely the communication of the idea in an immanent 
sense, which is inapplicable to the development of the 
receiving individual's progressive knowledge and 
appropriation of the actual ideal. The genius is not a 
communicating individual who feels the necessity to 
communicate for other individualities as part of his own 
development, but as part of his relations in existence, 
which is purely within a state of immanence. There is 
little actual incentive to communicate, except for the 
pleasure of communication as existential incentive. Even 
if he is communicating aspects of the actual truth of 
existence, the very form of his communication (because of 
his status as genius) denies an authentic reflection and 
appropriation.
The Apostle is a development of the authentic 
communicator which is beyond the genius who, by the very 
identity of the individual after the revelation, has 
become transcendent. His message is given to him, without 
his consent, as revelation from the actual, and it 
requires that he communicate this. However, it also 
denies the direct communication of the message, and 
forces the Apostle to confront the world. He is given a 
conclusion, and forced to communicate that conclusion. 
The individual who has received an actual communication 
of the ideal nature of existence as idea must 
communicate, since it has become part of his own 
existence. Because this knowledge of the actual remains a 
revelation, however, and, therefore, an idea, it is 
incommunicable within existence. He is not concerned with 
his temporal or societal responsibilities, but only with 
the manner in which his communication will best be 
appropriated by those receiving it. He is moved by an 
outer transformation, over which is he has no will to 
change. The Apostle, is bound existentially by the 
message which he must communicate but which is wholly 
outside of existence itself.
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Kierkegaard's own understanding of the Apostle and 
the artist seems confused. Is the artist either a genius 
or an Apostle? Therein lies a vital distinction. 
Kierkegaard writes :
This is the idea of Christianity: that the most unfortunate person, the one who suffers most, is the very one who is to bring consolation to others. This is the very expression of the infinitude of his suffering, that it is not a matter of anyone's consoling him, but only that he is to console others- so inconsolable, in a certain sense, is his suffering I... This is poetry and dialectic.
What is of extreme importance is the fact that
Kierkegaard is relating the importance of the Apostle,
who has received a message of transcendence through its
revelation, to the suffering which is inflicted upon the
Apostle within existence. For Kierkegaard, this becomes
poetic in nature, and therefore artistic. However,
Kierkegaard has failed to realise the opposition which is
present in the immanent nature of the suffering and the
transcendent nature of the revelation which would
seemingly create the Apostolic identity of the
individual. Does Kierkegaard mean that the suffering
nature of the Apostle's existence within existence is
artistic in nature? This is a confusion which seems to
run throughout the literature.
Even in the later years^ss the need to continue to
define what it means to be an authentic communicator of
the truth continues. Despite the polemical nature of the
attack, and the direct form of communication employed,
Kierkegaard continued to utilise indirect communication
to some degree. This is evident in the very nature of the
attack, since it is, at times, nearly a ridiculous style
that is employed for a serious purpose, without resorting
to mere caricature or satire, but it also contains
strictures for the authentic artist. The requirements of
the authentic communicator, the artist, as recognised by
Kierkegaard for himself and others is indicated thusly:
265j-p^ vol. 1, p. 187, « 4 7 2 ;  VIII^ A 493, n.d., 1847 
266particularly in the Attack Upon Christendom.
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This has to be said; I oblige no one to act accordingly, I have no authority to do so. But having heard it, thou art made responsible and now must act upon thine own responsibility, in such a way that thou canst justify thine action before G o d . 2^ 7
The requirements of the authentic communicator, the 
artist, is not only that he should be scored by his 
fellow individuals, or, more specifically, put himself 
into a position where he is scorned, but also that he 
should have an unwillingness to his ability, a hesitation 
to speak beyond his authority, which he recognises as 
being something that is lacking.
Ability being assumed, it is best that the person in question should have no liking for the task. For doubtless it is true, as the proverb says, that liking makes the work go swiftly, but real seriousness only appears when a man with ability is compelled by a higher power against his liking to undertake the work- so it stands with ability opposed to liking.268
Even further than this, not only should the artist be
able to recognise the lack of authority, but the very act
of communication or production itself should be in doubt.
In recognition of the limitations of Kierkegaard's own
authorship, artistry, activity as an author and the
reason, or at least an indication of the debate, for
remaining a " silent" author, he writes:
What troubles me is whether or not I have the right to do this [remain silent about his own work] , whether in relation to God this silence is permissable, whether it is permissible to let a productivity which is so infinitely indebted to Him for its ingenuity remain an enigma and for many somewhat odd. And why? In part because the author considers this to be self-denial and in part because he feels unable to assume every misunderstanding in actual life resulting from giving an explanation. 269
For Kierkegaard, it would seem that the very
communication itself should remain the embodiment of an
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unreconciliable difference, between the material form of 
the communication within existence against its nature as 
a communication of the ideal. For Kierkegaard, the fact 
that the communication seemingly acts as a transference 
of knowledge of the actual idea as ideal from the actual 
to existence seemingly requires an acknowledgement of the 
debt which such a communication has to its source. The 
implications from his concerns are that the authentic 
artist, as extraordinary individual, must acknowledge 
that source within his own existence as a relation to the 
actual, but not acknowledge it within existence as a 
whole. This is a problem explored in the chapter on the 
art object itself.
From this, and beyond Kierkegaard, the authentic 
artist is both immanent and transcendent. The authentic 
artist must be understood as different to both of these 
types of individuals and, on the scale of development 
that Kierkegaard constructs, the authentic artist is 
between the genius and the Apostle; the authentic artist 
(or, more specifically, the product of the authentic 
artist) is both immanent and transcendent, even though 
this results in a contradiction of terms. The authentic 
artist is one who is a genius but who is also nearly an 
Apostle. He is one who is able to manipulate the message 
that he is communicating while at the same time 
developing towards the state of existence, of 
understanding, which the Apostle has received. As he 
develops towards being an extraordinary individual, he is 
developing towards an appropriation of the actual ideal 
truth of his ontological grounding. As an extraordinary 
individual, it can be said that the authentic artist is a 
continually-developing Apostle, whereas the Apostle is a 
given part of that specific individual's existence. He is 
not called by revelation, but, through reflection, 
develops the means of an existential appropriation of the 
revelation, which is a given element for the Apostle, and 
which is something that the genius is incapable of 
communicating. The authentic artist is not an 
extraordinary communicator in the sense that his
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communication is developed outside of himself, but he has 
reached the development and construction of his authentic 
communication by himself. This message has the same basis 
as actual truth as that of the Apostle, and is only 
different in how it is determined.
The authentic artist, within the potential for a 
Kierkegaardian understanding of such an identity, matches 
what he describes as the essential-artist, but is more 
than that. The premise-author/artist is outwardly 
directed towards an appreciation by others within the 
totality of existence, bound by externality, by social 
constraints, etc. The essential-artist, in contrast, is 
continually aware of his own development, the 
teleological aspect of his development, and his 
relationship and responsibilities to other
individualities, but is also bound by its own 
subjectivity. The concern is still there to differentiate 
between the genius and the Apostle, to establish those 
grounds whereby the communication is authentic, and its 
there that the identity of the Kierkegaardian artist 
lies. As noted even at the end of his life, Kierkegaard 
writes on this issue in the Attack Upon Christendom:
The difference between a genius and a Christian is that a genius is nature's extraordinary, no man being able to make himself a genius, whereas a Christian is freedom's extraordinary, or, more properly, freedom's ordinary, for though it is found extraordinarily seldom, it is what everyone ought to be. Therefore God wills that Christianity should be preached to all men absolutely, therefore that Apostles are very simple men, and the Pattern is in the lowly form of the servant, all this in order to indicate that this extraordinary is the ordinary, is accessible to all- but for all that a Christian is a thing even more rare than a genius.Only be not deceived by that fact that it is accessible to all, possible to all, as if from this it followed that it must be an easy sort of thing and that there were many Christians.No, it must be possible for all, otherwise it would not be freedom's extraordinary, but, for
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all that, a Christian is a thing even more rarethan a g e n i u s .  270
Kierkegaard's Attack Upon " Christendom" has to it a tone 
which seems to suggest that the degeneration of 
Christendom is an almost inevitable affair, that the 
nature of being a human individual in existence lead to 
the individual. While the requirements of the individual 
do not necessitate this, the nature of existence lead to 
this lack. Therefore, the artist is hindered by the very 
nature of his production to construct an art form which 
annuls itself. The production of art, to some extent, can 
turn into a farce of Christianity, or to the 
communication of the actual truth.
And then everything went gaily, with fine words and grandiloquent phrases and heavenly glances and torrents of tears, all the artists engaged for this purpose, who could not find words to thank God enough for the great privilege that we are all Christians, etc.- and the secret was that we have falsified the concept of what it is to be a Christian, but hope by knavish and hypocritical flattery and sweet word, giving thanks again and again that we are... the opposite of what God understand by being a Christian- by this hoping, deluding ourselves, to put a wax nose on God's face; by so heartily thanking Him that we are that, we hope to get out of being that.271
The artist and his inherent danger is the means of
removing the individual from the requirements of
actuality into the pleasures of existence, allowing the
individual not to strenuously adhere to the truth of
actuality in its own existence but to transform the truth
of actuality in the existence of actuality, thus
annulling it. If, however, the artist functions within an
authentic manner, the very process of annulling- which is
inherent to the dialectical nature of the identity of the
artist and, as will be shown, to the art object- becomes
a catalyst for the development of the receiving
individual towards understanding of its actual
ontological grounding.
270^tüacJc Upon " Christendom" , 'The Instant, No. 5', July 27, 1855, p. 159 
27lAttacJc Upon " Christendom" , 'The Instant, No. 5' , July 27, 1855, p. 169
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what clarifies the definition of the authentic 
artist even further is the form that his communication, 
takes as well as the development of that form during the 
development of the individual. The authentic artist is 
one who is able to communicate the truth of existence, a 
truth which can only be communicated between individuals 
indirectly. The truth of existence, though, must not 
begin to be communicated directly with truth, but may be 
communicated through untruth. " If one were to say that 
then the extraord.ina.rius [the extraordinary individual] 
begins with an untruth, indeed makes God a party to the 
untruth, it may be replied that all communication of 
truth must always begin with an untruth." 272 -j>he genius 
is incapable of communicating untruth, since his very 
communication is based on his relation to factors which 
are external to his individuality. His communication is 
determined by elements outside of himself. The Apostle is 
unable to communicate untruth, since the truth which he 
is given is a revelation. Even though the form which the 
Apostle may employ in his communication may have the 
appearance of untruth, its primary concern is never 
involved with this. This extends within the identity of 
the Apostle to such an extent that:
If I were to imagine such a one [an Apostle] in our time, he would refrain completely from preaching, in order, if possible, to draw attention to what it means to exist [at existere[, to preach by existentially [existentielt] expressing self-denial, the imitation of Christ, etc. How could he cope verbally with those artists in eloquence who preach now- and completely cover up what it means to exist [at existera] .273
The authentic artist, in contrast to both, is able to
communicate untruth at first (as part of the necessary
development out of the esthetic stage of existence) and
allow the transformation of the message of his
communication so that it evolves from being untruth to
truth. This does not mean that the artist's product as a
'^^ A^dler, p. 276
273j-p, vol. 1, p. 463, <<1062; A  725, n.d., 1851
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communication of the actual idea as ideal is truth in 
itself, but that the dialectical nature of the authentic 
artist, as a communicator of both immanence and 
transcendence, allows the dialectical relation of both 
within the single object. The paradoxical relation 
remains and the object, as the greatest extent of its 
capacity (at its most authentic, its nearest 
approximation to a direct communication of the actual), 
as paradox, reflects the relation that the receiving 
individual has within existence to the actual. The 
authentic artist is beyond the genius but not yet 
Apostle, being a developing individual whose message 
expresses both his own development, as well as assists 
that development, while at the same time is the means by 
which other individuals can develop towards authenticity, 
unlike the pure essential-artist.
The conclusion from all of this is a Kierkegaardian 
description of the author/poet/artist. This is more 
proscriptive rather than descriptive, since I am sure 
that Kierkegaard would find very few individuals who 
would match up to the standards which he e s p o u s e d .  274 
However, this high degree of authenticity to the truth of 
the actual existence of the individual is what is 
required within the framework of his thought. The 
authentic artist must have a developed life-view, an 
ethical stance with regard to other individuals (in the 
sense that he wishes to develop them towards the 
authenticity which he has either reached or is 
progressing towards), and an awareness of his 
relationship to the idea of the ideal message which he is 
communicating and to the form of communication which he 
is employing. Finally, the authentic artist must be a 
developing individuality, transforming himself through 
reflection towards an existential stage, at which his 
communication is approximating that of the revelation of 
an Apostle. Though the art objects produced by such an 
individual never equate to such a revelation, they can
274 Something addressed in the second appendix,
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indicate it by the very fact that they are both a product 
of an individual who exists within the paradox of 
immanence vs. transcendence as well as embodying such a 
paradox in separation from the individuals involved in 
the communication process.
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Chapter Six- Approaches to a Kierkegaardian Aesthetics
One of the reasons that Kierkegaard is so 
underestimated as a potentiality for the art object is 
that Kierkegaard himself seems to have been not only able 
to dismiss it but also to qualify his position. This 
occurs particularly in CUP when Climacus, in the section 
of CUP entitled " A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in 
Danish Literature" 275 makes it quite clear that the 
assumption that knowledge of the artist's personal 
existence and intentionality can make clear the purpose 
and effect of the production of that individual is wrong. 
In this sense, Kierkegaard himself can be removed from an 
interpretation of his own understanding of the aesthetic. 
As a " Christian poet" , which he so aptly describes 
himself as, his own life intrudes upon his work too
closely. This might make him susceptible to his own 
criticism against Andersen. What it certainly establishes 
is that Kierkegaard cannot be used as a model on the
basis of his work if one is to construct an aesthetic 
from his philosophy.
Each of the preceding chapters has been an analysis 
of a specific concept which is a necessary element of a 
Kierkegaardian description of communication of the idea 
as ideal within the context of the individual as producer 
and receiver. Issues such a repetition, objectivity and 
subjectivity and, perhaps most vital to keep in mind, the 
Kierkegaardian dialectic. The question is whether any of 
these, however, serve as adequate means of defining the 
art object. Quite clearly, they do not. None of them
serve to explain the art object as a material and
externalised object, as an embodiment of a communication 
of the idea as actual ideal. Kierkegaard himself does not 
work through this and other problems. What should be 
done, before turning to Kierkegaard's understanding of 
the art object, is to turn to the secondary literature.
There are a variety of approaches which various 
authors take when discussing Kierkegaard in terms of the
275 CUP, pp. 251-300
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aesthetic. To some degree they are dictated by the 
differences in the emphasis on either the esthetic or the 
aesthetic, but all remain inadequate when it comes to 
describing the art object within the Kierkegaardian 
literature. The reasons that they are inadequate are 
equally various, and usually intertwined with each other. 
However, they can be described in the following 
categories: 1. adherence to an esthetic interpretation of 
the aesthetic, which denies the inherent value of the art 
object (producing itself two subcategories, the first, in 
which the only reference to the esthetic is within the 
context of E/O I; the second, in which the aesthetic is 
completely denied any value); 2. adherence to Kierkegaard 
as a poet, which can only focus on Kierkegaard's own 
poetic or artistic output as a specific paradigm but 
which cannot be used to describe the production of other 
individuals (producing a subcategory in which the 
aesthetic is only considered in terms of literary 
output); and 3. an emphasis on the relationship that 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the art object in purely 
idealist terms that are coloured by Hegelianism. Very few 
of the commentators on Kierkegaard addressing the 
aesthetic fall into one specific category or another, and 
almost none have bothered to examine the material art 
object within a Kierkegaardian sense. They usually 
acknowledge the others, if they do not in part subscribe 
to them, and, therefore, end up leaving out the art 
object altogether. Why is this the case? More 
specifically, why can the vast majority of the secondary 
literature be dismissed in this regard? Two simple 
reasons. First, almost all commentators acknowledge and 
give precedence to the esthetic, and rightly so. Some of 
this investigation into the esthetic is extraordinarily 
interesting (Louis Mackey and George Malantschuk are 
primary examples), but the esthetic is not the aesthetic. 
Second, because of the nature of Kierkegaard's writings, 
his commentators are generally philosophers or 
theologians, and are not art historians nor 
aestheticians. In many cases, however, there are those
p . 169
who have not directly addressed the issue of the 
aesthetic, but have contained within their own writing an 
awareness of such. I shall now turn to these examples.
For Walsh's Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's
Existential Esthetics, the poetic and the artistic is 
Kierkegaard's writing is grounded as a mode of
reflecting and communicating the religious ideal. Her 
book's primary objective is to show that Kierkegaard 
maintained a positive attitude to the esthetic and what 
it means to be an authentic poet or artist. Kierkegaard 
is shown to be concerned with a
mode of living poetically [which] is one that affirms both possibility and actuality, a sense of our historical situatedness and finite limitation of a human personality through a process of self-development, rather than self­creation, in relation to the infinite or divine. ^76
There is an emphasis on the personal, on the existential, 
rather than on the objectively defined artistic, such 
that the aesthetic idea is concerned with the 
individual's own development rather than the 
communication of the ideal through objective means. Thus, 
in Walsh's reading, Kierkegaard emphasises individual 
striving, striving for the wholeness of the individual 
described as a authenticated comfortableness of the 
individual in relating itself to the actual truth of the 
grounding of its existence.
Walsh asks and answers: What does it take to be a
creative and authentic artist? She traces this through 
Kierkegaard's review of Andersen's Only a Fiddler 
published as " From the Papers of One Still Living" and 
The Concept of Irony- both books having been dismissed by 
Kierkegaard himself in PV - and continues through the 
majority of the corpus. Walsh shows how Kierkegaard 
identifies what he believes is the main trend in artistic 
production of the time: the adoption of a negative
attitude towards actuality. Constructed in relation to 
Hegel, Heiberg, Martensen, and Gyllembourg, Kierkegaard
^"^^Walsh, p. 2
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asks after the extent that the artist's own activities 
and experiences can affect the production. Kierkegaard 
believes that the life of the artist and the production 
should be connected, but not in the manner of Andersen, 
who has both a lack of a developed life-view and a proper 
life-development, of a proper self-cultivation and an 
understanding of existence in relation to actuality as 
the means for a continuing self-development. What emerges 
in Walsh's reading is that there is an interplay of the 
two factors- the artist's own development and the 
positive, affirming element of the message that he is 
producing and communicating- which produces the second 
power " involving a dialectic of transmuted personal 
experiences and ironic detachment in the creation of the 
work of art, not merely the wholesale projection of one's 
personal experiences into a work and identification with 
its characters and viewpoints." z?"?
This is further developed in her reading of The 
Concept of Irony. Walsh believes it contains two 
dialectically related threads: a criticism of romanticism 
coupled with a prescriptive design for an authentic 
artistic life, and an incorporation of the esthetic with 
the ethical-religious. Walsh makes the interesting point 
that Kierkegaard's remarks on imitation as the depiction 
of ideality must be either less than or greater than that 
which it seeks to aspire to. It can never be that which 
it imitates, since it is always imitating it. The problem 
lies, in Walsh's interpretation of Kierkegaard, not so 
much in the presentation of the actual, but in how that 
representation reflects the artist's position in his own 
development to the actual. The actual is not a telos, the 
romantic (represented by Tieck, Solger, Schlegel and 
Fichte) , a lack of self-development, an awareness of the 
inwardly infinite, but is developed, for Walsh, such that 
artistic production, as the communication of the 
individual's development, is a process of 
transubstantiation, wrought by the poetic and the
277ibid., p. 40
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religious upon the actuality of the individual. This last 
point becomes, for Walsh (and I disagree) , not only a 
means of determining poetic and artistic authenticity for 
communication, but also an authentic development of 
identity. She writes:
ultimately, he [Kierkegaard] envisages... an identity in which 'actuality is possibility'
{Cl, p. 325), wherein we have acquired in our personal lives the poetic ideality to which we stand personally, as well as artistically related through a combination of imagination, controlled irony, and existential s t r i v i n g .  ^78
The personal and the artistic acquire, thusly, a sense of
analogy.
Regarding the esthetic itself, Walsh concentrates on 
E/O I, asserting the emergence of the esthetic as an 
ethical activity. Interestingly, Walsh rightly notes that 
" ...we must be guarded in associating the aesthetic views 
of volume 1 with those of Kierkegaard, since they 
generally reflect a romantic aesthetics corresponding to 
the romantic mode of living poetically he wishes 
indirectly to criticize in his work." 7^9 g^e is correct 
to try to establish the esthetic within the context of 
volume two, but her implications lead to a distinct lack 
of conclusion. Walsh clearly believes that volume one has 
limited value but, while being clear in characterising 
the first half as fragmentary and incomplete and as 
missing a necessary and elemental fulfilment, the art 
object does arrive at a specific identity that can 
function across the range of existence.
Chapter 4 is one of Walsh's best chapter and 
contributions with the central concept: in order to make
the aesthetic ethical, one must actualise the aesthetic 
into one's own existence. The ethical emerges as a vital 
and valuable mode of living poetically while remaining 
essentially aesthetic/romantic, having enough earnestness 
to move through the ethical and ultimately into the 
religious. E/O II corresponds to a repetition of The
278ibid., p. 62
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Concept of Irony, taking up the theme of the Christian 
mode of life expressed poetically. This is seen most 
clearly in her interpretation of the Judge. The Judge- 
Kierkegaard's pseudonym at this point- of E/O II 
reconsiders what the aesthetic is, focusing on the 
concept of beauty and the concretion of the ideal. He 
clears up the confusion between the aesthetic, realised 
in artistic form and realised in life, emphasising in the 
process repetition and time and showing how those 
concepts not susceptible to aesthetic material treatment 
can be acknowledged in a mode of living poetically and a 
theory of self-identity appropriate to the self. The 
Judge is, according to Walsh, working against the
literary stream, examining marriage after the fact and 
not the events leading up to it. Marriage becomes an 
aesthetic act, uniting sensuousness and spirit and the 
erotic and the religious. Marriage, as an act, becomes 
determined not by finite means, but by the infinite 
development of the individuals involved through love.
Artistic significance is established not as a purely
external affair but as that which is acquired, 
appropriated, into the existence of the individual.
Artistic expression is inadequate because it represents 
the extensive in the intensive, the moment instead of the 
temporally successive.
I concur with Walsh in her specific points. She
correctly identifies the primary question of the Judge: 
" whether the aesthetic ideal of internal history can be 
represented aesthetically since traditional forms of art 
are inadequate to express it." s^o The aesthetic idea
becomes represented solely through repetition of the 
aesthetic in love and in time. The individual himself 
becomes an expression of the aesthetic idea in his own 
individuality, poeticising and poeticised as both the 
produced and the product of God. For the Judge, this
process involves the individual synergistically
constructing his self along with the simultaneous co-
280 Ibid., p . 110
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operation/construction of the Christian. Whereas the 
romantic aesthetic is concerned with the alleviation of 
boredom that never ends through multiple possibilities of 
the individual, the ethical is the construction of a 
singular, teleological unity of selfhood, allowing the 
imagination to play its vital role in realising the 
possibilities, presenting them, towards the actual. Walsh 
correctly stresses that the Judge's, and Kierkegaard's, 
remarks accomplish three things: 1. transfer categories
of description normally applied to art to the existing 
individual; 2. emphasise the historical and not the 
immediate ideal; 3. orienting the aesthetic in a
religious sense. Walsh sees E/O II as a further
development of " From the Papers of One Still Living" . 
But the object is still left behind, and fading fast!
For example, in chapter six, Walsh bring forward the 
critical remarks of the middle period of the authorship- 
Stages on Life's Way, CUP, PV, and WL.^ si From a series of 
proposition and statements, poetry and art are recognised 
as a tempting distraction from actuality, transfiguring 
actuality in favour of the desires of the individual, 
removing the individual and establishing a primacy of the 
immediate and the externalised; art is considered
dangerous as a mode of life. Art can be tempered, 
however; its activities are also recognised as ones which 
can be tamed and utilised in a positive fashion. This 
takes away from the dangerous nature of the aesthetic 
object which the Judge identifies himself, but which 
Walsh does not seem to be able to do so. Walsh, perhaps, 
identifies a solution to this in recognition of the 
potential for the specific art object within the context 
of the individual's developing knowledge of the actual in 
the epic, declaring it to be in correspondence with the 
ethical, but this then produces the statement that: " I
think the subjective thinker, whose internal action 
brings that individual under ethical qualifications, can
28lparticularly WL, which is never given the treatment which I feel it deserves, especially since it contains a number of remarks about community (which of course can be related to communication and art) as well as both positive and negative comments on the artist and the art work.
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also be constructed in aesthetic terms as an artist, even 
if he or she never produces a work of art." ^82 Does this 
mean that the art object does not even have to exist? The 
implications are that the subjective thinker is an 
artist, just by its thoughtless
Walsh attempts to alleviate this by describing the 
authentic form of communication which an individual must, 
as an individual, enact. es4 This degenerates, however,
from containing the possibility of discussing the art 
object to describing Kierkegaard's challenge to the 
individual which she describes as " ...to don the artistic 
frock, take up our palettes and sketch our own self-
portraits in existence, reproducing in ourselves the 
human ideal towards which we strive." a^s This is
unsatisfactory, because her reading of Kierkegaard, 
however, as a development in the concept of living 
poetically, advance his thought beyond the German 
Romantics to establish an ethical-religious, Christian, 
alternative which is self-developing and one which is not 
elitist but a possibility and requirement for all
individuals. The importance of the aesthetic, in 
opposition to the esthetic, becomes meaningless. For 
Walsh, we can all be and should be authentic artists, 
something I disagree with.
Walsh believes that is incumbent to require that we 
consider an application to the present age. Walsh applies 
this in particular to current French feminist theories of 
identity, theories which she believes " ironically result 
in a volatilization of the self in the other that 
corresponds to the romantic experimentation with self- 
identity so roundly criticised by Kierkegaard in his 
writings." For Walsh, Kierkegaard provides an
alternative, one in which the structure of the self and 
the process of self-identification provide a communality
^^^Walsh, p. 204
^®^Walsh seems to be wanting to equate the subjective thinker with the artist, thereby making all individuals potential artists- something I have no ability to approve of,
284vjalsh, pp. 207-209 
285ibid., p. 209 
^®®Walsh, p. 220
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which constructs a matrix transcending differences, while 
retaining uniqueness. Focusing on the concept of 
otherness, Walsh reads current French feminist thought as 
a process of decentering the self, a process of self- 
identity in which the identity is reborn and remade, an
" assertion of female difference [which] ironically
results in a question of self-identity rather than an 
affirmation of it in the process of becoming." 
Focusing on SUD and WL, Walsh sees in Kierkegaard's 
thought^ss an explication of the concept of the self and 
love which are beyond gender limitations, which are
visions of independent subjects equally grounded in
actuality. 289 Differences are disregarded in the face of 
the Christian truth of existence, but are also called 
into question in concern for the singular individuality's 
relationship to the truth of actuality. Kierkegaard's 
dialectic of the individual's self-identity " is one that 
seeks to affirm and synthesize rather than to exclude one 
term in relation to the other." 290 However, Walsh has 
failed to recognise the inherent exclusion of existence, 
the exclusive nature of the material art object, and 
tried to recreate the esthetic as a mode of existence to 
extend it as a mode of incorporation of individualities. 
Walsh is also unwilling to establish any sense of 
priviledge for the identity of the artist. Walsh 
discusses esthetics, but leaves out art. The poetic 
ideality, the artistic communication of the idea, no 
matter how authentic it is, must remain separate from the 
individual. Herein lies my major criticism of Walsh, in 
that she simply does not treat the art object as a 
created object but as a process of creation and 
communication. The art object is separate from its
287ibid., p. 257
288i)egpite the normally patriarchal tendencies exhibited throughout most of his writing.
28^An emphasis on gender differences- either negatively or positively- results in a manifestation of despair in which the individual loses the self in identification with the other, in infinitude's or possibility's despair. In particular, this achieves a certain clarity in WL with Kierkegaard's analysis of the other in his contemplation of the responsibilities of the individual to the neighbour.
290walsh, p. 266
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creator; even though a continuing reciprocal relationship 
can be established between the viewer and the artist 
through the object, the object remains separate from the 
individualities involved.
Adorno's Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, 
a much ignored text, should be included for no other 
reason than the fact that Adorno wrote one of the major 
texts on aesthetics of the 20th century, and was deeply 
indebted to Kierkegaard in many respects. Beyond the 
simple historical reasons, Adorno's text is a major 
contribution in many respects, though it too has its 
failings. Adorno's text implies throughout that he
understands Kierkegaard to be an idealist in nature, 
despite Kierkegaard's own protestations to the contrary. 
I would agree with this to a great extent, though with a 
modification to Adorno's assessment. Kierkegaard is an 
idealist in the sense that he is communicating and 
describing the paradoxical ontological grounding of the 
developing individual within its relation to the actual. 
The object of his description is necessarily ideal in 
nature, though the product of such communication remains 
merely the idea of such an ideal in that it does not
communicate knowledge of the actual but only of the
existential. Kierkegaard is, as always, describing
something which is indescribable.
Adorno's assessment of Kierkegaard focuses in on his 
conception of the esthetic stage of existence, with 
references being made to the other definitions of the
aesthetic and the esthetic. Because of this, one can 
safely place Adorno's commentary in a rather exclusive 
group- that which does recognise such differences and 
does not try to include them in a singular category of 
existence. Adorno's text is also in another exclusive
group, in that he, as no other commentator on Kierkegaard 
does, attempts to establish the legitimacy of the
esthetic (the stage of existence) in the face of
Kierkegaard's depiction of its nature, to reinvigorate 
the positive possibilities inherent in the esthetic.
p. 177
The success of this endeavour is difficult to judge, 
particularly because of Adorno's own philosophical 
inclinations which would lead to categorising this text 
as biased against Kierkegaard without the possibility of 
reconcilement. Though Adorno continued to regard 
Kierkegaard as an important informant of his own 
development throughout his life, one cannot help but read 
into this text a corrective established, in part, because 
of a political grounding, rather than an effort to fully 
engage with Kierkegaard's writing.
Adorno begins by questioning the poetic nature of 
Kierkegaard's writing. For him, philosophy requires the 
real and the manifestation of the thinker's subjectivity 
or the coherence of its thought in a unified direction of 
discourse. Poetics deny this, since they remain wholly 
subjective in nature and are connected only indirectly 
with the real to which they allude. Philosophy is the act 
of illuminating ideas to existing individuals, 
disseminating the particular and applying it to the 
universal. Poetry in philosophy means that the elements 
not specifically applicable or understandable can be 
ignored, which is bad philosophy. Adorno's first concern 
is, therefore, to distinguish the poetic from the 
philosophical in order to determine philosophy as a 
rigorous engagement with the real.
Adorno recognises the poetic nature of many of the 
texts. The inclusion of poetry into the style or nature 
of the writing is apparent, but they do not constitute 
art in the normal sense, and therefore cannot be labelled 
as art objects. The poetic production of Kierkegaard is 
inadequate to the task at hand. Adorno establishes the 
failure of Kierkegaard as a poet from the start:
Three times [" Journal of Seducer" ," Repetition" , and " Guilty/Not Guilty" ] , with allegorical rigidity, he present the enigmatic empty image of his disintegrating love. Its collapse degrades the entire phenomenal world to mere semblance. In its presence people are
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transformed into masks, while speech comes to sound like opera dialogue...^ !^
For Adorno, Kierkegaard's attempts at including a form of
communication, which he himself identifies as poetic, is
to transform not only the nature of the philosophy that
he is writing, from one which is concerned with existence
to one which is not, but also the individuals depicted in
the " poetic" communication and, therefore, the actual
individuals receiving such a communication. This
transformation is to move them from a realm in which they
are concerned with their actual existences (something
which Kierkegaard professes to do) to being mere images
of such a concern. This transformation is such that the
individuals to whom it is being directed cannot, in
Adorno's opinion, begin to appropriate such a
communication. He writes: " he [Kierkegaard] was not
involved with giving form to the content of experience,
but with the reflection of the aesthetic process and of
the artistic individual in himself." 292 For Adorno,
Kierkegaard's writing prepared the way for a
contemplation of art for art's sake- an aesthetic
idealism he traces through Schelling and Schopenhauer to
Wagner and Nietzsche- giving power to the individual in
isolation from other individualities. This criticism has
some validity but, as Adorno proceeds to discover
Kierkegaard's faults, he is also clearly missing some of
the positive value in such faults. This has a further
application. Both Adorno and Kierkegaard miss the
positive potential for such an empty poetic communication
which purports to be philosophy.
Correctly, Adorno is one of those who recognises
Kierkegaard's idealist constructions. Though Adorno
strongly accuses Kierkegaard of being Hegelian, he
identifies him as an idealist particularly in with regard
to the production of communication. For Adorno,
Kierkegaard' entire theory of communication, and hence
28iAdorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (all references to Adorno refer to this text unless otherwise stated), p. 8 
282^dorno, p. 8
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the production of the art object, are bound by an 
idealist origin which is a communication of that which 
cannot be known by the receiving individual. The ideal is 
hidden by its very nature as ideal, and thus the truth of 
the communication is one created by the producing and 
receiving individuals in the production and receiving 
appropriation of that communication. What is interesting 
is that Adorno's interpretation seems to exclude the 
theological from the ideal. Adorno writes:
Kierkegaard's fruitless attempts to compose self-animating poets confuse creator with artist and corresponds better to is idealist origins than to his theological goal. 293
This denies the entire thrust of Kierkegaard's efforts,
which were continually to stress the religious and the
relationship that the individual has to the religious as
knowledge of its ontological grounding. Adorno's
characterisation of Kierkegaard's understanding of
communication is itself coloured by Adorno's own distinct
project. Adorno continues to attempt to impose a positive
assessment of the existential as actual, while moving the
actual into the mere idea. Adorno's understanding of
Kierkegaard states that the ontological is always absent
from the subjectivity and therefore the object is always
an obstructed object. This is a position which must be
reversed; the existential must then become, for Adorno,
the actual as the grounding of the individual, while the
ideal becomes an empty indication of the actual as merely
idea without the existential.
Adorno traces Kierkegaard's own thought to the
influence of Fichte, whose idealism he identifies as
constructing a form of actuality that becomes pale, a
rendering of knowledge as infinite but also negative. For
Adorno, Kierkegaard follows Fichte such that
the idealist who conceived of " relegating reality to the ethical," that is, to subjectivity, is at the same time the archenemy
293ibid., p. 11
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of any assertion of the identity of the external and the internal. 294
For Kierkegaard, this 'relegation of reality to the
ethical' is an assertion of the internal, which must take
precedence over the external; Adorno's statement merely
equates the external with the internal, thereby annulling
the particular forms of primacy which each should be
given. For Kierkegaard, this involves a mediation or
transformation of the actual into the existential, and he
would deny this transformation of the actual by Adorno.
However, it is valuable that the ideal nature of the
communication is identified by Adorno.
Adorno further recognises that Kierkegaard remains
attached to the dualistic determination of communication
as form and contents as ideal which involves a
necessarily atemporal quality, writing; " Where
Kierkegaard clings to the dualism of form and content,
this dualism retains its idealistic character." 295 This
idealism is constructed within an atemporal context, one
in which Adorno feels the art object becomes a static
construction, not involved with the existence of the
individual's producing and receiving that communication.
For Adorno, the greatness of the art object should be
first determined by the activity of the subject stamping
the object with an idea. This too is done from a
particular point of view (Marxist, perhaps?), in that it
is an attempt to socialise the construction of the object
as opposed to the Kierkegaard's isolated individualism.
Adorno recognises that the object, for Kierkegaard, is
" radically devolved upon the " I" , as purely immanent to
the subject and, at the same time, as removed and
unreachable transcendence." 296 that sense, Adorno is
correct to interpret Kierkegaard's art object as
atemporal to a degree, but the temporal nature of the
appropriation is always evident and necessary. Adorno's
intentions remain purely personal, and are not a valid
294ibid., p. 29 
295ibid., p. 20 
29Gibid., p. 27
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criticism in that respect. For Adorno, in reading 
Kierkegaard, inwardness becomes a potent symbol of an 
increased subjectivity against the external, in 
alienation from its externality. This occurs such that 
the Kierkegaardian subject is confronted and overcome by 
the impossibility of the object. To achieve inwardness 
and thence truth requires that the individual struggle 
with itself, rather than with its position amongst the 
external realm. This leads to Adorno's identification of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy as characterised by a bourgeois 
intérieur of the 19th century. The individual becomes, in 
such a situation, merely a flaneur, promenading in his 
own internal space- " the world only appears to him
reflected by pure inwardness." 297 gpace is not an opening 
of the intérieur, of the subjectivity, but is an 
enclosement, a boundary which repels the individual from 
any applicable knowledge of the external. The symbols of 
the intérieur, Adorno finds in the " Diary of the
Seducer" in such as passages as the following:
Surroundings and setting do have a great influence upon a person and are part of that which makes a firm and deep impression on the memory [Hukommelse] or, more correctly, on the whole soul, and for this reason cannot be forgotten either. No matter how old I maybecome, it will nevertheless always beimpossible for me to think of Cordelia in surroundings other than this little room... At moments I let the lamp be the motif in my landscape. I sit with her then, stretched out on the ground under the flower of the lamp. At other times, I let the willow matting cap up the image of a ship, of an officer's stateroom- we are sailing out in the middle of the great ocean. We are sitting far from the window, we look directly into the sweeping horizon of the sky... Cordelia's surroundings must have no foreground but rather the infinite boldness of the horizon. She must not be earthbound but must float, not walk but fly, not back and forth but eternally f o r w a r d . 298
Space is not merely means of exclusion, but also the
means of inclusion of the individual into an historical
287ibid., p . 41 
29 8^/0 I, pp. 389-390
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or temporal situation with that which is external to its 
subjectivity. The intérieur of the small room becomes an 
environment within which a distance is created from the 
world outside of the room while at the same time the two 
individuals are situated so that they are both opposed to 
the world (and therefore should be opposed to each other) 
as well as include in each other's worlds. Cordelia does 
not become removed with the infinite, but is brought 
" eternally forward" . And the items of the room, in 
Adorno's reading of Kierkegaard, are not merely
decorations but are links between a shared sense of 
personal history which is inclusive rather than
exclusive.
Adorno is, furthermore, critical of Kierkegaard's 
conception of aesthetic. Though he does not necessarily 
mean the aesthetic and refers to the esthetic throughout 
the text, there is one section of his book titled
'Subjective " How" and Enmity toward Art" within which 
the boundaries are blurred.. He begins with the following 
statement :
In the sleeper the spontaneity of the " I" comes to rest, without, however, being annihilated. If the aesthetic images that surround him are- as ontological semblance- located beyond subjective autonomy,Kierkegaard's theory of the subjective " how" and its correlate, the verdict on the " aesthetic sphere" , lose their ultimate legitimation.
For Adorno, the images of the aesthetic must be 
incorporated into the development of the individual, 
valued as such and not superseded by the individual's 
closer approximation to knowledge of the ontological. If 
this is not done, then the description of the subjective 
individual in the Kierkegaardian literature is, for him, 
invalid, excluding the aesthetic from that individual's 
existence. The individual is born into the aesthetic and 
must continue to relate to the aesthetic or the esthetic 
throughout its development of its existence.
2^^Ibid., p. 134
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I cannot completely agree with this. Adorno is 
suggesting that the esthetic remain a concern for the 
individual throughout its existence as if this were not 
the case within the Kierkegaardian description of the 
individual's development. But Kierkegaard himself would 
not state this and, furthermore, it denies the potential 
for ideality of the art object. However, Adorno's remarks 
leads into a more poignant criticism of Kierkegaard, 
where I find more sympathy. For Adorno, Kierkegaard's 
conception of communication and, necessarily, of the art 
object is an exclusionary one. Objective or direct 
communication is an impossibility, even if direct 
communication of the objective is necessary; in Adorno's 
opinion Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity denies 
the possibility of communication in any sense. Adorno's 
understanding of Kierkegaardian communication is one 
bound completely within the subjectivity of the 
individual, determined by the communicator's 
subjectivity, reflection on itself, and reflection and 
awareness on the receiving individuality and its 
reception of the communication. This is, in Adorno's 
opinion, incorrect, since communication or, more 
specifically, the art object is an autonomous creation, 
bound by the reception process, but autonomous in its own 
right. Adorno quotes Kierkegaard's famous saying- " The 
greater the artistry, the greater the inwardness." - and 
remarks; " this may be the regulating principle of 
Kierkegaardian 'communication,' but it is not a law of 
art.
For Adorno, even if the Kierkegaardian theory of the 
art object is one appearing to be completely aware of its 
service to human understanding and relations, it removes 
the art object in its autonomous form from any real 
relation to the individualities to which it is directed. 
The subjective communication, however, is authentic 
communication of the actual ideal precisely because of 
this process is a separation or an alienation from the 
ideal of the actual. The subjective communication becomes 
an alienated one, and
p. 184
Only alienated, mute contents can be adapted, dressed up, and " communicated" as " content" to suit a subjective will; only to the extent that they are not binding are they made so by individual existence. 200
The content of the communication of the art object
becomes a complete abstraction, removed from the
existence of the individualities involved and therefore
directionless in nature and lacking in any concreteness.
The art object's autonomy is, in Adorno's reading, a
product of its eloquence, determined by its forms and its
presentation of the truth through semblance. This does
not, however, acknowledge the existential requirement of
the idea becoming ideal nor its potential. Kierkegaard's
theory of the art object, in his opinion, remains
alienating in that it does not allow the art object to
contain within its communication such an eloquence. For
Adorno,
His " subjective how" reflects distortedly the power of truth over the manner of its appearance, a manner that can never be separated arbitrarily from it as if it were a mere sign, for truth itself exists exclusively in the dialectic in which it " appears" . The " how" - developed by Kierkegaard in opposition to the shallow dualism of form and content- gains its philosophical justification as the expression of objective laws in the manifestation of truth. Yet his doctrine qualifies this justification by consigning it to subjectivity which superadds truth to the matter at hand as something new; by dividing truth from the material in which it appears; by ascribing truth to existence and contingency tothe material.201
In Adorno's reading of Kierkegaard, the communication of 
the truth which the art object should be an embodiment of 
is denied in favour of the subjectivities of the 
individualities involved. What should be a communication 
that is indirect in nature and yet which is also an 
embodied manifestation in objective form is warped by the 
addition of subjectivity. What Adorno finds in reading
300lbid., p. 134 
301ibid., pp. 134-135
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Kierkegaard on art is that he longs for an imageless 
presence, one in which the subjectivity remains isolated. 
Subjectivity leads to iconoclasm, one which 'recognises' 
the impossibility of the image of truth but which, as 
positive, appropriatable presence neither Kierkegaard nor 
Adorno acknowledges; Kierkegaard's isolated subjectivity 
is one for whom semblance has no meaning. For Adorno, the 
power of semblance cannot be i g n o r e d . 202 Neither realise 
that both positions must be maintained within a 
Kierkegaardian notion of the dialectical.
Adorno's limited remarks regarding the art object 
within the context of Kierkegaard's writing fail in many 
respects, but do so in a manner which remains truthful to 
Kierkegaard's own failures. His text on Kierkegaard 
remains, though outside of the normal sphere of 
Kierkegaardian scholarship. Only three authors within 
that context have directly addressed this issue at any 
length- George Connell, Stephen Crites and George 
Pattison.203 All are very interesting in their approach, 
and very different, but they have one feature in common 
not only with each other but with all of the secondary 
literature and, perhaps, even with Kierkegaard himself- 
they are dismissive of the positive potential of the 
authentic art object as communication of the idea of the 
actual ideal within the framework of the Kierkegaardian 
literature. The simplest reason is that none of these 
individuals are concerned with the art object per se, in 
a 'normal' aesthetic sense. The more important reason is 
that none of them have been able to take into account the 
Kierkegaardian notion of the dialectic and apply it to a 
material object. The potential is there, but the next 
step has not been taken.
Crites is the most interesting. In the introduction 
to his translation of Crisis in the Life of an Actress^°^,
2®2jggygg A d o m o  takss up in his own Aesthetic Theory.
would also add Poole's Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication to this list but, because of the nature of his book, I cannot say that it specifically addresses such issues in a manner which would fit into the scheme of my research.
2°4’^ bich is titled " Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress" in the Danish, and much closer to Kierkegaard's own intentions and to his ideas on repetition and the art object.
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Crites seems to have established the groundwork for
thought on the art object in a Kierkegaardian sense. He 
correctly identifies Hegel's Aesthetics as being one of 
Kierkegaard's great interests^os and correctly notes that 
this text was the basis for Kierkegaard's thought on art. 
However, this seems to have given Crites the freedom to 
equate Kierkegaard's thought on art directly with
Hegel's. This is understandable, particularly within the 
context of the Crisis^'^^, but has led to the misconception 
that Kierkegaard's writings could only produce an 
Hegelian understanding of the art object, rather than a 
more existential one. As always, this is in keeping with 
Kierkegaard's own facade regarding the issue but, in
response, one must always keep in mind the fact that 
Kierkegaard seems not to have recognised the potential 
present in his work (or has deliberately concealed it).
Crites is an acute observer, however. He begins his 
interpretation of Kierkegaard's aesthetic by noting that 
a particularly problem exists in the writing.
Kierkegaard's emphasis is always on the poetic or, in the 
case of his criticism of any one particular art object, 
curiously almost always focused on the theatre. This 
means that Kierkegaard's aesthetics are obscured, hidden 
within his writing, as if Kierkegaard himself did not 
wish them discovered. Crites writes:
Kierkegaard's general aesthetics is left largely implicit in his writings. He never attempted to produce a complete systematic theory of art, but for reasons which had nothing to do with his well-known polemic against 'the System' . His primary task as a writer lay elsewhere, and besides he seems to have considered that the basic groundwork of aesthetic had already been laid. Kierkegaard was, broadly speaking, a Hegelian in aesthetic theory. 207
To some extent, this is true. Kierkegaard's aesthetics is 
left hidden away amidst all his writing, and has to be
also Thulstrup's Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel regarding this. 
2°®Since the subject of The Crisis and A Crisis in the Life of an Actress is Fru Heiberg, the wife of Johan Ludvig Heiberg, one of the key Hegelians in Denmark at the time and a target for Kierkegaard's wi t .
Crisis, introduction by Crites, p. 19
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teased out. But what are these reasons that Crites speaks 
of? He leaves this question mostly unanswered. Certainly, 
Kierkegaard relied heavily on the theatre as an example 
of the art object and, therefore, any application of his 
aesthetics which might be applied to another form is 
implicit, but why is this so? Crites does not venture an 
answer for this.
The most contentious point of Crites' observations 
is the Hegelian nature of Kierkegaard's thought. Crites 
writes :
...for the basic theoretical background whichinformed his aesthetic thinking he[Kierkegaard] drew heavily on Heiberg and otherHegelian writes, and even more on Hegel's own 
Aesthetik, to which Heiberg's work hadintroduced him.^os
This means that, for Crites, Kierkegaard would allow an
Hegelian interpretation of the art object to exist
simultaneously within his own thoughts on existence.
Crites offers a simple, and persuasive, explanation. For
Kierkegaard, it was possible to read Hegel as being
correct regarding the aesthetic because Hegel's system of
thought was essentially esthetic itself. While Hegel
might be incorrect on ethics and the religious, because
of the nature of his philosophy and, as Crites interprets
Kierkegaard's own interpretation, because of the nature
of objective knowledge within Hegel's system of thought,
he is essentially correct regarding art. Objective
knowledge is merely the distancing of the world or, more
particularly, the actual ideal, from the individual's own
existence. An individual regarding objective knowledge as
applicable to its existence remains distance from the
actual and becomes essentially an observer, one who
cannot partake in an actual manner within existence. The
art object, as objective knowledge and as the product of
speculation, is similar, in that contemplation of such
removes the individual from an actual engagement with its
existence and the actual ideal.
308ibid., p. 20
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What is striking about Crites' interpretation of 
Kierkegaard is that his understanding of the art object 
appears to be more esthetic than aesthetic. Rather than 
determining the positive potential of the art object as 
it would relate to the existence of the individual and 
that individual's relation to the actual within 
existence, Crites allows it to slip back into the terms 
within which it seemingly exists in Kierkegaard's own 
thought. This emerges when Crites discusses the notion of 
the individual's relation towards reality^®^. For Crites, 
in his interpretation of such, the aesthetic becomes a 
viewpoint which every individual adopts as a knower or 
experience of existence. Objects are merely means of 
coherent understanding of existence, and perform their 
task as such to a greater or lesser degree of exactitude. 
This means, however, that the relation which the objects 
have to the experiencing individual is a limited one. 
Crites writes:
A person is... essentially an observer, the subject to whom the objects become manifest.That the experiencing subject also participates in existence, and hence suffers it contingencies and its limitations of perspective, is accidental and irrelevant, is in fact precisely the aspect of his situation which he must try to overcome in the aesthetic relation. 210
I agree with this to a limited extent but note that such 
objects- indeed, all objects- therefore become merely 
esthetic objects within the relation that the individual 
has to its existence. Thus, the aesthetic becomes merely 
one object amongst many, all being esthetic. Kierkegaard 
himself would disagree with this, since it then 
transforms the individual into a reified individuality 
who has no relation with existence at all.
This is in contradiction to Crites further 
statements, since this position seemingly denies a 
special role for the art object which Crites is trying to 
establish. He continues with a discussion of the
2®^Which, I believe, should more correctly be labelled existence. 
2^°Crites, introduction to Crisis, p. 21
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aesthetic and its relation to time and the idea. Within 
Crites interpretation of Kierkegaard, the art object is a 
timeless object, one which has been transmuted in order 
to conform to the requirements of the communication of 
the ideal. Such a conforming requires that the object 
remain almost aloof from existence because it is 
undergoing a process of transmutation whereby the idea is 
progressed from existence towards the actual, during
which time becomes, for Crites, accidental. This means 
that the art object becomes merely a play of
possibilities functioning and communicating within a 
medium whereby existing is removed as far as possible. It 
is on this grounds that Crites determines Kierkegaard as 
being Hegelian in terms of his aesthetics.
Crites identification of Kierkegaard as Hegelian is 
extremely interesting and admirable to an extent. 
According to this, Hegel argued that philosophy was the 
ultimate medium for the idea because the idea exists most 
purely in thought. Art was able to grasp to a limited 
extent the pure ideal of thought but, because of its
material form, is limited to such. In Hegelian terms,
this establishes the inadequacy of the art object, since 
it is merely idea in material form. However, according to 
Crites interpretation of Hegel and his identification of 
Kierkegaard as Hegelian, it is important to note that the 
ideal cannot enter into the consciousness of pure thought 
until it has been expressed previously in its necessary 
forms. This means that the art object contains, within 
its expression, a communication of the idea to the 
fullest extent, but one limited in its degree of purity 
because of its medium as ideal. Therefore, the art object 
is merely a progression towards and within the ideal. For 
Crites, Kierkegaard is in complete agreement with this. 
Where Kierkegaard differs from Hegel is by noting that 
all thought and communication of the ideal (or, in
^^^Again, I agree with Crites. However, he seems to be contradicting himself. The art object cannot exist as a process of a movement from immanence totranscendence- from existence to the actual- since such a movement is only-possible within the existence of the individual who is experiencing such anexistence. However, a variety of art object can show such a progression,while a single individual can indicate a direction.
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Kierkegaard's case, of the actual) is removed from the 
individual's existence. As such, the distinction between 
idea and ideal are reversed. Crites, doesn't have a 
problem with this (though he should), interpreting 
Kierkegaard thus ;
...there is no knowledge available to an existing individual from which a real decision could simply follow, as a logical conclusion, from secure premises. Hegel's attempt, however, to absorb ethics and religion into a comprehensive system of objective knowledge [which, by its very nature as objective is therefore removed from the individual and therefore esthetic], by making the ethical or religious consciousness itself into an objectified datum, simply obscures the leap of decision...^^^
and therefore obscures the individual's potential to act
within existence in the direction of the actual. Thus,
Hegel's system and description of the art object is
merely esthetic in Kierkegaard's mind and, thus, so is
the art object itself.
Crites does offer part of Kierkegaard's writing as a
means of determining a positive potential for the art
object. He does so by focusing on Kierkegaard's attempt
to create a form of communication which would not be
esthetic in nature but able to introduce itself in the
receiving individuals' existence. This does not, however,
approach the art object in its own right. Furthermore,
Crites offers the fact that Kierkegaard did believe that
the art object as such could be approached in a merely
esthetic manner, and that this was a valid approach. This
carries with it an incorrect stipulation. As long as one
approaches the art object in a timeless fashion- aware of
its inability to enter into the individual's existence-
then one can appreciate the art object for what it is.
According to Crites, this went so far as to include
Kierkegaard's opinion that each medium was limited in
what it was able to express, and thus " he [Kierkegaard]
was persuaded that each medium is limited in the range of
ideas that can be expressed by it. In fact, he believed
^^^Crites, introduction to Crisis, p. 26
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that only a single idea could be perfectly embodied in a 
particular medium." Thus, the truly classic and,
therefore, timeless art object is a limited one, though 
limited in a manner which I do not believe fits with 
Kierkegaard's own writings. Despite Crites' own efforts, 
his approach to Kierkegaardian aesthetics remains very 
similar to that of others- willing to acknowledge in some 
sense, but almost apologetic in the final analysis. The 
art object within Crites is purely esthetic.
Connell's efforts, in To Be One Thing: Person Unity 
in Kierkegaard's Thought seek to address some of the
difficulties found in Crites. Connell's approach is 
similar, in that he understands the art object within the 
Kierkegaardian framework to be a limited material object 
which is the embodiment of a communication of the idea of 
the actual and which is also separate from the
individuals to whom it is addressed. Where he differs is 
in including texts which have already been mentioned by 
myself but which are generally ignored, specifically the 
criticism of Anderson's and Gyllembourg's novels. This 
does not result in an adequate interpretation, because 
Connell- like all of the others- refuses to follow a 
development of the potentials of the art object, but it 
does provide some interesting points.
For Connell, as for Crites, the art object is an 
object embodying communication in an external form. It is 
a unified object, essentially complete in itself. Its 
essentially unified nature means that it is a form of 
objective knowledge, and therefore external to the 
subjectivity of the individual. This externality,
however, does not preclude the possibility of such a 
unity affecting the individual's subjective unity.
Connell notes Kierkegaard's own criticism of an objective 
form of knowledge having such an affect on the 
subjective, but believes that the art object, because of
^l^Crites, introduction to Crisis, p. 29; it must be quickly noted that I disagree with this interpretation, since such a statement is based on an esthetic author rather than on Kierkegaard himself.
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its very nature as a communication of the idea, goes 
beyond mere speculation. This is too dismissive.
Connell's criticism of Crites results from his 
observation that Crites' interpretation of the art object 
as idea means that such an object remains necessarily 
separate from the subjective. For him, " From the Papers 
of One Still Living" and TA provide ample evidence that 
Kierkegaard had a different conception of the art object 
per se. Connell interprets the differences in 
Kierkegaard's comments found throughout the literature as 
being indicative of a dualism^i^ which allows the art 
object to be treated either as an esthetic object or as 
an ethical object. This is such that
The first Kierkegaardian aesthetic presents the unity of a work of art as uninvolved with the personal unities of the artist and the audience. The second aesthetic asserts a relationship between the unity of a work of art and the personal unities of both the artist andthe audience.315
In effect, the esthetic art object is one which is a 
unified object having no actual relation to the 
perceiving individual, while the ethical art object must 
necessarily have such a relation.
Connell's interpretation of the art object within 
the context of Kierkegaard severely limits the 
possibilities of its potential because of this dualism. 
Though recognising the discrepancies between the various 
representations of the art object and, thereby, 
indicating to a limited extent the determination of 
esthetic aesthetic objects as authentic within the scope 
of the esthetic, Connell's understanding requires that 
the art object become almost an autonomous individuality 
which is removed from the individuals that created and 
perceive it and, furthermore, that it exists as either 
one aspect in relation to the individual or another, but 
not both. The correspondence of the dialectical natures 
of the art object and the individuals involved is ignored
5l4one which he credits to Marete Jorgensen's dissertation Kierkegaard som 
Kritiker (Kierkegaard as Critic).
^^^Connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 25
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in favour of an isolated externalisation. In the above 
quote, the movement and development of the art object 
becomes a separation between unities. Connell would have 
the art object presented as a unity to the individual, 
but the results of this would be an object which becomes 
either purely objective for a subjective individual, or 
purely subjective for an individual within an objective 
sense and which, according to Kierkegaard, as such, is a 
communication of a unity which is necessarily subjective 
to another subjectivity resulting in an impossibility of 
communication and therefore appropriation.
Moving from Crites and Connell to Pattison, a more 
accurate approach is apparent. Pattison's recent work is 
the most interesting of all the commentators on 
Kierkegaardian aesthetics because he would appear to 
believe that something positive can emerge from the 
negativity and because he is one of the few to actually 
investigate the art object itself within the framework of 
Kierkegaard's literature. This belief and position is 
present despite Pattison's own reluctance to accept the 
positive potential. What is also important about 
Pattison'8 work is that he, like Crites, is able to 
examine the art object within the framework of
Kierkegaardian literature while maintaining a distinction 
from the esthetic (though not a complete distinction).
In Pattison's book Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and
the Religious, he traces clearly the background which 
influenced Kierkegaard' development of his concept of the 
aesthetic through Heiberg, Martensen, and Holler's
Hegelianism or reaction against its perceived nihilism. 
Pattison also traces the aesthetic elements which can be 
found in Kierkegaard's writing with two statements: 
first, that the artist works not merely in copying from 
Nature but from the individual's own intuition and
imagination to communicate the Idea of the ontological 
grounding of existence by actuality; second, that art
an excellent discussion of this material, see Pattison, Kierkegaard: 
The Aesthetic and the Religious, " Chapter One: Idealism and the Justification of the Image" , pp. 1-34
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initially acquires the means to relieve that individual 
from the difficulties of existence but that this is only 
an incomplete means of relief within existence. 
Recognising this fact, Pattison shows how Kierkegaard's 
understanding of art acts to such an extent that it 
becomes esthetic in nature rather than aesthetic and 
therefore completely removes the individual from 
existence. With Pattison's Art, Modernity and Faith: 
Towards a Theology of Art, Pattison continues this, but 
also shows how Kierkegaard's understanding of the 
aesthetic can be used as a bridge between the 
exclusivisation of the art object as a communication of 
the Idea and modern art. Art within the 20th century has, 
for Pattison, become a sign of the collapsing of the 
church's position into generalised society, such that art 
now has a transcending role through following 
Kierkegaard's emphasis on subjectivity.
This, however, does not address the nature of the 
art object per se. Pattison's most important statement on 
the subject is found in his article " Kierkegaard: 
Aesthetics and 'The Aesthetic'" 3i7, In this, he rejects 
the a priori character of 19th century investigations and 
analysis of the art object and addresses the question of 
Kierkegaard's identification of a particular stage of 
awareness of knowledge of an individual's ontological 
grounding as 'esthetic'.
For Pattison, Kierkegaard's conception of the 
esthetic is derived from his contemporaries' 
investigations into the nature of the aesthetic art 
object (a point which Pattison also details in his book). 
Like Crites, Pattison understands Kierkegaard to be 
idealistic in nature in this regard. Pattison notes, 
correctly, that even those writers who came after such 
idealists as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel remained wholly 
idealist. Kierkegaard is one example, and Schopenhauer 
another. Art functions within this sense in a particular 
fashion :
3^'^Pattison, " Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and 'The Aesthetic'" , British Journal 
of Aesthetics, Vol. 31, No. 2, April, 1991, pp. 140-151
195
Art is therefore the point at which the two worlds so severely distinguished by Kant's first two critiques- the worlds of idea and appearances, noumena and phenomena- touch and unite. In art the world of finitude, externality and impermanence is transfigured and illuminated by the light of infinity, inwardness and timelessness. In aesthetic intuition we no longer know in part : weperceive the whole- an image or an anticipation of eternal blessedness in earthly guise.
This statement is loaded with controversy, both in its
interpretation of idealistic notions of art as the
communication of the ideal, as well as the conception of
the aesthetic object as a blessedness, but contains some
interesting truthes within the context of Kierkegaard's
thought. The identification confuses the communication of
the idea with the communication of the ideal. The idea,
as stated before, is merely the indication of the ideal
in an almost objective form. The ideal is that which can
be appropriated by the existing individual, but only
through personal struggle. This aesthetic intuition
(which is strikingly Kantian in flavour) verges on being
merely esthetic. It is right, however, to state that
Kierkegaard's understanding of the art object is one
which is idealistic.
For Pattison, Kierkegaard's idealism emerges as part
of his understanding of the idealist writers who
conceived of such as being a dynamic process of thought.
The idea was identified as part of the Will, either of
the ego as in the case of Fichte or the Absolute Spirit
in the case of Hegel. In the context of art, the idea
emerges as part of the activity of the imagination of the
individual. Art is the manifestation of the individual's
imaginative activities in a process of making clear the
idea or the ideal. What is important to note, as Pattison
does, is that Kierkegaard's ideal is very different from
Hegel's, for example. He writes:
The external form, in other words, is merely the product of the Idea. But the world of
3i5ibid., p. 141
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ideality is given a quite different ontological status in Kierkegaard's view than that which it had held in idealist thought. From a Christian point of view which presupposes the fall, man's alienation from both God and his own essential being, the human subject cannot determine reality as such solely on the basis of his own inner freedom... But, since God is acknowledged to be the ground and guarantor of reality, it follows that what is merely a product of human imagination will have no claim of itself to be 'real'. Indeed, its 'reality' may turn out to be sheer illusion.
The art object, as a communication of the Idea,
supposedly communicates the actual truth of existence.
Yet, from a Christian point of view, which concedes the
actual to God as the ontological grounder of existence,
such hubris reveals itself as an illusion because the
idea is merely a product of human intellect. This
understanding of art is something which resulted in
iconoclastic spasms against art throughout history as
well as in the immediate perception of Kierkegaard's
conception of the art object as merely esthetic. Pattison
is closest to Kierkegaard's own position that the art
object remains merely esthetic, but Pattison and
Kierkegaard miss the dialectic possibilities contained
within this statement. If we are to be iconoclastic in
our relation to art- recognising the inadequacy of the
art object's communication of the ideal (and noting that
it can be a communication of the idea, which remains
wholly abstract and removed from existence)- then surely
something positive can come out of this? Pattison's
identification of Kierkegaard, and Kierkegaard's own
identification of himself, precludes this- a point
addressed in the final chapter.
Furthermore, Pattison focuses on the necessarily
synthetic nature of the art object. The art object, as a
material form of a communication of the idea, is
synthetic because it combines into one object the
material and the idea supporting that material. This
results in a wholeness of synthesis, one in which the
319lbid., pp. 142-143
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idea is intuited by the material. This also results in 
the requirement- within the context of 19th century 
thought on the aesthetic- that the art object be one of 
harmony and beauty because it is unable to be incomplete. 
Art is a reconciliation of life with thought through a 
pleasing image. " In this way art cuts life's corners and 
smooths out its rough edges. " 320 an immediate or
esthetic sense this is a good result. However, again,
this requires that the art object become removed from 
existence, which itself is necessarily incomplete. The 
art object is a communication of the wholeness of the 
material and the idea, but such a communication remains 
aloof from the fact that the material object remains
within existence and is part of continuing existence. 
Pattison writes:
The harmonious and joyous quality which isart's chiefest glory thus emerges as a limiting factor in the relation of art to the religious.For the short cut of aesthetic experience might make us think that we have arrived when in fact there is still far to go. Its image ofblessedness is an illusion...32i
The art object, on one level, is a process of forgetting
one's own existence, a process exemplified in E/O I for
example. This leads Pattison to state that the art object
is one which is dangerously timeless. The fact that the
art object appears to be a harmonious whole, perfectly
communicating the idea of existence, while seemingly
remaining outside of existence, means that it would
appear to be timeless in nature; i.e. to not actually
exist within continuing existence. Even further, Pattison
writes: " By virtue of its harmonious perfection, its
completeness, art lifts us out of the dispersion of
temporal existence. The barriers of separation which time
imposes are broken down." 322
Pattison's chief mistake (though it really should
not be labelled as such, since it is so closely
Kierkegaardian) is to remain within Kierkegaard's
32°Ibid., p. 144 
321ibid,, p . 144 
322jbid., p. 145
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category of the esthetic when discussing the aesthetic 
art object. No room is given for the possibility of a 
positive potential, nor for an authentic art object which 
can overcome the difficulties he correctly identifies. 
This results in Pattison's analysis bearing a remarkable 
resemblance to Walsh's. Both attempt to determine the art 
object solely within the context of the subjectivity of 
the developing individual rather than as an objective 
material type of communication of the idea of the ideal 
outside of the individual's existence. It is if they 
wished to determine a dialectical relationship between 
the art object and n a t u r e . ^23 He writes: " Art comes from
life and return to life." ^24 Does this means that the art 
object is wholly involved with the individual's
existence? Quite the contrary, since the object within a 
theatrical setting must remain an object of communication 
wholly outside of the individual's existence (even though 
it remains a product of an individual's existence at its 
origin and as part of its identity) . With the 
timelessness of the art object Pattison is correct, but 
only in the context of an esthetic or inauthentic art
object. Pattison posits a positive possibility for the 
art object, but only to a limited extent, and does so 
while ignoring the dialectic of the art object. In the 
case of the timelessness, the dialectical development 
should result in the communication of the complete 
immersion within time that the existing individual 
experiences. Pattison writes that the timelessness of the
art object is one of deceit, but does not recognise the
necessity of such deceit nor the dialectical 
implications. To be fair, this is perhaps not so much a 
mistake as one of the difficulties when writing about 
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard too was unable to remove himself 
from this category.
The one point made by these authors with which I 
agree is stated by Crites. In his introduction, it
point that is not without merit, but inapplicable within the context of Kierkegaard.
324pattison, " Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and 'Aesthetic'" , p. 14 9
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appeared that he was unable to determine a specific 
response or description of Kierkegaard's approach to 
aesthetics. The negativity found in Kierkegaard's writing 
seemed to be an abiding factor. Crites wrote: " Is all
poetry... like unconsecrated food, nourishing but profane? 
In general it is. Kierkegaard does make a distinction, 
though it is not made as clearly as one would like." 325 
This is the resounding characterisation of Kierkegaardian 
scholarship regarding the art object- a lament at the 
lack of clarity. Even though Crites finds positive value- 
" It may deepen one's sense of the pathos as well as the 
joy of the world..." - he does also find a limitation which 
causes uncertainty- " ...but in either case the effect is 
profoundly humanizing." 32s_ which limits his ability to 
fully find a determinable value for art within the 
framework of Kierkegaard's writing. This extends to a 
position which characterises much of the secondary 
literature- " When he [Kierkegaard] wrote on art... he did 
so exclusively on esthetic premises." 327 is on this
particularly point, with the grounding established in the 
previous chapters, that my own position is affirmed by 
taking into account the Kierkegaardian dialectic.
Before turning to the art object itself, it is 
necessary to discuss two authors, Steven N. Emmaneul's 
book Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation and some 
further passages in Adorno's text, both of which have 
their applications beyond the merely esthetic.
Emmanuel's purpose, in his book, is to determine the 
nature of revelation amongst the philosophical- 
theological writings of Kierkegaard, and it is important 
because the art object must be understood within the 
context of revelation. He does so by examining revelation 
as it appears within the framework of the Christianity 
which he believes Kierkegaard envisioned, one that he 
characterises as such:
325cj-ites' introduction to Crisis, p. 41 
326ibid., p. 36
32?ibid., p. 42; I have changed the spelling of Crites' text from aesthetic to esthetic since this coincides with my own emphasis and for clarification.
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Kierkegaard's claim that Christian faith exists only in the subjective appropriation of the truth is qualified by the further claim that the Christian form of life must be shaped by reference to dogmatic Christian concepts.328
These two strands of the approach to Christianity are one
part of the task of describing or reintroducing the
requirements of Christianity into Christendom, clarifying
the ethical requirements of faith which is revealed in
revelation. Emmanuel shows how Kierkegaard recognises
that the Christ-revelation is the determining factor for
Christianity, and how also Kierkegaard elaborates on his
understanding that revelation is a limitation to
Christianity in a positive sense.
Emmanuel continues his analysis by dissecting
Derrida's notion of signification. He does so because so
much of Kierkegaard interpretation has based itself on
identifying Kierkegaard as an early precursor to
deconstruction. According to Emmanuel, Derrida's notion
of signification is contrary to the typical, normative,
or positive understanding of language. Derrida's negative
understanding posits language signification as relational
rather than positive, i.e. a word is not directly related
to the object but is given meaning because of its
relation to other objects and, hence, negatively produces
a meaning for the object. Only the differences of signs
as a process of that differentiation produces meaning,
leading to undecidability. This leads further to an
interpretation of the text which denies any inherent
unity of meaning to the text, or any inherent meaning to
the body of texts produced by a single author.
In Kierkegaard scholarship, Emmanuel is correct to
point out that this has lead to people329 reading
Kierkegaard in order to deny any unified m e a n i n g . 3 3 o
Emmanuel and I agree that Kierkegaard would not subscribe
328Emmanuel, p. 114
329pQr example, Mackey, Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard, " Points of View for His Work as an Author; A  Report from History" , pp. 160-192 
330gotnething which I think is a mis-reading of Kierkegaard in the sense that this removal of the initial text is not merely a dispersal of one layer of illusion, but an indication that illusion as sign leads to a dialectical denial of sign whereby the sign is both sign and non-sign.
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to the deconstruction of meaning, but view this as merely 
a recognition of something which, while being valuable in 
its own right in that it can serve to indicate mere 
illusion, can be a trap itself which does not acknowledge 
any possibility of the grounding of the self in 
existence. Emmanuel notes that a sense of presence must 
be pervasive in the dialectic of communication; a 
recognition of the possibilities is necessary, but the 
finality of those possibilities, the limits of 
possibility, must also be present as presence (or, in my 
words, as actual). George Steiner's in Real Presences is 
cited as one example of recent work done in response to 
the deconstructionists' attacks on a concrete meaning 
from a moral and theological point of view, and Emmanuel 
agrees with Steiner in this. Specifically, he writes: 
" Indeed, all meaningful encounters with art, literature, 
and music must presuppose this presence." 33i
Emmanuel would establish Kierkegaard in agreement 
with both. More particularly, he would establish 
Kierkegaard as not only both but neither. Based on 
Kierkegaard's conception of indirect communication, 
Emmanuel would describe Kierkegaard as one trying to 
communicate a presence through the absence of that 
presence, which indirectly acts as a position within 
which the reader can carry out the necessary 
interpretative activities without the interference of the 
author. The all-pervasive religiosity of the authorship, 
which was one of Emmanuel's initial indications, is 
enacted through this and through what Emmanuel terms the 
'implied author', which is the organising principle 
giving a common ground for the entire authorship. The 
implied author grants the interpreter some leeway in the 
method of interpretation, because it allows the level of 
interpretation of intention to be deferred.
Appeal to the concept of an implied author avoids the problem of having to " get it right" in the sense that one latches onto the actual authorial intention behind the work. For the
331Emmanuel, p. 17
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implied author is at once distinct from both the pseudonym and the historical writer. This concept also avoids the problem of what to do with texts without access to authors, as well as the problem of how to judge the sincerity oftheir authors.332
The idea of an implied author is a means of escaping the 
necessity of determination of the intention of 
Kierkegaard It is Emmanuel's strategy for reading 
Kierkegaard, and a good one. For my purposes, however, it 
fails to recognise the importance of the actual texts 
and, hence, the importance of the possibility of forms of 
communication or art objects. It focuses and remains 
focused on Kierkegaard without escaping from him.
This is interesting, and a necessary point of 
criticism, because Emmanuel begins the second chapter 
with the following statement :
It is the main contention of this study that Kierkegaard presents a coherent and philosophically interesting view of the nature of Christian revelation, and of the religious form of life that is defined by reference to that central c o n c e p t . 333
Already Emmanuel is focusing on the form of the
communication which revelation is, rather than on a
reading of Kierkegaard himself. This implies that the
form or type of communication is his subject. Emmanuel
understands Kierkegaard as employing philosophy in the
service of reintroducing Christianity to Christendom. In
this sense, the revelation begins to make an important
appearance. Emmanuel writes:
The philosophical scope of Kierkegaard's task, then, is to recover the original anddistinctive meanings of Christian concepts, so that their significance for determining the Christian form of life can be made apparent. To this end, Kierkegaard proposes to reintroduce what he calls the ideal picture of being a Christian, to show that Jesus Christ (the " absolute paradox" ) is the prototype, the object of Christian faith. The task ofrecovering the distinctive concepts ofChristian discourse involves showing how they
332ibid., p. 20 
333ibid., p. 23
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bear on the way a person lives, contrasting the Christian form of life and discourse with other forms of life and d i s c o u r s e . 334
Thus, by displaying the particular necessities involved
with acting within a Christian existence, Kierkegaard
contrasts it to the speculative approach (which Emmanuel
and others have cited as constituting a specific manner
of existence which Kierkegaard perceived as prevalent in
his time) and develops other individuals towards that
form of existence. But how can such an introduction take
place?
The process of a réintroduction takes place through 
the presentation of an ideal, which is in an absolute 
paradoxically relationship to the existence of the 
receiving individual. Emmanuel identifies this 
facilitating concept from the writings of Climacus as 
revelation. Revelation holds a unique position with 
regard to the existential understanding of the actual. 
Emmanuel writes :
On the basis of his [Climacus'] analysis, he shows that there are logical reasons why we cannot assess the truth of what is actuallygiven in revelation. The content of revelation transcends human reason and, as such, presents the individual with an absolute paradox. In revelation the individual confronts the unknowable God. 33s
Revelation is a communication of the truth, but it stands
in total contrast to a speculative or objective
communication of an actual truth in that it is received
directly as a communication from outside of existence. In
this sense, revelation becomes central to an
understanding of Christianity; since subjectivity is
required as part of the individual appropriation of the
paradoxical nature of actuality into the individual's
existence, it serves as a vehicle for such a
communication. Revelation is not a matter of objectively
determined fact, but is an ethical requirement and duty
imposed upon each individual receiving it. It is a
334ibid., p. 34 
335ibid., pp. 34-35
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communication of a truth about the individual's existence 
which is directly communicated from within that actuality 
of the truth, and therefore cannot be resolved within 
existence through thought. It is the most viable means of 
communicating t r u t h . 336
Emmanuel recognises that revelation in the hands of 
Kierkegaard is open to criticism, particularly because of 
its " irrationalism" . As always, this is based upon the 
view that Kierkegaard puts forward an absolute paradox in 
the form of Christ, one in which an individual has both 
the characteristics of a human individual as well as 
being the incarnation of God. Emmanuel rejects most 
acceptance of this proposition as a reading from 
Kierkegaard, regarding the coherency of logic as
necessary. He seeks to discover a logical means of 
understanding the illogical. In this, I admire his
efforts, but resist his outcome. Why? Because he fails to 
take into account the historical (part of the dialectic 
of historical-ahistorical) nature of Christ, and the 
conclusions of PF. But, his argument is a persuasive one, 
though occasionally unnecessary. For Emmanuel, 
Kierkegaard is not trying to put forward a doctrine of
nonsense. Rather, he is putting forward a paradox or an
absurdity (this is different from nonsense) which 
understanding is inadequate to grasp.
The terms paradox and absurd are thus introduced as a conceptual means of indicating that God's appearance in the temporal order transcends the possibilities of human knowledge, and that it cannot be grasped at a purely intellectual level. Kierkegaard's strategy is clearly not to demonstrate the
336j differ from Emmanuel's reading of the concept of revelation so far very little. I think that he places too much value on the contribution of philosophy to the clarification of specific concepts of religion. He would suggest that philosophy allows the individual, according to Kierkegaard, to act in an essential manner to specifically define the nature of revelation. This would seem to slip into the speculative form of philosophy, if care is not taken. A  danger is inherent in this process, one which Emmanuel does not recognise. However, he is essentially correct.Regarding art as a communication of the actual, it approaches the vitality and viability of a revelation, but does not achieve it. A  recognition of this is necessary, though Emmanuel does not, of course (its not part of his book), treat revelation in such a manner. Art as near-revelation (much as the artist is a near-apostle) can communicate the actual truth of existence, going beyond mere speculative thought or rationalism. But it cannot overstep its boundaries.
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impossibility of accepting the truth ofChristianity, but the impossibility of appropriating that truth on purely objective or intellectual t e r m s . 337
For Emmanuel, Kierkegaard does so by moving faith from
being understanding towards being an existential in
nature.
Emmanuel's distinctions are superfluous, but his 
interpretation makes clear that what Kierkegaard was 
describing, when he referred to the absurd or the 
paradox, was not the normal meaning of such words, but an 
indication of the relationship that God has to existence. 
The Christian absurd is something which might be true, 
unlike the secular absurd. The absurd becomes, in the 
hands of Kierkegaard, a category unable to be understood 
by reasoning but which may be accepted by faith. It is 
the limitation of human reasoning, beyond objective 
understanding. Emmanuel writes:
A paradox in the sense of a logical contradiction occurs within the sphere ofreason; it is a point at which reason collides with itself and is thereby brought to astandstill. But Kierkegaard's paradox occurs outside of reason, it is a point at whichreason collides with something foreign toitself, something o t h e r . 338
This may be tantamount to what would normally be
considered nonsense, but it does have it value. The
absolute paradox is the limits of reason; human
understanding may be able to conceive of and grasp in
rational thought all of existence, but the actual
grounding of existence is beyond the existence of
thought. 339
Thus, human understanding fails to reach the actual. 
The actual can only be reached through revelation, which 
comes from beyond understanding; revelation is the actual
337Emmanuel, p. 43 
338ii3id. , p. 45
339fiere, of course, my ideas on the nature of the authentic art object have particular power. Again, the art object approaches revelation, but does not actually achieve it. In this sense, it acts as a near-absolute paradox while not being an absolute paradox itself.
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entering into existence. It transcends rationality, 
revealing its limits. Quoting Kierkegaard:
What I usually express by saying thatChristianity consists of paradox, philosophy in mediation, Leibniz expresses by distinguishing between what is above reason and what isagainst reason. Faith is above reason. Byreason he understands, as he says in manyplaces, a linking together of truths
{enchainment), a conclusion from causes. Faith cannot therefore be proved, demonstrated,
comprehended, for the link which makes alinking together possible is missing, and what else does this say than that it is a paradox. 34o
Indeed, not only does the absurd nature of the revelation
transcend the rational, according to Emmanuel, but it
also acts in opposition to human understanding. It is the
means whereby our own natures are determined as limited
rather than as infinite. The finite nature of our
existence is made clear through the means of the infinite
actual. This still creates, however, an impossibility to
Christianity. Since belief remains part of human
rationality (albeit tenuously), Christianity becomes an
impossible task for the individual. Revelation may be a
means of determining the limits of understanding, of
showing that God is beyond cognitive reason, but it does
not necessarily show how one can still believe. Emmanuel
asserts that this is possible through pragmatic reasons
for belief.
Emmanuel's more contentious statements begins when
he starts to describe revelation as the means of 
communicating divine truth to the individual beyond 
normal human understanding. He does so by asserting that 
it is sin that is the initial limitation of human 
objective reason. Sin is the singular experience of each 
individual such that it limits the individual in its 
understanding of itself. Reason may achieve the highest 
in human achievement, but it also becomes the highest 
means of asserting human sinfulness. Because each 
individual is marked by sin, separating human reason from 
divine reason or understanding, the discovery of the
340JP, vol. 3, pp.399-400; IV C 29
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ultimate truth of existence- the ontological grounding of 
existence in actuality- is impossible. Revelation serves 
as the only viable means of communicating such a truth.
Emmanuel moves from this point to a more interesting 
one. He writes: " Assuming that a revelation has
occurred, what are human beings to make of it?" 342 
Revelation can be made to conform to received opinions 
and doctrines, but this denies the inherent value of 
revelation as such. Revelation must be accepted as a 
'mystery', one which claims to be able to communicate the 
actual truth of existence while simultaneously denying 
any objective application within existence. It is a 
paradoxical presentation of the truth, one which 
indirectly leads the individual to the truth. Revelation, 
as Emmanuel points out, is not only an address to the 
subjective and, therefore, passionately-engaged
individual to recognise its nature, to recognise its 
separateness from the actual while it remains in 
existence, but it is also a need for 'repentance' or, to 
interpret that within the framework of the communication 
of the art object, a rejection and simultaneous 
acceptance of the nature of one's individuality in the 
face of the actual truth of one's existence. Revelation 
is an option both to deny existence and embrace its true 
nature. For Emmanuel, Kierkegaard's concept of revelation 
" does not aim at increasing our knowledge or
enlightening our intellects, but rather at motivating an 
existential decision and giving us practical 
guidance." 343 in this sense, his understanding of
revelation mirrors my own interpretation of the authentic 
art object in Kierkegaard.
344Emmanuel, p. 58; I agree with what E. has said, to a point, but do not disagree that it is sin which marks off the limits of human reasoning. Rather, it is the subjectivity of the individuality which does so, rather than the inherent and internal emotions which are described in an external fashion. Subjectivity is the natural limitations of human reason and understanding; sin is an imposition which arises both from the development of subjectivity (without which it cannot be applied to subjectivity) as well as being an external objectification of the individual's relationship to its ontological grounding.
342Emmanuel, p. 58 
343ibid., p. 60
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If we are to turn to the question of the 
relationship of history and the art object, Emmanuel's 
interpretation of revelation in a similar relationship 1
provides some interesting problems. Revelation is 
necessarily historical in nature but, as Kierkegaard 
continually recognises (in PF and CUP) , any use of the 
historical in a purely objective sense confuses the use 
of the historical in a purely subjective sense. The study 
of historical facts may be necessary when it comes to an 
understanding of the purely human state of existence and 
the history of such an existence; when it comes to the 
actual truth of such an existence, research into the 
historical tends to distort the application of such truth 
into subjectivity.
This question is addressed most directly in PF.
Kierkegaard asks whether an individual can learn the 
actual truth of existence from an historical point within 
that existence; whether such an historical point of 
existence can be anything more than such; and whether an 
appropriation of the actual truth of existence can take 
place from knowledge based upon such an historical point 
within existence. From a Socratic point of view, these 
questions are easily answered positively, but, from a 
Christian point of view, there is more difficulty. For a 
Christian, of course, prior to any form of revelation 
there is no knowledge of the actual. Christianity, the 
historical acts which have allowed the construction of 
Christianity to take place, not only presents the 
knowledge necessary for such a development but also 
enables the conditions within which the individual can 
come to such a knowledge. This is a qualifying set of 
conditions, which Emmanuel notes thus:
...the Socratic view maintains that the learner already possesses the truth, and the historical circumstances of the teaching is an accidental feature. History is merely an occasion for making explicit what is already implicit. The Christian view, by contrast, posits a discontinuity in the temporal order, whereby something essentially different is introduced.The learner cannot proceed by quantitative
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steps toward the truth. What is required is a qualitative transformation, the condition for which is a divine gift, made possible by God's revelation in h i s t o r y . 4^4
The historical fact of the revelation becomes decisive
for the individual. The moment of revelation acts from a
specific historical point throughout history to determine
the relationship that the individual has to the actual.
What is specifically interesting at this point, for
Emmanuel and myself, is that Christian revelation offers
a specific beginning which transforms the concept of
revelation. This is because the concept of 'historical
evidence' would seem to offer a window into the actual
truth of existence while also denying such a truth. The
art object can function in the same m an n e r .  345 jf the
communication of the art object (as with the
communication which the historical evidence embodies) is
appropriated subjectively, then the individual can bring
into its existence some sense of faith with the necessity
of objectivity. However, once the element of objectivity
is introduced, then this process of appropriation ceases
to continue because the ability to have faith in the
subjective appropriation is interfered with. The
authentic art object exists as a dialectical material
object and so, therefore, can and must function both as
an object of faith and as an historical object.
Subjective appropriation is evident in the communicative
form which is the art object, but objective communication
is also necessarily present. Therefore, the art object
becomes a dialectical process of communication of the
truth and denial of the truth. The Christian revelation
is that which occurs in time, producing a relationship
between the individual and God in time. Yet, the only
form of relationship that can exist for the individual
with God must, by its nature, occur outside of time in a
spiritual form. Thus, historical evidence becomes
something which cannot be used to base eternal happiness
on, because an objective inquiry into the historical
344ibid., p. 63
345uever taken, however, as a progression of thought by Emmanuel
210
point of departure produces evidence which denies the 
possibility of faith (since faith is something which is 
inherently believed in, and the objective approach 
introduces doubt). Emmanuel writes:
The underlying point is that faith requires a kind of certainty that historical inquiry cannot provide. Given that empirical inquiry cannot preclude the possibility of error, it is always possible that further evidence will come to light that will force us to revise our beliefs. What this means is that we are never in a position to make a final d e c i s i o n .346
Yet, in Emmanuel's reading of Kierkegaard, the pursuit of
final happiness- the knowledge of the actual truth of our
existence as being ontologically grounded- through
infinite passionate interest is vital.
Choice and certainty about that choice is required
for such an attainment of eternal happiness.34? However,
belief in historical evidence is not required. The
evidence that Emmanuel correctly suggests for this is
Kierkegaard's concept of the absolute paradox. For
Emmanuel, in his reading of Kierkegaard, objectively
viewed, the incarnation of Christ is an event impossible
to believe in. The object of faith, however, transcends
human knowledge by its very nature. Historical
objectivity makes such an event impossible. Revelation of
that event, on the other hand, makes faith necessary and
therefore makes belief in that event possible.
To take the Christian view, therefore, is to see revelation as absolutely authoritative, and to see the corresponding response of faith as one of trustful obediance. Either revelation is the standard of what is true and false, or else human reason is ; but we cannot have it both ways. Given the logic of this argument, Kierkegaard is justified in claiming that the search for historical evidence is incompatiblewith the claims of r e v e l a t i o n . 348
And it is revelation thusly which leads the individual 
into an authentication of its appropriation of faith. And
346Etnmanuel, p. 66
347gomething that the art object can only lead the individual towards but will ultimately indicate its own inadequacies for such.
348Etnmanuel, p. 72
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it is faith through revelation (or, more specifically, 
through the nature of the historicity of revelation), 
which is the reason that the individual is able to make 
the choice to develop toward eternal happiness. As 
Emmanuel notes: " By stressing the centrality of the
paradox, Kierkegaard drives a wedge between knowledge and 
faith, and affirms a practical justification for belief 
in the historical fact of God's existence." 349 The 
historicity of the fact of faith emerges from its 
rejection in objectivity and its affirmation in the 
subjectivity of faith qualified by grace through 
revelation.
Religious statements do not have a validity in 
themselves when considered from a human standpoint. 
Rather, they only have validity and therefore truth when 
they are understood as having a relationship to and 
meaning within the divine which is inaccessible to human 
understanding. This inaccessibility is not absolute, but 
enters into the realm of human understanding only if it 
is made a part of that understanding with the condition 
that it is referable only to the divine. The meaning of 
doctrine then emerges only when the individual is aware 
of this limitation on the nature of divine truth within 
doctrine and, instead of seeking to confirm it, applies 
it to the individual's existence. Doctrine becomes a 
means of determining the individual's activities, rather 
than being merely a descriptive element of those 
a c t i v i t i e s . 350 « The religious value of doctrinal
statement...," according to E,'s reading of Kierkegaard, 
" lies in the fact that they are vehicles for being 
related to divine reality or living 'in the truth.'" 3si 
The implications of this I shall turn to in the 
concluding chapter.
349lbid., p. 75
350rphis understanding of doctrine is not, of course, strictly Kierkegaardian in nature, but does correspond to what Climacus has to say about knowing what it means to be objectively Christian while simultaneously being able to not be a Christian. However, it does serve as an excellent model for the function of the art object within his literature.
35iEmmanuel, p. 107
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There are even further p r o b l e m s . 352 Most importantly, 
Emmanuel would have us put forward revelation as 
something that must be accepted without question. This is 
the key point when discussing Apostolic authority. For 
Emmanuel, Kierkegaard's Christianity is an existential 
means of determining and guiding the individual's life, 
and the revelation is a direction granted through grace 
to that individual. This revelation is not something 
which can be judged by human standards, but must be 
accepted as divine by nature. This does not mean, 
Emmanuel is quick to point out, that revelation cannot be 
examined from an objective stance. Such an acceptance 
could only be characterised as blind or irrational 
j u d g e m e n t . 353 what is more interesting, at least in terms
352por example, Emmanuel notes the basis for Kierkegaard's argument with Adler- that he [Adler] is an example of an individual who is so completely bound by Hegelianism or speculation that not only is he unable to understand the nature of a revelation but, even were he to have experienced one, he would be unable to recognise and apply it to himself; Adler's revelation would not make himself more understandable to himself.Emmanuel goes through the distinctions for revelation and the difference between a genius and an apostle. He also notes that the means of communicating the revelation must be of a specific sort and by a specific person (the areas important to myself). But, his clearest and most interesting arguments arise from his efforts to define a means of determining how one recognises an example of divine authority, a revelation. Quoting T.H. Croxall's " Kierkegaard on 'Authority'," {Hibbert Journal 48 (1949-50):151-165)Are we then to accept the Apostolic authority blindly? By no means. We must examine why we accept it, an also its objective content. But in the last resort we must leave dialectic aside and submit, before we can know the value of Apostolic authority. For Christianity is communicated and kept alive not
epistemologically but existentially.  ^tEmmanuel, p. 123
353guch an acceptance could only be characterised as blind or irrational judgement. This near-objectivity is something which I think is most fruitful, since it goes a long way towards explaining how one must accept a revelation and, therefore, how a revelation or (more importantly) near­revelation can take place.Emmanuel begins with the Christ-revelation. This is, in Emmanuel's reading of Kierkegaard's opinion, an existential communication in which the knowledge of the ontological grounding of the individual self, the actual truth of existence, is posited and communicated. This actuality is presented in embodied form, and this form is a telos for the individual to strive for in imitation. This actuality, the revelation, is also a 'transcendent authority', one which is an absolute judgement on human activity and it serves to define the means of judging future forms of revelation. Yet, it is interesting because it says so little. The material on Adler is much more fruitful than Emmanuel allows in his work, and he should have expanded on it. Instead, he offers simple solutions to a rather complex problem. If I were to conjecture this further, I would apply the same standards that he is applying to the revelation to the art object as a communication. Emmanuel simply equates the 'confusion' which seems inherent in the message of Adler with Kierkegaard's own critique of Hegelianism and the contemporary Danish church. Emmanuel's reading of Kierkegaard on Adler is inadequate, and therefore his understanding of the power of revelation as a form of communication or divine communication is also lacking.It is with chapter 8 that he tries to repair some of argument, by referring to Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication. Emmanuel's understanding of this is the same as mine, based as mine on the lectures on
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of my own research, is that Emmanuel then goes on to 
interpret the Christ-revelation in light of the 
Kierkegaardian understanding of 'ethical' communication. 
As shown in PC, the Christ-revelation is necessarily 
indirect in nature, rooted, according to Emmanuel's 
reading of Kierkegaard, in the absolute paradox. 
Revelation becomes rooted in the existence of the 
individual, and is therefore necessarily indirect. The 
Christ-revelation is an example which does not contain 
doctrine, messages, specific communication of the nature 
of existence; it is an example of a life to be led. There 
is apparently no answers within the scope of Emmanuel's 
interpretation of K i e r k e g a a r d .354
Emmanuel concludes by noting his understanding of 
revelation and one of the salient points which can be 
derived from his argument. For Emmanuel, deciding whether 
a communication is such is less important than 
determining the proper response and appropriation of it. 
He writes :
Even though the decision to accept the Christ- revelation cannot be decided on theoretical grounds, it does not follow that the decision to believe (to become a disciple) is therefore groundless. For as we have seen, the absolute paradox reveals a basic tension within the concept of rationality itself. Whereas purely evidential considerations do not warrant the decision to believe, there are important practical and ethical considerations that may render that decision perfectly rational.35s
communication found in the journals. He continues his agreement when he asks how God can communicate subjective or 'essential' knowledge in an ethical manner (by 'ethical', Emmanuel here means the means necessary to communicate to the subjective individual). Emmanuel writes: " He uses midwives. The Christian midwife is one who gives rise to the birth of a new person by
being the for that person to acquire essential knowledge."  ^ I certainly would agree with this. I would also agree with Emmanuel's characterisation of Kierkegaard as communicating in order to try to bring the individual into action, differing from the Socratic maieutic which tried to bring knowledge to the individual (based on the differences between the Socratic and the Kierkegaardian understanding of the nature of knowledge).
^Emmanuel, p. 133
354gp^^^^^g2 goes on to note some of the criticisms against Kierkegaard's 
theory of communication. From John A. Mourant's article " The Limitations of Religious Existentialism" {International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1961) : 437-452) he notes that Kierkegaard's theory can be understood as excluding, in that the religious truths can only be appropriated by the singular individuality. This leads into the two questions about communication: why should there be any indirect communication (i.e. what motives exist for it) and how can religious truths be appropriated if they are purely subjective? 
355Emmanuel, p. 146
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This basic tension is Emmanuel's most important 
contribution. In recognising it, he recognises the 
dialectical nature of revelation. The connection is 
tenuous, but this can be applied to an interpretation of 
the art object within the Kierkegaardian literature.
Where Emmanuel fails is when he refuses to answer 
the most basic question: how can a revelation be
communicated. He strives to find a means of determining 
the grounds upon which a communication can be termed a 
revelation, but by pointing to the reception and 
acknowledgement of the revelation, rather than the 
revelation itself. " Even if it is finally impossible to 
say whether a person has in fact received a divine 
revelation, it is possible to determine whether a 
person's statements and actions are consistent with such 
a c l a i m . 356 Therefore, a revelation is proven not as such, 
nor by its effect on an individual, but purely by the 
reception of the communication which that receiving 
individual produces once the revelation has taken place. 
Emmanuel does an excellent job of describing the 
conditions under which the concept of revelation has 
within a Christian framework, but leaves much. Examining 
the art object leads into a greater clarity about the 
concept itself.
One of the most interesting connections that can be 
made between a source within the secondary literature and 
a positive understanding of the art object within a 
Kierkegaardian framework is Adorno's writing on 
Kierkegaard and mythical content. As such, it bears a 
strong relation to the work of Emmanuel. This is the most 
important engagement that Adorno has with Kierkegaardian 
aesthetics, even though it is also the most indirect. For 
Adorno, Kierkegaard's introduction of the mythical as 
counter-concept to historical movement and in unity with 
it leads to the mythical in his own thought, concealed by 
his mature philosophy. In The Concept of Irony, 
Kierkegaard sets out to deduce the difference between the
356ibid., p. 146
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conceptual and pictorial form of presentation in Plato, 
specifically the necessity of this divergence. What 
emerges, in Adorno's opinion, is that the mythical, for 
Kierkegaard, is not a free creation of the mind but a 
development in history, having an inner history. The 
mythical is separate from the dialectical in Plato until 
Plato becomes a master of it, when the mythical becomes 
image. Kierkegaard wards off the historical implications 
of the mythical's unity with the dialectic, but Adorno 
does so mistakenly.
For Adorno, Kierkegaard sees the development of 
self-consciousness as the means to dispel the myth 
leading to the Ideal. The mythical holds a specific power 
over the individual, but, in the development of the 
individual, the mythical ceases to become a means of 
revealing. In the mythical image the natural and the 
spiritual emerges, surpassing the mythical for a 
spiritual self-awareness. What Adorno recognises in this 
movement is that the mythical destroys i t s e l f  .357 The 
character of the mythical in conceptual form is thus 
attributed to Kierkegaard's absolute inwardness as to all 
forms of idealism of absolute spirit." 358 Mythical 
content, in Adorno's reading, becomes a means of
justifying the development of the individual within the 
dialectic of that development. I would disagree with this 
completely, since only the relationship that the
individual has to its actual ontological grounding in 
existence justifies the development of the individual. 
Yet, Adorno does have a point, given the dialectical 
relationship between myth and such a development. 
Mythical content, despite its structuring role in that 
development, continues its own destruction. Adorno 
writes :
...the origin of the structure is mythical : thetyranny of spirit, of the created that
3 57^ vital point of agreement between ray own reading concerning the art object and Adorno's reading of the myth. What is consistently emerging in the various readings of Kierkegaard is that the production of communication ultimately constructs the necessity of its own annulling.
355Adorno, p. 56
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enthrones itself as creator and sinks so much deeper into nature the higher the spirit imagines itself towering above it. In the final product of the idealist spirit, the mythical content simply breaks through the cells of the systematically developed concept, where philosophical criticism has banished it, and takes possession of the old images. Along with the stability of the system, it destroysitself ...359
This, Adorno points out, does not lead Kierkegaard into 
an emphasis of the mythical metaphysics (as Kierkegaard 
identifies Schelling and others as doing); rather, the 
mythical remains embedded in the immanent dialectic of 
the individual's development. Where Adorno fails to 
realise the potential is when he states that this 
mythical content is only expelled by the obliteration of 
subjectivity itself. This is true only in the sense that 
it happens, but the implications for a positive expulsion 
are not present. The mythical transforms through 
subjectivity from the idea to the actual ideal and in so 
doing obliterates the ideal subjectivity to produce the 
actual subjectivity (or, at least, an awareness of it) . 
Positive potential for the objec,t whose content is 
mythical, must be understood first as a communication 
between individuals. By its very nature as myth, such 
communication is necessarily understood as applicable 
idea with the potential of leading towards knowledge of 
the actual ideal. It is, however, precisely because it is 
recognised as myth that a vital distinction can be made. 
The nature of myth is dependent on its communication as 
embodying the idea as ideal or revelation. What is 
distinct about this, though, is that myth remains a 
communication between individuals, and is therefore not 
revelation per se. Therefore, such a communication as 
myth is an inadequate communication in relation to the 
ideal since it is not an embodiment of the actual ideal, 
remaining outside of existence and is only communicated 
within existence as idea. Myth, if it can be understood 
as communication of truth (which is the nature of myth
359lbid., p. 57
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within an immediate context), as an authentic 
communication of the actual ideal), is also necessarily 
distinct from the actual ideal since it remains wholly 
within existence. As such, myth can be understood as an 
authentic art object.
Adorno states that only the mythical as a developed 
and then expired element of the subjective can clarify 
the relation of the absolute inwardness and objectless 
nature of the subjectivity for a bleak ontology.
Through conjuration a mythically self-enclosed subjectivity undertakes for rescue" fundamental human relations" and their mean, [while] ontology... And conjuration is no more limited to the " aesthetic sphere" than to the praticizing metaphor. Inwardness itselfconjures 360
This conjuring Adorno describes as a second inferiority, 
a constructed subjectivity. It is not inwardness itself, 
but a metaphor for inwardness. Adorno states that the 
mythical enters into the dialectic of the developing 
individual as part of its existence and as a perception 
of a second and deeper dialectic of the self and its 
ontological grounding which, however, is not developed by 
the philosophy but is present in the philosophy. Adorno, 
however, cuts off any positive value for this, 
identifying in Kierkegaard the progression to despair as 
denying the mythical's power of redemption, particularly 
as melancholy. The movement is confined to the 
reflections of the subjectivity on its own nature as 
subjective, and the nature as historical character is 
interpreted as intertwining without the possibility of 
productivity. But this is, from the result of such a 
process, a failure- for both Adorno as well as 
Kierkegaard.
Adorno recognises the failure of the process itself, 
but fails to see the positive in such a failure or to 
apply the failure within the context of his own ideas or 
that of Kierkegaard's. He writes of this process:
360Ibid., p. 57
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The figure that separates truth from inwardness, to which truth appears as mere semblance, defines the shape of truth itself...With the historical break between inner and outer, with the collapse of " totality" [into pure inwardly-directed subjectivity] , the mythical essence of aesthetic image expresses itself at the same time as discontinuity. The aesthetic region is ambiguous and no more knows the sharp distinction of the individual than the nexus of the whole,
This discontinuity is portrayed as negative in value,
when in fact it is positive in that the actual always
remains discontinuous to the individual. Myth remains
idea, ad retains its distinction as communication within
existence. For Adorno, the aesthetic becomes a means of
declaring the discontinuity, and therefore enacting a
despair about the relationship of existence to the actual
which feeds into the bourgeoisie mentality of
Kierkegaard.
Thus objective images and the subjective modes of behaviour, whose mythical illusoriness is exposed by the plan of his own philosophy, are, for Kierkegaard, aesthetic. In his own philosophy, however, this insight into the mythical origin does not apply to the form of objective inwardness itself. Thus, although the spell of the " aesthetic" in Kierkegaard indeed covers the loving of the immediate, external world, which is jettisoned from inwardness ascontingent, and although this spell causes aswell the ruins of a transubjective " meaning" .. it does not extend to the movements of the illusory internality that are unhesitatingly appealed to... as movements toward positive religiosity. 362
Yet, Adorno seems to have missed a vital dialectical 
point. Myth cannot be extended as impact into the
subjectivity of the individual. Yes, the ruins of the
illusory or of the images of the objective may be founded 
on the movement towards the subjective, but these ruins 
should be recognised as positive in value for the 
individuality as such, rather than mourned for their 
loss. For Adorno, this process means that these objects 
come closest to the denied conditions of objectless
361ibid., p. 65 
362ibid., p. 66
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inwardness in communication with the objects, reflecting 
an estrangement from reality that is inherent in the 
philosophy. Furthermore, for Adorno, Kierkegaard's 
philosophy takes objectless inwardness and pure 
subjectivity as substantial reality and, in doing so, 
reverts to that conception of the perceived truth of 
existence as merely semblance. In this, he is correct, 
but the perceived truth of existence remains in the 
positive rather than wholly negative in value for the 
individual. The result of this is that the truth of 
existence moves from an ideal truth to an actual truth as 
appropriatable idea, unable to be fully appropriated into 
existence as actual, even though it can be known, but 
which can be applied within existence. For Adorno, 
Kierkegaard's position regarding this movement and 
towards the weakness of semblance is merely a 
capitulation :
Semblance, which illuminates thought from the remoteness of the images like the star of reconciliation, burns in the abyss of inwardness as an all-consuming fire. It is to be sought out and named in this abyss, if the hope that it radiates is not to be forfeited by knowledge. 363
Kierkegaard himself would probably have not agreed with 
this, holding out in melancholy and despair. In that 
respect, Adorno is correct to make this statement. But 
both are wrong; both do not recognise that in the 
discontinuity and perceived weakness there is a certain 
hope, one denied by Adorno's statements as well as 
Kierkegaard's. And it is precisely this discontinuity, 
the dialectical nature of the art object as both positive ^
and negative, that is its strength. Emmanuel and Adorno 
come closest to developing out of Kierkegaard a positive 
potential for the art object. They both appear to be on 
the verge of recognising the paradoxical, self-negating 
nature of the art object. Truth emerges through the 
immanent transcendence of the subjectivity within 
existence, through an appropriation of the infinite
363 Ibid., p . 67
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contradiction as the absolute paradox embodied in a 
material, finite form. Paradox is primary, and Adorno in 
particular recognises that this is inherent in 
Kierkegaard's conception of truth, which he characterises 
as transparent in nature (i.e. truth is transparent). 
Paradox infuses all: " Truth appears paradoxical in the
subjective- and not only subjective- dialectic that is 
extinguished in it; truth becomes ambiguous as the 
quintessence of dialectical movement without being its 
measure." 364 None of the secondary literature, however, 
understands the full implications of this statement. 
Neither does Kierkegaard. It is to his understanding of 
the art object and his specific failure that I now turn.
364ibid., p. 73
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...I
Chapter Seven- The Art Object
To a great extent, Kierkegaard's understanding of 
the artist serves to define the nature of the art object, 
precisely because the artist is an individual 
communicating to another individual within existence 
about the idea of the actual ideal; the artist's 
concerns, and, therefore, its production, are determined 
with the same desires for results for itself as for the 
receiving individual. Intentionality is key because any 
communication must be related both to the existence of 
the receiving individual as well as the producing 
individual. In order for the art object to be authentic, 
it must be related directly to the development of the 
relationship to the actual, a development which occurs 
within the existence of the individual. Where the 
difficulties arise is with the material object itself. 
The singular and material nature of the art object as the 
product of an individual is necessarily communication 
but, by not being present, the communication of the 
individual is contained wholly within an object which 
remains outside of the individuals involved. A confusion
results in both the mind of Kierkegaard and the secondary
literature, since the message of the authentically 
developing individual is wholly concerned with the 
individuals by containing the communication in material 
form and, hence, separate from the existence of the 
individuals involved. This produces a discrepancy 
between the object as such (aesthetics in the
traditional, Baumgaurtenian sense) and the object as 
communication of an embodied idea as ideal. First, the 
art object is a communication of the idea as actual 
ideal. As a communication of the idea, it is transcendent 
in nature, since the idea is communicated in order to be 
able to be appropriated by a receiving individual within 
immanence and therefore become an actual ideal through 
the application of the received idea towards 
transcendence. However, the art object is in material 
form. Because of this, the material form- which is
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necessarily immanent- is in a contradictory relationship 
to the ideal. The material form, by removing the 
individual communicating from the communication, makes 
the value of the communication for the receiving 
individual lessened. Within these discrepancies and 
contradictions lies the true value of the art object in a 
Kierkegaardian sense- its dialectical nature and, 
ultimately, its valuelessness. The art object is 
dialectically both immanent, in the fact that it is in 
material form as communication of idea, while being 
simultaneously transcendent as communication of the
ideal. The Kierkegaardian notion of the dialectic serves 
to advance the very definition of the art object, since 
it now can function both within existence as well as 
within an indication of the actual. Art is a 
communication of the ideal, but only in so far that at 
one point in the development of the receiving individual 
it communicates its inability to communicate the ideal. 
It is with this point that the art object becomes a
radical aspect of Kierkegaard's philosophy, and acquires 
a radicality of its own as an unique form of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 365 it might even be understood, within a 
postmodern context, to be an answer to the declaration of 
the 'end of art'. Ultimately, it be said that art's value 
is its valuelessness, a notion discussed in the
conclusion.
The grounds of art, its basis, it medium or its 
form, have been defined. This involves the exposition and 
explication of a number of concepts: dialectics;
objectivity and subjectivity; repetition, reduplication, 
and reflection; direct and indirect communication; the 
artist as producer; and the notion of idea and actual 
i d e a l .  366 These concepts are the grounds of art as
365-phough one based, as always, on certain radical contingencies.
366^gain, the idea is the pure thought which is appropriatable by the receiving individuals through a material communication which is, through repetition, applied to their existence. Through this application, the idea acts as a catalyst to allows a self-transformation towards a greater awareness and understanding of the receiving individual's actual ontological grounding. Knowledge of the actual ideal, which is the applicative idea outside of existence, can never be fully known nor applied, but is always the goal of individuals within existence.
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communication, being both necessary elements of the 
existing individual as well as necessary aspects of 
communication. They are that on which communication is 
based, the structure of the art object as communication. 
The form of the art object is those basic elements which 
are descriptive of individual existence in general.
The second part of the dialectical nature of 
communication is the actual communication itself, the 
message from one individual to another, in material form. 
This is more difficult than the grounds, since 
Kierkegaard never describes what these actual 
communications would be if they were in an art form. 
However, I have taken my cue from those communications 
which Kierkegaard both describes as between individuals 
as well as being necessary for the authentic development 
of those individuals who are communicating and 
communicated to. They are not the traditional means of 
describing art, but is a type of communications which 
Kierkegaard would describe as necessary for the 
individual developing as well as being communication for 
those who would develop others, where Kierkegaard capable 
or interested in this subject.
What makes my own research an advance on Kierkegaard 
is, firstly, the sheer fact that I have dealt with the 
art object per se. Second, I've taken into account 
Kierkegaard's own understanding of the dialectic and 
applied it to the object. Both parts of the dialectic of 
art as communication are necessary for art itself, 
operating wholly within the framework of Kierkegaard's 
philosophy. By being described as aspects of art as 
communication, this advances beyond any other sources and 
comments on Kierkegaard's aesthetics; these aspects allow 
and establish the dialectical nature of the art object to 
act as part of nature of art's identity and purpose as 
communication. But the development of such a dialectic, 
while in itself being an advance as well as the means of
367go often associated with beauty, a concept which Kierkegaard would relegate to the esthetic stage and art created solely for that level of development and one to which he almost never refers.
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grounding art, it not sufficient to describe art. This 
dialectic is only the necessary conditions for art as 
communication. The imagination^^s serves as a binding
force between the two, but is not sufficient. The art 
object is a necessarily synthetic object, but this 
synthesis does not reveal the whole of the ideal being
communicated. Though the above is the grounds of 
establishing art as communication, it produces only the 
option of art, rather than its nature. This dialectic 
establishes the relationship between communicating 
individual, communicated individual, and the ideal truth 
of the communication and determines the point of 
development and potential which is contained therein.
The necessity of art is contained within this 
dialectic. Art must be a form of communication which is
dialectical in nature, being both indirect and direct.
The communication of the art object is direct to the 
senses as well as being a type of communication 
established between two individualities, but the artist 
must also step back from his production; it must always 
be indirect and removed from his individuality's^ so that 
the communication can be appropriated by the individual 
receiving such communication on their own terms. But 
there are differences beyond mere communication. Art has 
a basis in the dialectical grounding of communication 
without the inclusion of individualities, established 
when the specific qualities of the art object are 
elaborated upon. The fact that an art object can be both 
a finite object as well as a representation of the 
infinite indicates such a dialectical nature. The 
materiality of the object establishes a return to the 
individualités receiving the communication.
Certain important points remain outside the scope of 
this thesis. For instance, the difference between an 
inauthentic and an authentic artist, and the value of 
their production. There can be such a thing as an
35®A concept very much outside the scope of this thesis, though very important. I would defer to the work done by Gouwens and Ferreira on this subject.
369Though, of course, the problem of reciprocity always is present.
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inauthentic artist- one who satisfies the requirements of 
the esthetic individual- but, for Kierkegaard, there is 
little value in such production. What is of value in such 
a description of art is a description of the authentic 
artist- one who is concerned for other individuals' as 
well as for his own development towards authenticity; 
what is being discussed is 'great' art by 'great' 
artists. The authentic artist is one who is in a
reciprocal relationship with his audience, serving 
through his communication both the needs of the
development of the receiving individual as well as his 
own needs as an developing individual who is concerned 
with his relation to the actual. The question remains, 
however, can inauthentic art have value? An answer can be 
found if one notes that inauthentic art is already 
indicated as that which directly communicates facts
and/or appeals to esthetic requirements. Inauthentic art 
is not an expression of the actual ideal^^o but a clever 
manipulation of material and message and a belief in 
man's infinite capacities to produce. Inauthentic art may 
be an expression of the idea of the ideal, but this idea 
is not one which can be appropriated by individuals for 
their own development towards authenticity; though 
inauthentic communication itself may be an indication of 
the ideal, it can never be an expression of the actual.
A second problem is to describe art as communication 
as a singular object which is normally material in 
nature, which continues to communicate long after the
communication has been finished and the artist is no 
longer present to the communicated; what of art history, 
for instance? Though the artist must remove himself from 
the actual indirect communication which takes place, he 
still remains as an individuality for the receiving
370The actual ideal is opposed to the existential ideal. The existential ideal is that which can be realised within existence, the concept to which the Romantics refer to when speaking about the ideal. The actual ideal is the authentic ideal, being the ontological grounding of the individual. The difference between the existential and the actual is that the existential is the perceptions and assumptions of the individual about their own existence and their interaction within externality (the world about them) while the actual is the truth of existence (that the Christian God grounds everything). Kierkegaard's philosophy is always about accepting the actual truth of existence.
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individual. What distinguishes the art object from 
authentic communication is that it may be present and 
continue to communicate long after the communicating 
individual is not present. In effect, does art have a 
history, and can art objects continue to have an effect 
outside of their immediate, historical context? This too 
lends crendence to the necessity of the art object.
Third, though an art object is removed from the 
individual creating it, in the process of creation it 
always maintains the reciprocity between communicator and 
communicated involved in the process of communicating and 
appropriation. The art object sustains its value 
throughout the individual's development. Thus, it may be 
created for the development of the esthetic individual, 
but it also continues to have value for the religious. 
This aspect of the nature of the art object is created 
through its dialectical nature and the means of its 
grounding. It is a product of a developing individual for 
the communication with other individuals and the 
development of a reciprocal relationship In essence, how 
does the productive individual specifically interact with 
its production?
Fourth, what about style? Does Kierkegaard relegate 
changes in style to the esthetic stage? And the 
development of art forms, the history of art? 
Kierkegaard's own remarks about history are vague, but 
they seem to indicate that he regards any interest in 
another age by an individual as superfluous as well as 
dangerous, since the individual is to be concerned with 
his own existence. What about different forms of art? 
Kierkegaard's references are to poetry or theatre 
throughout most of his writing. This coincides with the 
general belief of the time that poetry and music were the 
'highest' art forms as well as Kierkegaard's own 
predilections. This is a limitation which can be overcome 
by taking such prejudices into account, and also by
3'^^For further discussion of this, see the second appendix of this thesis. However, this involves a detailed description of Kierkegaard's understanding of the concept of history, something I wish to explore in further research.
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noting that Kierkegaard would perhaps distance himself 
from a material object because it would be able to be 
related to the esthetic requirements so easily.
These objections to my interpretation of art within 
the framework of Kierkegaard are minor points. What they 
do not do is suggest the difficulty involved from the 
very nature of the art object itself. Though it is 
possible to describe the art object within the context of 
the developing individual, this description runs against 
that which makes direct communication inauthentic. As the 
individual develops and incorporates the message of the 
communicating of the ideal, this message becomes more 
direct the more the individual develops. The closer to 
the ideal that the individual is, the more clear and 
direct the message is. This development is paralleled in 
the development of Kierkegaard's own writing, when he 
changes from writing indirectly to writing direct attacks 
on the establishment, which is a change in Kierkegaard's 
own style (and he had many, throughout his own 
production).
The art object is elusive within a Kierkegaardian 
context, but is a possibility. Despite my earlier 
criticism of Stephen Crites, I agree with him completely 
on one point. He writes :
Kierkegaard never elaborated his aesthetics in a single major opus. Instead he wrote a number of separate essays, each more or less self- contained. His method in each of these essays was to take up one particular aesthetic idea, and attempt to express its essential character in relation to its appropriate artistic medium or in relation to a particular work of art or artist in which it is successfully e m b o d i e d . 372
This statement attests to the ambiguous and difficult
position that the art object occupies within
Kierkegaard's writing. The appearance of the art object,
within Kierkegaard's writing, has remained to a limited
extent a confused issue. Each of the approaches described
in the previous chapter fail to actually meet the
3"^^Crit:e8, introduction to Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, p. 30
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possibility of including the art object in its broadest 
sense. This is not to say that they do not attempt to 
provide an inclusive niche within the framework of such 
description for the art object per se, but that each 
individual author's approach leaves the art object as an 
inadequate element within the framework of actuality. 
Even when such an indication does hint at positive 
possibilities- as in the case most notably of Pattison's 
writing on Kierkegaard- nevertheless the art object is 
not described within a context of its fullest potential 
as a communication of the actual ideal. Always the art 
object is shown to be inadequate to the actual and to 
remain wholly within existence as idea rather than 
indicating the ideal. The art object is emphasised as a 
material object is determined to be merely esthetic 
rather than authentically aesthetic, and, therefore, 
functions within a very narrow framework of possibility 
in terms of the development of the existing individual 
towards knowledge of its actual ontological grounding.
Why does this occur? It might be obvious to blame 
the authors themselves. In part, this could be because of 
their inadequate appreciation of the complexities of a 
dialectical understanding of the art o b j e c t .  373 Perhaps, 
more specifically, it can be said that, because most of 
the secondary authors wish to remain truthfully attached 
to the position which Kierkegaard established in his 
writings, they are incapable of advancing beyond such. A 
certain prejudice has set in amongst commentators on 
Kierkegaard, one which is very difficult to overcome, 
because it is so thoroughly based on Kierkegaard's own 
prejudices. As some have noted, it appears almost 
impossible to reconcile a position which recognises the 
positive potential of communication as embodied within 
static material form as art object with the progressive, 
developing and existing description of the individual 
which emerges in K i e r k e g a a r d . 374 This is a position which
373a  simplification, but one which can be applied in a valid manner to the majority of the secondary literature.
374>i>hj^ g ig a personal remark which some have directed against my own research. In no way would I be suggesting a lack of respect for such
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can be traced throughout the secondary literature. If one 
only takes the Hongs' comments in the Journals and Papers 
section devoted to art, one can clearly see the almost 
confused state which is present. The Hongs write:
Art in the narrower sense is symbolized for Kierkegaard by poetry, and in his comprehensive view of the various spheres of existence art is in the lowest sphere. In line with his stronger emphasis later upon the significance of action for existence, he turns against the artist who wants to paint Christ {Training in 
Christianity...) instead of obeying him. Art as a poet's creating and forming activity is of great concern to Kierkegaard. He lays considerable weight on the artistic treatment of material and particularly on the way it is to be communicated. He develops his original theory of the art of communication. He is also attentive to the ethical and religious problems related to the poet's life. Throughout his entire authorship, Kierkegaard wrestles withthe question of the extent to which poetic activity is justifiable form and ethical and religious point of view.^^s
Full credit should be given to the Hongs. Of all the
statements on Kierkegaard's position concerning
aesthetics this is, despite its briefness, one of the
most important. It is also, however, confusing. The Hongs
show that they, along with the vast majority of
commentators on Kierkegaard, have misunderstood and
muddled the issue. The art object becomes merely
esthetic, yet Kierkegaard himself confuses the issue.
Kierkegaardian aesthetics, as I have hoped to have shown
in the previous chapters, is a complicated dialectical
issue. This is the reason, I feel, that the secondary
literature does not engage with the potential for the art
object in Kierkegaard. One can only blame Kierkegaard
himself !
The art object within Kierkegaard has positive 
potential, a potential which- despite the dialectical
positions, since I fully understand them (see my comments on Kierkegaard's own inadequacies concerning art later in chapter), but am using this example as a citation of how strongly entrenched such a prejudice against art is within the Kierkegaardian community. This entrenched antithetical position in one found in such strong examples as the International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: Two Ages, which shows almost no recognition of the aesthetic potential involved in that title.
375jp, Vol. 1, p. 502
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nature of its effect on the developing individual- is one 
which can be identified in a specific fashion. In the 
above statement, the Hongs have actually intermingled 
specific issues without showing any signs of recognising 
certain relations. First, they equate the aesthetic with 
the esthetic (one of the most common misconceptions). 
Secondly, they use the example from PC to back this up, 
when that passage has a very different purpose^^s. Third, 
they state that the production of art is important and 
was of concern to Kierkegaard throughout his life (which 
can be shown by the amount of writing he devoted to the 
method of communication) , but this is divided into three 
separate issues: the nature of communication, the ethical 
nature of the artist's existence, and the ethical nature 
of the artist's production. All three are distinct 
issues, and should be treated as such.
This chapter is devoted to describing and critiquing 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the art object and its 
place within his description of the relation of the 
individual's existence to its actuality. It is divided 
into three sections. In the first, I will analyse 
Kierkegaard's negative remarks concerning art (in no way 
related exclusively to his description of the esthetic) , 
and offer the reason for such (and hence the reason for 
the confusion of the issue). It can be shown that 
Kierkegaard's apparent apprehension about art resulted 
from his own inability to fully assimilate it into his 
writings. In the second section, I will analyse how 
Kierkegaard felt he truly understood the art object, 
exploring its positive potential. Despite the negative 
remarks, Kierkegaard's writings contain a number of 
positive indications about the art object. It emerges 
that Kierkegaard believed the art object to be an 
indication of the idea of the actual, but an indication 
which held dangers to the existing individual because it
5 76.phe passage in PC is more concerned with obedience to Christ rather than to the production of the art object. Kierkegaard makes an excellent point in that passage, determining the limited value of the art object as being its very means of constructing a valid and applicable communication. I shall discuss this passage specifically.
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did not communicate the possibility of appropriation of 
the ideal. Because of its nature as static, material form 
the art object interferes with the individual's 
progression towards the a c t u a l . 377 This is why the Hongs 
make the mistake they do. Third, I will show that 
Kierkegaard failed to perceive the full positive 
potential of the art object. Any positive remarks which 
he makes about the aesthetic can still be interpreted as 
referring to the esthetic. Contained within many 
statements, however, is a fuller interpretation and 
potential for the art object as a communication of the 
knowledge of the existing individual's actual ontological 
grounding. There is the potential for a description 
running completely counter to Kierkegaard's own position, 
inevitable in the light of his writing. Keeping in mind a 
particular distinction between the idea of the actual and 
the actual ideal, the art object can be described as a 
full indication and as the grounds for the possibility of 
appropriation of actual knowledge. Unlike Kierkegaard's 
own specific comments, only allowing the art object to 
communicate the idea of the actual, contained within his 
writing, as well as his own specific statements on art, 
the art object can function as communication of the 
actual ideal- something that Kierkegaard fails to 
understand and would object to. This point is always kept 
in mind. The art object has the positive potential to be 
an authentic communication of the ideal as an indication 
of the actual ideal, while the actual is the actual. 
Inauthentic communication can communicate the idea of the 
ideal, but never the actual ideal. Inauthentic art only 
indicates the idea, while authentic art indicates the 
idea of the actual of the ideal within existence. Coupled 
with the previous chapter on the artist, the art object
377a s  always, any analysis of the art object within'the framework of Kierkegaard's writing involves conjecturing against his own statements at times- though this section will have the appearance of being a summary of his views, in no way would Kierkegaard have admitted to such a codification. More importantly, Kierkegaard would simply have noted that such a rigid description of the art object merely furthers his own position that it is inadequate and belongs in the esthetic. However, the second section of this chapter will show that Kierkegaard failed to recognise the art object's positive potential even within the framework of his negative remarks.
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emerges as a positive element in the dialectic of the 
individual's progression towards knowledge of the actual.
Before moving on, an understanding is necessary of 
those who might have influenced Kierkegaard, as well as 
the secondary literature which deals specifically with 
the subject of art. This has already been touched upon in 
the section of the chapter on the artist dealing with the 
imagination, but some reiteration is necessary. The 
influences on Kierkegaard's are not great, even though he 
considered himself more than sufficiently knowledgeable 
of others. This is because he was more interested in the 
grounding and development of the individual towards 
a u t h e n t i c i t y . 378 Socrates, Aristotle, Hamann, Kant, 
Schelling, and the various Romantic writers show up as 
minor figures of importance. At times, these points of 
interest are of little consequence, and interpretation of 
such is speculation. For example, one of the influences 
regarding art appear in 1845. At the time of writing 
Stages on Life's Way, Kierkegaard was working on Three 
Discourses on Imagined Occasions, each part coinciding 
with the three parts of Stages. At the same time, he was 
writing on the possibility of a Christian communication:
A new science must be introduced: the Christian art of s p e a k i n g 379 , to be constructed ad modum [in the manner of] Aristotle's Rhetoric. Dogmatics as a whole is a misunderstanding especially as it now has been developed.VI A 18, n.d., 184 5: Addition to Pap.VI A 17 : Reference could be made here also toCarneades' doctrine of probabi 1 ity...3^ o
Another example might be the following:
Aristotle places the art of speaking and the media for awakening faith (pistis) in relation to probability so that it is concerned (in contrast to knowledge) with what can happen in a different way. Christian eloquence will be distinguished from the Greek in that it is concerned only with improbability, with showing
3 78a  convenient phrase used to describe the teleological goal of the development of the individual as comprehending and appropriating its ontological grounding in existence.
379Hongs refer to JP (I 630, 631; II 1116, 1467; III 3192, 3467-71; V 5786), 
Three Discourses On Imagined Occasions, p. 167 
330j-p, I, p. 627; VI A 17, n.d., 1845
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that it is improbable, in order that one can then believe it. Here probability is to be rejected just as much as improbability in theother, but both have in common the distinctionfrom knowledge. 381
Kierkegaard, for the most part, merely confuses the
issues. Kant is particularly interesting, since his
conception of art characterises it as purposive and moral 
in nature as well as an expression of the ideal. 
Kierkegaard would agree with this, but would also counter 
that this leaves art limited by rationality, and 
therefore inappropriatable for the individual. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Green, establishing a link 
between Kant and Kierkegaard is tenuous at best.
Two figures are of particular importance, but only
in that they too do not seem to fit within the 
Kierkegaardian description of existence, and, therefore, 
are rejected by him. Certain statements by Schelling in 
his philosophy of art have a distinct correspondence to 
the possibilities of constructing a philosophy of art
within the framework of Kierkegaard's writing. This is to 
be expected, considering Kierkegaard's early enthusiasm 
for Schelling as a student, but it also bears out upon 
consideration of Schilling's own writing. For example:
§23. The immediate cause of all art is God, for God is by means of his absolute identity the source of all mutual informing (into indifference) of the real and the ideal uponwhich all arts rests; or, God is the source of the ideas. The ideas originate only in God.Art, however, is the representation of the archetypes, hence God himself is the immediate cause and the final possibility of all art; he himself is the source of all b e a u t y . 382
Kierkegaard would have to be in agreement with this, to
the extent that the representation of the ideal has its
authority in the actuality of God. This is also
particularly true in Schelling's description of the
development and distinctions between the various forms of
art objects. Could it be said that Kierkegaard himself
was following Schelling's own schema in placing the epic
381j-p, I, p. 628; VI A  19, n.d., 1845 
382gchelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 121
234
and the dramatic arts at the top of this lists in E/O I 
and elsewhere? Most importantly does the discussions of 
music which is considered separately from opera (in fact, 
there are almost no discussions of music qua music that I 
can remember in the texts) included? Whether this is the 
case or not, Kierkegaard would also disagree with 
Schelling on many points. For instance, Schelling also 
provides some interesting points in his discussion of the 
specific forms of art objects. He writes:
Art as such... is so far removed from deception that in its highest works it must rather 
destroy that particular appearance of reality...[in that it might be a means of perfectly depicting reality] Anyone who views the idealistic constructions of Greek artists must be smitten immediately by the impression of their nonreality. He must recognize that here something is portrayed that is elevated above all reality even though it is made real in this sublimity precisely through art. Anyone who needs deception in order to enjoy art, who has to forget that he actually has a work of art before him, is without a shadow of a doubt totally incapable of any artistic enjoyment whatever. 383
It is interesting that Schelling is speaking about 
enjoyment, but this enjoyment is not simply for the 
purpose of pleasure but can also be understood as part of 
the development of the individual since art is the 
expression of the ideal. This enjoyment would allow 
Kierkegaard to relegate him to the esthetic.
As indicated from some of the secondary literature, 
Kierkegaard might also be labelled as subscribing to a 
Hegelian view (despite his anti-Hegelian stance) on art. 
Stephen Crites, as already discussed, in his introduction 
to A Crisis and The Crisis in the Life of an Actress and 
George Connell's To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in
Kierkegaard' Thought both describe Kierkegaard as being 
Hegelian when it comes to art. Even Thulstrup cites some 
parallel between Kierkegaard's and Hegel's thought 
regarding aesthetics in his book Kierkegaard's Relation
383 Ibid., p. 129
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to H e g e l . Others, however, in general keeping with the 
majority of the secondary literature, criticise any
connection between Kierkegaard and Hegel. Louis Mackey, 
George Pattison, and Sylvia Walsh's are all good examples 
and have a point, but the link is still there. For
instance, Kierkegaard describes the moment as a 'blink' 
of time and provides the following commentary:
It is remarkable that Greek art culminates in the plastic, which precisely lacks the glance.This, however, has its deep source in the fact that the Greeks did not in the profoundestsense grasp the concept of spirit and therefore did not in the deepest sense comprehendsensuousness and temporality. What a striking contrast to Christianity, in which God is pictorially represented as an eye.^ss
This passage is one of Kierkegaard's few remarks on the
visual arts, and one of those types that are scarcest-
remarks that contain some interchange with aesthetics.
Quite clearly it is derived from Kierkegaard's reading of
Hegelian aesthetics Kierkegaard may have had in mind this
remark when he stated the above: " In the plastic figures
of classical art the subjective inner element is so
related to the external one that this external is the
very own shape of the inner itself and is not released
therefrom into independence." 386 The fact that
Kierkegaard read Hegel's Aesthetics is undeniable but, as
Thulstrup points out :
It is characteristic... of [Kierkegaard's] use of [Hegel's] Philosophy of Fine Art that it is only a series of items and opinions on particular phenomenon that Kierkegaard has taken notice of, and his treatment lacks theneeded perspective. 387
The link is there, in that they are both idealistic when 
it comes to art, but what distinguishes Kierkegaard's 
position so clearly from Hegel's is that, for Hegel, the 
art object is a specific manifestation of an historical 
moment, of a particular stage in the development of the
384.jhulstrup, pp. 224-229385 CA, p. 87
386negel, Aesthetics, Vol. 1, p. 594
3 8 7Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, p. 22 8
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Absolute. This requires a lack of personal engagement 
with the art object, regarding it as only a manifestation 
rather than an appropriatable communication of the idea 
or the ideal. This lack of appropriation, of engagement 
with the communication embodied in the object on a purely 
subjective, personal level is something Kierkegaard
necessarily rejects. To this, I can now turn to describe 
Kierkegaard's negative position on art.
1 . Kierkegaard's Negativity
Kierkegaard's negative assessment of the art object, 
in terms of the development of the individual, is found 
throughout his writings, both in his earliest published 
work as well as in his later, more Christian texts. It 
applies both to his own production as an author as well 
as art in general, as noted in the following journal 
entries :
Will not light opera as developed here destroy itself in a way, simply because the musicalelement has been made so important and the point is constantly one of finding theconnection between the musical number and the opera from which it is taken; but its stock will so be exhausted, at least as far as it is adaptable to light opera (as commonly known- popular) , and therefore the new light opera will finally reach the point of using the same musical number in another production (which has already happened, if I am not mistaken, in 
Neil)- and so on, until it destroys itself. Is 
this not a proof of the transitory
significance of light opera- significance as a 
stage of development
and Should I now blink, shrewdly take it all back because of apprehensions about making ends meet and become a poet- that is, religiously understood, a deceiver.389
The communication of the actual ideal remains wholly an
impossibility in Kierkegaard's mind except through the
depiction of possibility in indirect communication, which
itself is shown at times to be inadequate. For
388jp, vol. 2, pp. 230-231, <<1627; I A 242, September 14, 1836 
389jp, vol. 6, p. 151, «6394; X^ - A  309, n.d. [May 5], 1849
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Kierkegaard, any type of communication which attempts to 
communicate in embodied form the ideal- the appropriated 
idea- fails. It is thus necessary to trace the negative 
statements which are found throughout, concentrating on 
the more important ones. This can be divided into two 
types of statements about the art object; art as 
deception, and art as removed from the existence of the 
individuals involved.
Art as deception has its roots in classical 
philosophy and the origin of it within Kierkegaard, given 
his academic training and specific interest in Greek 
philosophy, can be traced to the discomfort with ' the 
visual arts found in Plato. In Kierkegaard's case, art as 
deception reflects the apparent conflict between 
representation and an understanding of the represented. 
At times, Kierkegaard sounds like he would quite 
willingly subscribe to the statement that a painting of a 
human being is not a human being because it is merely 
coloured material on a surface. This ambivalence goes 
deeper, however, as shown in the following journal 
entries. In an early passage, Kierkegaard ridicules the 
requirements of depiction which are imposed on the 
artist. He writes:
It occurs to me that artists go forward by going backward, something which I have nothing against intrinsically when it is reproduced retreat- as in the case with the better artists. But it does not seem right that they stop with the historical themes already given and, so to speak, think that only these aresuitable for poetic treatment, because these particular themes, which are no more poeticthan others, are now again animated and inspirited by a great poetic nature. In this case the artists advance by marching on thespot. -Why are modern heroes and the like not just as poetic? Is it because there is so much emphasis on clothing the content in order that the formal aspect can be all the morefurnished?39o
390.'JP, vol. 1, p. 51, <<119; I A 86, September 29, 1835. Why do artists (of Kierkegaard's age anyway) not express or produce from the contemporary and instead look to the past? The notion of a reproduced retreat is vital and interesting, since it indicates not only the inadequacy of the art object's communicative powers but also the form of indirect communication which is
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Kierkegaard is both pointing out the dangers involved in 
an academy system, as well as indicating truthfully one 
error. Academic painting and sculpture at this time would 
often depict contemporaries in classical garb, as if to 
grant some specific historical weight to those figures. 
This, in itself, is a deception. This type of deception 
is more broad-ranging, though. In two other journal 
entries, he writes:
Is there not a necessary relation with respect to what results from what a man says and teaches so that he inevitably embraces the consequences, and thus if the consequences are not there, one is justified in concluding:Well, then he has not truly proclaimed this?...But when Christian self-denial is proclaimed in such a way that the one who proclaims it makes a hit, then he is not actuallyproclaiming it; perhaps he declaims at a poetic distance from actuality, but he does notexpress it existentially, and therefore theconsequences are o m i t t e d . 392and A true Christian may involve himself in secular affairs essentially only in order to deceive- that is, to create a situation for introducing Christianity. If, for example, a true Christian has a striking talent by means of which he can make a big hit, he may do it for a few years, will all the honor, esteem, and fame possible- in order to throw it all away suddenly, nowafter having made sure of getting a hearingwhich can constitute a situation in which Christianity can make an i m p r e s s i o n .393
The very act by which the individual gains respect is an
act of deception. The object produced becomes a means for
the individual to act within society, not in order to act
as a catalyst for appropriation of knowledge of the
actual. Christianity may be the subject, but the end
result is not to generate a movement in the direction of
the Christian, but towards an impression of the producer.
The requirements of the author, artist, poet are to
interact with the secular world and yet, still, through
necessary for authentic art. This passage also indicates that the product of authentic art should be targeted at the developing, existing individual. 
3^3.And statements like this make me believe that he understood nothing of the great flowering of art in Denmark at the time! Between the years 1810-1848, there existed what is called the " Golden Age of Danish Painting" .
393jrp, vol. 3, p. 738, <<3748; A  604, n.d. , 1850
3 9 3 vol. 4, p. 123, <<4054; X^ A  397, n.d. , 1851
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indirect communication, be able to authentically 
communicate the actual truth of existence. This is such 
that even the criticism which Kierkegaard directs against 
the artist can be applied specifically against the 
artist's production :
Even though a poet suffers actual persecution from his contemporaries, he reproduces and transforms even his actual suffering into a work of art and gives his contemporaries occasion- for new enjoyment... In a certain sense the poet is more resigned; he does not actually demand justice; he abandons his case with actual people and transposes the whole scene into the medium of imagination. But the poet lacks courage. His imagination terrifies him; so he does not dare attack the actuality directly; he distills something poetic out of it and holds himself back.394
The suffering, which Kierkegaard identifies as being a
vital quality for the production of an authentic, truly
Christian (i.e. appropriatable ideal of the actual) here
becomes a means whereby the audience enters into a
position of admiration. The deception is that the object,
which should be purposive in its own right on behalf of
the receiving individual and is presented as such,
becomes a means of producing a relationship between the
producing and receiving individual.
The second type of negative attitude evident in
Kierkegaard towards the art object is one more important
to an holistic approach. It involves seeing the art
object as a communication of the idea which is removed
from the existence of the individualities involved. The
object is a presentation of an idea, one which could be
considered to be appropriatable but, because of
Kierkegaard's own inclinations, he does not believe it to
be so. The idea is communicated, but in such a manner
that the method of communication keeps the idea from
becoming an ideal. This is an attitude which Kierkegaard
again takes from his academic training, noting:
What Socrates really meant by wanting to have " the poets" expelled from the state was that
394JP, vol. 1, p. 374, <<819; A 137, n.d., 1849
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by writing in the medium of imagination instead of precipitating men into ethical realization in actuality, the poets spoiled them and weaned them or kept them from it.^ ^s
Furthermore, one can cite the Platonic strictures against
the art object, seeing it as removed not only one step
from the idea, but even further as an imitation of an
imitation. Kierkegaard's predilections for this position
are clear throughout, and this is a position which
Kierkegaard adheres to. The art object is an antithetical
position in relation to existence, being merely a pale
imitation of it and, by being so opposed to existence, is
therefore in opposition to the appropriation of the idea
as ideal, the actual into existence.
For the most part, Kierkegaard's position seems to
be coloured with a sense of respect for the aesthetic.
This is apparent in two of the most important passages on
art. Kierkegaard writes in two journal entries:
One suffers only once- but is victorious eternally. Insofar as one is victorious, this is also only once. The difference, however, is that suffering's once is momentary (even though the moment was seventy years) - but the victory's once is eternity. Suffering's once (even though it last seventy years) can therefore not be pictured or portrayed in art.On the altar in Vor Frelsers Kirke there is a work which presents an angel who holds out to Christ the cup of suffering. The error is that it lasts too long; a picture always endures for an eternity. It appears interminable; one does not see that the suffering is momentary, as all suffering is according to the concept or in the idea of victory. The victory, however, is eternal; this (insofar as it is not spiritual) can be portrayed, because it endures.and All art is essentially involved in a dialectical self-contradiction. The truly eternal cannot be painted or drawn or carved in stone, for it is spirit. But neither can the temporal essentially be painted or drawn or carved in stone, for when it is presented in these ways, it is presented eternally; every picture expresses a fixation of that particular moment. If I paint a man who is lifting a spoon to his mouth or blowing his nose, it is
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immediately eternalised- the man continues toblow his nose this one time as long as thepainting endures.
What is interesting about these two passages is that they
show a difference in Kierkegaard's opposition to art. In
the first, the art object seems to be presenting a
communication of an idea outside of the temporal aspect
of existence. The subject matter then can be depicted in
authentic art, authentic art cannot contain as its
communication the secular or the momentary but only an
intimation of the eternal truth of existence. In doing
so, Kierkegaard notes that the art object projects the
idea into the eternal. The individual, however, remains
within existence, which is always both temporal as well
as finite. Therefore, the art object is at direct odds
with the existence of the receiving individual. In the
second, the moment, which is part of the existence of the
individual as one of a series of moments, becomes
eternalised; the movement from the ideal to the depiction
of the actual ideal is one fraught with dangers.
Kierkegaard's concern is focused on the idea as a
presented idea, however, which is separate from the
existence of both the producer and the receiver. In that,
he is remaining close to his concern for the esthetic,
but the aesthetic is alluding him. What is fascinating
about his negative position is how contradictory both
these passages (which are indicative of his position
until 1847) are. The first is the atemporalising of an
idea, the second is the hypertemporalising of the moment.
Until 1847, Kierkegaard's position seems to be confused.
From 1847 until 1850, there is hostility, but it is
subtle. From 1850, the attacks (like the attacks against
the church) become very direct. However, Kierkegaard's
negativity floats amongst these years.
Moving beyond these approaches to art, the strongest
and most important example of Kierkegaard's negative
assessment of the art object within the context of
Christianity is found in Judge for Yourself ! Speaking
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about the need to 'become sober' and, specifically, about 
the need to understand one's relationship to one's 
understanding or knowledge in order to transform that 
understanding into action, Kierkegaard is critical about 
the possibility of the art object to be a tool for 
understanding or knowledge. For Kierkegaard, knowledge 
without action is a falsity, a misunderstanding which 
places importance within the existence of the individual 
on that which is unimportant within the individual's 
existing relationship to actuality. Only action changes 
one's life and one's understanding of one's relationship 
to one's ontological grounding. Knowledge is applicable 
within actuality only when it is turned inward, and 
understanding within the context of Christianity must 
immediately become action. Kierkegaard uses two examples. 
In the first, he writes:
When we have understood something, it takes ages before there is action or before reproduction is an action. In the right relation, however, action follows immediately, and then, just because of this, the reproduction is your understanding, accurate, complete, and unabridged. If the action does not follow immediately, this reproduction of your understanding in action is garbled. Alas, so it is with our actions! How do they resemble our understanding? As do Chladni figures you produce by a stroke of the violin bow? As does the exact reprint of a picture? No, as blotting paper resembles the handwriting on which it haslain. 398
For Kierkegaard, understanding is usually only an 
inadequate mirror of the necessity of action, of the 
requirement of moving immediately from understanding to 
action. And the references to reproduction or the Chladni 
figures (a metaphor Kierkegaard uses a number of times) 
stresses this, and stresses the negativity which 
Kierkegaard feels towards an artistic representation or 
reproduction of such action. This negative assessment of 
the visual arts is extended on the next page in 
Kierkegaard's strongest and most critical statement 
against the art object.
398JY, p. 120
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Writing about the requirements of the individual, 
Kierkegaard notes that one might feel convinced that 
one's knowledge is something which could communicate the 
truth of actuality to other individuals. Within
existence, being able to convince thousands of the truth 
would seem important. The individual, however, cannot
convince himself. Kierkegaard's example denies this even 
further within the context of the art object. He writes:
Let me take one example. There was a time when art tried to portray the Saviour of the world,Jesus Christ. It was no doubt amisunderstanding, since he cannot possibly be portrayed in this way, since his glory is the invisible, the inward, and he, the sign of contradiction- what a contradiction to want to 
paint this!- concealed in a contrary exterior. Consequently art will in vain try its hand at this. But what if the art of words tried its hand at this? Imagine a person captivated by these impressions, and now he wants to muster the full power of language to portray theSaviour of the world. But, says he, to do that I must have peace and quiet, an environment that can encourage this work. And he must not be disturbed by anything, says he, andfurthermore, he must if possible be supported by everything that can serve to maintain him in the right mood. So he chooses the loveliest surroundings in a beautiful area, arranges everything artistically and tastefully, andnever has any poet been so lionized as he- but then, of course, it is the most significanttask... Christianity believes that this is intoxication, that compared with this intoxication even the least self-denial is being sober. Christianity believes that being sober is that your understanding is your acting... your understanding is continuallyissued as action, warm and full and complete, issued immediately first-hand, immediately when you have understood something. 399
Though Kierkegaard moves from the visual arts to the
written in this example, the intended criticism is clear.
The depiction of the idea becomes an end in itself, and
is removed from the continual existence of the receiving
individual. The existence of that individual is changed
as a result of the production, but not in a manner which
is an appropriation of the idea as ideal. Understanding
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is not established in relation to the idea and, 
therefore, to appropriation into ideal; instead, the 
object becomes a masturbatory activity on the part of the 
receiver. The idea in aesthetic form becomes merely 
esthetic, a thought echoed more obliquely in a journal 
entry;
For that purpose it was a matter of keeping
oneself unchanged in equability... This did notmean that the religious should have this opulence but that one writing it should be able to produce it simultaneously, thus making it clear that the religious did not lack it for some fortuitous reason- namely, that the author lacked the necessary youthfulness.
The production of the art object, within the normal sense
of existence as an object communicating knowledge, is an
impossibility, and one which is an affront to
Christianity's or actuality's requirements for action.
The object must not become an end in itself, to be
enjoyed merely as production, but should be a catalyst
for appropriation of the ideal. Kierkegaard is unwilling
to concede that potential for the art object, but he
certainly is willing to agonise over it.
Two further examples of Kierkegaard's negativity can
be found in the published writings. The first in CUP and
the second in PC. Each address the issue of the value of
the art object within the context of the individual's
development towards knowledge of its ontological
grounding in a similar manner to the example of
inadequacy for continual existence. It makes sense to
examine these, though, despite their seeming redundancy.
Like Judge for Yourself, they remain outside of the
'esthetic' literature, and, therefore, can be cited more
directly as indications of Kierkegaard's understanding.
They also determine the apparent uniformity of
Kierkegaard's position, one which we shall see shortly is
not as unified as Kierkegaard would like it to appear.
In CUP, Kierkegaard establishes a distance between
the poetic-existence and actuality. The poet may.
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according to Kierkegaard, suffer on behalf of the idea or 
the poet's understanding of the actual, but the 
production of the poet remains excluded from embodying 
this suffering. The actuality of the suffering remains a 
necessity and an essential continuance rather than the 
depiction of such. He writes;
Although poetic production is in the medium of imagination, a poet-existence may at times provide a confinium [border territory] to the religious, although qualitatively different from it. A poet often suffers in existence, but what is reflected upon is the poetic work produced in the process. The existing poet who suffers in existence does not, however, comprehend the suffering in this way. He does not concentrate upon it but in the suffering seeks to escape the suffering and to find alleviation in the poetic production, in the poetic anticipation of a more perfect (a happier) order of things... But the poet and the actor return from the fascination of the poetic work and imagination's wished-for order of things, from the confusion with the poeticcharacter, to the suffering of actuality that they cannot comprehend because they have their existence in the esthetic dialectic between fortune and misfortune. The poet can explain (transfigure) all existence, but he cannotexplain himself.
Therefore, because the poet cannot explain himself or his
existence and, furthermore, his relation to actuality,
his production cannot as well. Suffering within existence
is an accidental relationship, and only an essential
relationship in actuality. Because the poet and therefore
the poet's production are unable to understand the
relationship of existence to actuality within the context
of suffering, therefore they are unable to understand or
communicate an understanding of such a relationship. In
essence, for Kierkegaard, the art object as a product of
an individual is unable to enact its own existing
relationship to actuality and, therefore, it cannot
produce the communication of an understanding in another
individual.
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In PC, Kierkegaard's negative position to the art 
object becomes more focused and more critical than in 
CUP, since it is established within the boundaries of 
Kierkegaard's attack against the established church. It 
is on these passages which much of the attitude towards 
understanding Kierkegaard's position on art is based. 
Kierkegaard writes about art within the text in two 
passages. In the first, Kierkegaard is concerned with the 
depiction of the ideal. He writes:
We shall now imagine a youth. With his imagination he perceives image of perfection (ideal) . It could be handed down by history, thus from a time past; therefore it has beenactual, has had the actuality of being. Or it is formed by the imagination itself, so it has no relation to or determination by time and place but has only thought-actuality. To this image (which, since for the youth it exists only in the imagination, that is, in the imagination's infinite distance from actuality, is the image of complete perfection, not the image of struggling and suffering perfection) the youth is now drawn by his imagination, or his imagination draws this image to him... the imagination is related to this image ofperfection, and even if it were the image of 
the perfect one [Christ]... it looks very easythe way the imagination depicts this image; one sees only the perfection, sees even thestruggling perfection only as finished. In other words, the imagination is in itself more perfect than suffering in actuality. It is timeless, beyond suffering in actuality... In one sense the imagination's image or the image that the imagination depicts or maintains is stillnonactual ity...^ °2
The image becomes a product of the imagination which is 
outside of existence. This leads into a continuation of 
the above. For Kierkegaard, no matter what effort is 
invested into the production of the art object, the 
product of the imagination remains an impossibility. He 
writes :
...even if he [an artist] succeeded in the depiction of the image of perfection as no poet had ever succeeded, also in getting the sufferings depicted- essentially it still cannot be done... the imagination is related to
402PC, p. 187
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the depiction of perfection... it is already made to seem easy simply because it is within or in the imagination... this is precisely theimperfection of the image belonging to theimagination- that the imperfection is notdepicted.
For Kierkegaard, the very product of the imagination 
remains and maintains an impossible relation with the
actual (though he does not make mention of existence). 
Contained within this statement, however, were 
Kierkegaard to maintain the dialectic regarding art, is 
the possibility of the impossibility. The very inadequacy 
of the perfection of an image can produce a recognition 
of the imperfection, leading to the actual.
The second set of passages found in PC regarding art 
are more specific, and the most famous comments 
Kierkegaard made on this subject. In the first, the very 
possibility of depicting the ideal in the product of the 
imagination becomes an impossibility. In the second, 
Kierkegaard becomes more direct, focusing on specific 
Christian expositions. For Kierkegaard, the depiction of 
Christ is as impossible as the depiction of the ideal 
(the implications for this are present in the first 
passage). He writes:
Only the imitator is the true Christian. The admirer really assumes a pagan relation to Christianity, and this is also how admiration, in the middle of Christendom, gave birth to a new paganism- Christian art... it is... incomprehensible to me from whence an artist would gain the calmness, or incomprehensible to me is the calmness with which an artist has sat year in and year out occupied in the work of painting Christ- without having it occur to him whether Christ would wish to be painted, would wish to have his portrait, however idealized it became, depicted by his masterly brush. I do not comprehend how the artist would maintain his calm, that he would not notice Christ's displeasure, would not suddenly throw it all out, brushes and paint, far, far away, just as Judas did with the thirty pieces of silver, because he suddenly understood that Christ had required only imitators... understood that he scarcely desired or desires that anyone after
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his death should waste his time, perhaps his eternal happiness, in painting him.^o*
These are very strong words, particularly the comparison
of the artist to Judas, as if an equivocation can be made
between the production of the art object and Judas'
betrayal of Christ himself! For Kierkegaard, the
depiction of Christ in artistic form is sacrilege, a
product of artistic indifference, because it cannot
contain the demand or requirement of the viewing
individual to imitate rather than admire. As mentioned in
the introduction, Kierkegaard writes: " ...this is
incomprehensible to me; I repeat, it is incomprehensible
to me..." 408 ag if he doesn't even begin to understand the
very concept! Does this mean that Kierkegaard doesn't
understand art? It might appear so.
The very fact that Kierkegaard takes up such a
position indicates that he regards the art object, at
least at one specific level, almost as an abhoration
against existence itself. Understanding the nature of
existence as he does- as a continual development made
through the choices of a single individuality towards
appropriatable knowledge of the idea as ideal- the art
object becomes an obstacle in that progress.
Appropriation of the idea of the actual ideal in
existence is the goal of the individual, but Kierkegaard
continually states that the art object becomes almost a
means of denying existence itself, allowing the
individual not to engage with existence, but merely to
contemplate it. He writes:
But Christianity dare not be communicated in the medium of tranquility (less so because one who does this ventures to affirm that now all are Christians). Therefore, Christianly understood, the artistic, the poetic, thespeculative, the scientific, the pedagogical are sin- how do I dare give myself the tranquility to sit this way and piddle with it ! 406
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It fixes the object of appropriation with a timeless and, 
therefore, beyond-existence state. The example of the 
depiction of Christ goes furthermost of all, because, for 
Kierkegaard, any depiction of the Christian becomes an 
arresting of the idea of Christ. This is an idea which 
should be communicated as ideal, within the potentiality 
of the individual's existence rather than outside of it. 
It thus becomes an impossibility, a direct contradiction 
to the viewing individual's existence, as found in the 
following journal entry:
Therefore what should have helped to lift society or at least awaken a memory that there is something higher, now strengthens the finite and finite striving in its finitude, yes, in such a way that these very representatives of the idea and of Christianity villianously exploit the finite understanding of the common man to oppose anything, if it did appear, which really bears the idea or is borne by the idea and is really related to Christianity...407
The idea as the communication of the ideal becomes, in
Kierkegaard's words, an 'homogenisation' of the ideal,
and therefore an 'homogenisation' of existence and its
relationship to the actual. He is even able to extend
this further in noting that not only is this process
dangerous for the individual, but it is also dangerous
for the whole of Christianity. The idea becomes finitude,
is captured in material form, and, therefore, enters into
a directly contradictory relation to the infinite. For
Kierkegaard, this is a contradiction which he declares to
be irresolvable. This is proven to him when he considered
what was involved in depicting Christ in an art object.
He writes :
The point of the essentially Christian is that it is presence [det Næværende] . For this reason no poet and no speaker can portray it, for they use too much imagination. This again is the very reason (this error) that the poet and speaker themselves come to be loved and esteemed. For it is at a distance that Christianity appears lovable in men's eye's.Only a dialectician can portray Christianity, because by continuously taking away all
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illusions he drills it, so to speak, into the present. Consequently it will go hard with such a dialectical person, for Christianity which is 
wholly present is hateful and disturbing.408
Such is the requirements of the authentic artist, writer,
poet in communicating the actual truth of Christianity.
What is important is that a distinction be made between
portraying such a truth which, of course, remains an
objective and distant issue from the subjective
individual, and the indirect communication which, when
indirect and thereby authentic, can produce an authentic
communication in the form of an art object. The very act
of creating a material object as an embodying
communication involves, necessarily, the use of
imagination. One cannot produce without the use of this
faculty because choices must be made in the very process
of production. Once this occurs, however, that act of
imagination becomes an act which generates the production
from the mind of the artist rather than from the ideal
itself. The artist is able to imagine the idea, but this
imagination is always a personal indication of the ideal,
and therefore not related to the ideal itself. For
Kierkegaard, all art should be understood as self-
contradiction, without redemption. In both the published
and the unpublished literature, this is how he would have
us understand his position. The art object is a 'base'
object, one neither worthy nor capable of Christianity's
message.
The Christian language is wholly and entirelly qualitatively different from our language at every point, even though we use the same words. Christendom's great feat was to transpose Christian language back into the old wretched gabble- and in this way we all have become Christians.And now we are waiting for new apostles, for now presumably mankind has finished and thoroughly learned the lesson assigned by the apostles- what insolence 1
There are, though, problems. Perhaps Kierkegaard wouldn't
be able to recognise those new apostles were he to
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encounter one? Or, perhaps, those new apostles can be 
found amongst authentic artists and art objects? Reading 
Kierkegaard's positive statements on art, one becomes 
aware that Kierkegaard himself wasn't so sure about the 
art object as he would have us believe.
2. Kierkegaard's Reluctance and an Exploration of His 
Positive Statements about the Art Object
Kierkegaard's negative statements are often tempered 
with a positive element, as if he wishes to admit a 
begrudging respect, but is incapable of doing so. This is 
clear in the following long journal entry which, despite 
the fact that it is dripping with sarcasm, appears to be 
a hint of Kierkegaard's uncertainty.
In order to defend the reality of art in relationship to religious spirit the argument runs like this: the spirit penetrates a man insuch a way that one sees what sort of a man he is- for example, when Luther said: God help me. Amen," he said this so that people got to see into his inner self, what manner of man he was.This then is something of a concession, although it must be remembered that it must not be taken too literally, for it transformed a man in this way, then also his enemies might immediately see the same thing. Next, it must be remembered that it does not hold true in respect to the object of " faith" , precisely because immediate obviousness is denied in order to test faith and in order that faith can be faith- that is, there can very well have been a human transfiguration... but quite properly there is no corresponding direct immediacy as the token of its being God. And thus the object of faith is not available for artistic presentation... What is " faith, " then?Well, of course, nowadays " faith" is this thing and that thing, opinion, and the like- and art is a higher sphere; and then, too, weare all Christians.
This is primarily a negative statement, defining the art 
object in Kierkegaard's understanding as being an 
illusion, generated to remove the receiving individual 
from a position of appropriation of the idea as ideal.
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His argument is clearly sarcastic, but contained within 
it is some sign of potential recognition of the power of 
transformation, a power which 'must not be taken too 
literally'. Kierkegaard denies the immediacy present in 
the material form of the art object, but concedes that it 
is an embodiment of a communication, a communication 
which is related to the idea if not the ideal. Despite 
Kierkegaard's attitude towards the art object, there 
remains specific instances such as this one when his 
writing betrays a begrudging respect, and a more positive 
stance. This does not in any instance extend to a 
specific example except the literary. 4n One could even 
look at the following " positive" statements and 
interpret them all as critical. Furthermore, this is a 
position which must always be carefully understood as 
separate from any acknowledgement of the esthetic, but 
its presence is a continual point of opposition to the 
view that Kierkegaard denied the positive potential of 
the art object; a view which he always strove to maintain 
himself. There are specific examples of positivity.
Kierkegaard seemingly rejects the notion of an 
authentic art object because of its negativity, because 
it is apparently antithetical in relation to the
continual state of existence which the receiving
individual remains in, but, as seen in the chapter on the 
artist- acting between the genius and the Apostle- such 
an individual has the means of communicating the idea of 
the ideal in a manner which is authentic and, therefore, 
appropriatable by the receiving individual. Of particular 
importance would appear to be the example found in Fear 
and Trembling. Not only because of its influence on 
a r t i s t s , 4 1 2  but also in the third " Problemata" ,
determining whether Abraham was ethically correct in 
concealing his intentions from Sarah and Issac. This 
discusses the ethical requirements of any individual for 
whom communication of faith is possible. Faith shows up
4llAnd, one could even add that this does not run to any example except, perhaps the Bible.
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in Fear and Trembling not only as a product of the grace 
of knowledge of the actual bestowed upon the individual, 
but as something which contains within itself an inherent 
necessity for communication. Fear and Trembling brings 
out the single individual as a subject for the artist.
The single individual is bound by his ontological 
grounding.
The single individual, sensately and psychically qualified in immediacy, is the individual who has telos in the universal, and it is his ethical task continually to express himself in this, to annul his singularity inorder to become the universal. 4i3
The single individual is one governed by the ethical,
whereas Abraham was not. Abraham is governed by the
absurd, by the need of God and his own need to declare
his faith. He is not one giving up the finite for the
infinite, not giving up something certain for something
even more certain, but giving up the universal to grasp
something which is not universal in order to better
arrive at the universal itself. Faith must therefore be
communicated. The true artist cannot aspire to this
directly, he will always be an individual bound by the
ethical in his productions, but he can always indicate
it.
It is great when the poet in presenting his tragic hero for public admiration dares to say:Weep for him, for he deserves it. It is great to deserve the tears of those who deserve to shed tears. It is great that the poet dares to keep the crowd under restraint, dares todiscipline men to examine themselvesindividually to see if they are worthy to weep for the hero, for the slop water of the snivellers is a debasement of the sacred. -But even greater than all this is the knight of faith's daring to say to the noble one who wants to weep for him: Do not weep for me, but weep for yourself.
The true and authentic artist cannot be equivocated with
the knight of faith. " The true knight of faith is a
witness, never the teacher... He knows that true greatness
413
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is equally accessible to all." The ethical is the
universal and, as the universal, it is disclosed. The 
single individual, governed by inwardness, is the hidden. 
His ethical task is to disclose himself to himself and to 
become disclosed in the universal. The authentic artist, 
in this process, can also indicate the path of
disclosure. This also shows up in a journal entry. 
Speaking about the esthetic (as opposed to the aesthetic, 
and therefore a negative indication of the authentic art 
object), Kierkegaard writes:
Even thought a poet suffers actual persecution from his contemporaries, he reproduces andtransforms even his actual suffering into a work of art and gives his contemporariesoccasion- for new enjoyment. An ethicist goes about it in earnest, actualizes it, and says:It is you, my contemporaries, of whom I speak.He does not publish plays, does not poetically hold the matter at a distance.In a certain sense the poet is more resigned; he does not actually demand justice; he abandons his case with actual people andtransposes the whole scene into the medium of imagination. But the poet lacks courage. His imagination terrifies him; so he does not dare attack the actuality directly; he distills something poetic out of it and holds himself back.It would probably be one of the mostinteresting tasks to present a poet who was developed to such a degree and had come along so far that he himself really began tounderstand that he should make a liSTapaaiç EIÇ aX,Xo yevoç, that is, go over into the ethical, the heroic- but still could not convince himself of this and become dialectical at that point.416
It is this transformation of suffering into a
communication, into a conveyance of faith and, therefore,
in knowledge of the actual, which Kierkegaard cites as
having potential. But why the change from the esthetic to
the ethical individual as the only vehicle for such a
communication? And why cannot such a presentation as
mentioned take place within existence? Kierkegaard does
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not give us an answer, but the fact remains that the
potential is something which he recognises.
One specific instance where the positive potential 
for the art object is apparent is in Kierkegaard's 
discussion of contemporaneity. Kierkegaard concerns 
himself with the fact that Christ as embodiment in
material form of the actual ideal remains at an
historical distance to the individual. Because of this, 
he investigates the potential for such a communication, 
and finds it capable of its purpose. A reading of the 
notion of contemporaneity found in the following journal, 
and brought up also in PF both as negative and positive 
simultaneously, exhibits this:
One who is proficient in the language in which a poetic work is written but has never lived in the country of its origin would always lack something, the national individuality by which the poet was essentially nurtured, so also one can contemplate a work of art but can never get the characteristic impression, the inner understanding of, for example, a Raphael, which we must imagine to be present for a contemporary generation. For us beholders a certain historical aspect is more prominent- which consists in contemplating that such and such was the case with that people- and a differentiating gradation in the " to what extent" one is able to live into that nationality is indeed conceivable, but one still never gets a perfectly adequate impression as does one who has imbibed with his mother's milk the ideas constitutive of that nationality. Therefore it seems somewhat narrow to want to maintain this view only with respect to poetry just because of language, for it is self-evident that if one is to understand the poem he must know the language, and therefore at he outset I specified proficiency in the language.
These narrow set of remarks made by Kierkegaard himself 
during his student days, holds some ground in determining 
the art object as inadequate in a full sense as
expression of the ideal, but one must also remember that
the author must step back, and therefore some
understanding must take place in the communication
417JP, vol. 5, p. 64, <<5134; I C 87, March, 1836
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despite the difficulties. The contemporaneity of the art 
object, the nature of the art object as communication of 
such is present. One has to ask whether the individual 
has to be contemporaneous with the artist in order to 
fully comprehend the communication of the actual ideal 
truth of existence? This is a question which Kierkegaard 
seems to appreciate, in that the very event is, of
course, of vital interest to his writing. He 
characterises it in such a manner that the Christ-event, 
or, more particularly, the revelation of the actual ideal 
in existence, becomes beyond understanding within 
existence.
This is most evident when Kierkegaard investigates 
this very question in PF. For Kierkegaard, the basic 
question is whether or not the actual truth can be 
learned, one which he takes from the Socratic dialogues. 
Within the Socratic context, truth is learned by the
individual through a process of remembering which is
instituted through being reminded of the idea, which was
already known. Interpreting Socrates, Kierkegaard writes: 
" In the Socratic view, every human being is himself the 
midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because 
his self-knowledge is God-knowledge." 4ie xn this sense, 
the actual ideal is contained within the individual and 
the temporal element which determines the individual is 
unimportant since the idea of the actual ideal has always 
been present.
Kierkegaard takes issue with this position. For 
Kierkegaard, the temporal remains important, in that it 
is only through the temporal that the individual comes to 
realise its relationship to and knowledge of its 
ontological grounding. The individual initially exists in 
a state of ignorance, and the teacher must be- within the 
temporal- a point of departure as the occasion of coming 
into knowledge. Because the individual is initially in a 
state of untruth, the teacher must provide him with the 
conditions to enter into truth. Yet, because of the
418PF, p. 11
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nature of Christianity (wherein the truth is the actual, 
which does not enter into existence wholly until 
existence becomes actuality- which can occur only in 
death), in order for the individual to come into truth in 
existence there must be a teacher who is also the actual. 
This necessitates that the teacher be God, as Christ is 
in Christianity. No human is capable of providing the 
truth of existence since this requires a position within 
the actual, which no individual can occupy except in 
death. Therefore only the one individual who occupies 
both in the absurd paradox can do so, i.e. Christ.
This requires, however, not the teacher immediately 
granting the actual ideal as truth to the individual but 
a facilitation of the process whereby the individual 
comes on its own accord into the truth. The god 
understands himself, and must continue to be unmoved, 
since it remains the actual which grounds existence. 
However, in the descent into existence, the embodiment of 
the actual becomes a part of existence- the idea and the 
ideal enter into existence, Christ becomes man- and in 
doing so demonstrates the ability that man has to move 
towards the actual in existence.
One problem exists, however. The existence- 
embodiment of the actual remains a paradox. It becomes an 
unknown, since individuals within existence can only know 
existence and can only reach the actual ideal through the 
end of existence. The entire event of Christ becomes an 
impossibility, an unknown. " The paradoxical passion of 
understanding is, then, the continually colliding with 
this unknown, which certainly does exist but is also 
unknown and to that extent does not exist. The 
understanding does not go beyond that." The unknown is 
at the point of being disclosed, but remained 
undisclosed. The unknown is defined as absolute 
different, and therefore remains accessible only through 
temporal development into actual rather than as knowledge 
within existence. Thus, an paradox-an unbreachable gap-
4i9ibid., p. 44
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exists between the unknown as the actual existence of God 
and the learner's understanding defined as absolute 
different.
This leads one to question how knowledge of the 
actual can ever occur at all, particularly within 
existence. For Kierkegaard, the answer is found in the 
dogmatics of Christianity. The presence of God in human 
form as a paradox must be assumed and believed in faith. 
The very materiality of the Christ-event implies a sense 
of analogy with the art o b j e c t . 420 The god does not take 
on human form in a mockery of human form but in order to 
be recognised as impossible for the individual to 
understand, eternally at odds with the individual while 
at the same time being the individual. For the learner, 
the appearance of the god is not just a moment for 
Socratic contemplation of himself, but is a beginning of 
the eternal as a consequence of the moment, to which the 
individual can relate.
This is certain within a contemporary context in 
relation to the God-man event. The contemporary learner 
follows an historical point of departure with the 
consequences of the immediate moment. The real question 
is how the learner who is not contemporary to the God-man 
event can come to an understanding of the paradox. For 
Kierkegaard, the understanding in existence of the 
paradox comes together with the idea of the actual ideal 
(i.e. the paradox as the actual ideal truth of existence) 
in the moment through the temporal, generating passion 
(i.e. devotion to the paradox) and, thereby, faith. It is 
only through faith- through the acceptance of the 
absurdity of the paradox- that the individual who comes 
after the event can accept and appropriate the knowledge 
of the event. Kierkegaard further states that the 
contemporary and the 'second-hand follower' are equal, 
since the temporality surrounding the God-man event means 
that existence is continually brought into conflict. What
420rpo this end, one can point to the use-value of Eastern European and Byzantine icons, in which a dialectical relation is established between the image and the figure represented, such that the presence of the figure exists in the very material form itself.
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is most important, however, is to recognise the fact 
that, for Kierkegaard, the individual only comes to 
knowledge of the actual ideal within existence through 
faith in that knowledge, which is based on a singular 
event.
The implications of this are both a negative
regarding the art object as well as positive one. If the 
art object is to be a communication of the ideal (or, at 
least, of the idea of the ideal) , then its temporality
must be overcome. This is an impossibility, since the art 
object remains wholly a temporal object. The art object 
cannot be a generator of faith, which can only arise
through the individual's acceptance of the paradox with 
the temporal while at the same time indicating the 
paradox as beyond the temporal. The art object cannot
serve as a communication of the ideal within this 
context- only the God-man event and faith in that event 
can act thus. Therefore, in Kierkegaard's understanding, 
the art object is an impossibility if it claims to be a 
communication of the ideal, the actual truth of the 
grounding of existence. However, if one maintains the 
dialectical nature of the art object, then this 
impossibility becomes possibility. The art object becomes 
a reflection, a vehicle, for the acquiring of faith.
The question of contemporaneity is interesting in 
the negative sense because, according to Kierkegaard, it 
remains an impossibility to portray Christ or to 
understand more specifically the actual ideal of Christ 
from a contemporaneous stance. This is, of course, 
perfectly true. However, does this mean that the actual 
ideal is an impossibility to communicate as 
contemporaneous to the individual receiving a 
communication? If one is to use this logic, then one must 
note that, for Kierkegaard, the only actual ideal in 
relation to the existence of the individual is the 
Christian and all other ideals are merely thought within 
existence (i.e. merely existential ideas rather than 
actual and appropriatable ideals). Communication is 
fraught with dangers, as Kierkegaard notes:
p. 260
The real trouble in the communication of truth is that one must be anxious and fearful about expressing the truth, about showing what constituted the previous error- for there are ten to one ready to repeat the same error with a little modification- that is, a new and still more dangerous untruth arises- for the closer untruth lies to truth the more dangerous is theuntruth. 421;
and, furthermore:
On closer inspection all this talk about wishing to have been contemporary with Christ is presumptuous; for what is it but fancying oneself to be good enough to be an apostle. And even the apostles fell away, and they had to be equipped with extraordinary divine powers in order to be, that is, to be able to keep on being, contemporary with him- the best evidence that no one can keep on being contemporary with him all by himself.But those who talk this way about contemporaneity do not know what they are saying; it is the usual think: they take awaythe glory and leave out the difficulty. It is flirtation. 422
But the potential is there:
It is only, perhaps, in certain passages in the
journals that an explicitly positive position is present.
Kierkegaard never describe the art object as anything but
esthetic, and eschews its aesthetic qualities. This is
odd, since he himself wrote and, therefore, wrote to an
audience who would appropriate his communication. It is
even odder, since he wrote through the use of pseudonyms
in his most popular texts- even though he rankled against
their popularity- which therefore inscribes such texts as
containing poetic and thereby artistic aspirations. It is
even further odder still, considering the wealth of
artistic production occurring in Denmark; Kierkegaard
lived in what has been described as " Denmark's Golden
Age" . However, there are a few statements. For example,
he writes:
421j-p, vol. 4, p. 489, <<4853; IX A  4, n.d., 1848 . To communicate the truth is to communicate in fear and trembling, aware of the dangers involved even in attempting to communicate the truth. This passage also indicates how close Kierkegaard felt the danger was in an authentic art object to become a communication of untruth.
422j-p^ vol. 1, p. 325, «694; see <<693; X^ A  253, n.d. , 1849
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Truth suffers in the world. The witness to the truth expresses this thesis in character; he suffers for the truth. Upon seeing this, the person who still wants to appear to be of the truth should be motivated to want to suffer in . like manner.But no. Here comes the counterfeiting- instead of personally suffering for the truth, he chooses the task of presenting, depicting how truth must suffer and does suffer in this world. It is easy to see that this is an understanding which will not bring suffering but is a way to make a brilliant success in the world. In fact, this is a poetic task, a theatrical entertainment, absolutely absolutely the same as when Nielsen acts the Nordic hero and Dame Heiberg acts the innocent sufferer.The closer the poet- or what he could just as well be called, the theater-actor- is to the one who suffers in character for the truth, the more revolting it is. If he is contemporary, then it is as base as it could possibly be... Presenting and depicting how the truth suffers does not incite persecution but bring profit- why? Because it makes demands on a person no different from any other esthetic performance; it does not put the audience under any obligation (and it has not put the orator, the eminent or most revered artist, under obligation, either), but intends merely to divert (edify) them for an hour, merely helps people pass a pleasant hour.This treachery would be most loathsome in the situation of contemporaneity, just like being at a fire and, instead of helping, taking it all quite calmly in order to travel around later and describe the horrors of this fire, how dreadful the shrieks of the man who burned to death inside- and whom one could have rescued had one not been occupied canvassing the whole situation with the aim of describing
i t .  ^ ^ 3
Kierkegaard seems to be conceding the art object as a 
presentation of truth (by which he means knowledge of the 
actual within existence), created by an individual who is 
aware of the relation that such truth has to existence, 
who does not profit from it, nor seeks fame for it. The 
presentation is one meant to be able to invoke 
persecution or, at least, incite a radical change in the 
receiving individuality's understanding of the nature of
423J-p, vol. 4, pp. 500-501, <<4881; A  609, n.d., 1852
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its existence, such that the persecution of the producing 
individual is not inconceivable. The positive potential- 
particularly felt when one notes the possibility of an 
individual describing the idea of the ideal, necessarily 
antithetical to existence, not for profit but for 
upbuilding- turns people away from existential concerns 
to their relation to the actual, to the grounding of 
their existence. This is extended in another passage:
Fundamentally every generation goes equally far, partly because one generation cannot depend upon the communication of another generation, which providence has no doubt arranged in order to protect itself. What enormous, gigantic strides the race would make if one could depend upon the communications, if what is put in writing were entirelly true, if every author, especially every thinker, said outright wholly and precisely what he meant.But this conventional lying, especially the clergy's- how it has damaged spiritual life and the cause of Christianity ! 424
Here, Kierkegaard is willing to concede the possibility
of authenticity, though he does not elaborate on it. One
can posit beyond him that the object, as embodied and
therefore existing example of the opposition of the idea
of existence, serves to induce the motion of
appropriation of the idea of the ideal and, thence,
through repetition and application of the appropriation,
of the ideal itself. Kierkegaard never seems to have
given up on the idea of an adequate and authentic art
object which would facilitate the appropriation of the
actual ideal. He writes :
 But someone will say: " What if someoneactually expresses existentially that he has forsaken and does forsake this world, is it therefore absolutely certain that he will be saved? Maybe not? It could be arrogance or pride, to which God is very much opposed."True, it is not absolutely certain, nor will it ever be, for in the uncertainty is the striving. 425
One could, perhaps, ask Kierkegaard: 'and what is someone
say that the production of art is carried out
424j-p^ vol. 1, p. 444, <<1015; IX A 44, n.d., 1848 
425j-p^ vol. 3, pp. 746-747, <<3765; X^ A 645, n.d. , 1852
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existentially in a manner forsaking the world, the 
existential, in favour of the ideal, the actual?' 
Uncertainty is present, of course, but the potential is 
there if the communication is carried out with an 
awareness and dedication of one's individual existence in 
pursuit of appropriatable knowledge of the ideal as the 
grounding of existence. Potential is there, if the art 
object is understood as diametrically opposed to the 
movement of existence, opposing existence within 
existence.
Finally, what can a positive Kierkegaardian position 
on the art object be understood as, if there is one? The 
art object is a material embodiment of a communication of 
the idea of the ideal, of the actual grounding of 
existence, which is intended, when authentic, to be 
appropriated by the receiving individual in order to 
further that individual's growing knowledge and relation 
within existence to the actual grounding of its 
existence, always in opposition both existence and its 
own existence. There is one more thing, though, which 
creeps in Kierkegaard's positive statements, which serves 
to define the Kierkegaardian art object. Kierkegaard 
establishes the initial stage of knowledge of the actual 
as occurring in the immediate understanding and portrayal 
of the character by the young actress in Crisis. The fact 
that it is immediate in nature in the first performance 
is clear to Kierkegaard because the nature of the 
aesthetic object presented is one in which a 
communication of an authentic ideal occurs, but it occurs 
in an indeterminate state. He writes:
She is in possession of- well, what it is that she possesses is very difficult to define, justbut because it is something indeterminate,which nevertheless asserts itselfoverwhelmingly and demands an unconditional response. 426
The performance is a communication of an ideal, a
representation of knowledge of the individual's existence 
in relation to the actual or ontological, which is
426Crisis, p. 72
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nevertheless unclear. Yet it still demands to be seen and 
recognised as such.
One of the most interesting examples of dialectics 
applied to Kierkegaard's work and one indication of a 
reading of Kierkegaard's understanding of art is found in 
one of the texts which discusses the art object in the 
least productive manner- Connell's To Be One Thing: 
Personal Unity in Kierkegaard's Thought. Connell, citing 
research by Marete Jorgensen, notes that two different 
types of aesthetic exist within Kierkegaard's literature: 
the esthetic and the ethical. This I would believe is a 
great simplification of the nature of the aesthetic, but 
Connell does at least ask why such differences should 
exist, thereby posing the possibility of answering and 
determining the nature of the dialectical development of 
form. He notes:
Marete Jorgensen is correct in attributing this difference between the two aesthetics to a difference in perspective. While the " ethical critic" (that is, the aesthetician who follows the principles of criticism employed in Af en 
Endnu Levendes Papirer [From the Papers of One 
Still Living] and similar works) writes from an existential position high enough to comprehend the functions and importance of a life-view, the " aesthetic critic" does not. The instances of aesthetic criticism that Marete Jorgensen identifies are for the most part writings attributed to representatives of the aesthetic stage, notably the young aesthete A andConstantine Constantins.
Thus, for Connell, specific types of aesthetic expression 
are determined by the stage of existence of the
individual, which is part of Kierkegaard's indebtedness
to Hegel, i.e. Hegel's notion that the manifestation of 
the art object is necessitated by its historicity. What 
this leads Connell to believe, however, is inherently 
incorrect. For Connell, the differences between the
stages of existence of individuals determines the form of 
their communication, but he would also state that this 
determines the desire for unity and the communication as
'^^^Connell, To Be One Thing-, Personal Unity in Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 35
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clarification of existence. Art, for the esthete, 
constitutes a communication of the idea of the actual, 
removed from the individual, while for the ethical 
individual this is a communication of a life-view which 
allows some expression and appropriation of the idea as 
ideal into the individual's receiving existence. Connell 
rejects the possibility of Kierkegaard's acknowledgement 
of the positive potential of the art object, and allows 
only for the function of such as an object of beauty. He 
writes :
...room must be made for aesthetically valid immediate art. Such art in no way communicates a life-view, but since it does not represent an evasion of existential responsibilities and is not the product of an attempt to make art fulfil nonaesthetic needs, it is to be appreciated and enjoyed for what it i s . 428
But this simply does not acknowledge the dialectic of the
art object! Art stands apart from the individuals
involved in both the creation and appropriation of its
communication. This does little to answer how art can
truly function. What is necessary is to return to the
idea found in the Crisis text. Kierkegaard's
incomprehension at the presentation of the character in
the play strikes him as authentic, but he does not
understand why. Kierkegaard is unwilling to provide the
answer to a definition of the authentic art object at
all, though it is always present. This double-movement is
a transition whereby the first step is made, and the
second step follows on without the activity or guidance
of the actor and also to his amazement- a movement
without movement. The Hongs reference Fear and Trembling
subsequently:
He [Abraham] climbed the mountain, and even in the moment when the knife gleamed he had faith- that God would not require Isaac. No doubt he was surprised at the outcome, but through a double-movement he had attained his first condition, and therefore he received Issac more joyfully that the first time... It is commonly supposed that what faith produces is no work of
428ibid., p. 37
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art, that it is a coarse and boorish piece of work, only for the more uncouth natures, but it is far from being that. The dialectic of faith and the most extraordinary of all; it has an elevation of which I can certainly form a conception, but no more than that.429
It is the indeterminacy which is vital, along with its
immediacy and its indirectness. Kierkegaard's inability
to comprehend the presence of the idea of the ideal
present here is striking. The indeterminacy is a
reflection of God's creation and man's relation to the
actual within existence, which is always a dialectical
relation. The indeterminacy itself reflects the very
nature of the opposition of existence and actuality.
Kierkegaard writes :
It seems remarkable to me that the greatgeniuses among the poets (such as Ossian andHomer) are represented as blind. Of course, it makes no difference to me whether they were actually blind or not. I only make a point of the fact that people have imagined them to be blind, for this would seem to indicate that what they saw when they sang the beauty of nature was not seen with the external eye but was revealed to their inward intuition. How remarkable that one of the best, yes, the very best writer about bees was blind from early youth. It seems to indicate that however much one believes in the importance of the observation of externals, he had found that [Archimedean] point and now by a purely spiritual activity had deduced from this all the details and had reconstructed them analogously to nature . 43o
This is a very interesting point, and completely true,
but also denies the communicate capacity of the art
object, something which later develops continue in an
ambiguous manner. The blindness of the poets, 43i is an
example of faith in the face of uncertainty. Their
production, therefore, must be considered as an act of
faith, because they have no means of determining the
outcome of their production. This is faith and confusion,
an indeterminate relation to the natural world, which is
é29pT, p. 36
430jp, vol. 1, p. 50, <<117; I A 8, September 11, 1843
42^-Kierkegaard seems to have been duped by Macpherson's Ossianic tales as well as everyone in Europe.
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still channelled into a production which affects that 
world. As it is with the indeterminacy of faith that 
Abraham has, faith remains. Yet, this is something which 
Kierkegaard does not see. It is to this lack of 
recognition on the part of that I shall turn now.
3. Kierkegaard's Inadequacy to Perceive the Full 
Potential of the Art Object
A further indication of the positive potential of 
the art object contained within Kierkegaard's writing can 
be found in CA. In the section devoted to anxiety about 
good which results in sin, Kierkegaard analyses the 
demonic individual. This conception of the individual 
Kierkegaard offers has a positive means for the 
individual to overcome its demonic state through the 
introduction of an external communication. The demonic is 
an individual which closes itself up in upon itself; in 
this sense, it is one of the most important and difficult 
individuals to whom the authentic artist can communicate. 
The demonic individual is able to rationalise its 
existence and its relation to actuality, but refuses to 
act upon this. The demonic is in sin, in an existential 
position in opposition to the idea of the actual, while 
having knowledge of the actual nevertheless. So how does 
the artist then produce an art object which can overcome 
this? Kierkegaard would seem to believe that this is an 
impossibility. The demonic individual is characterised by 
inclosing reserve, which denies the possibility of 
reception of an actual ideal communication. Yet, within 
his definition of the demonic, he also describes a form 
of communication which allows the demonic individual to 
overcome its existential knowledge in relation to the 
ideal. Kierkegaard writes ;
An obdurate criminal will not make a confession (the demonic lies precisely in this, that he will not communicate with the good by suffering the punishment). There is a rarely used method that can be applied against such a person.
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namely, silence and the power of the eye. If an inquisitor has the required physical strength and the spiritual elasticity to endure without moving a muscle, to endure for sixteen hours, he will succeed, and the confession will burst forth involuntarily. A man with a badconscience cannot endure silence... this silence while the judge is present, while the clerks are ready to inscribe everything in the protocol, this silence is the most penetratingand acute questioning.^22
What emerges from this description is that the demonic 
can possibly be overcome by art, through which the
individual develops the means of overcoming which are 
indirect communication and which are presented in silence 
(i.e. not directly communicated). What does this have to 
do with art? Kierkegaard does not recognise the fact that 
silence requires, in his description, an almost visual 
aspect, completely external to the individual's
subjectivity. This silence becomes one of indeterminacy, 
indirectness, and also immediacy. And, furthermore, this 
example of the necessity or justification of
understanding and utilising the art object as a 
communication of the idea or the idea of the actual ideal 
can be found if one parallels Kierkegaard's understanding 
of sin with art; i.e. sin as objective knowledge and 
subjective truth.
Kierkegaard states correctly that such a 
communication and, therefore, its possibility as an
authentic art object, is difficult to achieve. There are 
specific conditions under which such a communication as 
actual can take place. Kierkegaard writes:
The only thing that can constrain inclosing reserve to speak is either a higher demon (for every devil has his day) , or the good, which is absolutely able to keep silent, and if any cunning tries to embarrass it by the examination of silence, the inquisitor himself will be brought to shame, and it will turn out that finally he [the inquisitor or, in my interpretation, the artist] becomes afraid of himself and must break the silence... the tormentor of inclosing reserve may also relate
432 CA, p. 125
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himself selfishly to his own inclosing reserve. 433
What this implies, however, is that such a silence is a 
positive potential for the art object, one which produces 
a reaction in the viewer (and it must be noted that 
Kierkegaard here is speaking in purely visual terms, 
something he does not seem to be aware of) and which 
prompts what Kierkegaard describes as disclosure. Such a 
disclosure reveals that which the individual, who has 
been racked by inclosing reserve, was unable to reveal- 
namely, its knowledge and the relation of its existence 
to its ideal actuality, which then becomes knowledge of 
such, necessitating the movement towards further 
knowledge of the actual.
What the inclosed person conceals in hisinclosing reserve can be so terrible that he does not dare to utter it, not even to himself, because it is as though by the very utterance he commits a new sin or as though it wouldtempt him a g a i n . 434
But, the external form of communication- one which can 
easily be imagined and interpreted as being an authentic 
art object (because it is external, communicates the 
actual ideal, and is not related to the receiving 
individual's continual existence but to the one 
particular moment)- prompts such a disclosure from the
receiving individual. Embodied in specific
characteristic- indirectness, since it is related to
self-knowledge, while still being external;
immediateness, because of the presentness of the 
individual and the communication within existence; and 
indeterminacy, which is the total structure of the 
communication, since the communication never says 
anything directly to the receiving individual within 
existence, let alone actuality. Most importantly, it
prompts such a disclosure from the individual to itself. 
Thus, sin, as externally communicated or prompted, 
becomes a means of exposing the demonic individual to
433it,id., pp. 125-126 
434ibid., p. 128
270
itself and therefore to knowledge of its actual grounding 
within existence. Thus, one can cite sin^ s^ as an art 
object created by the actual.
The authentic production of communication of the 
ideal is integral and a responsibility, passionately 
attached to the individual's existence, and taking into 
account as well as expressing anxiety. Anxiety can either 
be expressed to the individual (correctly by one who has 
experienced it) so as to induce a proper understanding of 
the concept of anxiety and to allow the individual 
through indirect means to come to terms with its 
existence, or it can be a means by which the individual 
comes to terms with its own anxiety through the 
expression of anxiety. In both cases, anxiety is 
embodied as a form of communication, but becomes an 
embodiment which the receiving individual within 
existence goes through the process of repetition. A third 
possibility is suggested with the notion of continuity, 
which is negated by the demonic individual's suddenness 
of existence. Kierkegaard, referring to the individual 
who has not come to terms with anxiety and the eternal 
nature of the individual, writes:
Art is an anticipation of eternal life, because poetry and art are the reconciliation only of the imagination, and they may well have the 
Sinnigkeit [thoughtfulness] of intuition but by no means the Innigkeit [inwardness] of earnestness. Some paint eternity elaborately with the tinsel of imagination and yearn for it. Some envision eternity apocalyptically, pretend to be Dante, while Dante, no matter how much he conceded to the view of the imagination, did not suspend the effect ofethical j u d g e m e n t . 4 3 6
Clearly, both the negative and positive possibilities of 
art are indicated. In one specific passage, Kierkegaard 
indicates not only the positive potential in a negative 
sense, but also shows clearly Kierkegaard's indebtedness 
to Hegel's idea if the necessity of form, generating its
435specifically, one can cite the Kierkegaardian notions of anxiety and despair as indications of the demonic or the wilful opposition to the actual within existence to an extent as art objects.
436c a , p.153
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own potentiality. On the difference between wonder (which 
is ambivalent worship containing fear and blessedness 
about the unknown) and worship (which is worship as a 
state of mind of the unknown that mixes fear and 
blessedness), worship is clearly more authentic, vital 
for the individual. This can have its reflection in the 
communication, in the art:
To be sure, a poet has rightly said that a sigh to God without words is the best worship; then one could also believe that the infrequent visit to the sacred place, when one comes from far away, would be the best worship, because both contribute to the illusion. A sigh without words is the best worship if the thought of God is only to shed a twilight glow over existence, like the blue mountains on the distant horizon, if the unclarity of the soul's condition is to be satisfied with the greatest possible ambiguity. But if God is to be present to the soul, then the sigh presumably finds the thought, and the thought presumably the words- but also the difficulty, of which one has noinkling at a distance.^*?
The fear and trembling becomes a path through repetition
to the actual. The wonder, and the sigh as a
communicative act resulting from that wonder, initiates
movement towards knowledge of the actual.
The art object emerges within a Kierkegaardian
context as a dialectical opposition between finitude and
infinitude, between its material existence as the
embodiment of a communication of the idea of the ideal
and the ideality of its actuality which is beyond the
material form. Yet, despite its oppositional position, in
regards to the actual, if one is able to maintain the
dialectical relationship between the two, then the art
object serves as an indicative means of allowing the
receiving individual to existentially appropriate
knowledge of its grounding by the ideality of the actual
through recollection and repetition within its own self-
knowledge. The art object serves as a catalyst for such
knowledge, and then remains in opposition to the actual
as material, embodied communication dialectically opposed
Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, p. 16
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to actuality, but prompting its intrusion into existence 
through the dialectical movement of opposition. 
Kierkegaard is able to point this out. He writes :
All art is essentially involved in adialectical self-contradiction. The truly eternal cannot be painted or drawn or carved in stone, for it is spirit. But neither can thetemporal essentially be painted or drawn or carved in stone, for when it is presented in these ways, it is presented eternally; every picture expresses a fixation of that particular moment. If I paint a man who is lifting a spoon to his mouth or blowing his nose, it isimmediately eternalized- the man continues to blow his nose this one time as long as thepainting endures. 438
What Kierkegaard does not recognise, nor is he capable of
recognising, is the fact that by not being able to paint
the temporal, the continuing existence of the individual
and therefore its continual relationship to its knowledge
of its actual grounding, nevertheless the art object,
through its very opposition, still indicates that
continual state of existence. By being atemporal within
temporality, the idea of such dialectics is a further
indication beyond the idea of the temporal-atemporal
duality; the inability to embody the actual dialectical
only prompts further awareness of the lack of knowledge
of the actual, and acts as a catalyst for further
movement towards that knowledge. Concerning contradiction
and the dialectical element of the art object,
Kierkegaard indirectly demands this:
Above all, it is asking too much of an ordinary reviewer to be interested in the dialectical battle in which the exception arises in the midst of the universal, the protracted and key complicated procedure in which the exception battles his way through and affirms himself as justified, for the unjustified is recognized precisely by his wanting to bypass the universal. 439
Such is the dialectical requirements of the art object, 
but Kierkegaard does not follow through. The
communication must be a process that destroys the
438j-p^ vol. 1, p. 61, <<160; VIII^ A  88, n.d., 1847 
439p, p. 225
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individual's personally understood existence- his 
relationship to his own existence and therefore his 
understanding of actuality- while at the same time 
affirming a new view of actuality, a new form and content 
constructed within a new individual existence through the 
individual's own activity, simultaneously maintaining in 
justification the superseded existence and understanding 
of actuality. As R shows, action reflects actuality as 
possibility, rather than as actuality itself. The artist 
does so by and for the purpose of placing the
possibilities of actuality into pure thought (in an 
esthetic manner) , but the object does not go beyond its 
own creation. The young poet in R is an example. The 
young man is realised as a poet, able to inwardly
understand his existential relationship to actuality, yet 
the only poetry he recites (and nothing is ever shown to 
be written by him, despite his esthetic position as a 
poet) is by another poet at the time when he has not yet
completed the movement into the religious (though
Constantin could, but does not, recognise this after the 
fact, based on the chronology of the writing of the 
book) . That one poem does not retain its value as the 
individual develops, yet, as Gouwens points out;
Kierkegaard reflects his broader concern to delineate the legitimacy as well as the inadequacy of an objective understanding of ethical and religious existence. In Repetition as elsewhere, his refusal to oversimplify the issues is striking. Both the claims and the limits of the respective types of imagination and understanding are fully presented; Constantin must be given his dues, and so must the young man.^^o
The point of this is that Kierkegaard's conception of the
art work shines through in this interpretation of the
nature of R.
Kierkegaard has set up the object as the 
communication of the idea, but then denies its 
dialectical possibilities as a communication of the
440Gouwens, David J. 'Understanding, Imagination, and Irony in Kierkegaard's Repetition', International Kierkegaard Commentary, ed. Perkins, R. Mercer University Press, Mercer, GA, 1993, p. 303
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ideal. He would appear to recognise the potential, but 
doesn't follow through on it. For example:
It would be very interesting sometime to develop examples of what is meant esthetically and artistically by eternal images, what basic mood-relationships ought to exist between the particular details of the image in order for them to cohere as an eternal i m a g e . 44i
And furthermore, he writes:
Make it an actuality- and everything is changed. No longer do you charm others, but all flee from you. You only make the girls anxious and cause men to avoid you. You inspire no one, hardly get permission to enter the pulpit- in Christendom, where all are Christians and that presentation is admired, that poet- presentation. *42
Despite his objections, it is precisely this poetical
presentation which causes Kierkegaard's own problems. The
poetical potential is there, inferable in his own
statement. Each of these journal entire describes an
approach to the art object which is negative, dismissive
of the authenticity which is embodied as a material
communication of the artist's own relation and knowledge
of the actual and as the potential to communicate in
indirectly bring about appropriation of that knowledge in
another individual. Despite his uneasy respect for the
art object, Kierkegaard cannot bring himself to allow the
type of relation between an existentially-continually
existing individual and a material object. It is
precisely this that is the problem in the Kierkegaardian
corpus and its relation to the art object. The potential
is there, even more so when one remembers that in the
Kierkegaardian structure of existence the actual is
always in opposition to existence itself, and therefore
the art object as embodied can reflect that opposition.
The art object is an indirect communication of the idea
of the ideal in appropriatable form, through which the
receiving individualisa ig able to come to a better
443.j-p^  vol. 1, p. 62, <<163; A  621, n.d., 1848
442jp^ vol. 1, p. 375, <<821; A  151, n.d., 1850
443^d, by inference, the producing individual, though this requires more space to explicate than allowed.
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understanding of its relation to the actual. 
Kierkegaard's reaction is against this embodiment, 
against the pleasure of the esthetic, and correctly so, 
since the material form is dangerous as a temptation for 
losing oneself in romantic contemplation, but he does not 
admit the potential of the material embodiment. In this, 
he fails to understand the art object as if fits within 
his own description of existence, as seen in further 
examples.
For instance, towards the end of his life, one of 
the most interesting negative statements regarding the
art object can be found in Judge for Yourself. 
Kierkegaard devotes a number of pages to describing what 
it means to become sober within the context of
Christianity. This requires that the individual must act 
in reliance on the actuality of God, without relying on 
the perceived strengths of the existential. This should 
be such that an individual is able to act sagaciously 
within existence, but does not apply that sagaciousness 
to its own existence because of its perception of the 
relation of its existence to actuality. What this results 
in is Kierkegaard's definition of what is means to be 
sober: " To become sober is : to come to oneself in self-
knowledge and before God as nothing before him, yet
infinitely, unconditionally engaged." 444 i>he majority of 
this statement is clear within the context of 
Kierkegaard's texts, but it is his specific comments on 
portions of what this means that are interesting in the 
context of the art object. Kierkegaard concentrates on 
self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is, of course, the only
true form of knowledge which an individual can 
appropriate fully into its subjectivity. Knowledge which 
is external to the individual- which must be regarded as 
objective- can only be appropriated to a limited extent. 
What does this have to do with art? Kierkegaard writes:
To come to oneself in self-knowledge. In self-knowledge . In any other knowledge you are awayfrom yourself, you forget yourself, are absent
444 jy, p. 104
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from yourself. Yet precisely this the purely human view calls becoming sober. To forget oneself, to come, not to, but to go away from oneself by losing oneself in knowing, in comprehending, in thinking, in artistic production, etc.- precisely this is called being sober. From the Christian point of view,this is intoxication.445
Kierkegaard has failed to understand his own point about 
intoxication and sobriety, if he includes authentic 
artistic production. The art object is an object of
external knowledge, one which an individual can attempt 
to appropriate into its existence but which will fail to 
be an adequate appropriation. It is true that the art 
object cannot be self-knowledge, since it is both 
aesthetic and esthetic, and therefore external. However, 
in this statement, Kierkegaard is specifically referring 
to artistic production. This is, on one level, 
irreconcilable with his own production- which he often 
labelled as poetic (and which Adorno has shown to be an 
inaccurate description anyway)- but is also 
irreconcilable with those statements concerning an
artistic individual as shown in the chapter on the 
artist. Kierkegaard writes:
The one who presents this ideal must be thevery first one to humble himself under it, and even though he himself is striving within himself to approach the ideal, he must confess that he is very far from being it. He mustconfess that he is related only poetically to the ideal picture or qua poet to the 
presentation of this picture, while he (andhere he differs from the ordinary conception of a poet) personally and Christianly is related to the presented picture, and that only as a poet presenting the picture is he out infront. 446
The poet can create an ideal awakening, but only as an 
authentic artist occupying the existential position in 
relation to actuality between the genius and the Apostle. 
How can one believe that Kierkegaard had an understanding 
of the art object within the context of his own writing 
if he writes such a contradictory statement? Artistic
445ibid., p. 105
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production is clearly not a form of knowledge, but a 
means of communication which Kierkegaard has continually 
described as possibly authentic. Kierkegaard is correct 
to define the art object as e x t e r n a l , 4 4 ?  and, therefore, 
in contradiction to self-knowledge, but it can act as a 
catalyst leading to self-knowledge, a starting point from 
which the individual begins the process of recollection 
and repetition.
Judge for Yourself contains another one of the 
strongest indications or reconciliations of the positive 
potential of the art object, though Kierkegaard again 
does not seem to be aware of it. The passage must be read 
as metaphor, indirectly, rather than as a direct 
description of the positive potential of the art object. 
It does contain, however, a return against Kierkegaard's 
criticism of a material object as communication of the 
actual. He writes :
in our thieves' jargon we human beings express it differently, we maintain that we are sagacious, sensible, level-headed people, that we are sober, and that it is precisely the unconditioned that would make us intoxicated...It is not the unconditioned that makes one intoxicated, but it is the unconditioned that makes manifest that we are intoxicated- something we ourselves know well enough and therefore sagaciously stick to the finitudes, hug the line of buildings, stay in the alleys, and never venture out into the infinite. 448
Though Kierkegaard is referring to the unconditioned as
determining the state of intoxication with the finite, it
44' S^otne area of agreement between myself and Kierkegaard on this subject exists, the development of form and content alongside imagination and the requirements of the artist implies that a certain necessity exists in the production of an authentic communication of the idea as art object, a notion derived from Hegel. Kierkegaard has a number of objection which he raises to the idea of introducing necessity into any historical process since existence and the movement to actuality remain one of the choices of possibility, specifically, in CUP (SV VII, 297). these must be addressed, but one answer lies in the dialectical nature of the art object and the fact that an historical process is not a consistent element of an authentic art object, if the art object is inauthentic, i.e. ideal or merely an indication of the actual, then one half of the dialectic of existence will be favoured, this may be, for example, the temporal against the eternal, such a favouring denigrates the art object as communication of the actual into a merely historical communication of the ideal, if, to use the opposite and more difficult example, the eternal is favoured over the temporal, this is part of a historical necessity, the communication is done by a single individual who is stressing one singular element of its existence.448JFY, p. 114
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is also precisely the finite which in a metaphoric- and 
therefore potentially artistic- manner that determines 
the individual's relation with the infinite. The finite 
always has the potential with Kierkegaard, and thereby 
the art object as finite does also.
All of the above still does not answer the question 
of the reason for producing art. Why produce art at all 
when the communication of the idea of the ideal, the 
actuality of existence, can be communicated 
merely between single individuals, and, thereby, might be 
even more successful? The answer lies in the Judge's 
description of marriage which, for the character of the 
Judge, has aesthetic qualities in its own right. It is 
interesting to observe the Judge's opinion on the why of 
their marriage and, hence, apply this opinion to asking 
the why of art. This is not, of course, the full answer, 
in an Kierkegaardian sense, because it is firmly rooted 
in the ethical viewpoint of the Judge, but it does 
provide an interesting note to compare later to the full 
understanding of why is there art at all, in a 
Kierkegaardian view.
The Judge's views on marriage can applied to 
establish the development of the formal qualities of art. 
The ethical understanding of the formal qualities of art 
establishes it as the stage in which art is understood as 
the form of communication which is inclusive of other 
individualities, rather than being exclusive of them. 
Interestingly, the Judge writes:
Since marriage is an inner harmony... it of course has its teleology in itself; it is, since it continually presupposes itself, and thus any questions about its " why" is a misunderstanding, which is very easily explained by prosaic common sense...^ ^^
But is it? The Judge certainly does not think so in most
of the text. But one thing is very clear- the Judge
believes that marriage is something beautiful, something
necessarily inviting and akin to a parallel
interpretation with art, particularly since he sees such
449g/o II, p. 62
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beauty as derived from the teleological nature of 
marriage itself. He writes :
What I want to stress, however, is the beauty in the marriages that have as little " why" as possible. The less " why," the more love- that is, if one perceives the truth in this... Indeed,the less " why," the b e t t e r .
The Judge concludes, after deliberating at length on
possible reasons, that purposes extraneous to marriage
make marriage not only immoral but also unesthetic.
" Marriage can be undertaken with only one intention,
whereby it is just as ethical as esthetic..." This is
true in the many situations which the Judge cites- e.g.
the desire for a home.
Those who marry to have a home always pleadthat there is no one who is waiting for them, no one who welcomes them, etc. This adequately indicates that they actually have a home onlywhen they think of being outside it. Thank God,I never need to go out in order to remember or to forget that I have a home. 452
Marriage must have no finite why, because, for the Judge,
" this is the esthetic in marriage, that it hides in
itself a multiplicity of " whys" that life discloses in
all its blessedness." 453
The multiplicity is further reflected in the nature
of the marriage, for the Judge, since marriage is an act
which is bound to the truth of actuality in that it is
the interpenetration of the universal and the particular.
The more the universal and the particular penetrate each other, the more beautiful thelove. The greatness is not in being theparticular either in the immediate or in the higher sense but in possessing the universal inthe particular.454
The first love in the ethically-religiously oriented
marriage becomes actual love between and created by two 
individuals, as communication of the truth of the
actuality of their existences. The marriage is a
450lbld. p. 62
451lbid. p. 72452ibid. P- 82
453ibid. P- 88
454ibid. p. 90
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teleological expression; its purpose is the embodiment of 
the love as communication between two people. Marriage 
and, hence, the art object, have their own teleology 
within them for the Judge and his ethical view. 
Kierkegaard himself would agree, but the actual why of 
art within the whole of his authorship has much deeper 
dialectical implications and purposes. What emerges is 
that marriage and, hence, the art object, since both must 
be considered as object external to the individuals 
involved, remains separate from the relation between the 
individuals while still providing a basis for grounding 
their existence in a form of the ideal. Marriage becomes 
a means of expressing the individuals' relation to the 
ideal of the other individual, to the actuality of that 
individual within the practice of existence. The 
communication which is the art object- in this case,
marriage- creates an interpenetration as idea between the
ideal and the particular, an interpenetration between 
immanence and transcendence. Existence becomes focused on 
both the universal as the idea and the particulars of 
existence as existence, and are able to reveal to both 
within a balance of the relation of the actual and the 
existential. There is always a danger of being caught up 
in the particulars of the art object- in the example of 
marriage, in the specific features of the married one- 
but marriage and therefore the art object understood as a 
communication which becomes both present within the
relation and removed from the relation allows the
ideality to be appropriated and acted upon by all. 
Kierkegaard uses a further example in WL when he 
discusses the relationship that an individual has to one 
who has d i e d . 455 %n both cases, a balanced relationship 
within an abstracted and removed concept, within an 
embodied form which remains separate from the individuals 
after appropriation, serves to allow both the receiving 
idea of the ideal and the produced idea of the ideal 
(which is the actual itself) to remain in their proper
455pÿi,^  pp. 317-329
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relation without resorting to an esthetic stance; it 
allows a movement through immanence towards 
transcendence. The art object allows the idea of the 
ideal, the actual in existence, to function in removing 
itself from itself as communication once appropriated; 
the idea is presented in embodied form within existence, 
and its removal emphasises reciprocally its its 
teleological necessity already present in the 
individual's existence.
Two last final points. In the Crisis, Kierkegaard 
identifies the art object as accidental (i.e. the fact 
that it material in nature and therefore, to some extent, 
static within time whereas the individual is continually 
moving within time). Kierkegaard, writing about Fru 
Heiberg, notes: " If she is to play Juliet, it must be an 
eminent presentation, or more concretely a presentation 
in an eminent sense. And this is just the 
metamorphosis." This is confusing to some extent,
because it almost negates what I have stated in this 
chapter concerning the art object as a positively 
potentialised communication of the actual ideal. It is as 
if the immanent or esthetic element of the art object 
remains a barrier to transcendence despite the 
authenticity of its communication and the artist. Yet, if 
the dialectical nature of the art object is maintained, 
then this functions in a positive sense as well.
Kierkegaard, as always seemingly unaware of the potential 
of his words regarding the art object, writes that this 
somehow functions within the interaction between the 
individuals in the process of the communication embodied 
in the art object. He writes:
Time has asserted its right; there is something which has been consigned to the past. But then again an ideality of recollection will cast an illumination of the highest sort over the whole presentation, an incarnation that was not present in those days of the first youthfullness. Only in recollection is there absolute rest, and therefore the still fire of the eternal, its incorruptible glow. And she is
456crisis, p. 89 j1
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soothed in the eternity of her essential genius.
Kierkegaard is speaking of Fru Heiberg, making a comment 
on her various performances and the metamorphosis that 
she has made from being the immanent embodiment of the 
idea of feminine youthfulness into the transcendent 
embodiment of such. The implications, however, can be 
applied to the art object. Recollection occurs, but 
within Kierkegaard's framework recollection and perhaps 
repetition is also a denial of the continuing existence 
and communicative possibilities of the art object. It is 
on this point that leads into the final chapter- the 
death of art. Positive potential exists but, as with the 
development of the individual, such potentiation requires 
some degree of fulfilment. Kierkegaard writes:
...the metamorphosis of which we have spoken is one of potentiation, or a more and more intensive return to the original condition.This metamorphosis will be of absolute concern to an aesthetitician, because the dialectic of potentiation is precisely the aesthetic- metaphysical d i a l e c t i c . 458
This intensive return to the original condition requires
that the art object- which originally did not act within
the existence of the individual but then, within a
specific moment or moments of time, did- no longer
function once its function has been fulfilled. The
material nature must always be recognised in existence,
and therefore in opposition to actuality from within
existence.
Finally, one of the most vital passages found within 
Kierkegaard relating to this issue, and to a transition 
into the conclusion of my research, is the following:
The great poetic power of folk literature is expressed in various ways, also in the intensity of its craving and coveting... this covetousness... is very conscious that the neighbour no more possesses what it seeks than it does itself, and therefore it does not need to desire what is his, and it if gets what it desires, it will have a superabundance for the
457ibid., p. 89
458%bid., p. 90
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whole world, and if eventually it covets sinfully, it will nevertheless tower so imposingly over the chicken-thieves of our time, since it is so scandalous and titanesque, that it inevitably must at least shake people up, and in its description it does not allow anything to be scaled down by the cold calculation of probability and pedestrian understanding. [Don] Juan still glides across the stage with his 1,003 mistresses and no one smiles at it, but if this were created in our time it would be laughed to scorn; no one dares do it, out of respect and deference for tradition no one dares do it; indeed, one is carried away by it momentant, although in the next moment he is ashamed that this enthusiasm has " made a fool of him" .459
What is so important about this passage is that is
constructs the positive potential for the object in
relation to folk literature, to a specific type of art
object which Kierkegaard held in high e s t e e m .  46° Folk
literature here functions as a means of communication
which directly engages the individualities involved as
well as, by its very nature as folk literature, engaging
an entire community. It does so, though, in a manner
which does not directly affect the individualities
involved. A communication of an ideal is embodied in the
material form as idea, but this establishment does not
act as a means of affecting the communication and
appropriation of the ideal as embodied. Interaction
becomes present, but it is important that interaction
occurs only after the object has been removed. The nature
of the folk literature in Kierkegaard's description is
such that it acts within existence in order to establish
a concrete sense of community, while being dismissed in
its own right from that establishment. The specific point
about Don Juan can be interpreted to mean that the
positive potential of the art object is a production of
impact, of appropriation of the ideal through the
presentation of the idea as ideal, but that this impact
only occurs once the object itself has been removed.
459j-p, vol. 5, pp. 139-140, <<5426; II A  575, n.d., 1839 
4S0^hich can be related to Adorno's conception of myth.
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appearing within existence and then outside of it. 
Kierkegaard writes :
A condition for the unity of the divine and the human given in faith is doubt (which corresponds to the doubt prior to the unity of the divine and the human, of the infinite and the finite, given in knowledge) whether sinful humanity, after the original relationship has been altered, is able to return to unity with God- a doubt or, a more pathos-filled and concrete expression, a concern (which, like everything Christian, is a concretion) .46i
and
Every step forward to the ideal is a backward step, for the progress consists precisely in my discovering increasingly the perfection of the ideal- and consequently my greater distance from it.One cannot love the ideal selfishly; for the progress would make me happy only if I were to come closer to the ideal in a direct way- yes, in a certain sense I might then with the ideal not to be all too perfect or that I might not learn too much about its perfection- so that I could better attain it.To love the ideal in truth (so that as a consequence progress is retrogression, or my making progress means that I step back out of respect because I see its sublimity even more perfectly) is therefore like hating oneself.
This doubt and backwards step is something that is a
necessity for the art object. It must maintain its
distance, and not be contemplated or produced merely as
an esthetic object for the pleasure of its reception. In
fact, the doubt and the backwards step must always be
present, so much so that the art object must die to the
receiving individual upon the completion of its reception
and appropriation. It is with this point that I turn to
the conclusion of my thesis.
461j-p^ vol. 1, p. 358, <<773; III A  4, n.d., July 5, 1840. A condition for the authentic work of art as well- indeed, perhaps the continually-present theme or communication which underlies all authentic art objects.
452jrp^ vol. 2, p. 287, <<1789; A 509, n.d., 1850
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chapter Eight- Conclusion: The Death of Art
The art object is thus an indirect, indeterminate 
immediate communication of the idea of the ideal which is 
appropriated as ideal into the existence of the 
individual and becomes, within the individual's 
recollection and repetition, as means of developing the 
individual's knowledge of the actual grounding of and 
relation to the actual. It is this indeterminacy which 
allows one to conclude that the description of the art 
object, derived from the Kierkegaardian texts, is 
involved in a process of self-annihilation. The art 
object communicated the idea of the ideal in existence 
but, because of its material form as embodied 
communication, it is inadequate to the idea in-and-of- 
itself in relation to the actual. As communication of the 
idea of the ideal, the Kierkegaardian art object is 
directly related to the thought of the time, and a case 
can be made for labelling it as Hegelian in tone. What 
makes the Kierkegaardian description different, and 
provides it with further uses beyond Kierkegaard's own 
philosophy, is the fact that art object denies itself. 
The art object as indeterminate within immanence as 
existence, leading through to transcendence into the 
actual, acts as a catalyst for the appropriation process 
of and in confrontation with the actual for the single 
individual receiving the communication therein embodied, 
and then removes itself from the continuing existence of 
the individual. In effect, the art object opposes 
existence within existence, indicating the actual through 
its existence as material and directing the individual 
through its inapplicability. The result from this is that 
the value of the art object is its valuelessness because, 
once it has served its purpose, it then becomes an 
impediment to the continual progressive development of 
the individual.
This ties in neatly with various postmodern 
theories, but takes them one step further. Rather than 
simply denying the veracity and the presence of the art
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object- its idealism- it links the idealism to the same 
issues which postmodern theory has so rightly indicated 
as over-emphasised in previous theories of art. It can be 
said that the Kierkegaardian art object creates an 
entirely new category for understanding the art object. 
Again, the value of the object as embodied communication 
is its valuelessness- it indicates, communicates, and 
then, as material form, is quickly understood to be no 
longer applicable to the existence of the individual 
because it remains outside of the individual's existence, 
in opposition to the appropriatable idea of the actual 
ideal, and hence to the individual's relation to the 
actual. This is something that Kierkegaard recognises, as 
always :
God can appear to man only in the miracle, i.e. as soon as he sees God he sees a miracle. But on his own it is not possible for him to see the miracle, since the miracle is his own annihilation... It is more accurate to say that to see God or to see the miracle is by virtue of the absurd, for understanding must step aside. 4^ 3
However, he fails to understand the implications of his 
thought. Even though the production of an authentic art 
object is always a possibility, there is always a denial 
of that object because of its ultimate inadequacy to the 
communication of the ideal. Yet, the very denial has 
value. This progression of thought is furthered by such 
statements as such:
Every striving which does not apply one-fourth, one-third, two-thirds, etc. of its power to systematically working against itself is essentially secular striving, in any case unconditionally not a reforming effort... What does it mean to work against oneself? It is quite simple. If the established, the traditional, etc., in the context of which a beginning is to be made, is sound, thoroughly sound- well, then apply directly what has to be applied; in any case there can be no talk or thought of reforming, for if the established is sound, then there is nothing, after all, to reform. 4^ 4
463J-p, vol. 1, p. 4, <<6; V A  78, n.d., 1844
JP, vol. 6, pp. 294-295, <<6593; A  560, n.d., 1850464
287
And, further:
To die to the world is the requirement. But compel- no, says, God, that I will absolutely not do, not at any price will I force a man to do that, and neither is it possible, since it is an act of f r e e d o m . 465
The striving, the acting, the act of communication should
contain failure; it must contain failure. Not only must
the artist work against itself, but the implication is
that the object must do so as well. But this has
potential. Kierkegaard is speaking of the artist, but the
object too, especially if the artist is aware of these
strictures, can be an indication, and an even stronger
one. Rigorousness and a dying-to-the-world is a
requirement and, therefore, a requirement for the
production of an authentic art object; the value is its
valuelessness.
This is not something generally recognised in the
secondary literature, though Pattison comes closest. He
writes about the art object and its relation to faith in
an interesting fashion. In it, he almost recognises the
dialectical result of the art object's confrontation with
time as a 'timeless' object. Pattison writes:
The task of faith, by way of contrast, is (in an expression from one of the Edifying 
Discourses) to become 'older than the moment', in patience and long-suffering to imitate the unchangeable character of God, a character powerfully described in Kierkegaard's last- published discourse in which it is made abundantly clear that this unchangeableness is not conceived in negative or metaphysical terms but in the quality of persistence and endurance through time- and only in this way also beyond time. 466
It is this beyond time which is what the individual is 
striving for, and which the art object, by communicating 
its presence as a timeless object, dialectically 
determines for the individual as its path towards the 
actual truth of the ontological grounding of its 
existence. Art is inherently limited in its capacity to
465j-p^ vol. 3, p. 749, <<3770; A  29, n.d., 1852 
466pattison, " Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and 'Aesthetic'" , p. 146
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communicate such, but since each individual must arrive 
at the truth of its existence subjectively, the rejection 
of such an objective communication is a powerful and 
valuable, though, ultimately inadequate, guide.
Kierkegaard provides an interesting remark which 
shows, once again, how unaware or unwilling he was to 
recognise the dialectical possibilities for art that were 
contained within the framework of his literature. In SUD 
he writes:
...the self in despair is always building only castles in the air, is only shadowboxing. All these imaginatively constructed virtues make it look splendid; like oriental poetry, they fascinate for a moment; such self-command, such imperturbability, such axapa^ia, etc.practically border on the fabulous. Yes, they really do, and the basis of the whole thing is nothing. In despair the self wants to enjoy the total being itself; it wants to have the honor of this poetic, masterly construction, the way it has understood itself. And yet, in the final analysis, what is understands by itself is a riddle, in the very moment when it seems that the self is closest to having the building completed, it can arbitrarily dissolve the whole thing into nothing.46?
Kierkegaard is quick to point the difficulties and
disappointments which are an inherent element in
constructing an object- be it written or made of
material- through which the individual seeks to establish
some sense of identity. He is, of course, quite right
when he continually points out that the external is a
danger for the development of the individual self; a
danger in that the individual can lose their sense of
subjective self. However, this remark from his discussion
of despair prompts a further, dialectical inquiry. It has
been shown that Kierkegaard's understanding of the art
object is, in general, idealistic in nature. Thus, as I
have tried to stress throughout this research, for
Kierkegaard the art object- if it is authentic- is a
communication of the idea of the ideal to the individual.
This means that the ideal is the truth about the
467güD, pp. 69-70
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existence of the individual, but its communication is 
always outside of existence; the ideal authentically 
communicated is the actual ideal rather than the merely 
ideal. However, Kierkegaard evades, at every turn, the 
possibilities inherent in his writing for the art object. 
In doing so, the very value of the art object is put into 
question within the framework of that writing and his 
description of existence and actuality. It is important 
to note, though, that Kierkegaard simply did not address 
this issue. And it is in the silence that the answer to 
the value of art is arrived at, both metaphorically and 
'literally'.
The art object, in is fullest authentic 
manifestation as a communication of the idea of the 
ideal, becomes not merely a communication of that ideal. 
A second level exists once such a communication has been 
established or, when it has been made concrete, can be 
recognised as successful. This level is one of 
appropriation. Reception by an individual of another 
individual's ideal communication requires that this ideal 
be made part of the receiving individual's existence. It 
is part of the dialectic of the art object; both the 
producing and receiving individualities involved have a 
relationship to the ideal which applies to their own 
existences, transforming such towards knowledge of the 
ontological grounding of such within actuality. The 
reception of such a realisation of actuality within 
existence implies a transformation of the individualities 
on an ethical level, one consistent with a developing 
sense of moral decision, but one which is nearly outside 
of existence. Because of this development, the 
individualities must necessarily turn away from the art 
object towards themselves, abandoning the art object as a 
communication of knowledge. In effect, the art object is 
left out of the understanding of actuality which the 
individuality has taken into its existence. If this is 
so, then what of the art object? What is its value after 
such a process?
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The art object is something that requires 
seriousness, a commitment to the authenticity of the 
actual truth of existence, but which it cannot achieve as 
a material, unified, and yet unexisting object. Only the 
divine can achieve this completely.
Only divine authority could impress the human race in such a was that the thing of absolutely willing the eternal became absolute seriousness. Only the God-Man can unite these two things: to work absolutely for extension,and absolutely to hold back on the question what is to be understood by being a d i s c i p l e .468
Perhaps Kierkegaard is suggesting only Christ can be an
authentic communication of the ideal in existence? The
implications, however, for a material embodiment nearly
achieve the potentiality of Christ. The death of art
implies a limitation of the art objects potential for
expressing the ideal or the actual as an idea within
existence, but also allows an infinitising. This bears
some similarity to the Hegelian interpretation of the art
object, in that Hegel's conception of the communication
of the art object is of the idea is that it communicates
within material, and therefore limited, form. This allows
to a limited extent, as always, the labelling of
Kierkegaard as Hegelian in terms of aesthetic matters.
However, a Kierkegaardian interpretation goes beyond
this.
1. Initial Grounding
Kierkegaard's existential aesthetics are concerned 
primarily with the notion and explication of the 
existence of the individual and his relationship to his 
actuality, with the reduplication of the ideal nature of 
the truth of existence in the existence of the individual 
human being. In this sense, it is both informed and 
constrained by the religious, which is always present 
both in a dictation of the form of communications 
utilised as well as the subject matter of such
'^^^Attack Upon " Christendom" , 'The Instant, No. 5', July 27, 1855, p. 160
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communications and which is always the primary direction 
of the development of the authorship. What can 
Kierkegaard teach us about the creation of material or 
externalised objects which are labelled art objects? What 
would he have to say not only about art objects created 
in the past, but also those being created now? Indeed, 
what prescriptive does a study of Kierkegaard's writing 
bring with itself when it is applied to the production of 
art? Or, more specifically, does it have anything to say 
at all? One criticism which I have of recent scholarship 
in the field is that it is generally limited to a 
discussion of works of art mentioned by Kierkegaard 
rather than applying his ideas to others. I have come up 
with a number of immediate answers to these questions. 
Kierkegaard's writing allows a number of interesting 
interpretations about the art object. However, 
Kierkegaard's answers more often than not produce 
questions of their own. For example, once the developing 
individual has come to terms with the esthetic stage, and 
is in the process of a development towards an 
appropriation of the truth of his existence, does art 
continue to have any value? Or, once that process of 
development has finished (and the individual has become 
an authentic Christian), can it continue to have value? 
Does it have value at all? Can an individual continue to 
create art once he is more fully aware of the nature of 
his existence? The answers to these questions will 
continue to provoke debate. What I would like to do is 
ask and answer a further question, one which is informed 
by recent theory in the arts and which radicalises art 
within a Kierkegaardian sense. The question changes the 
nature of any approach to art within Kierkegaardian 
sense, colouring not only the analysis of art works but 
also their production. That questions is: is art dead?
What exactly do I mean by asking this question? How 
can art be dead? Analysing art works is partially asking 
after their value. It is a process of decision about the 
appropriateableness of such objects. Can we continue to 
take part in the communicative structure constructed as
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part of the creation of the art within the light of 
certain theories of art? Or does art no longer have 
value. I believe that Kierkegaard provides an excellent 
answer to this question, but first I must consider the 
possible reasons for the labelling of art as dead.
What I would like to do is to analyse first of all 
some theory of Postmodernity, particularly as it is 
related to the writing of Arthur Danto and his 'end of 
art' . Second, I would like to clarify what I believe a 
Kierkegaardian prescriptive response would be to Danto's 
claim that art is dead. Taking into account certain 
difficulties, I would like to reverse that position and 
show that, in some areas, Danto and Kierkegaard are in 
agreement- though they themselves would never have 
realised it. This final argument is the third part of the 
dialectic of the value of the art object.
2. Postmodernity
Postmodern art and theory is no longer concerned 
with the impressive issues of the day, but with simply an 
exploration of playfulness and idiocy. Whims and fancies 
take the artist and the theorist to expand their 
horizons, but they actually say little at all, and 
nothing about the existential actuality of the 
individual. Certain statements epitomise this attitude. 
The work of Kroker and Cook posit the current trends as 
an age of schizophrenic delusion and illusions, where all 
that matters is double-edged and double-meaninged 
statement. For them: " Words are no longer necessary;
merely the seductive pose which entices the eye of the 
tourist. Codes are no longer required, as long as silence 
is eliminated... The postmodern scene is a panic site, 
just for the fun of it." 469 xn the writing of Foucault, 
the artist as an autonomous individual, constructing its 
own vision of the future and rejecting the past, is 
itself rejected. The author is dead. The artist is dead.
469Kroker, Cook, The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics, p.27
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The author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works, he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion.One can say that the author is an ideological product...47o
And, if the author is dead, then Barthes has killed off 
the art object. Rather than privileging the art object as 
a communication of truth (or even untruth) which is self- 
contained, whose priority is to enliven a reciprocal gaze 
between viewer and object, the art object or text emerges 
in his work as being completely contingent. The art
object is a product of shifting interchanges from an
infinite variety of sources which deny the internal 
coherence of any meaning which might be attached to the 
identity of the object. The object is a field of play, a 
field of interactions, denying its own value, done solely 
for the pleasure of the text.
Just as Einsteinian science demands that the
relativity of the frames of reference beincluded in the object studied, so the combinedaction of Marxism, Freudianism andstructuralism demands in literature, therelativization of the relations of writer,reader and observer (critic). Over against thetraditional notion of the work, for long- andstill- conceived of in a, so to speak,Newtonian way, there is now the requirement of a new object, obtained by the sliding oroverturning of former categories.
The text is not constructed with closure. It is
experienced in a plural sense, regulated not by
comprehension but by associations, contingencies, and a
liberating of symbolic imagery. The reader is a text is
at a loose end-
470poucault, Michel, " What is an Author?" , Harrison and Wood (eds.), Art in 
Theory, pp. 923-928
47lBarthes, Roland, 'From Work to Text', Harrison and Wood, Art in Theory, p. 941
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" what he perceives is multiple, irreducible, coming from a disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives... all these incidents [signifiera] are [only] half- identifiable... woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages (what language is not?), antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it through and through in a vast stereophony."
The text is a new thing, asking the reader for co­
operation in completing itself, asking the reader to play 
the game. Reading is reduced to a consumption in which 
the individual reader is making up his own recipe as he 
goes along.
Contemporary artists have taken this on board. 
Shirley Levine writes
We know that a picture is but a space in which a variety of images, none of them original, blend and clash. A picture is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture... We can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. Succeeding the painter, the plagiarist no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense encyclopaedia from which he d r a w s . 472
Or Peter Hailey, whose emphasis on the individual artist
at times bears a remarkable resemblance to the author A
of E/0 I: " The art of this period is overwhelmingly
concerned with the situation of the individual as a
perceiving and deciding entity." 473 But these are choices
based on the simulation of media images, of
commercialism, of externality, in rejection of the
responsibility to the existing individual's actuality.
All of these statements point to an end to art, and end
to the art as a strongly identified object whose purpose
is the communication of an idea, or, the communication of
the possibility of an idea leading the individual through
their own sense of appropriation and reflection to the
472Baldwin, Michael, Ramsden, Mel, Harrison, Charles, 'Letter to a Canadian |Curator', in Harrison and Wood (eds.). Art in Theory,, p. 1067 ,|
473Halley, Peter, " Nature and Culture" , in Harrison and Wood (eds.). Art in |
Theory, p. 1071 IIIp. 295 j
ideal. This is further aggravated by the writing of 
Arthur Danto.
Danto ends his book The State of the Art with a 
chapter titled " Approaching the End of Art" . In it, he 
describes the transformation of the concept of art, 
showing that it has become a purely philosophical 
enterprise rather than solely a material exercise with 
intrinsic value. He begins the chapter by citing three 
quotations from Hegel's lectures on art:
Art no longer counts for us as the highest manner in which truth furnishes itself with existence.One may well hope that art will continue to advance and perfect itself, but its form has ceased to be the highest need of the spirit.In all these relationships, art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest vocation, something p a s t . 474
Art, for Danto as for Hegel, has come to a logical end.
We have been living in an epilogue of art, a concluding
postscript to its endeavours. Until recently, it has been
a series of historical breakthroughs. Art has been
considered historical rather than timeless by its
creators, and its imperative has often been as simple as
producing an art form which is different from previous
ones :
a great deal of art was made that would have made little sense but for the belief that one had achieved a historical advance by means of it. The discoveries in questions had to do with the nature of art itself, for it is possible to read twentieth-century art as the collective quest for the essence and nature of art- a reading that is confirmed by the intolerance each stage in this advance provoked when the new forms were displayed as having captured and distilled the pure being of a r t . 475
In essence, each new art form had been a rejection of the
past in favour of the present. It had been an affirmation
of those conditions in which specific individuals
resided. But this has changed in recent days.
474j3anto, p. 202
475ibid., p. 204
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In the 1970's, the art world became obsessed with 
two ideas. First, that everything had been done before 
and should simply be repeated.476 indeed, this repetition 
became itself an art form, whereby the fact the one 
artist was quoting another was ascribed a certain 
artistic value- as long as it was being done with a sense 
of irony. Second, that a pluralistic value system 
transformed the previously convictions and puritanical 
intolerances : " the charge that everything other than
what one was doing was not really art- gave way to a sort 
of pluralism, which is itself a concession that one no 
longer believes in a truth of art." 47? Those movements 
which should have found themselves dialectically opposed 
to each other discovered that they had just as much in 
common as different. Why do one thing when something 
else- no matter how different- is just as acceptable? 
From the 1970's, the whole of history, the whole of the 
future, was consigned to a simple repetition of 
meaningless facts which would offer brief respite from 
the anxiety of the creative process, but which would 
never have an element of truth to them.
The forms of art had been used up. The esthetic in a 
purely Kierkegaardian sense has been realised, and a 
general malaise has set in. Art's truth was no longer to 
be discovered in the production of art but, as with the 
beginnings of Conceptual art, must be found outside of 
art. The question about the truth of art must consist 
amongst the known forms of art, and therefore answering 
this questions requires an outside perspective, neatly 
provided by philosophy. Danto's metaphor is particularly 
descriptive :
I thought at the time that there was an influential segment of the art world that rushed about the scene with Cinderella's glass slipper, but the slipper was huge and the feet were tiny. There would, even so, be ecstatic cries of " It fits! It fits!" as one very small foot after another found it could not fill enough of the immense slipper to take even a
476^ position similar to that of Mannerism in the 16th century. 
477oanto, p. 204
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baby-step into the historical future. And those who believed in historical closure might have said that in any case there would be no place to set one's foot, because art was walled in by its own internal logic. History was o v e r . 478
Art had become meaningless. Those forms- even if they
were as new as could be expected, were simply empty
repetitions which were not indications of the actual but
merely of themselves as ideas, and could no longer muster
enough originality to cast off the burden that history
had become, and instead found themselves comfortably in
bed with those very functionaries who would abuse them.
Form had become an empty repetition of quotations,
feeding off other art objects in an effort to
authenticate themselves by imitation. Content had become
a matter of indifference, occasionally linked to a
political motivation but, even so, still empty of any
reference or reduplication in relation to the existence
of the individual in the direction of the actual ideal.
No art form is historical enough that it can continue
history. The history of art was exhausted.
Danto's premise is based on Hegel's own claim about
the end of art. This is not a claim that the production
of art has come to a stop, that it has ceased to happen,
but that the pattern of recurring revolution,
transformation, and consummation has ceased.
Hegel had thought that art had come to an end in the narrative sense of ending, namely a an episode in a larger narrative in which art played a certain role. The story of art is the story of art's role in the grand history of the spirit. There was art before and there will be art after, but the highest vocation of art was to advance some grander matter. There was a moment when the energies of art coincided with the energies of history itself- and then it subsided into something e l s e . 479
Art's function was to occupy a specific period in the
development of the self-consciousness of the Absolute,
and once it had fulfilled its function, its ceased to be
an innovationary form of human production. No matter how
478ibid., p. 205
479ibid., p. 211
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narrativistic one might construe the history of art as 
being, it ends at some point. Art had to begin a quest in 
the direction of determining its essence.
In Hegelian terms, it had reached a kind of consciousness of itself as a problem. Up to now, art had a set of problems, but it was not a problem for itself. Perhaps it had been a problem for philosophers. But now, in becoming a problem for itself, it began to attain a certain philosophical dimension... It could no longer assume that is history had to be the progressive endeavour it had seemed up to then to be. 480
And, on the basis of such Hegelian terms, art no longer 
was a product for the development of the individual. Form 
and content were constructed no longer for the purpose of 
describing other than themselves. Art, through the 
'logical', systematic development of itself, had to 
discover what it was. It had to work out its forms and 
become, through such a dialectical working out, self- 
aware. And, in that process, it closes itself off from 
the existential, from a revealing of the eternal element 
inherent in all.
3. Kierkegaard's First Response
Kierkegaard's writing provide a complicated and 
dialectical response. First, a response to Danto and 
Postmodern theory would be in agreement, speaking as if 
in criticism of the esthetic. Second, a further 
clarification of a Kierkegaardian response would 
disagree, since the art object is a form of communication 
which is ideal and indirect in nature and therefore has 
some value for the developing individual. Finally, to 
continue the dialectical thread, a Kierkegaardian 
response would find itself back in agreement with Danto, 
but only in that the value of art as a communication lies 
in the death of art, in an embodiment of its own 
valuelessness, and only in a manner which Kierkegaard 
failed to do.
480lbid., p. 214
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In the first position, Kierkegaard is more in 
agreement than disagreement. Art is dead, merely a 
product of the esthetic. The aesthetic has no value 
beyond the requirements of the esthetic, and therefore 
does not allow a continuation of its value structure. The 
aesthetic is a product of the immediate, and incapable of 
determining the future authentic possibilities for the 
developing individual. Art is not a communication 
assisting through indirect means such a development, but 
serving to facilitate an alleviation (albeit briefly) of 
the needs of the esthetic, and ultimately indicate that 
it is a dead endeavour. This is a position notable in 
Kierkegaard's negativity towards art. Art as object and 
communication is an expression of the idea truth of 
existence for the esthetic individual and the expression 
of the idea may be couched in concrete terms which might 
have relevance for the individual, but their is a failure 
also which is a further indication of possibilities for 
the future of the specific individual.
Analysing the arts, the author of the first half of 
E/O I states that the requirements of a classic work of 
art are its concrete communication of the idea:
The more abstract the idea is, the less the probability. But how does the idea becomeconcrete? By being permeated by the historical,the more concrete the idea, the greater the probability. The more abstract the medium is,the less the probability; the more concrete, the more. But what does it mean that the medium is concrete except that it either is, or is seen in its approximation to, language, for language is the most concrete of all media.Hence, the idea that is disclosed in sculpture is totally abstract and has no relation to the historical; the medium through which it becomes manifest is likewise abstract.
But, the more concrete the communication of the idea is,
the less appropriatable it is for the individual
receiving such a communication. The failure to embody the
historical denies the presentness of the individual
existence and his relationship to the paradoxical nature
481s/o I, p. 55
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of his ontological grounding. As in PC, the artist does 
not paint in fear and trembling but in calm and
contemplative detachment to produce the image. By being 
concrete, the idea becomes inappropriatable since it is 
absolutely separate from the individual's existence
within actuality. By being concrete, the very static 
nature of such a communication denies further 
possibilities. Such a denial of possibilities leads the 
developing individual to reject the aesthetic as
containing the possibilities which might continue to 
supply it with succour from its self-imposed necessities.
4. Kierkegaard's Second Response
In the second response, Kierkegaard would have had 
serious problems with this interpretation about the state 
of the arts today. At a most basic level, Danto's 
reliance on Hegel closes off the opportunity inherent in 
the art object as a production of an individual. Danto's 
description agrees with Hegel's that art is a product 
whose completion separates it from the individual who is 
producing the object as a form of communication. 
Kierkegaard would argue that art is not a teleological 
development of an expression of thought but the embodied 
form of communication of a singular individual 
communicating the idea of the ideal truth as it appears 
to him in the present. An art object is not that which 
Hegel has described. For Kierkegaard, it is both the aim 
of art, religion, and philosophy to show that truth does 
not consist of vague generalities but is the universal, 
particular, and determined for the individual existence. 
But, because the art object is so particular, it is also 
abstract, which does not communicate for Hegel the truth 
of the Idea. Kierkegaard would agree to this, since the 
object is a particular form of communication, but he 
would differ in an interpretation of its implications.
Kierkegaard would have also criticised Danto because 
he is describing an inauthentic art form- an esthetic 
object. What is obvious when reading Kierkegaard is that
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he is critical of the esthetic stage of existence, which 
is characterised as childish, selfish, and barely aware 
of anything beyond its immediate concerns. This has lead 
most critics to comment disapprovingly of art within a 
Kierkegaardian framework. No immediate value for the art 
object is found, and art is confined to the esthetic 
stage as something which the individual develops out of 
completely. This is based in part on Kierkegaard's own 
statements on individual art object. However, if one 
reads Kierkegaard negatively- with the understanding that 
what he is saying describes art as it should not be- one 
can begin to describe art within the context of his 
writing as it should be.
Danto's use of Warhol's art is an excellent field on 
which to compare the two. For Danto, Warhol's art objects 
are the culmination of the development of art as a human 
endeavour. They are not simply representations (though 
they are representations in the most basic sense, at a 
pre-iconographie and iconographie level) but are 
philosophical treatises whose questions and answers 
describe succinctly the nature of art. For Kierkegaard, 
Warhol's boxes are a sign of despair in a deep, demonic 
sense, aware of the potential, but refusing to translate 
possibility into actuality. Indeed, despair might be 
considered the subject of some of the best modern art. 
With Warhol, his objects are communications of the 
despair not to will to be one's self, to seek an identity 
which is beyond the individual self. Could we also look 
at other examples of 20thc. art in the same manner? Could 
Cubism be considered despair in the sense to be one's 
self? And Dada art, especially the work of Duchamp, as 
despair not to be one's self as well? Art of this kind is 
empty of meaning for the individual; it is alienated from 
the existential situation of the individual, and does not 
communicate the truth of its actuality. But it has 
meaning and positive value for the individual in a 
negative sense- it indicates through the negative the 
positive path to truth. Warhol's art (and so much of the 
postmodernists art products as well) is an expression of
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despair, of a development towards that stage before the 
individual is capable of coming to terms with his 
ontological grounding; despair is developed negative 
content. And, in this sense, it not only constitutes the 
development of a high art form, but also prescribes the 
continuing possibilities of art.
Art as communication is a communication of the 
ideal. It can exist in a variety of increasingly 
authentic forms, from the purely inauthentic products of 
the esthetic individual to the fully expressive products 
of the religious. At its most authentic stage, art is a 
product of an individual situated existentially between 
the genius and the Apostle, being a facilitated 
communication (facilitated by the capabilities of the 
individual) while at the same time nearly containing the 
requirements of a revelation. Art cannot be at an end, 
since it is always the product of an individual contained 
wholly within their own existence. While a history of art 
is fine to maintain knowledge (something which 
Kierkegaard would not have problems with), art products 
must always be understood as the communication of one 
individual in a reciprocal relationship with other 
individuals in the context of their presentness. Danto's 
point that art has exhausted itself is entirely without 
grounds in Kierkegaard's thought because art, for 
Kierkegaard, is something which can be continually 
produced and has no relation to history except in the 
most material sense. Knowledge of art and art techniques 
may change, as may style, but the fact that it is 
communication of the truth of existence, of actuality, is 
something which does not change. Therefore, art itself is 
never dead.
Positive and authentic art as communication can 
develop along with the individual. At the most esthetic 
level, it can act in a negative fashion, wholly a part of 
the dialectics of communication, to make the individual
462Mhich is something which an individual artist will take into account, since it is only a communication which is fully based in the existential situation of its viewers that can be authentic.
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aware of the emptiness of their existence and indirectly 
allow them to advance. As the individual develops, the 
art object can function on an increasingly vital level, 
communicating the ideal truth in an increasingly direct 
fashion. Direct communication of facts was necessary, but 
was insufficient. The were required for the individual's 
activities within existence (within day-to-day 
activities) , but they did not begin to express the ideal 
truth of the actuality of existence. The very nature of 
both the individual's ontological grounding as well as 
the individual's own nature made this an impossibility. 
What is necessary for communication of the ideal truth of 
actuality is indirect communication. Indirect 
communication fulfils the role of allowing the individual 
on his own existential terms to come to accept, to 
appropriate for his very actuality, the truth of 
existence. This presentation is not direct, in that its 
purpose is not to simply communicate facts, but is 
indirect, in that its intended purpose is to allow the 
receiving individual to reflect upon the message of the 
communication. In this very sense of indirectness, the 
negativity becomes positive; the Kierkegaardian notion of 
dialectics transforms the object into potential. This 
reflection is then applied to the individual's own 
existence and actuality, such that the receiving 
individual uses the knowledge of his existence, which he 
himself believes he has created, to transform his 
existence towards a better understanding of his 
ontological grounding. In clearer terms, the communicator 
wishes to change the way the receiving individual thinks, 
tells him something (often the opposite of what he 
intends, whereby Kierkegaard labels indirect 
communication as dialectical), and then allows the 
receiver to think that the change was brought about by 
his volition (the better to bring him peacefully to think 
a certain way without rebellion). But, an evidenced by 
the later writing of Kierkegaard, at some point in the 
individual's development the communication of the ideal
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truth becomes necessarily direct in nature. Accordingly, 
one can ask where the art object fits into this.
5. A Kierkegaardian Third Response
In the third response that can be constructed from 
Kierkegaard's writing, but which is unrelated to his own 
position, he is again dialectical, in agreement with 
Danto that art is dead, but for a specific purpose rather 
than as a sign or indication of the state of the 
individual communicating or being communicated to. Art is 
created by individuals who have either developed towards 
an understanding of their ontological grounding or who 
are developing in that direction, and for individuals who 
are in the process of developing. My problem lies in the 
fact that appropriation, unlike the development of the 
individual, is a historical event and exists only within 
the context of repetition and its developed forms. Unlike 
an existential activity, which has implications for the 
individuals actuality within existence on an eternal 
basis, the appropriation of the ideal communication of an 
art object is historical; it happens once, and then 
ceases to continue to occur. The existential change 
becomes part of the existential and eternal nature of the 
individual receiving the message, but the object no 
longer continues to function in the same manner. The 
acceptance of Christianity by the individual is an 
appropriation of an historical event into the 
individual's eternal existence, but this is, for 
Kierkegaard, the only historical event which can be 
understood in such a manner. Kierkegaard writes:
Every step forward to the ideal is a backward step, for the progress consists precisely in my discovering increasingly the perfection of the ideal- and consequently my greater distance from it.483
The art object must reflect this concern, acquiring value 
through an expression of its own inadequacy, through its 
ideal communication of its distance from the truth of the
483JP, vol. 2, p. 287, <<1789; A  509, n.d., 1850
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actuality of existence. It is clear that the art object, 
once it has served its purpose in assisting the 
individual to make an existential decision about its own 
development, no longer continues to have value, for it
shows in its embodied form as communication of the ideal 
how distant it is from being a communication of the
actual truth.
In order to defend the reality of art in relationship to religious spirit the argument runs like this: the spirit penetrates a man in such a way that one sees what sort of a man he is- for example, when Luther said: God help me. Amen," he said this so that people got to see into his inner self, what manner of man he was.This then is something of a concession, although it must be remembered that it must not be taken too literally, for it transformed a man in this way, then also his enemies might immediately see the same thing. Next, it must be remembered that it does not hold true in respect to the object of " faith" , precisely because immediate obviousness is denied in order to test faith and in order that faith can be faith- that is, there can very well have been a human transfiguration (although one should always bear in mind that the enemy did not see it- to take a lower example, the ones who stoned Stephen did not see his face as theface of an angel), but quite properly there isno corresponding direct immediacy as the token of its being God. And thus the object of faith is not available for artistic presentation. And even in the relations among men, to the extent to which a man in relationship to something may be the object for a kind of faith, to the same extent he cannot be painted or depicted in this relationship. For the fact that there must be accompanying faith signifies precisely that there is no direct immediacy; otherwise everyone would have to see the same thing...^ ^^
of miraculous revelation The direct immediacy is the only
means of truly communicating the actual. The material
immediacy of the art object makes this an impossibility.
The fact that the immediacy is present, that
communication of the idea of the actual ideal exists,
gives initial value, but this communication then denies
itself in the face of the actual. Art is dead because it
is always dead, even if the individual creating it would
484JP, vol. 1, pp. 64-65, <<170; A  380, n.d., 1850
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completely disagree. This position is found even in E/O 
I, in the section " The First Love" :
The occasion, therefore, is of the greatest significance for every literary work- yes, that is what really determines its true esthetic value. Literary works without any occasion always lack something- not outside themselves, for although the occasion belongs to it, yet in another sense it does not- but they lacksomething within themselves. A literary work in which the occasion is everything also lacks something. That is, the occasion is generative n the negative sense, not the positive. A creation is a production out of nothing, but the occasion is the nothing that letseverything come forth. The whole wealth of thought, the fullness of the idea, can be present, and still the occasion is lacking... So the occasion is simultaneously the mostsignificant and the most insignificant, the highest and the lowest, the most important and the most unimportant. without the occasion, nothing at all actually occurs, and yet the occasion has no part at all in what occurs. The occasion is the final category, the essential category of transition from the sphere of theidea to actuality...48s
The occasion, the moment, is the catalyst towards the 
beginning of appropriation of the actual into existence. 
Once the movement has occurred, however, the art object, 
whose necessity is its embodiment of the idea, is no 
longer necessary; while still maintaining necessity and 
unnecessity within its continuing existence. The art 
object becomes inadequate;, for the receiving individual, 
in the face of the actual, it is lacking in movement 
towards the actual, once the actual has been initiated as 
knowledge in the existence of the receiving individual. 
Then, the possibility of the object which has moved into 
actuality through necessity, is negated. The occasion is 
the object, the expression of the ideal. But, it fails. 
Why? Because it is doomed to failure, because it must be 
an embodied form of failure, of inadequacy. An art object 
is not simply a means of reliving, re-experiencing an 
experience, so as to engage in romantic irony, but is 
communication which can be of an authentic sort but which
X, pp. 236-238
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also ends itself. It acts only as a witness to the
existence of actuality, as can be see in the following 
passage :
The idea of proving the existence [Tilværelse] of God is of all things the most ridiculous.Either he exists [er til] , and then one cannot prove it (no more than I can prove that a certain human being exists [er til] ; the most I can do is to let something testify to it, but then I presuppose existence) - or he does not exist, and then it cannot be proved at all.486
And, thus, it is not capable of, acting as a
communication of the actual, but its incapability directs
the individual yet again inward into the receiving
individual's existence, leaving the responsibility of its
existence in relation to the actual to itself.
This position is further clarified if one takes into
account Kierkegaard's understanding of two modes of
communication: despair and love. Despair is a misrelation
of the synthesis, though it is not the synthesis itself.
Despair is a result of God releasing the individual to
determine the balance of the synthetic elements out of
which the individual being is constructed. God allows the
individual to construct itself, but also allows the
individual to create a lack of equilibrium. The
individual creates a misrelation, and this misrelation of
the relation relating itself to itself which is a
continually renewed effect of the relation to the
synthesis, since its manifestation can be traced to every
instance of possibility occurring within the existence of
the individual.
Every actual moment of despair is traceable to possibility; every moment he is in despair he 
is bringing it upon himself. It is always the present tense; in relation to the actuality there is no pastness of the past: in everyactual moment of despair the person in despair bears all the past as a present inpossibility .487
Despair is a process of self-negation which is
continuously affirming the individual. It is an impotency
48 6j-p, vol. 2, p. 93, <<1334; V A  7, n.d., 1844 
487guD^ p. 17
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for the individual to act which manifests itself also 
when the individual despairs in being itself. By- 
attempting to determine one's self, the self is also 
attempting to determine the self as what the self is not; 
therefore, the individual self creates a misrelation in 
the self which is the continuation of despair. Thus 
despair is continually present, even in the face of 
death. Despair over the eternal requires more imaginative 
capability, and this very fact indicates the potentiality 
for the object. The art object must embody a sense of 
despair in itself. This despair is a significant step 
towards an authentic appropriation of the ontological 
grounding because " this is despair over his weakness" 488 
where the individual has risen to a new form of 
consciousness. First comes consciousness of the self, 
then a further understanding of what despair is, then, 
despair becomes an act. It is still a step forward, in 
that it is a closer realisation of the significance of 
despair, and closer still to an understanding of 
knowledge of the actual ontological grounding of 
existence, but is still despair of weakness. Kierkegaard 
identifies this as the development of inclosing reserve, 
which is the opposite of immediacy. And breaking out of 
it is only a further intensification of despair as an 
attempt. Kierkegaard cites the pursuit of great 
activities, restlessness, sensuality, etc.; all are noted 
as attempts to return to immediacy, all failing because 
of the increased separation from immediacy in the 
direction of the truth of actuality.
Despair is defiance, consciously an act as a 
individual against the eternal while simultaneously 
recognising the eternal. It is an act which contains the 
possibility of a recognition of the actual truth of 
existence, but a possibility which is realised only if 
the act of despair is overcome. The individual beings to 
fashion out of a form of the self the self which the 
individual desires- " he does not want to put on his own
488lbid., p. 61
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self, does not want to see his given self as a task- he 
himself wants to compose his self by means of being the 
infinite form." 489 The self in defiance is despairing 
through acts which are imaginary constructions grounded 
in existence rather than in actuality. The individual 
recognises no power over itself, simulating earnestness. 
But this is imaginary precisely because self-redoubling 
remains contained within the self.
In so far as the self in its despairing striving to be itself works itself into the very opposite, it really becomes no self. In the whole dialectic within which it acts there is nothing steadfast; at no moment is the self steadfast, that is, eternally steadfast.49°
This is a hatred towards existence, but a form willing to
remain in it. This is a rejection also of eternity's
position regarding the individual's actual existence (as
is all despair ultimately), which will have the final say
in death. The esthetic aesthetic product is concerned
with finite needs. The authentic art object, in contrast
(and indicating the communication of the ontological or
Christian truth of existence), is concerned with a
synthesis of the finite and the infinite, but always with
an indication of the infinite at hand as an interested
object. From the point of view of an authentically
developing individual, as well as from the requirement of
the necessity of an authentic form to communicate truths,
death and the heroism of Christianity (the death to the
world in favour or as a martyr to the truth) is an
indication of truth. This is particularly interesting
when one considers that death still has an element of
ending and finality. In application to the art object,
acts in despair indicate death, since it indicates
nothing else but a break from the finite (including its
specific objectness), and the object indicates the same,
if its communication is authentic. This break from the
finite leads to the infinite. Death indeed becomes almost
489ibid., p. 68
490lbid., p. 69
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an abiding factor. In a journal entry, Kierkegaard 
writes :
Therefore the art now is to be a reflective martyr, a person who from the beginning moves in all consciousness toward this, employing all capacities (which otherwise are used to gain earthly advantage) to engage in everything in such a way so that men cannot get rid of him- and then becomes a martyr. This is a protracted and difficult process, to do all this and to hold on year after year, simply to achieve one's downfall, but to fall, of course, in such a way that truth is decisively victorious.This is the ultimate means for extricating men out of the self-satisfied fascination with prudence and shrewdness.Such a martyr I would call " truth's secret agent. " 4si
The martyr is, for Kierkegaard, an individual. For
myself, beyond Kierkegaard, the art object must also be a 
martyr. The beginnings of despair are the beginnings of a 
recognition of the self as an individual who is
determined according to the synthesis. The art object 
cannot make an individual fully aware of their identity 
as self, as individual self separate from other 
externality.
This position can be created through interpretation 
even in those areas of the authorship least likely to be 
a discussion of art. Kierkegaard devotes the final 
chapter in WL to a discussion which has profound
implications for the art work within his system- " The
Work of Love in Praising Love" .49% For him, to speak of 
love is no art. To do so is to restrict both love and art !
as a product of a superficial level of accidental talent.
Speaking of love is an universal aspect of the 
individual, since it is upbuilding and since everyone can 
speak of it.
Self-renunciation, as noted, is a requirement for 
love. God is love and, therefore, only in self-
49lj-p, vol. 3, p. 155, <<2646; IX A  495, n.d., 1848. An important statement about the artist's role in relationship to other individuals. The martyr is " truth's secret agent" and the authentic artist, writer, poet must also act in such a capacity, to produce such that individuals must act towards his production, his communication, as if it requires martyrdom. Also an indication of the final death of art.
492pyX,, p. 359-374
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renunciation can one truly praise love. " What a human 
being of himself knows about love is very superficial; he 
must get to know the deeper love from God, that is, in 
self-denial he must become what every human being can 
become... an instrument for God." 493 The art object may be 
an act of self-renunciation but " the work of praising 
love must be done inward in self-renunciation" 494 ; this 
indicates, in contrast to superficial praise for love, an 
existential path for the artist to authentically approach 
and use love as a subject matter for his art. The artist 
can praise erotic love and friendship, relying on his 
rare gift, the invention of presence, the relationship to 
his muse and the abilities of production. The part of the 
artist, however, cannot be to praise love in its fullest 
glory solely through such means, since love requires 
s e l f - r e n u n c i a t i o n . 4 9 5  inward self-renunciation and a 
desire to fully understand his fellow human beings as 
individuals within a community of individuals is 
potential for art which should meet Kierkegaard's 
approval. The outward aspect of the art would be achieved 
through sacrificial disinterestedness, making oneself 
merely an unprofitable servant, while the inner would be 
achieved by the object's own individual growth towards an 
understanding of his ontological grounding. Love 
expressed and embodied to the highest degree in a 
Christian sense is the point at which Kierkegaard might 
be willing to agree to an authentic art object, 
containing within itself both an expression of the nature 
of the individual as well as expressing what it means to 
be an individual within the dialectical requirements of 
the individuality's ontological grounding, grounding this 
as an authentic art form. Art and love become almost 
synonymous. Both are the communicative acts of authentic 
individuals towards other individuals for the purpose of 
indirectly inducing a development towards authenticity in 
another individual, directing the individual to
493ibid., p. 334
494ibid., p. 331, my emphasis
49 5j^d this is something which most artists are unwilling to grant themselves to produce their art, relegating them to the esthetic.
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understand the necessary being of his individuality, 
revealing the individual task of his existence, and 
grounding that existence and the individual's self, and 
assisting others in a recognition of this through self- 
renunciation, through its communication in God. Love is 
the most direct path to this, but art can function as a 
indirect path, communicating between individuals and 
revealing this communication as being based in God's 
existence.
This description of the art object points the way to 
a new manner of thinking about the art object, one in 
which the art object no longer has value and identity 
intrinsic to its nature, but has value only in assisting 
the development of the authentic identity of the 
individuals involved. Once completed and then given, the 
art object destroys itself as an identifiable Being and 
asserts the identities of those included in the process. 
Hence, art too must be a demonstration of death, its own 
death. In the first position, Kierkegaard finds himself 
in agreement with Danto. The necessities for the 
continuing production of the art object, of any art 
object, is a dead issue. Since the individual is in a 
process of authenticating himself solely in terms of his 
own relationship to the ontological grounding of the 
actuality of his existence, the work of art is a 
superfluous element which does not assist the individual 
to come to terms with the paradoxical truth of his 
existence. In the second position, the art object as a 
communication is a continually reflective element in the 
development of the individual which ultimately kills 
itself off. Finally, while maintaining the Kierkegaardian 
dialectic, the absurd becomes potency. Kierkegaard 
writes :
The human dialectic cannot advance further than to the admission that it cannot think this [revelation] , but also to the admission that this does not imply any thing more than that it cannot think this. But the human dialectic, if it wants to understand itself, consequently, be humble, never forgets that God's thoughts are not man's thoughts, that all this about genius
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and education and reflection makes no difference but that divine authority is the decisive factor, that the apostle is the one whom God calls as such... The divine category is the category, and here, also, quite appropriately, is the characteristic mark of it: the possibility of offense. Undoubtedly agenius can be an offense, esthetically, for a moment or 50 years or a 10 0, but he can never be an offense ethically; the offensive factor is that a man has divine a u t h o r i t y .
The application of this position regarding the art object
beyond Kierkegaard's authorship is as such- the actual is
not part of man's existence. The art object's potency,
its possibility, is in its communication of the idea of
the actual ideal, but its existence is always in
opposition to its existence as embodied communication. As
such, the art object acts to begin the movement towards
knowledge of the actual within existence while remaining
outside of the existence of the individual, moving
through indirect communication to transform the existence
of the receiving individual closer to actuality, within
the process of repetition and reduplication. After this
process has begun, the art object does not continue to
have importance for the individual within existence. The
object communicates, but its material immediacy is
immediately nullified by itself within the existence of
the receiving individual (though it may continue to exist
and impact on other individuals) . The absurdity of the
object establishes a requirement to a returning
reflectiveness in the individualities involved, and no
longer functions to facilitate such reflectiveness once
the embodied communication is fully appropriated. The art
object, once appropriated as the idea of the actual
ideal, then withdraws from the existence of the receiving
individual. The conclusion is that art's value is its
valuelessness.
4 96j-p, vol. 3, p. 365, <<3026; VIII^ B 15, n.d., 1847. Divine authority and revelation are beyond human understanding and conception, and the production of an art object, no matter how close to the actual truth of existence, remains inadequate.
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Appendix One- The Self in Fichte and Kierkegaard
Fichte states that his method is Kantian and, unlike 
many who called themselves Kantian, he believed that he 
was the only one to positively build upon Kant's system. 
The important element of Kant for Fichte is his method- 
Fichte stressed the deductive method as a means of 
demonstrating a certain concept deriving its conception 
and identity from an activity which designates it. Kant 
takes as his starting point our experience of spatial and 
temporal aspects of experience in causal connection- 
Fichte does not deny the value of this method, but he 
maintains that deduction must have its source in our 
immediate but nonsensible acquaintance with an absolute 
and infinite self, a process of deduction which arrives 
at the totality of the structure of experience.
This process has, as its goal, a definition of the 
self as absolute and unconditioned. In Fichte's 
understanding " a finite, rational being has nothing 
beyond experience" and, thus, a philosopher must raise 
himself above experience through his freedom of thought. 
This is strengthened when the philosopher, in Fichte's 
understanding, accepts idealism as the means to described 
actuality, in that with idealism concentrates on the 
self-in-itself which occurs as something real for the 
consciousness and not as a thing-in-itself as determined 
by itself. For Fichte, the highest concern for a 
philosopher should be himself. Within idealism, the
intellect, as but a part of the self, acts without 
grounding external to itself, without external 
determination. The intellect is act- Fichte stresses that 
it is not activity- and as such is determinative in its
own right such that the intellect as determinative acts
within law which are necessary to limit its own being.
The self is nothing but reversal into itself such 
that it is not necessarily present a priori to itself to 
make itself an object of its attention. The self emerges 
only as a matter of reflection, not as a conceiving and
497pichte, J. G,, The Science of Knowledge, p. 8
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not as consciousness but as an act leading to self- 
consciousness. This act is an act of self-consciousness 
which leads to consciousness and through it to the self 
as the original positer of the self.
This proposition of the existential of the self is 
only possible if the self, in positing itself, posits 
itself as absolute and valid. " It is a ground of 
explanation of all facts of empirical consciousness, that 
prior to all postulation in the self, the self itself is 
posited." 4^ 8 For Fichte, " that whose being or essence 
consists simply in the fact that it posits itself as 
existing, is the self as absolute subject. As it posits 
itself, so it is; and as it is, so it posits itself; and 
hence the self is absolute and necessary for the self. 
What does not exist for itself is not a self."
With the positing of the self, there is thus a 
positing of the not-self by the self, i.e. that which is 
opposed to the self is not-self. Though the not-self is 
posited by the self, it negates the self as the self 
negates the not-self, thus both positing and annulling 
the self. Both the self and the not-self are posited in 
and through the self as mutually limiting each other. The 
process of annulling is checked by the self which acts to 
check itself and through checking itself creates it own 
reality. This process of checking is one in which the 
self determines and limits itself imagination and 
activity as absolute and infinite through the finite, 
thus creating the finite conditional self and its 
counterpart, the objective world, which is the not-self. 
The self determines itself as determined by the not-self 
through absolute activity and thus, through activity, the 
self posits itself by determining itself through absolute 
activity which posits the not-self.
The self is positive, while the not-self is 
negative; in positing itself the self posits negative 
qualities to itself, thereby checking itself, producing a 
series of interdetermination. The grounding of the
498lbid., p. 96 
499lbid., p. 98
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interaction as interdetermination is absolutely grounded 
by the fact that it is posited by the self- this
interdetermination as activity grounds the not-self 
within the self as positing the not-self. The objective 
of the not-self is thus determined by a check on the 
subjective of the self whereby the self sets bounds for
itself- thus, the self moves beyond a requirement of a
not-self towards pure determination an the activity of 
the intellect. This activity becomes an interplay whereby 
the self posits itself both as infinite and absolute and 
finite and bounded by the not-self (which is a creation 
of the self). This interplay Fichte calls imagination, 
which reconciles contradictions. Thus, the not-self is 
but an imagined and reconciled aspect of the self's 
positing itself within itself as itself. Reality exists 
through this process, for Fichte, whereby the self 
imagines the object and thus intuits the object by
stabilising it, determining it, and producing it so as to 
understand it. " Understanding is a dormant, inactive 
power of the mind the mere receptacle of what imagination 
brings forth." o^o Thus, by limiting itself, the self, 
through imagination, posits the not-self and understands 
it as reality, thus positing and determining actuality.
Though there are a number of problems with Fichte's 
thought- the absolute, in checking itself, becomes no 
longer absolute; the transcendental method used by Fichte 
doe not adequately match his description of experience; 
and Fichte's dialectical method of thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis is inadequate to the process of thought 
that he is describing- nevertheless, Fichte does produce 
a form of thought that has certain value, embodying the 
Romantic. The central aspect of Fichte's thought sees the 
self as positing itself, as setting its own value for 
itself; the absolute posits the not-self and, through 
this positing, posits the self-conscious self. The 
absolute self is an active being, having two drives: the
practical and the theoretical. The practical drive seeks
p. 207
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to fill out infinity, to engage in an activity which does 
not have any finite end and to transform its surroundings 
into something similar to itself. The theoretical drive 
is one that forces the absolute self to reflect upon 
itself, limiting the infinite process of conditioning 
which the practical drive undertakes and thus limiting 
itself. The conflict which takes place between these two 
drives limits the self's activities to a contemplation of 
its self, positing both an external world to transform as 
well as to limit, and also positing a finite self through 
which to act in practical as well as theoretical terms 
governed by the activity of the imagination.
The self in Kierkegaard's philosophy, in contrast to 
Fichte's conception, is not a particular phenomenon, an 
imaginative construction, nor an imaginatively 
constructing phenomenon; it is, instead, a process of 
development which the individual undertakes. The self 
comes to a fuller realisation of itself through 
contemplation of itself as such. The self of the 
individual thus constitutes itself to some degree but, 
lacking a grounding for this self as such, continues to 
evolve towards a fuller understanding of the self's 
actual ontological dependence upon God for the grounding 
of its being in a process of reflection. The self is 
constructed of specific dialectical elements which grant 
the individual human being the ability to continue to 
ground the development of itself- the process of becoming 
an authentic self- and are a necessary part of that 
individual. Through these, the self becomes able to 
relate itself to itself and to its own formal structure. 
Therefore, because of this self-relational activity, the 
self constructs a form of communication with itself which 
informs its communication with other individualities. 
Thus, the formal structure of the self and its relation 
to itself structures the communication between it and 
other selves. In this sense, the self must be looked at 
as part of the formal structure of any aesthetic object.
Kierkegaard utilises a definition of the self as a 
concept to describe the individual throughout his
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writing, expressed most clearly in the opening lines of 1
SUD. The opening lines have provided much confusion, but 
are easily understandable if read within the context of 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the three stages.
Kierkegaard begins :
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit?Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self.In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus, under the qualification of the psychical the relation between the psychical and the physical is a relation. If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive third, and this is the self.Such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established itself or have been established by another.If the relation that relates itself to itself has been established by another, then therelation is indeed the third, but thisrelation, the third, is yet again a relation and relates itself to that which establishes the entire relation.The human self is such a derived, establishedrelation, a relation that relates itself toitself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another.501
This description of the self takes three stages: first,
the self is seen as a synthesis of opposing elements- the
infinite and the finite, temporal and the eternal, and
freedom and necessity- thus constituting the initial or f
esthetic stage of individual existence; second, the self
is seen as a relation between the two elements while at
the same time being a relation negatively to the relation
itself, i.e. a form of self-consciousness, thus
constituting the ethical existence of the individual;
501SUD, p. 13-14
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finally, the self develops such that it understands 
itself as dependent upon God as a positive third in a 
dialectical relation with its negative aspects. Through 
this progression the self comprehends itself such that it
becomes an authentic self- a vital process in
Kierkegaard's thinking.
The first stage defines for Kierkegaard what he 
means by a " human being" . A human being is not yet a 
self as such, but only has the capacity to become an 
authentic self in that it is a synthesis of both form as 
body and content as spirit. It is composed of the various 
elements- the infinite and the finite, temporal and the
eternal, and freedom and necessity- which are the source 
of conflict within the spirit of the human being. The 
conflict arises when the individual stresses either one
or the other aspect of the above pairs- either the 
infinite or the finite, etc.- to the point that he is 
overcome by anxiety and despair. What follows is a 
discussion of the these pairs.
The infinite/finite aspects of the individual are 
" the synthesis of which the finite is the limiting and
the infinite the extending constituent." soz -po stress the 
infinite capacity of the individual is to stress the 
constructive nature of the individual's imagination and 
capacities. The danger is that " the self becomes only 
more and more volatilized and finally comes to be a kind 
of abstract sentimentality." 503 This aspect of the
volatilization of the individual takes place on the level 
of feeling, knowing, or willing, such that the individual 
is no longer recognisable as itself, but has believed 
itself to be constituted infinitely, and thus finds
itself without grounding except within its own 
constructions. To stress the finite aspects of the
individual is to emphasise the grounding of reality in a 
mere prudential attitude towards life. To stress finitude 
is to stress reductionism and narrowness, to be concerned 
only with secularity and to " lack primitivity... to have
502ibid., p. 30 
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I
p. 320 I
emasculated oneself in a spiritual sense... [in] fear of 
men not to dare to be itself in its more essential 
contingency... in which a person is still himself for 
himself." ^04 The individual at this level of selfhood is 
either immersed in its own powers of imagination, thus 
rejecting reality, or so immersed in reality and its care 
within that it is has rejected its powers of imagination.
To stress either the eternal or the temporal is not 
directly handled in the text of SUD, but is found in a 
journal entry included in the publication as well as in 
CA. A correspondence exists between the eternal and the 
infinite, and the temporal the finite. The individual who 
stresses the eternal stresses his individuality as if it 
is immortal, capable of being dispersed throughout 
eternity, throughout different moments. By understanding 
the individual' individuality as such he constructs 
himself such that he is not bound within the present 
moment. The individual who stresses the temporal stresses 
the individual moment, such that he is unconcerned with 
the future but concerned only with present moment as it 
occurs for his individuality- " one may say [of such a] 
man that he lives only in the moment" sos. Neither aspects 
of the individual if they are stressed allow the 
individual to come to terms with the moment as an 
existentially-dialectically qualified aspect of being, 
allowing the individual to exist both within temporality 
and eternality simultaneously. As seen in Purity of Heart 
is to Will One Thing, the emphasis on one or the other is 
to be either unaware of the limitations of the individual 
as such or to have no knowledge of the eternal aspects of 
the individual as an immortal soul.^o^
To stress either freedom or necessity also 
corresponds between the infinite and the finite to a 
degree. In stressing possibility (as freedom, in an 
undeveloped manner), the individual finds no grounding 
not only for its imaginative activities, but also no
504ibid., p. 33 
505ca, p. 88
^^^Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, p. 35
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grounding for its activities as an individual. " The self 
runs away from itself in possibility, it has no necessity 
to which it is to return." Possibility becomes greater 
for the self such that reality for the individual no 
longer has any meaning but is understood only as 
possibility for the individual. The individual lacks 
actuality and has become unreal. To stress necessity, the 
individual removes itself from all possibility, and finds 
its future to be non-existent. " To lack possibility 
means either that everything has become necessary for a 
person or that everything has become trivial." The 
individual has removed the hope of possibility to become 
bound by determinism, a fatalist.
In SUD Kierkegaard analyses the effects of the 
above, when an individual emphasises either one or 
another aspects of his individuality. In Kierkegaard's 
understanding, the emphasis of one or another in the 
individual results in " the sickness unto death" , which 
is despair as a development from anxiety. This despair, 
which will be analysed in a later essay, directs the 
individual to investigate his own nature through 
reflection and, in the process, reveals the individual as 
determined only by these pairs to be groundless with 
regards to its own being.
What is clear is that Kierkegaard regards the 
emphasis that an individual at this point makes is 
something to be rejected in favour of reflection. This 
process of reflection leads the individual towards an 
understanding of his ontological grounding. Yet, these 
pairs which constitute the individual self at this level 
must still be understood to be a necessary aspect of the 
individual; by reflecting on itself, the individual self 
does not remove itself from these pairs as governing and 
defining aspects of its being. It is thus clear that the 
pair of the infinite/finite, temporal/eternal,and 
possibility/necessity are necessary and inherent aspects 
of the individual self such that they constitute the
507 SUD, p. 36
508lbid., p. 40
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initial grounding of the self as a human being. 
Concerning this, Adorno writes: " Kierkegaard's 'self
remains mythically-ambiguously between autonomy as the 
immanent production of meaning and a reflection that 
perceives itself in the semblance of ontology." Even 
if the individual self in Kierkegaard's eyes is required 
to remain wholly within the process of reflection towards 
ontological transcendence and revelation, the self still 
is dependent upon itself as human being, such that its 
reflection is a necessary aspect in that 'it relates 
itself to its relations within itself. It is this aspect 
which leads into the second part of the definition of the 
self.
The second stage of the self occurs as the 
individual comes to acquire reflection as an aspect of 
its individuality. It is at this point that the 
individual becomes a true self to a limited degree, 
understanding the relation of the psychical as spirit to 
the physical form of the individual being, and thus 
coming to an understanding of itself in reflection as a 
relation to the relations which define its initial being 
and thus as a third relation in a negative and defining 
relation to the relations of the previous groups of 
pairs. " The self is not a simple sum of the factors that 
compose its synthesis; its direction is not to be 
determined by mere analysis of the 'vectors' of its 
component aspects. Everything about the self is subject 
to an independent variable- namely, the stance which the 
self takes toward it." 5io The individual self becomes 
self-relating, from which arises self-consciousness.
Through anxiety and despair (to be examined in later 
essays) the self becomes volitional, capable of 
determining itself as it exists in relation not only to 
the pairs of determinants which were discussed as part of 
the first stage but also as external to these pairs as a 
relation to their own relations. It is difficult to
5®5;^dorno, T. Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, p. 81 
5^°Glenn, John D. " The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard's Work" in International Kierkegaard Cormentary: The Sickness 
Unto Death, p. 11
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separate Kierkegaard's conception of the self at this 
stage from despair as a dialectically defining concept- 
he describes the self to be fully governed by despair. At 
this point its development has occurred precisely
because, through despair, it has become self- 
consciousness. Therefore, it can either will to reject 
the aspect of itself in consciousness of its own despair 
and its relation to the eternal and its ontological
grounding and thereby will to be unaware of the lack of 
its grounding in this manner or it can will to declare 
the validity of itself as residing wholly within itself 
as an active self-consciousness and willing being, and 
thereby be made aware of the lack of its grounding in 
this manner. What is clear is that the self is to be
regarded as the unity of the diverse aspects of the self 
which appear in the first stage of its development as 
well as an individual self who contains the possibility 
to recognise that the grounding of its being is beyond
itself and ontologically dependent. The freedom which is 
the governing aspects of the self, in despair, to will to 
be either not itself or will to be itself at this stage 
forces the individual to understand that its conception 
of itself is correct if it is seen as being self-reliant. 
" The person is despair believes that he himself is the 
evidence, and that is what he wants to be, and therefore 
wants to be himself," but finds that it is only in 
undertaking an absolutely unconditioned affirmation of 
the self that the self enters into authentic selfhood, 
ultimately dependent upon a condition for the existence 
of its being.
In this third aspect of the individual self, the 
self comes to a relationship within itself such that it 
recognises both itself as being ontological dependent 
upon as well as that the relation which relates itself to 
itself and therefore to the diverse elements of the first 
aspect of the self relates itself to that which grounds 
itself, which is the positive third of God. This occurs
511SUD, p. 73
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when the individual self wills to be itself to the most 
authentic degree that it can, willing to be oneself in 
the fullest sense to take up an affirmative stance 
towards one's foundation such that " consciousness is 
decisive. Generally speaking, consciousness- that is, 
self-consciousness- is decisive with regard to the self. 
The more consciousness, the more self; the more 
consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more 
self." 512 The self becomes a new self in that it 
recognises the gradation of the self prior to the 
revelation of the ontological grounding, and thereby 
" this self takes on a new quality and qualification by 
being a self directly before God. The self is no longer 
the merely human self but is... the theological self, the 
self directly before God." 5i3
This grounding of the self takes on two aspects. 
First, the self comes to understand the ontological 
grounding of itself as being a transparent aspect of its 
being. This is a product of the development from the 
first stage of the self, when the self was unaware of the 
nature of the grounding of its being and could be 
described as being unaware while at the same time 
futilely searching for the answer in immediacy- the self 
now has come to terms with that which grounds its being, 
which is the ontological nature of its relationship with 
God. " In general, 'transparency' seems to mean this: the 
self's awareness of its ontological and ethical status 
(in particular its creaturehood and sinfulness) , both as 
part of the human race and as a specific individual, 
especially in its relation to God as Creator, Judge, and 
Redeemer." 5i4 second, the " power" on which the self is 
dependent upon is identified conclusively as God as 
Creator, Judge, and Redeemer. This identification is 
constructed from the concept of despair, in which 
Kierkegaard declares that the synthesis of the individual 
at the first stage of individuality as well as the
5^^Ibid., p . 29 
513 Ibid., p. 79
51^Glenn, John D. in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto 
Death, p. 13
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development of the individual through anxiety and despair 
could only come about through the possibility of 
redemption from the effects of despair and sin (which is 
only understood once the individual posits its possible 
relation with God and is thereby as a self a product of 
the development of anxiety and despair within the 
individuality). The individual recognises that it exists 
within a state of despair from which, on its own, it is 
unable to remove itself. Redemption from despair and sin 
is not self-granted, but must come from without. Thus, 
the self comes to a state in seeking redemption from sin 
whereby " in relating itself to itself and in willing to 
be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that 
established it." i^s is at this point that the self
comes to term with itself and its relationship to the 
necessary ontological grounding of its being through God 
and, for Kierkegaard, becomes an authentic self. The self 
thus becomes what Kierkegaard would define as a authentic 
self: " a derived, established relation, a relation that
relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself 
relates itself to another."
515SUD, p.l 31 
5l^Ibid. , p. 14
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Appendix Two- The Application of these Ideas
To fully apply the ideas contained within this 
thesis is an impossibility. The clearest reasons for this 
are two-fold. First, any Kierkegaardian description of 
the art object is proscriptive, i.e. it is an indication 
of how to produce art first and foremost. It is also, and 
dialectically, descriptive and opposed to any 
proscription. Because of this, an application would 
involve the creation of an art object within this thesis, 
something which is beyond its scope.
Second, and more importantly in my opinion, is the 
fact that this description is applicable within an art 
historical sense. While the primary aim of Kierkegaard's 
description of the art object would be to promote the 
authentic production of the art object, the primary aim 
of the Kierkegaardian description could be analysis. 
However, this is even more strewn with pitfalls than the 
proscriptive. This involves two levels of sustained 
thought.
First, the artist must be analysed in toto, not only 
the individual artist's objects produced throughout its 
lifetime in an holistic fashion, but also the artist's 
life. Furthermore, the artist must be examined as it 
relates its life to the idea of the actual ideal, i.e. 
whether or not it has successfully appropriated its 
ontological grounding. This is, of course, an 
impossibility, since the artist remains a subjective 
individual outside of the interpreting subjectivity, and 
its relation to the actual is beyond the knowledge of 
another individual within existence.
Second, since one is thereby making judgements about 
the individual artist's life and production, one then has 
to question the validity of one's judgements. Reception 
theory enters into the formula, and the receiving 
individual is, thereby, required to determine whether or 
not it has appropriated the production's communication in 
a manner which will lead to a fuller development of the 
knowledge, understanding, and appropriation of the
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individual's relation within existence to its ontological 
grounding of the idea of the actual ideal.
This is one of the most difficult problems to 
reconcile within the thesis. On the one hand, Kierkegaard 
does make mention of a number of examples of art objects 
throughout his writing. However, these are usually 
controversial and, in some cases, are written from a the 
point of view of a specific stage of existence. The 
discussion of Mozart in E/0 J is a good example, but 
Mozart is analysed from a purely esthetic viewpoint 
within a pseudonym, making it difficult to extract a 
distinct and encompassing understanding of the artist and 
his objects within the entire range of Kierkegaardian 
thought. On the other, I could mention and discuss 
artists who are either outside of the Kierkegaardian 
definition of the art object or within it. A number of 
artists can be understood within the range of this thesis 
or have been specifically influenced by the writing of 
Kierkegaard himself. Anselm Kiefer, Keith Haring, 
Picasso, Poussin, Rembrandt, Michelangelo (whose 
identification by both himself and Vasari as 'genius' 
would be most interesting), Walter Anderson, Christian 
Kobke, Fra Angelico, Dürer, Jackson Pollock, and many 
others (I have listed only visual artists, but others 
could also included) are candidates for being 
" acceptable" within a Kierkegaardian framework, and many 
of the Abstract Expressionists (notably Robert 
Motherwell5i7) are known to have read him. In light of the 
length of this thesis (and in light of its concluding 
length) , however, for the sake of brevity, I have 
excluded any lengthy references to specific artists of 
art objects. Merely to attempt a discussion within the 
entire range of this thesis, as would be required to 
remain faithful to the intent of Kierkegaard, is 
something beyond its scope.
believe that it would make an extremely interesting line of research to investigate the influence of Kierkegaard on artists, in particular those influenced by Walter Lowrie's translations during the 20thc.
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Yet, I would like to indicate some of the positive 
potential involved. At first glance, any application of 
this theory would necessarily involve an level of 
sustained thought which is almost unnecessary. I would 
agree. Not only is it an impossibility for the receiving 
subjectivity to make a judgement while at the same time 
as receiving the communication and appropriating it into 
its existence, but to make a judgement about the producer 
of that material form of the communication would involve 
the same process twice over. What my thesis does do, 
however, is allow a deeper understanding of the relations 
between the artist and the receiving individual and the 
production. This is still being judged on radical 
contingencies, but it has always been clear to me that 
the radicalness of the theory is part of its value.
Furthermore, the radicalness of the contingencies 
involved allow another lever of judgement, and perhaps 
this is where the Kierkegaardian description of the art 
object is best suited. It has been continually clear to 
myself that the only objects which could function within 
these strictures are those which are labelled " great 
art" . This may be a way of determining why some singular 
objects become the target of adulation, and others are 
confined to the back storage rooms of museums.
Finally, could these ideas be applied to specific 
art objects. Can the Kierkegaardian notion of dialectics 
inhabit certain images? Can the relation between the 
subject and the object be part of the mindset involved in 
the creation of an example of architecture? Could 
repetition be present, not only in the display of forms 
but in the Kierkegaardian sense, in the appropriation and 
continual engagement within the existence of the 
receiving individual, perhaps within a sculptural type? 
Could the artist be found to have a sustained life-view, 
and understand the impossibilities and possibilities 
involved in communicating with other individualities? 
And, finally, could the art object produced by the 
artist, within its sustained life-view, be understood by 
the creator to meet only certain needs for the existences
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of the viewers, but yet function in such a manner so as 
to lead them into fuller understanding of their 
ontological grounding? Certainly. Examples?
Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel. Or much of the work of 
Jackson Pollock. And the work of Walter Anderson, in the 
isolated context of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, in 
silence, would be even more fruitful. They meet certain 
requirements, and the radicalness of their work, the 
contingencies involved in the productions, are enough to 
make it certain that the reception of each example within 
the existences of individuals leads to a fuller awareness 
and understanding of the actual within existence itself. 
The idea of the actual ideal is present, generated in the 
viewers. When it is present and applied, then there is no 
more need to look. The implications of this thesis are to 
establish some sense of criterion about what is 'great' 
art.
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